



Napoleonic Scholarship

The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society

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J. David Markham
President

Wayne Hanley
Editor-in-Chief

Illustrations



Front Cover:

Pressed wood snuffbox showing member of Napoleon's St Helena entourage mourning at a stylized depiction of Napoleon's tomb. The caption is *RECOIS DE NOTRE AMOUR TRISTESEI ET DERNIER GAGES* (Receive from our love these sad and last pledges). The box has a silver band around it and features a hidden compartment on the bottom which reveals a military image of a standing Napoleon. 3.25 inches in diameter.



Papier mâché snuffbox with a painting showing the Apotheosis of Napoleon. Here Napoleon rises towards heaven and is welcomed by Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, while his supporters below grieve. On the bottom is a transfer print with an N topped by an Imperial Eagle and the word *Souvenir* (Remember). The inscription around the edge translates as 'Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar greeting the hero of the 19th century in Heaven.' The box is 3.5 inches (9 cm) in diameter and dates to ca 1825. It is in excellent condition and well represents the genre.

Mother of pearl cameo of Napoleon on one side and a stylized portrayal of his tomb on St Helena on the other, in a gilt mount. 4.3x5cm. Ca. 1821-25.



A very well carved Coquilla nut snuff box. On one face there is a cartouche with musical instruments, on the reverse the tomb of Napoleon with 'N' on the lid surmounted by a stand of arms and regimental colors and his famous hat lying on top. In the background a flowering lily and a weeping willow, symbols of mourning. 85x37x25mm.



Back Cover:

A detail of a drawing of Napoleon's gravesite on St. Helena. The caption, in French, reads 'The shadow of Napoleon visits his tomb.' Ca 1821-1840, 8.75x7 inches. The actual piece has a wider margin and a raised seal 'REYNOLDSS BRISTOLBOARD with a crown in the middle, which describes the paper used.



A drawing of Napoleon's tomb on St. Helena. Initialed by the artist and dated 1824. 4.25x4 Inches.



"Longwood House in Which Napoleon Died" by WMR(?), artist unknown. Ink and wash sketch. 9.5 x 6 inches. Presumed to have been done on St. Helena during the 1840's.

All pieces are from the David Markham Collection.

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THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL NAPOLEONIC SOCIETY

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
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Czech Republic	Mexico	Sweden
Egypt	Monaco	Switzerland
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Georgia	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Germany	Pakistan	United States

International Napoleonic Society Aims and Goals

- 
- The purpose of the International Napoleonic Society is to promote the study of the Napoleonic Era in accordance with proper academic standards. To this end, the goal of the International Napoleonic Society is to gather the leading minds in this field for the purpose of creating, reviewing, commenting upon, making awards to, and financially supporting Napoleonic Scholarship.
 - The International Napoleonic Society will sponsor periodic International Napoleonic Congresses to give scholars and students the opportunity to meet and share the results of their research and studies. These Congresses will be held throughout the world. To date, Congresses have been held in Italy, Israel, Georgia, France, Poland, Canada, Malta, The Netherlands, Russia, Cuba, Belgium, Ireland and Austria and have attracted some of the world's foremost Napoleonic Scholars. We may also sponsor and support smaller meetings and/or joint meetings with other scholarly organizations.
 - The International Napoleonic Society will encourage the publication of work of academic merit. To this end we will provide the opportunity for scholarly articles to be published in our journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship*, as well as on our website. We may also support the publication of works of academic merit, as well as the reprinting of important material no longer easily available.
 - It is important that original documents, as well as material available only in languages not commonly read by western scholars, be made available to Napoleonic Scholars. We will therefore encourage and support the translation and/or publication of such materials, including in our journal and on our website.
 - The INS may sponsor lectures, tours, the granting of scholarships, the production of exhibitions and other displays, and other academic and/or cultural activities as deemed appropriate.

Message from the President



I am pleased to send you the 10th issue of our academic journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship*. In it we feature articles that were submitted by scholars as well as some that were presented at the INS Congress in Grenoble, France, in July of 2019. That Congress was one of the best, thanks in very large part to the hard work of Romain Buclon.

As always, I want to thank our Editor-in-Chief, Wayne Hanley, and our Production Editor, Edna Markham, for their outstanding work in producing this journal. Thanks to their efforts, and the outstanding articles that were submitted, we can all be proud of this issue of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.

As we all know, this past year has been very challenging for the INS and, indeed, the world. Because of the world-wide pandemic we had to cancel our planned 2020 Congress in Warsaw, Poland. And it appears quite likely that we will have to cancel the planned 2021 Congress in Athens, Greece. As a result, we will not have papers from those Congresses to present in the Journal. So instead of this being the 2019 Journal it is the 2019-2020 Journal. For those who have papers they had planned to present, I strongly encourage you to submit them now for publication in the next issue.

This has also been a difficult financial time for the INS, as the Weider family, for reasons known only to them, have eliminated their annual subsidy called for in Ben Weider's will. As a result, we have had to charge for some features of our Congresses and in the future will have to charge a registration fee that will cover both Congress and normal administrative expenses. This will be difficult to do. Therefore, I want to encourage anyone who wants the INS to continue to exist and has the financial ability, to step up and make a significant financial contribution to the INS.

I am very pleased to tell you that we still hope to have INS Congresses in Cork, Ireland in 2022, Acre, Israel in 2023 and Eisenstadt, Austria, in 2024. If anyone would like to help organize a future Congress in their city, please let me know. We do have some tentative possibility to hold one in Regensburg, Germany, perhaps in 2025.

Finally, with this issue we commemorate the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's death on St. Helena. The pandemic prevented the possibility of getting timely papers on the subject, but we pay honor to the Emperor with the images on our front and back covers. *Vive l'Empereur!*

With my very best Napoleonic regards,

J. David Markham, President
Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques

Message from the Editor-in-Chief.



I am pleased to present the 2019 edition *Napoleonic Scholarship* and its wide-ranging articles on the Napoleonic era (with topics ranging from traditional military history to the decorative arts to diplomacy and more).

The first article is David Markham's keynote presentation for the 2019 Napoleonic Congress and appropriately traces Napoleon's return from Elba and his march to Grenoble (the host city of that Congress).

The next three articles explore aspects of the decorative arts. Susan Jaques explores the Musée Napoléon and the restitution of captured art following the fall of Napoleon. Next Marian Hochel explores the fate of Napoleon's carriage following the Battle of Waterloo and how it became the possession of Field Marshal Blücher and his descendants. And Nataliya Tanshina describes the perhaps unusual source of the porphyry used to make Napoleon's tomb.

With the next several essays, we explore different aspect of diplomacy during the Napoleonic era. Paul van Lunteren analyzes the challenges facing Austria's transition from French ally to opponent. Gilles Bertrand highlights the activities of a diplomat from a minor Italian state during the Congress of Vienna. And Peter Hicks traces the activities Baron von Stürmer during Napoleon's final exile on St. Helena.

