

Leadership by Inspiration: An Episode of Marshal Ney during the Russian Retreat

By Wayne Hanley
West Chester University of Pennsylvania

How do we judge the quality of military leadership? This question is more difficult to answer than what one might expect. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach note in their introductory essay of *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* that “the study of leadership is laced with paradox. Individuals who possess all the important characteristics and qualities of effective leaders do not necessarily succeed, and if they do, their efforts often result in harm or tragedy to others. . . . An individual who is a successful leader in one situation may fail in other situations even though he or she employs the same capacity, skill and style.”¹ So much depends on circumstance and the proper mix of tactical and leadership skills, such as those described by General S.L.A. Marshall in his 2005 essay on military leadership. He observes six characteristics of a good leader: “Quiet resolution, the hardihood to take risks, the will to take full responsibility for decisions, the readiness to share its rewards with subordinates, an equal readiness to take the blame when things go adversely, and the nerve to survive storm and disappointment and to face toward each new day with the scoresheet wiped clean, neither dwelling on one’s successes nor accepting discouragement from one’s failures.” While these are not the only traits of a quality military leader, the general concludes that “in these things lie a great part of the essence of leadership, for they are the constituents of that kind of moral

courage that has enabled one man to draw many others to him in any age.”² Throughout Napoleon’s retreat from Russian in 1812 and especially during a celebrated four-day period in November as he fought his way from Smolensk to Orsha, Marshal Michel Ney certainly exhibited most (if not all) of these characteristics. Through a combination audacity, tactical judgment, and sheer force of will, Ney’ inspired leadership produced one of the most astonishing feats in military history by ensuring the near-miraculous survival of his isolated *corps d’armée* despite overwhelming odds.

Marshal Ney’s command of the rearguard began on 3 November 1812 when Napoleon ordered Ney and his III Corps to replace the exhausted Marshal Louis Davout and I Corps in that function with instructions “to move the army along as quickly as possible because we are not making good progress and are losing good weather.”³ For the next ten days and despite the worsening weather, Ney held at bay several much larger enemy forces in a series of running battles and well-timed counterattacks while pushing as many stragglers as possible toward

² General S.L.A. Marshall, “Leaders and Leadership,” in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005), 15.

³ Napoleon to Berthier, 3 November 1812, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l’empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1858-1869), No. 19316, XXIV, 344. See also Philippe-Paul de Ségur, *Napoleon’s Russian Campaign*, trans. by J. David Townsend, (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1965), 176.

¹ Taylor and Rosenbach, “Introduction to Leaders and Leadership,” 3.

Smolensk ahead of his corps.⁴ As Armand de Caulincourt recalled, "Ney conducted the rear-guard with a vigor worthy of his courage, and infused his own energy into all around him."⁵ When Ney finally marched into Smolensk on 14 November 1812, the emperor and the main body of the French army had already departed. Only Davout's corps and 3,000 Illyrian reinforcements remained.⁶ Instead of giving the Marshal a much needed rest (as had been promised), Napoleon instead ordered Ney to hold the city and its suburbs and to cover Davout's withdrawal on 16 November. On 17 November, III Corps was to follow after blowing up the city's fortifications and destroying whatever munitions were left behind. Meanwhile Marshal Davout and I Corps were to advance toward Krasnoi, to hold open the line of retreat, and to coordinate with Ney's rearguard action.⁷ Unfortunately, the relationship between the two marshals soured to the point of open arguments since Ney's assuming command of the rearguard. At Smolensk the bone of contention was the resupply and revictualling Ney had hoped for: there was none. Pillaging—much of it by the stragglers—had depleted what should have been a surplus, and Ney blamed Davout for failing to prevent it.⁸

⁴ Ségur recalled that the weather suddenly turned bad beginning on 6 November with wind and snow adding to the misery of the retreat (169-71).

⁵ Armand de Caulincourt, *With Napoleon in Russia* (New York: William Morrow, 1935), 199. Ségur vividly describes Ney's actions, noting that while he never ceased to be the general, at times Ney fought with musket in hand, leading by example when those around him began to lose heart (176).