The next group of essays are more eclectic, touching on a variety of topics. Doina Harsanyi continues her intriguing series of articles on the French administration of Italy. Tatiana Kosykh analyzes the French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula through the lens of the British press. Meanwhile John Gill traces the activities of Hessian–Darmstadt forces during the ill-fated campaign of 1813. And Agnieszka Fulińska examines the fate of Napoleon's son before and during the Hundred Days.

We conclude this issue with not one, but two photo-essays. In the first, Xavier Riaud highlights the advancements in medical science (and the men who made it possible) that occurred in Napoleonic France. Liudmila Sakharova traces the strange fate of various Napoleonic artifacts associated with his abdication. Finally, I submit my paper on Marshal Ney during the Hundred Days that I presented to the INS congress in Grenoble.

I hope that you will find these articles as enjoyable and informative as I have.

Please note that in addition to article submissions, we would like to include more book reviews in the future, so if you come across a noteworthy new or recent book on a Napoleonic era topic, please consider writing a review (3-5 pages in length).

Wayne Stanley, Editor-in-Chief

List of Contributors

J. David Markham is president of the International Napoleonic Society and president emeritus of the Napoleonic Historical Society. A retired educator and popular historian who specializes in Napoleonic history, he has appeared on the History Channel, the Discovery Channel and the Learning Channel (as an expert on both Napoleon and Julius Caesar). This paper is the keynote address delivered at the recent Congress of the International Napoleonic Society held in Grenoble, France.

Susan Jaques is the author of *The Caesar of Paris* (forthcoming in 2020) and *The Empress of Art* (2017). She graduated from Stanford University with a major in History and earned an MBA from the University of California, Los Angeles. A member of the Napoleonic Historical Society and Historians of Eighteenth-Century Art & Architecture, Susan is a gallery docent at the J. Paul Getty Museum.

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Nataliya Tanshina is a professor at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow.

Paul van Lunteren was born and raised in Arnhem, the Netherlands. In 2008, at age 18, he won a prize from the Arnhem Historical Society for his paper about the liberation of Arnhem by the Prussians in 1813. Later that year, he went on to study history at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, where he graduated (MA) in political history. In 2013 he co-published his first book about the French occupation of Arnhem: *Arnhem 1813. Bezetting en Bestorming* (translation: Occupation and storming). Besides a MA-degree in history, Van Lunteren also holds a BA-degree in theology of the Protestant Theological University of Amsterdam and follows now a master theology in Nijmegen. Since 2013, Van Lunteren had

published several books and articles, mostly on regional history of Arnhem and Ede. In the latter place, he works at the Municipal Archives of Ede.

Gilles Bertrand is a professor of modern history at the University of Grenoble and a member of the Institut Universitaire de France. He is also the author, co-author or editor of nearly a dozen works on the celebrations and masks in Venice in the Eighteenth Century, on the history of the Italy of the Enlightenment and on the French Revolution.

Peter Hicks is the manager of international affairs at the *Fondation Napoléon* and serves as the editor of the English-language version of *napoleon.org*, the editorial secretary and a member of the editorial board of *Napoleonica: La Revue*. In 2006, Hicks was appointed an honorary fellow at the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution (Florida State University), became a visiting professor at the University of Bath in 2007, and has served on the editorial board of *St Andrews Studies in French History and Culture* since 2011.

Doina Pasca Harsanyi received her Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2001 and is a professor at Central Michigan University. Her BA is from the University of Timisoara, Romania, in French Language and Literature. Her research interests include topics in French revolutionary and Napoleonic history, French-American relations, the movement of ideas across the Atlantic during the Enlightenment and the modern era, and the history of the nobility throughout the revolutionary era. Her current research project explores different aspects of Italy under Napoleonic occupation.

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Agnieszka Fulińska is an archaeologist, specializing in ancient Greece and Rome, works at the Institute of History at Jagiellonian University. Dr. Fulińska earned her PhD in Modern Literatures (specializing in classical reception studies) and in Classical Art (specializing in the public image of power). She is the author of *Imitation and Creativity* (Wrocław 2000) and *New Alexander. Iconography and Legend of Mithridates VI Eupator* (Kraków 2016) as well as numerous papers on classical reception and Hellenistic iconography. Since 2013 her research interests have been focused mostly on classical reception in the Napoleonic propaganda and legend, resulting in a number of papers on medallion production, propaganda and rhetoric of the period. At present she prepares monographs on the 19th and early 20th century legend of

Napoleon's son, the Aiglon, and on classical models in military commemoration from the wars of the French Republic to the Franco-Prussian war.

Xavier Riaud, a practicing dentist, holds a doctorate in the History of Sciences and Technology. He is a laureate and full member of the National Academy of Dental Surgery, a member of the National Academy of Surgery and author of *Napoléon and his Physicians* (2012).

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Wayne Hanley is a professor of history at West Chester University (Pennsylvania) and holds a doctorate in modern European history from the University of Missouri-Columbia with a specialty in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Winner of the American Historical Association's 2000 Gutenberg-e Prize, he is author of *The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796-1799* and of numerous articles on historical and literary topics. He is also the editor of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.

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“The Die is Now Cast:” The Route Napoleon

by J. David Markham, FINS

In a life and career laced with momentous events, in a legend unmatched in history, the “One Hundred Days” of Napoleon’s return to power in March 1815 stands out as the ultimate gamble in history. Blasted as an egocentric effort to regain lost imperial glory and praised as a last try to restore the values of the French Revolution, the Hundred Days was nothing less than a throw of the dice with the judgment of history at stake. Napoleon himself recognized this fact. As he stepped onto the *Inconstant*, he exclaimed to those around him “The die is now cast.”¹ He was quoting Caesar, of course, on *his* “return” to power. Perhaps the Mediterranean was Napoleon’s Rubicon! Napoleon rolled the dice, and seldom have the dice been so fickle. After teetering on the edge of victory, the dice finally came up craps and the final result of the effort was a remote exile and another exciting chapter in the legend of Napoleon. The preparations for and the actual trip made by Napoleon from Golf Juan to Paris give a fascinating view of the Emperor’s methods. This paper will review some of the reasons for Napoleon’s gamble, and then concentrate on the actual trip itself; a trip that will reveal much

about the motivations and political abilities of the once and future emperor.

In the campaign of 1813-1814, Napoleon failed to either defeat his enemies or accept early offers to retain his throne. He placed his last hopes in a desperate defense of Paris, hoping to sandwich the Allies between Paris’s defenders and his own forces. As he later told Montholon “... they [the Allies] would never have given battle on the left bank of the Seine with Paris in their rear.”² The good citizens of Paris, however, were not interested in making additional sacrifices. After Marie Louise and the King of Rome were sent to safety, the Parisians busied themselves with their own version of a defense: “Instead of volunteering to build redoubts, they moved any valuable furniture to the country. Instead of chipping in with money, they buried their napoleons in their gardens.”³ The sadness that Napoleon must have felt is surely reflected in the Sixteenth Bulletin of 5 April 1814 which reads in part: “The occupation of the capital by the enemy is a misfortune which deeply afflicts the heart

¹ Archibald Alison, *History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution in M.DCCC.X.V to the Restoration of the Bourbons in M.DCC.XV* (Edinburgh and London, 1843), X: 804.

² Charles Jean Tristan de Montholon, *Memoirs of the History of France During the Reign of*

Napoleon, Dictated by the Emperor at Saint Helena to the Generals Who Shared His Captivity; and Published from the Original Manuscripts Corrected by Himself (London, 1823), II: 265.


³ Vincent Cronin, *Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography* (New York, 1972), 361

of his Majesty, from which, however, there is nothing to apprehend.”⁴

If there was any hope of a military victory for Napoleon, it was dashed with the defection of Marshal Marmont’s Sixth Corps, the unwillingness of the Marshals to continue to rally the troops, and the political efforts made by Talleyrand and other members of the Provisional

Government. Napoleon abdicated unconditionally on 11 April 1814, with the words “... there is no sacrifice, not even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interests of France.”⁵

Napoleon’s loss of the support of the French people is summed up by his secretary Fleury de Chaboulon who wrote:



⁴ Posted at Rennes on the 5th April, 1814. Found in *Original Journals of the Eighteen Campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte; Comprising All Those In Which He Personally Commanded In Chief; Translated From The French. To Which Are Added All The Bulletins Relating To Each Campaign, Now First Published Complete.* London, 1817), II: 431.

⁵ Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* (Paris, 1869), 27, No. 21558. Translation found in John Fain, *The Manuscript of 1814. A History of Events which led to the Abdication of Napoleon.* Written at the Command of the Emperor (London, 1823), 250-51.

All the while, Napoleon kept an eye on events in Vienna, where the Congress of Vienna attempted to divide up Europe to every one's satisfaction. He also began to hear rumors of assassination attempts, or of attempts to move him to St. Helena or to a prison island. Further, Louis XVIII never paid him his pension, or any of his family their treaty-provided money, and there was some fear of running out of money. Napoleon had three options. He considered making a run for the United States. He considered taking his small army to Italy where he was popular and had his brother-in-law, King Murat of Naples, to help. And his wife, Marie-Louise, controlled the Duchy of Parma. Finally, there was the possibility of a return to France.

Napoleon soon began to believe that the people of France were anxious for his return. With Louis XVIII came hordes of noble émigrés, all of whom were eager to reclaim their titles and privileges and return France to its pre-revolutionary condition. The new king actually tried to reassure the people of France, and civil liberties were somewhat restored from their war-status restrictions. The Constitutional

personal safety. For a good discussion on this, see Henry Houssaye, *The Return of Napoleon* (London,

Charter was designed to convince the people that there would be no return to the pre-revolutionary days, but the actions of the aristocracy around the king told another story. French peasants were fearful that their land would be given back to the émigrés and that the system of privilege would return. Very quickly Napoleon became the hero of the Revolution. Moreover, some units of the *grande armée* were disbanded, but the soldiers did not assimilate well back into society.


France's economy had little room for them, and they were disgruntled at the loss of glory their defeat had brought.

Things came to a head when on 15 February Napoleon was visited by Fleury de Chamboulon. He relayed the opinion of

Hugh Maret, Napoleon's former Foreign

Minister, that the people were "clamouring for Napoleon's return."¹¹

This visit may have been just what it took to convince Napoleon that conditions were right. Napoleon himself had forecast the likelihood of, and the reason for, his return. On St. Helena he told Las Cases that he had anticipated this upon his departure from Fontainebleau. He explained that "if the Bourbons, said I, intend to commence a



1934), 11-13.

¹¹ Cronin, 385-86.

fifth dynasty, I have nothing more to do here; I have acted my part. But if they should obstinately attempt to recontinue the third, I shall soon appear again....”¹²

Only his closest associates were told of his plans. Bertrand was pleased with the opportunity to return to France. Drouot, on the other hand, took the entirely sensible point of view that challenging the military might of France and of the Allies with some 1,100 troops involved a certain amount of risk!¹³ Napoleon’s mother gave him encouragement with the words “Go my son, go and fulfill your destiny.... I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here.”¹⁴ This reminds one of Alexander the Great’s father Philip who told his son “Look thee out a kingdom equal to and worthy of thyself, for Macedonia is too little for thee.”¹⁵

On Sunday, 25 February 1815, Napoleon set sail for France on the *Inconstant*, accompanied by the *Saint Esprit* and the *Caroline*.¹⁶ Together, these ships carried

some 1,100 men, 40 horses, and 4 cannon. In a bulletin to his soldiers still in France, prepared prior to his departure, Napoleon was at his most eloquent:

Soldiers! In my exile I heard your voice. . . Your general, called to the throne by the voice of the people and raised on your shields, is restored to you; come and join him....

We must forget that we have been masters of other nations; but we must not suffer any to interfere in our affairs....

Victory will march forward with the charge step: the eagle, with the national colours, will fly from steeple to steeple till it reaches the towers of Notre Dame!¹⁷

A similar bulletin “To the French People” reminded them that they had been defeated due to the defection of Marshal Augereau in Lyons and Marshal Marmont in Paris, thus snatching a defeat from a sure victory!¹⁸

¹² Marie Joseph Emmanuel Auguste Dieudonné de Las Cases, *Mémorial De Sainte Hélène. Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of The Emperor Napoleon at Saint Helena* (Boston, 1823), II: 30-31.

¹³ Thiers, Adolphe, *History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon*, trans. by D. Forbes Campbell and H. W. Herbert (Philadelphia, 1893), V: 423-24.

¹⁴ Thiers, 423.

¹⁵ Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans* (The Dryden translation), edited and revised by Arthur Hugh Clough (New York, 1992), II: 143.

¹⁶ He left a letter for General Lapi in which he informed the general of his departure and indicated his satisfaction with the residents of Elba and entrusted the care of his Mother and sister to them.

See *A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon, with Explanatory Notes. Compiled by Captain The Honorable D. A. Bingham* (London, 1884), III: 361.

¹⁷ *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21682. For a complete translation, see Fleury, I: 173-77. Slightly different translations can be found elsewhere, especially *Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon*, and Barry O’Meara’s *Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815*. (Philadelphia, 1820), 227-30. Additionally, a reduced size photograph of this bulletin (*A L’Armée*) and the bulletin to the people (*Au Peuple Français*) can be found in René Raymond’s *La Route Napoléon de L’Ile d’ Elbe aux Tuileries, 1815* (Lyon, 1985), 22-23.

¹⁸ *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21681. Translation found in Fleury, I: 177-80; and O’Meara 224-27.