⁶ M. de Fezensac, *Journal de la Campagne de Russie en 1812* (Paris: Librairie Galliot, 1850), 95. On 9 November, the emperor issued orders for the Guard to prepare to depart for Krasnoi; the balance of the army followed, corps after corps. See Napoleon to Berthier, 9 November 1812, *Correspondance*, No. 19329, XXIV, 355-56.

⁷ Claude-François Meneval, *Memoires Illustrating the History of Napoleon I*, 3 vols., ed. by Napoleon-Joseph de Meneval, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), 73; and Napoleon to Berthier, 14 November 1812, *Correspondance*, No. 19337, XXIV, 359.

⁸ Armand de Briquerville, "De Smolensk à Orcha, Relation de Briquerville" in *Lettres de 1812*, ed. Arthur Chuquet (Paris: Librairie Ancienne, 1911), 185-86; Georges

As planned, Davout resumed his westward march at noon on 16 November, leaving behind General Richard's division to reinforce III Corps.⁹ Meanwhile Ney deployed his troops to cover his fellow marshal's retreat and prepared for the inevitable Russian assault. Sending General Razout's 2nd division to the right bank of the Dnieper to defend the *faubourgs*, Ney positioned his Illyrian regiments at the St. Petersburg gates and his 4th regiment at the Moscow gates. In reserve on the left bank of the river near the bridgeheads, he held the balance of his troops, including General Ledru des Essarts's 1st division. Just as the Marshal had anticipated, the advance guard of the Russian army launched a vicious assault, but it was beaten back superbly by Colonel Raymond de Fesensac's 4th Regiment. All day and into the night, the Russians attacked the French positions. At one point in the fighting, Ney was forced to transfer his forces from the suburbs to the Vilna road in order to protect his western escape route.¹⁰

According to plan, III Corps began its withdrawal toward Orsha on 17 November. Ricard's division served as advanced guard, followed by Razout's division and with Ledru des Essarts's division serving as the ultimate rearguard. Hoping to catch Ney's corps in a vulnerable position, the Russians launched yet another attack against the Marshal's hard-pressed defense, but Ney's soldiers withstood the assault. To buy time for the rest of III Corps, Colonel Fezensac counterattacked the Russian onslaught. Recognizing his subordinate's bold move, Ney directed what remained of his artillery to support the 4th Regiment. Surprised by this unexpected blow, the Russians fell back, but Ney ordered his tired troops not to pursue.¹¹ By midnight the last of Ney's 6,000 men (and perhaps an equal number of unattached stragglers) left Smolensk. An hour later, according to plan, the ramparts exploded,

Chambray, *Histoire de l'Expédition de Russie*, vol. II (Paris: Chez Pillet Aîné, 1823), 223; and Caulincourt, 220.

⁹ Jean-Jacques Pelet, "Carnets sur la campagne de Russie" *Carnet et Journal sur la campagne de Russie: Extraits du Carnet de Sabretache, années 1901-1902-1906-1912* (Paris: Librairie Historique F. Teissèdre, 1997), 30.

¹⁰ Fezensac, 96-97.

¹¹ Fezensac, 97-98.

illuminating the sky and shaking the ground beneath the feet of the retiring Frenchmen.¹²

Except for stopping to drive off repeated Cossack attacks, Ney and the rearguard continued until they reached the village of Koritnya, resting there for the remainder of the night.¹³ What Ney did not know as III Corps resumed its march shortly before daybreak on 18 November was that Napoleon's original plans for the retreat had been abandoned. The army's passage through the defile at Krasnoi had proven nearly disastrous. Although the lead elements of the *Grande Armée* made their way to Orsha without incident, the rest of Napoleon's forces came under attack as Russian Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov concentrated his forces around Krasnoi between 15 November and 17 November. The situation deteriorated, prompting the emperor issued revised Ney's orders, moving up his departure from Smolensk by one day.¹⁴ Whether or not Ney received these new orders is open to debate—Cossack patrols frequently intercepted French communications and likely did on this occasion.¹⁵ The result was that Ney departed Smolensk according to the original plans.