Finally, he prepared a bulletin for the soldiers he was most likely to face upon landing and marching toward Paris, which read in part “Soldiers, the drum beats the general, and we march: run to arms, come and join us, join your Emperor, and our eagles....”¹⁹

These bulletins show Napoleon’s clever understanding of what must be done if he were to have any hope of success. He has three audiences in these messages. The first, clearly, is the army. He could not succeed if he encountered any real resistance. Indeed, he predicted the necessity and the result: “I shall arrive in Paris without firing a shot.”²⁰

Therefore, he appeals to the army to join him in overthrowing the treachery of others and restoring their glory. He pulls out all the stops, with references to the treachery, the glory of his soldiers, and his “willingness” to respond to their “calls” that he return. These bulletins were “Sometimes terse, sometimes emphatic,



always dazzling ... will inflame the heads and the hearts.”²¹

The second audience was the people of France, and to them the message was pretty much the same. He understood, however, that the people would not be interested in new military adventures; they had had enough conquest and empire. With any luck, they might be willing to support him in a new role of a constitutional emperor. Thus, his appeals to glory and

calls for revenge were tempered with a recognition that times had changed, and control over other nations was no longer on the agenda. This latter point was especially important for his third audience, which was the Congress of Vienna.

While it may be true that Napoleon misjudged their readiness to rally against him, he certainly understood that they would at least need some sort of reassurance that he no longer harbored a desire to engage in imperial conquests. Thus, while he would contact them directly later, these bulletins deliberately stress his domestic goals, and specifically renounce a return to

See also the photograph in Reymond .

¹⁹ *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21683. Translation in Fleury, I: 181-82; and O’Meara, 231-33.

²⁰ Henry Houssaye, *The Return of Napoleon*

(London, 1934), 45.

²¹ Reymond, 22. “*Tantôt lapidaire, tantôt emphatique, toujours éblouissant . . . enflammera les têtes et les coeurs*” (my translation).

the earlier empire. *We must forget that we have been the masters of other nations.*

There is some discussion in the literature as to when these bulletins were prepared. The evidence strongly suggests, Stendhal's romantic descriptions notwithstanding,²² that Napoleon had prepared at least some of the bulletins prior to his departure and had numerous copies printed.²³ Napoleon, the master of planning, would hardly have undertaken such an enterprise without adequate preparation. The political need for such communications could not have rested on the off chance of finding adequate printing facilities upon landing.²⁴

At 4:00 PM, on 1 March 1815, the Eagle landed at Golf Juan. The majority of the soldiers had preceded the Emperor. With great fanfare, the Emperor landed once again on French soil. The image was great, but the reality was daunting, made even more the case by a crisis earlier in the day. Captain Lamouret foolishly took a few men and demanded the surrender of Antibes. Instead, he was arrested, and his twenty grenadiers taken prisoner. Rather than make a fight of it, Napoleon decided to ignore their plight, feeling that the first shot fired would break the spell of his arrival and lead to disaster. Indeed, he told Cambronne "You are not to fire a single shot. Remember that I wish to win back my

crown without shedding one drop of blood."²⁵

There is a common misconception that when Napoleon returned from Elba all of France rallied to his cause. This was decidedly not the case, a fact that not only complicated things before Waterloo but also made things rather more dicey than is often imagined after that battle. Napoleon chose to take the mountain road to Grenoble rather than pass close to the large garrisons at Toulon and Marseilles. This was sound military policy, but he also remembered the frightening reception he had received traveling through Provence on his way to Elba. This was a Royalist stronghold, and his dice could come up craps in a hurry if he risked this more direct route to Paris.²⁶ This meant leaving his cannon, carriage, and 16 supply wagons behind, and having to walk on narrow mountain roads, often single file. Even today, the road is narrow and travel by car is painfully slow. At Grasse, he met with a mixed reception, as most were unwilling to gamble on either the Bourbon king or the returning Emperor. Along the way Napoleon saw crowds that were more curious than supportive, with more than one person questioning whether or not Napoleon's return was a good thing. As Stendhal wrote, "The people allowed them to pass without giving the least sign of

²² Marie Henri Beyle [Stendhal], *A Life of Napoleon*, trans. by Roland Gant (London, 1956), 171.

²³ Paul Gruyer, *Napoleon, King of Elba* (Philadelphia, 1906), 226 (footnote).

²⁴ Houssaye, 47.

²⁵ Houssaye, 49.

²⁶ See Houssaye, 49; Cronin 389; and Alan Schom, *One Hundred Days: Napoleon's Road to Waterloo* (New York, 1992), 19.

approval or of disapproval.”²⁷ This attitude would prevail until Laffrey and Grenoble. It was a very mountainous trip, climbing to 2,500 feet, descending into a valley, climbing again to 3,000 feet, all in the first day. They actually made incredible time. At some points, soldiers had to scramble along ravines covered with ice, with Napoleon following breathlessly. No one could ride, and one mule fell off a cliff with 2,000 gold Napoleons.²⁸

All along the route, Napoleon talked with peasants, soldiers, and townspeople. Many of them were surprised to see their

Emperor, marching on foot, through the snow. While some were less than excited, others attempted to encourage Napoleon. Others simply offered him their hospitality. For example, at Escragnolles Napoleon on 2 March met with the abbé Chiris, the parish priest, who offered him two eggs.²⁹ Along the way he also greeted the Prince of Monaco, and remarked that they were both going home! At Castellane (3 March), the villagers had not heard of his pending arrival, but provided food and drink for Napoleon and his men. Napoleon sent messages to Bonapartists in Grenoble, as it was critical that he capture that city



²⁷ Beyle, 172.

²⁸ Houssaye, 57.

²⁹ Jean Tulard and Louis Garros, *Itinéraire de*

Napoléon au jour le jour 1769-1821 (Paris, 1992), 462. This unique book details Napoleon's daily activities throughout his career.

without difficulty. He also sent messages to Marshal Massena asking for his support. These actions were very important. While on the one hand, Napoleon wanted to march in advance of the news of his approach, on the other hand he clearly needed to have the way prepared. This was especially true as regarded supplies for his soldiers. He had Cambonne sent ahead for rations of food, transportation, and passports.³⁰

By now, the roads were much better, and Napoleon had his troops in fine marching order. As a fighting force they were still modest, but the emotional appeal was enormous. At Bras d'Or Napoleon chatted with two officials. They told him that the people would be pleased to see him on the throne, provided that conscription was not renewed. Napoleon answered that "A great many foolish things have been done, but I have come to put everything right. My people will be happy."³¹ Soon crowds of peasants were standing by the road side, cheering. Those who couldn't recognize Napoleon would pull out five franc pieces to compare that image with the man in the gray coat marching by them.

Until Gap, it had been easy for Napoleon, as he had met no serious resistance. He knew that that would not last, however, and that eventually he would face regular

troops. This ultimate test of his chances for success came at Laffrey, where General Jean-Gabriel Marchand, the commanding officer at Grenoble, had sent Major de Lessart and a battalion of the 5th Regiment to put an end to Napoleon's adventure. Napoleon's Polish Lancers actually were able to engage in discussion with members of the 5th Regiment, and the general feeling was that there was little fear that they would take hostile action against Napoleon.³² De Lessart, however, insisted that he would do his duty, and this set the scene for an emotional confrontation. As Napoleon approached, Captain Randon ordered the soldiers of the fifth to open fire. Nothing happened. Then Napoleon spoke to the soldiers. Accounts differ as to his exact words, but the words of the local commemorative plaque will suffice: "Soldiers! I am your Emperor. Do you not recognize me? If there is one among you who would kill his general, here I am!"³³ Shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" were his answer, and the confrontation was over. It was to be a good day for Napoleon, as later Colonel Charles de Labédoyère surrendered the seventh regiment of the line, with its 1,800 men.³⁴

The next challenge was Grenoble. The commanding officer refused to open the gates, but the people and soldiers, shouting "Vive l'Empereur," tore them down and

³⁰ Houssaye, 57.

³¹ Houssaye, 63. See also his proclamation to the Hautes and Basse Alpes "... the cause of the Nation will triumph again!" *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21684.

³² Thiers, V: 432-33.

³³ The plaque reads "SOLDATS. Je suis votre Empereur. Ne me reconnaissez-vous pas? S'il en est un parmi vous qui veuille tuer son général, ME VOILÁ!!! 7 Mars 1815. (translation mine)

³⁴Cronin, 392, and Fleury, I: 193-94.

escorted Napoleon to the Hôtel des Trois Dauphins. The pieces of the gate were placed under his window, with shouts of "For want of the keys of the good town of Grenoble, here are the gates for you."³⁵ The dice were really rolling well by the "conquest" of Grenoble. By now he had some 4,000 seasoned infantry, 20 cannon, a regiment of hussars, and more men arriving all the time. More importantly, the citizens seemed to be warming to his return; indeed, in some areas a revolutionary fervor had arisen that had not been seen since the days of France's great revolution. Thus it is no surprise that he recalled "From Cannes to Grenoble I had been an adventurer; in this last town I became a sovereign once again."³⁶

While in Grenoble, Napoleon engaged in some first class politicking. He met with various public officials, and made it clear that he no longer wanted to expand an empire. He recognized past faults, and swore to be a constitutional monarch. "I have been too fond of war; I will make war no more: I will leave my neighbors at rest: we must forget that we have been masters of the world.... I wish to be less its [France's] sovereign than the first and best of its citizens."³⁷ He told the people that he was there to relieve them of the oppressive policies of the Bourbons, and especially of the emigrants. He presented himself as the spirit of 1789 returned to do battle with the

spirit of feudalism. He even allowed that the Bourbons were well meaning, but surrounded by outrageous advisors. He would never again seek to conquer others, and only desired that foreigners would treat France the same way.³⁸

On 8 March, Napoleon and his growing army left Grenoble for Lyon. His confidence, and his army, had improved, but there were still many potential pitfalls to be found. The royalist forces had thus far failed, but increasingly desperate efforts to halt Napoleon's march were still being made. The comte d'Artois, aided by Marshal Macdonald, was determined to defend Lyons. The soldiers, however, refused to pledge allegiance to the king, and it was clear that they were not about to fight their emperor. The sullen refusal of the soldiers to cry *Vive le roi* told the comte d'Artois all he needed to know, and he left Macdonald to do the best he could. Macdonald's best wasn't much, as virtually all of his soldiers disobeyed orders and went over to Napoleon, while Macdonald himself made a hasty retreat.³⁹

Interestingly, a few days after Napoleon arrived in Lyon, the Mayor, one Jean-Joseph Méallet, Comte de Fargues, issued a proclamation praising Napoleon while asking for public order. A few days earlier he had issued a proclamation denouncing Napoleon! His change of heart

³⁵ Fleury, I: 195-96.

³⁶ Octave Aubry, *Napoleon* (London, 1964), 331.

³⁷ Fleury, I, 198-199.

³⁸ Thiers, V: 434-35.

³⁹ Edith Saunders, *The Hundred Days: Napoleon's Final Wager for Victory* (New York, 1964), 18-21.

notwithstanding, Napoleon fired him, though he was reinstated during the Second Restoration. When Napoleon left the city on 13 March, he issued his own farewell proclamation extolling their virtues and promising to take care of all their needs. He closed by saying, "People of Lyon, I love you."

While in Lyons, Napoleon began to act like a ruling monarch. He dissolved the two Chambers, and called for new laws to be passed that would make his reign more constitutional in nature.⁴⁰ He wrote to Marie Louise, asking her to return to Paris on 20 March, their son's birthday. He reestablished the imperial magistracy, and he demanded that all recently returned emigrants leave the country. Revenge would be sweet, as he arranged for trials of Talleyrand, Marmont, Augereau and others.⁴¹ In meetings with local and military officials, Napoleon again put forth the message that the future was to be different than the past: "I was hurried on by the course of events, into a wrong path. But, taught by experience, I have abjured that love of glory.... I have renounced forever that grand enterprise; we have enough of glory, we want repose."⁴²

Only one major roll of the dice remained. Marshal Michel Ney, the bravest of the brave, Prince of the Moskowa, had pledged to bring Napoleon back in an iron cage. A leader in the revolt of the marshals in 1814,

he had retired in great comfort, and could not have been particularly pleased to hear of Napoleon's latest gamble. Determined to show his loyalty and to keep France at peace, Ney began to organize a force to oppose Napoleon's march to Paris. He was moved by Napoleon's proclamations, but also doubted that his old master would have forgiven him for the marshals' revolt at Fontainebleau.⁴³

Napoleon was, of course, quite aware of preparations being made to halt his advance. He knew, for example, that Marshal Massena, stationed at Marseilles, had dispatched troops against Napoleon's rear guard. These troops were far from Napoleon, however, and thus provided no immediate threat. Ney, on the other hand, could be a much more difficult problem. Napoleon did not really fear defeat, as he had more soldiers than Ney. However, Napoleon wanted to arrive in Paris without having fired a shot; any other scenario would bring into question his claim to have returned at the demand of the people with the support of the army.

Meanwhile, as Napoleon advanced through Franche-Comté and Burgundy, the support of the people was more manifest. These areas had prospered under the Empire, and were thus more politically supportive of Napoleon. Their enthusiasm was great, and the crowds greeted Napoleon wherever he went. At Maçon, at Châlon, at Villefranche,

⁴⁰ Decree of March 13, 1815. *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21686.

⁴¹ Thiers, V: 444-46; and Fleury, I: 230-50.

⁴² Fleury, I: 231.

⁴³ Houssaye, 100-06.

Napoleon was greeted by crowds chanting “*A bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres! à bas les Bourbons!*”⁴⁴ A commemorative plaque on the spot indicates that some 60,000 people cheered him at Villefranche.

Ney’s preparations were slowed by poor organization on the part of the government, but he made preparations as best he could. Meanwhile, Bonapartist pressures were mounting. Napoleon had Bertrand write orders to Ney, and Napoleon himself wrote a letter, which closed “I shall receive you as after the battle of the Moskowa.”⁴⁵ Troops from Napoleon’s entourage went forward and mingled with those under Ney’s command. Conversations that Ney had with his officers revealed to him that the cause of the Bourbons was not quite the effective rallying point that he had hoped it would be. He swore to fire the first shot if necessary, but this seemed to have little effect on his soldiers. Meanwhile, he and his troops kept hearing wild stories, mostly untrue, of the great desire of France and all of Europe to see the Empire restored.