¹² Général d'Hautpoul, "Quelques jours de la retraite opérée par le maréchal Ney du 16 au 22 novembre de Smolensk à Orza en 1812, écrits jour par jour par le général d'Hautpoul," Archives du maréchal Ney, 137 AP 18, Archives Nationales, Paris, France; Briqueville, 187; Pelet, 35; Vicomte de Pelleport, *Souvenirs Militaires et Intimes du Général Vicomte de Pelleport de 1793 à 1854* (Paris: Didier et Compagnie, 1857), 46-47; and Jean David Freytag, *Mémoires du J.D. Freytag*, vol. I (Paris: Nepveu, 1824), 167.

¹³ Briqueville, 187-88; Pelleport, 46.

¹⁴ Chambray, 192-94.

¹⁵ Chambray, for example, contends that Ney received the revised orders (224) while General Pierre Berthezène, who commanded three regiments of Young Guard during the Russian campaign, mentions that the orders were intercepted by the Russians—see Pierre Berthezène, *Souvenirs Militaires de la République et de l'Empire*, Vol. II (Paris: Librairie Militaire, 1955), 155. In his memoirs, Caulincourt first states that orders were sent, but later questions whether anything had gotten through (221 and 224-25). Interestingly, the *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* does not contain a copy of these revised orders, lending some credence to Ney's never receiving them. Such evidence has led David Chandler to conclude that Ney never received the new orders. See *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1966), 830.

Meanwhile the situation at Krasnoi reached crisis level on 16 November when the Russians succeeded in cutting off and nearly destroying Prince Eugene's IV Corps. With the corps of Davout and Ney yet to arrive, the emperor launched a surprise counter-attack with his imperial guard to re-open the passage.¹⁶ The French position, however, soon became untenable once Kutuzov had concentrated fully his forces at on 17 November. To prevent the destruction of the rest of French army Napoleon realized that he would have to abandon the rearguard and resumed his retreat.¹⁷ Ney was now on his own and his way barred by the enemy. Caulincourt described the situation and Ney's leadership abilities: "To overtake us by way of the Krasnoi road was regarded as an impossible task; but if anyone could do the impossible, Ney was the man. . . . What finer tribute could be paid to a soldier than this universal confidence that he would successfully carry out what most men would hardly dare even attempt."¹⁸

Thus instead of finding elements of Davout's corps in the early morning fog of 18 November as Ney had hoped, the Marshal found his path blocked by three corps of Russian infantry—80,000 men—and several strongly emplaced batteries. To make matters worse, the Russians occupied the heights flanking the defile through which Ney had to pass. Turning to his officers, Ney ordered the divisions of Ricard and of Razout to attack the Russian batteries, holding Ledru des Essarts's division to protect the route of retreat. With only 6,000 men, twelve cannon, and a single squadron of cavalry, the Bravest of the Brave was determined to fight his way through the enemy positions (Marshall's willingness to take risks). Taking advantage of the covering fog, Ney's men advanced up the slopes, only to emerge into a hailstorm of Russian fire. Row after row of Frenchmen fell, and still they advanced, to the awe of the Russians.¹⁹ Astonishingly, the two savaged divisions reached the enemy line at the crest of the

¹⁶ Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Précis Politique et Militaire des Campagnes de 1812 à 1814* (Geneva: Slatkine-Megariotis Reprints, 1975), 178-80.

¹⁷ Jomini, 181-82. See also Chambray, 210.

¹⁸ Caulincourt, 228 (-29).

¹⁹ Fezensac, 109; Pelleport, 47-48.

ridge and carried the batteries, but they proved too weak to hold their gains.

When the Russians recovered from the audacity of the French assault, they counterattacked with artillery, cavalry, and infantry, forcing the exhausted French to fall back to their original lines. The divisions of Ricard and Razout virtually ceased to exist. The 18th Regiment lost its eagle and 350 of its 600 men. Fezensac's 4th Regiment was reduced to 200 men. Of the 650 men of Colonel Jean-Jacques Pelet's 48th Regiment which began the assault, only 100 returned, including a severely wounded Pelet. Armand de Briqueville also noted in his account of the combat that the French soldiers fought with added ferocity for fear of capture.²⁰ Their bravery was not wasted as the remnants of the attack rallied around Ledru des Essarts's 1st division, stopped the Russian counter-attack, and held the enemy at bay.²¹ Throughout the day, Ney himself entered the fray when needed to rally his battered corps.²² His bravery and leadership by example inspired his soldiers to prodigies of valor. According to Baron de Marbot, "at the sound of Ney's voice, the French soldiers, worn out as they were with fatigue and want, and numbed by the cold, dashed forward. . . ." ²³ British General Robert Wilson, who witnessed the fighting as an observer with the Russian army, called it "a combat of giants . . . and relative to numbers one of the most slaughterous [sic.] of the campaign."²⁴

Realizing that he had cut off the outnumbered III Corps from the rest of Napoleon's army, Russian General Mikhail Miloradovitch sent an aide through

the French lines to offer Ney terms for surrender. As the Russian officer detailed the hopelessness of the French position, a Russian battery opened fire in the distance. An outraged Ney declared, "A marshal of France never surrenders. And we do not parley under fire. You are my prisoner"²⁵ (not so much Marshall's quiet resolution as just plain old resolution). The capture of the officer had the added bonus of depriving the Russians of a first-hand intelligence of the condition of Ney's shattered corps.²⁶ Sporadic fighting continued until nightfall when Miloradovitch broke off the engagement, confident that he would crush the stubborn French corps in the morning.

Ney, however, had other ideas. Withdrawing to the shelter of a small village near Krasnoi, he held a council of war with his officers to determine his next course of action. Some argued for returning to Smolensk, sending a message for help to Davout, and awaiting a relief column; but Ney rejected the plan because it involved too many uncertainties (or perhaps, as de Briqueville suggests, because of earlier altercation between the marshals).²⁷ Instead, Ney decided to withdraw toward Smolensk, then march around the Russian positions, cross the Dnieper, and rejoin the main army at Orsha (taking responsibility for one's decisions as asserted by Marshall).²⁸

As the opposing forces set up bivouacs for the night, Ney ordered his soldiers to light more fires than usual, giving the appearance that the French would spend the night. Then Ney quietly marched his entire corps back toward Smolensk and then left the road to make his way to the Dnieper. After several hours of marching, III Corps arrived at the village of Danikowa. A search immediately commenced to find a guide to the river, but to no avail. But as Colonel Fezensac noted: "Marshal

²⁰ Pelleport, 47-48; Pelet, 40-41 and Briqueville, 190. Jakob Walter, who was with the main body, expressed similar fears in his memoirs, noting that many who fell behind during the retreat committed suicide or were killed by their comrades to prevent their falling into Russian hands. Jakob Walter, *The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier*, ed. by Marc Raeff, (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 67-68.

²¹ Fezensac, 105-06; Pelleport, 48; and Briqueville, 189.

²² Briqueville, 190; and Chambray, 226.

²³ Baron de Marbot, *The Memoires of Baron de Marbot*, trans. by Arthur John Butler (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1893), 557.

²⁴ Robert Wilson, *Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte and the Retreat of the French Army* (London: John Murray, 1860), 279.

²⁵ Ségur, 227; and Pelleport, 49.

²⁶ Briqueville, 191; Fezensac, 108-09; and Wilson, 280.

²⁷ Briqueville, 190-92.

²⁸ There is some debate concerning the originator of this plan. In his journal of this part of the campaign, Colonel Jean-Jacques Pelet claims that the idea was all his and that Ney never gave him proper credit (Pelet, 44). Most other first-hand accounts, however, attribute the idea of crossing the Dnieper and circumventing Miloradovich's forces to Ney (Chambray, 227; Briqueville, 192; Pelleport, 49; Freytag, 170-71; and Fezensac, 111-12).