By 14 March, Ney had made up his mind to join in Napoleon’s great gamble. In a proclamation he then read to his troops he declared, in part:

The cause of the Bourbons is lost for ever.... Liberty is at length triumphant; and Napoleon, our

august Emperor, is about to confirm it for ever.... Soldiers! I have often led you to victory; I am now going to conduct you to that immortal phalanx, which the Emperor Napoleon is conducting to Paris.... Long live the Emperor!⁴⁶

Napoleon arrived at Auxerre on 17 March, where he was greeted by the prefect. He spent the day discussing his plans with a wide assortment of people, but was disappointed to see that Marshal Ney had not yet arrived. He had been delayed, but either arrived on the evening of the 17th (according to Fleury) or on the 18th (according to Thiers).⁴⁷ The scene must have been dramatic; Ney, overcome with guilt and apprehension, Napoleon relieved that this final major obstacle was removed and he once again had the services of “the bravest of the brave.”

With Ney in hand, the remainder of the march to Paris was anticlimactic. Paris was alive with Bonapartist fervor. One banner proclaimed these words to the king supposedly from Napoleon: “My good brother: there is no need to send any more troops; I already have enough!”⁴⁸ The hopelessness of the situation for the king is summed up by General Thiébault’s observation “I was the only person holding out for the King either around or in

⁴⁴ Thiers, V: 446-47. “Down with the nobles! Down with the pretenders! Down with the Bourbons!” (Translation mine).

⁴⁵ *Correspondance*, 28, No. 21689. Translation found in Saunders, 33.

⁴⁶ Fleury, I: 259-60 (footnote). A photo of this proclamation can be found in Reymond, 165.

⁴⁷ Fleury, I: 262; and Thiers, V: 458.

⁴⁸ David Chandler, *Waterloo, The Hundred Days* (London, 1987), 19.

Paris.”⁴⁹ Perhaps there is no better illustration of the rapid growth of Napoleon's popularity than the following sequence of Paris broadsheets passed out on the streets to keep the citizens informed:

The Tiger has broken out of his den.

The Ogre has been three days at sea.

The Wretch has landed at Frejus.

The Buzzard has reached Antibe.

The Invader has arrived in Grenoble.

The General has entered Lyons.

Napoleon slept at Fontainebleau last night.

The Emperor will proceed to the Tuileries today.

His Imperial Majesty will address his loyal subjects tomorrow!⁵⁰

While additional royalist resistance was possible—and feared—the fact was that Louis XVIII had determined to flee, which he did on the night of 19 March. The next day, street vendors celebrated the return of Napoleon by selling medals showing a bust of the Emperor and the date.⁵¹ To add

insult to injury, the Paris Mint, which had so recently produced medals celebrating the reign of Louis XVIII, began to plan for a new series celebrating the return of the Emperor. By evening, Napoleon had reentered Paris, and the first phase of the Hundred Days had drawn to a close.

Napoleon had rolled the dice, and thus far all looked well. He had planned his moves carefully, and his plans had proved absolutely correct. He avoided battles, obtained the loyalty and discipline of the troops, and made the politically correct statements necessary to reassure a populace and a military leadership weary of war. In short, he did everything he could to load the dice in his favor for future rolls, save one thing. He failed to wait for the Congress of Vienna to disband. That one premature roll sealed his fate, and, in the words of Mercy Argenteau: “The cannons of Waterloo sent to a lonely death, on that rock in the Atlantic Ocean, the powerful Genius who had filled the world with the sound of his arms, and the grandeur of his fame!!!”⁵²

⁴⁹ Paul Charles François Adrien Henri Dieudonné Thiébault, *The Memoirs of Baron Thiébault (Late Lieutenant-General in the French Army)*, trans. by Arthur John Butler (New York, 1896), II: 417.

⁵⁰ Chandler, 19.

⁵¹ Cronin, 394.

⁵² François Joseph Charles Marie Mercy-Argenteau, *Memoirs of the Comte de Mercy Argenteau, Napoleon's Chamberlain and His Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Bavaria*, trans., ed., and intro. by George S. Hellman (New York, 1917), I: 178.



“A Great Moral Lesson”: Art Restitution and the Musée Napoléon

by Susan Jaques

From exile on Saint Helena, Napoleon Bonaparte wrote: “I wanted this capital to be so splendid that it would dwarf all the capitals in the universe. I did everything, and wanted to do everything for Paris.”¹ The crown jewel in Napoleon’s glittering capital was the Louvre, renamed the *Musée Napoléon*, brimming with Europe’s greatest art treasures. The 1814 Treaty of Paris left in place the museum’s confiscated art. The goal was to restore the Bourbon monarchy and not humiliate France, but Napoleon’s escape from Elba and the ensuing Hundred Days left the Congress of Vienna far less forgiving. Declaring Napoleon “an Enemy and Disturber of the Tranquility of the World,” the Allies reduced France to its 1789 pre-Revolution boundaries under the Second Treaty of Paris. The Congress also addressed the political issue of art repatriation with the Duke of Wellington spearheading the effort.

In a 23 September 1815 letter written in Paris to British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh, Wellington expressed his views on France’s war trophies:

The Allies then, having the contents of the museum justly in their power, could not do otherwise than restore them to the countries from which, contrary to the practice of civilized warfare, they had been torn during

the disastrous period of the French revolution and the tyranny of Bonaparte.

...The same feelings which induce the people of France to wish to retain the pictures and statues of other nations would naturally induce other nations to wish, now that success is on their side, that the property should be returned to their rightful owners, and the Allied Sovereigns must feel a desire to gratify them ... Not only, then, would it, in my opinion, be unjust in the Sovereigns to gratify the people of France on this matter, at the expense of their own people, but the sacrifice they would make would be impolitic, as it would deprive them of the opportunity of giving the people of France a great moral lesson.²

France resisted the art return, holding up Napoleon’s various treaties as legal proof of permanent ownership. Despite his fierce opposition to Napoleon, Louis XVIII maintained that France was legally entitled to retain the confiscated art and would not cede works at the Louvre or the Tuileries palace. In his first official speech in 1814, the restored Bourbon King declared that “the masterpieces of the arts belong to us

¹ Jean-Francois Lozier, *Napoleon & Paris* (Quebec: Canadian Museum of History, 2016), 77.

² Cecil Gould, *The Trophy of Conquest: The Musée Napoléon and the Creation of the Louvre* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 134-35.

forevermore, by rights more stable and sacred than those of conquest.”³

On 10 July 1815, however, Prussian troops arrived at the Musée Royale to retrieve the country’s art, including Correggio’s *Leda and the Swan*, one of Frederick the Great’s favorite paintings. In August, the Austrians formally requested that the French government return their art as well. With restitution underway, Pope Pius VII dispatched sculptor Antonio Canova from Rome to recover paintings and antiquities seized in Rome nearly two decades earlier.