Ney's presence was sufficient to infuse confidence. Without presuming to divine what he would or could do,—we knew he would do something.”²⁹ It was then that Ney stumbled upon a small creek—which, he reasoned, had to flow into the Dnieper—and decided to follow it. His soldiers “closed around their marshal in whom alone they personified safety,” and entrusted him with their lives.³⁰ Marching a little farther, they arrived at the river, but were unable to cross because the ice was not yet solid enough. The Marshal decided to wait several hours to allow the sub-zero temperatures time to work. Unable to do more until then, an exhausted Ney, “forgetting the dangers of the past, and insensible to those of the future,” curled up in his cloak and went to sleep on the riverbank (displaying his “nerve to survive storm and disappointment”).³¹

By midnight, the river had frozen sufficiently to support Ney's soldiers and a few horses, and the crossing began. The ice, however, proved to be too weak to withstand the weight of III Corps's baggage and artillery; these precious items had to be abandoned and the cannon thrown into the river.³² Throughout the crossing, the Marshal made his presence felt everywhere, encouraging soldiers, helping the wounded, and even rescuing men who had fallen through the ice. Once across the Dnieper, Ney found shelter for his sick and wounded, then continued his march.³³ By the early morning of 19 November, III Corps discovered a Cossack outpost at Gusinoe. After a quick skirmish, Ney was master of the village and continued his march through a nearby forest. When Ney's corps emerged from their wooded cover, scouts discovered 20-25,000 Cossacks and sleigh-born artillery, commanded by General Matvei Platov. The morale of the French soldiers was devastated; some even began to talk of surrender. Had they escaped from Miloradovitch only to be captured by Platov? Ney would have none of this. As de Briquerville recalled it: “The marshal threw himself into their midst, spoke to them with fire, reassured them, reanimated their courage and soon inspired them with an energy so

ferocious that they took up their arms again.”³⁴ Ney restored their confidence by reminding his soldiers of their moral superiority over the Cossacks, urging them to fight to the last man if necessary (once again displaying his resolution and ability to overcome adversity). Once the Cossack artillery had been driven off, the French column resumed its march, and the rest of the day proceeded without incident.³⁵

On the following day, however, Ney's luck ran out. Platov returned to harass the isolated French corps from all sides. Each time the Cossacks charged, Ney and the rearguard formed defensive squares and repulsed the onslaughts with repeated musket volleys. As Pelet recalled: “Ney alone appeared calm in this sea of agitation.”³⁶ To gain a brief respite, III Corps retreated to a nearby stand of trees; and for the rest of the day, Ney continued his march, using available cover and the rough terrain to help neutralize the Cossack charges.³⁷ But even his soldiers had a breaking point. Caught in the open between two forested areas, Ney and his soldiers were set upon by a particularly vicious Russian attack. Immediately the Marshal had his men form a square to repel the assault, but as the enemy struck, Platov opened fire with his sleigh-borne artillery. The additional attack so shook the confidence of Ney's soldiers that they threw down their weapons and dropped to the ground, leaving the Bravest of the Brave to fend for himself. Always at his best in the most desperate of situations, Ney sarcastically reminded them of the unpleasantness of becoming a prisoner. Thus through the sheer force of his indomitable personality, the Marshal rallied his soldiers. Spurred on by its leader, III Corps redoubled its efforts, drove off the Cossack charges, and retreated to the protection of the trees. When the enemy likewise withdrew, Ney said of his men, “Ah, the brave men have regained the fighting spirit of Frenchmen!”³⁸

For the rest of the evening and the following morning, the Marshal evaded the Cossack horsemen by marching through the woods and following ravines. About midday of 20 November, Platov and

²⁹ Fezensac, 111.

³⁰ Meneval, 75; and Briquerville, 192.

³¹ Fezensac, 113; and Meneval, 75.

³² Briquerville, 192-93; and Pelet, 45.

³³ D'Hautpoul; and Pelleport, 50.

³⁴ Briquerville, 195.

³⁵ Marbot, 558; Briquerville, 193; and Fezensac, 114-15.

³⁶ Pelet, 47.

³⁷ Fezensac, 118; and Pelet, 48.

³⁸ D'Hautpoul. See also Pelleport, 51; and Wilson, 280-81.

his Cossacks rediscovered Ney and were determined to destroy his surviving corps of about 3,000 before it reached Orsha. Once again, Ney used what cover was available and advanced from woods to woods, fighting the Russians in between. As the enemy attacks grew worse, the Marshal ran out of forest. Refusing to admit defeat yet another time, Ney, with musket in hand, formed what remained of his command into two mutually supporting defensive squares and marched across the open field!³⁹ Such a drill was difficult in parade and almost impossible in combat, but Ney's men responded to their leader's call. Driving off the Cossacks, the formation marched until it reached the relative safety of a small hamlet seven leagues from Orsha. There, Ney set up a temporary defense, rested his weary soldiers, and waited to gather the stragglers.