For the mild-mannered artist who had traveled to France in 1802 and 1810 to sculpt Napoleon and his family members, the trip represented the challenge of a lifetime. The diplomatic mission would pit him against Louis XVIII, France’s wily Prime Minister Talleyrand, and Russia’s Alexander I. The day after Canova accepted the assignment from Pius VII at the Quirinale Palace, he executed his will. On 28 August 1815, Canova arrived in Paris with his step-brother and personal secretary Giovanni Battista Sartori, armed with little more than letters from the Pope. Canova’s hope was that Prussia, having already removed its pictures from the Louvre, would be sympathetic to the Italian mission. His first act was to deliver a letter from Pius to Prussia’s minister Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Two days later, Canova delivered a similar letter to Lord Castlereagh. It was Castlereagh’s under-secretary of state William Richard Hamilton who proved a key ally, helping Canova frame the case for the return of Rome’s art. Their central argument was that the February 1797 Treaty of Tolentino should be annulled on the grounds that Pius VI had signed it under extreme duress. “To respect the treaty,” Canova argued, “would be to respect that which the wolf dictated to the lamb.” By the terms of Tolentino, Pius VI ceded 100 masterworks to France: 83 sculptures and 17 paintings, along with 500 manuscripts. Within two weeks of the signing of the treaty, France’s cultural commissars arrived in Rome to select and pack up the art. Sixty-three of the sculptures came from the Vatican; 20 from the Capitoline Museum. Six paintings were removed from the Pinacoteca Vaticana, one from the Quirinale, two from the Capitoline Museum, five from Rome’s churches, and three from Umbria. Among the manuscripts taken from the Vatican Archives were the *Codex Vaticanus*, the *Vatican Virgil*, and Pius VI’s private collection. The Vatican’s Profane Museum was emptied of its coins, gems, and classical cameos.

Museum director Dominique-Vivant Denon already disliked “this viper Hamilton” for seizing the famous Rosetta Stone and sarcophagus of Nectanebo II

³ Qtd. in Patricia Mainardi, “Assuring the Empire of the Future: The 1798 Fête de la Liberté,” *Art Journal* Vol. 48 (Summer 1989): 156.

from the French during Napoleon's Egypt Campaign. On his return from Egypt, Denon had compiled his impressions along with engravings of some three hundred of his own sketches. Dedicated to Napoleon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt during the Campaigns of General Bonaparte* extolled the originality of ancient Egyptian art and architecture. Translated into several languages, Denon's bestseller helped spin Napoleon's military defeat into a great cultural victory and launch a wave of Egyptomania across Europe.

Napoleon rewarded Denon in 1802 by naming him director of the Louvre, *the Musée des Monuments français*, and a museum at Versailles devoted to the French school. The discerning connoisseur soon earned the moniker "Napoleon's eye" for his talent at picking the finest art for the Louvre. Traveling with the French army, he selected works from vanquished Italy, Spain, Belgium, Prussia and Austria. As Thomas Gaehtgens puts it, Denon became Napoleon's Colbert, his minister of fine arts, guiding him in all matters of taste.⁴

Even after Napoleon's exile to Elba, Denon continued to run his patron's propaganda campaign. He arranged the production and distribution of a print showing Napoleon's son praying "for my father and for France." In late July 1814, Denon organized a Salon, displaying over 80 early Renaissance "primitives" taken from Italy in 1811. Two

200,000 visitors descended on the Salon Carré to see the beautiful pictures at the Louvre, newly renamed the *Musée Royale*. Denon refused to see his museum dismantled without a fight. He fired off a series of letters to foreign diplomats and the comte de Pradel, Louis XVIII's intendant la maison du Roi. "What is most certain is that Mon. Hamilton has behaved in this matter like a maniac, that he has set on the entire destruction of the Museum and that he has got the support of Lord Wellington in the execution of his project," wrote Denon.⁵

Canova's efforts were also hurt by a rumor that the Papacy and the British were colluding in a sale of Roman antiquities. In exchange for helping Rome, the Prince Regent and Lord Liverpool had discussed acquiring some of the repatriated works. Castlereagh put the kibosh on the suggestion, announcing that the Prince Regent would help pay for transporting art back to Italy. Meanwhile, the French held firm. In a dramatic face-off, Denon claimed that France had rescued the masterworks from adverse conditions. Talleyrand invoked "a right of conquest ... [that] has been admitted by all nations in all times" and argued the French couldn't be liable for the misdeeds of the Napoleonic government. Tensions continued to mount. While visiting the *Halle d'Etudes* of the *Académie française*, Canova was pelted with

⁴ Thomas W. Gaehtgens, *Napoleon's Arc de Triomphe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 52.

⁵ Christopher M. S. Johns, *Antonio Canova and the Politics of Patronage in Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 177.

bread pellets by students. He overheard an artist say that he would like to stick a dagger into him.

In September, when Dutch representatives arrived at the Louvre's galleries to take down the stadholder's pictures, they discovered that the ladders had been removed. Not surprisingly, there was no French staff available to help de-install the works. Denon may have choreographed the disappearing ladders, but that is conjecture.⁶ The Duke of Wellington, general-in-chief of the army of the Netherlands, called on Talleyrand to intervene and issued an ultimatum. If the French Prime Minister and Denon continued to obstruct the restitution, he would have armed escorts remove paintings belonging to the King of The Netherlands on 20 September at noon. As Judith Nowinski writes, it was only when a regiment of grenadiers showed up at the museum pointing bayonets at Denon that he told his twenty-five museum guards to step aside.⁷

The dismantling of the galleries caused a conflict of authority between Wellington and Paris's Prussian governor, Friedrich Karl Ferdinand von Müffling. After being closed, the museum reopened with a British regiment stationed along the galleries. As a

reminder of Allied strength, Wellington staged a review of the army on 22 September. Thanks to Wellington's personal intervention, a large part of the property of the House of Orange was returned to the Netherlands that fall. According to Quentin Buvelot, "Some 120 paintings were returned, which constitute the nucleus of the collection of the Mauritshuis. But sixty-eight works remained in France, some of which now hang in the Louvre."⁸ Among these are Hendrick Pot's *Portrait of Charles I*, paintings of lute-players and a music ensemble by Gerrit van Honthorst, and a landscape by Peter Paul Rubens. A masterpiece by Jan Davidsz de Heem, the *Portrait of William III in a garland of flowers*, is in the collection of the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Lyon. After William I (son of stadholder William V) gifted the returned paintings to the state, they were incorporated into the Netherlands' public collections in 1816 and transferred to the Mauritshuis six years later.

Meanwhile Canova persevered, working to gain the support of Austria, Prussia, and a recalcitrant Russia. The sculptor finally achieved a diplomatic breakthrough on 10 September when Louis XVIII received him. Speaking in Italian, the King

⁶ T.H. Lunsingh Scheurleer, A.B. de Vries, L. Brummel, and H.E. van Gelder, *150 jaar Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen Koninklijke Bibliotheek Koninklijk Penningkabinet* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij's-Gravenhage, 1967), 38.