When the night arrived and cloaked the Marshal's movements, he once again resumed the march to rejoin the main body. As he drew closer to Orsha, Ney sent two Polish scouts, the last of his cavalry, ahead to warn Napoleon of his approach.⁴⁰ Several hours later, Eugene's corps marched to the aid of III Corps; and Ney, exhausted, fell into Eugene's arms.⁴¹ Of the 6,000 men who had quitted Smolensk three days earlier, perhaps only 1,800 able-bodied men reached Orsha and the comparative safety of the *Grande Armée* (figures vary depending on the sources).

Once news of the Bravest of the Brave's miraculous reappearance spread through the French ranks, the morale of the entire army rose as if it had

won a great victory. The exploits of III Corps rekindled the army's fighting spirit and sparked new hope. When the Emperor learned of Ney's safety—the marshal whom he had been forced to abandon—his joy was obvious. “So I have saved my eagles!” he exclaimed, “I would have given three hundred millions from my treasury to ransom such a man!” Turning to an aide, the Emperor continued, “Better an army of deer commanded by a lion than an army of lions commanded by a deer.”⁴² Ultimately Napoleon would grant Ney the title Prince of the Moskowa (although this act was not made official until the beginning of 1813). Even Ney's enemies lauded his efforts. In recounting this phase of the French retreat, General Wilson wrote: “It is impossible to eulogize too highly the spirit, the energy, and the constancy exhibited by Ney through so many trials.”⁴³

While Marshal Ney was not necessarily the paragon of military commanders, he was far from the worst—as can be seen in the episode just described. His conduct of the rearguard also provides insights into the nature of military leadership during the Napoleonic era. As Taylor and Rosenbach noted in their recent volume, “leadership and heroism are not the same, but we have to learn about the latter in understanding the process of leadership.”⁴⁴ Indeed John Keegan devotes the first chapter of his classic *The Mask of Command* to the idea of “heroic leadership.”⁴⁵ Acts of heroism can inspire others to draw on the moral strength of a leader and follow him despite the apparent hopelessness of the situation as Marshal Ney demonstrated time and again during the retreat. He led by example, never asking more from his soldiers than he himself was willing to give. He trusted his instincts, seized the initiative, used what resources he had available to achieve his task, and refused to give up. But above

³⁹ Fezensac, 121-22; Briqueville, 197; and Wilson, 281.

⁴⁰ Briqueville, 199; and Pelet, 52. In a 20 November 1812 letter to his minister of foreign relations (Maret), Napoleon expressed his concern about Ney's situation: “I despair that I've yet to have any news of Marshal Ney.” Napoleon to Maret, 20 November 1812, *Correspondance*, No. 19343, XXIV, 362-63.

⁴¹ D'Hautpoul. See also “Ney à Berthier” in *Lettres de 1812*, ed. Arthur Chuquet (Paris: Librairie Ancienne, 1911), 206-07 in which Ney informs Berthier of his arrival at Orsha. Prior to Ney's junction with IV Corps, rumors that Ney had been cut off had begun to affect the morale of the *Grande Armée*, so much so that Napoleon issued orders to Marshal Berthier to assure the army that Ney had once again rejoined the army and had reached Orsha. Napoleon to Berthier, 21 November, *Correspondance*, No. 19345, XXIV, 363-64.

⁴² D'Hautpoul; Meneval, 77; Pelet, 53; and Caulincourt, 230.

⁴³ Wilson, 282.

⁴⁴ Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, “Introduction to Leaders and Leadership,” in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005), 3.

⁴⁵ John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988).

all, Ney understood that at times the leader's presence on the battlefield—his willingness to take risks, his grim determination, and his willingness to share in the hardships of his soldiers—could inspire his men to rise to the occasion and make the difference between success and defeat.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis called particular attention to these qualities in his essay "Leadership in a Combat Zone" in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005), 70-81.