⁷ Judith Nowinski, *Baron Dominique Vivant Denon* (Cranbury, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970), 104.

⁸ Quentin Buvelot. "1785-1815: Intermezzo in Paris, Musée Napoleon" in *Royal Picture Gallery Mauritshuis: A Princely Collection*, Peter van der Ploeg and Quentin Buvelot (The Hague: Royal Picture Gallery Mauritshuis, Zwolle: Waanders, 2006), 30-31.

commissioned his portrait. His hard-line position appeared to be softening. The following day, Louis submitted an address to the Allies' diplomatic agents questioning the validity of Tolentino and asking that the works be returned to the People of Rome for "the usefulness and advantage of all civilized nations in Europe."⁹ At the invitation of Austrian chancellor Metternich, Canova visited the Louvre on 28 September with a list of looted art works. Denon gave the celebrated Italian sculptor a rude reception. When Canova pointed out that this was no way to treat an ambassador, Denon replied "Ambassador! Come on, you mean packer, surely."¹⁰ Metternich threatened the use of force if works from Rome were not handed over within twenty-four hours. Sensing that the momentum had shifted, Italian cities like Perugia and Bologna asked Canova for help getting their own treasures back. On 30 September, France formally recognized the papal claim for restitution. Canova returned to the museum the next day, escorted by a platoon of Prussian and Austrian soldiers, and began removing art. A week later, Denon resigned as museum director, citing his advancing age (sixty-eight) and failing health. Still he remained defiant: "Let them take them then, but they have no eyes to see them with: France will always prove her superiority in the arts

that the masterpieces were better here than elsewhere."¹¹

Though Canova had secured the restitution of 294 statues taken from Villa Albani, Cardinal Giuseppe Albani considered the cost of transporting his family's antiquities back to Rome prohibitive. He sold many of his objects to buyers including Crown Prince Ludwig of Bavaria, who acquired the *Laughing Faun* (today at the Glyptothek, Munich). Like Villa Albani, Villa Borghese was one of Rome's showcases, with an antiquities collection renowned among European cognoscenti. The trove had been amassed over two centuries, starting with Borghese Pope Paul V and his cardinal-nephew Scipione Borghese. Napoleon's brother-in-law Camillo Borghese who had sold him the finest of the antiquities in 1808, was unsuccessful in annulling the sale. Several hundred Borghese pieces stayed in Paris, including the *Gladiator*, the *Hermaphrodite*, and a group of outstanding Roman sarcophagi.

Outside the Louvre, Parisians could only watch. Canova drew up detailed notes of all the objects taken from the museum, including the day of collection. Works were divided by their final destination in Rome or the Papal States. Canova spent his last weeks in Paris organizing logistics for the

⁹ Katherine Eustace, "The Fruits of War: How Napoleon's Looted Art Found its Way Home," *Art Newspaper*, 269, June 2015
<http://theartnewspaper.com/features/the-fruits-of-war-how-napoleon-s-looted-art-found-its-way-home/>

¹⁰ Carlo Pietrangeli, *The Vatican Museums: Five Centuries of History*, trans. Peter Spring (Rome: Quasar, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1993), 149.

¹¹ Margaret Plant, *Venice: Fragile City, 1797-1997* (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 210.

two art convoys. England provided two convoys, a British frigate, and £35,000 to pay for packing and transporting art from Paris to Italy. Ultimately, Canova managed to get back 77 of the original hundred papal works ceded under the Treaty of Tolentino. On 16 October, Canova wrote: “The cause of the Fine Arts is at length safe in port ... we are at last beginning to drag forth from this great cavern of stolen goods the precious objects of art stolen from Rome....”¹²

Escorted by Austrian soldiers, the first convoy left Paris by land on 25 October with such treasures as Raphael’s *Transfiguration*, Caravaggio’s *Deposition*, *Apollo Belvedere*, and the *Laocoön*. On the afternoon of 23 November, while crossing the Mont Cenis Pass, a heavy sledge skidded on icy snow. The crate carrying the *Laocoön* fell from the wagon and crashed on the ice, damaging the famous marble group. The convoy of masterpieces reached Rome on 4 January 1816. Canova’s assistant Alessandro D’Este supervised the shipment of the remaining art. Sculptures, including the colossal *Nile*, went by sea. In mid-November, crates of art were loaded onto fifteen wagons and left for Antwerp. The following May, the British naval vessel *Abundance* departed for Civitavecchia, with the art transferred to Rome in July and August. In thanks for his support, Pius VII sent a gift for the future George IV—a

circular tempietto of *rosso antico* topped by a statue of peace with plaster casts of Rome’s most beloved art works. After four tumultuous months, the world’s most prestigious museum was dismantled, with nearly five thousand objects returned. Denon wrote pessimistically: “Such an assembly—this comparison of the achievements of the human mind through the centuries, this tribunal where talent was constantly being judged by talent—in a word, this light which sprang perpetually from the inter-reaction of merits of all kinds has just been extinguished, and will never shine again.”¹³

Yet Napoleon’s network of 22 provincial museums throughout France made it virtually impossible to track the location of hundreds of other paintings dispersed by Denon. Paintings like Veronese’s *Marriage of Saint Catherine* and Rubens’s *Adoration of the Magi* from Munich stayed in the cities of Rouen and Lyon, respectively. Confiscated art also remained at the Brera in Milan, the Accademia in Venice, and Napoleon’s former imperial palaces including the Tuileries, Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau, the Trianon, and Meudon.¹⁴ Some of the Musée Royale’s pictures escaped repatriation altogether because they were being restored; others were said to be inaccessible or lost. Prussia’s Frederick William III caved in after Denon argued that removing the ancient marble

¹² Mainardi, “Assuring the Empire,” 160.

¹³ Germain Bazin, *The Museum Age* (Brussels: Desier S. A. Editions, 1967), 180.

¹⁴ Edward P. Alexander, *Museum Masters: Their Museums and their Influence* (Nashville, Tenn.: American Association for State and Local History, 1983), 92.

columns from Charlemagne's Aachen Cathedral would cause the roof of the Louvre to collapse. In the end, writes Andrew McClellan, roughly half of the confiscated art remained in France due to "a combination of diplomacy, bureaucratic obstruction, and the inability of weak nations to reclaim what was theirs."¹⁵ Along with these works, the Louvre retained its royal collections, confiscated Church treasures, and art works left behind by those fleeing revolutionary France.

Denon held onto two masterpieces for the Louvre: Tintoretto's *Paradise* from Verona and Veronese's *Marriage of Cana* from Palladio's San Giorgio Maggiore in Venice. As a result of the Congress of Vienna, Venice reverted to Austria, rendering its confiscated art in Paris the property of Austria. Denon sent the *Marriage of Cana* off to a workshop in the provinces for restoration, delaying compliance with Austria's restoration order. After Denon argued that the painting was too big and fragile to travel back to Venice, Austrian commissioners agreed to trade the Veronese for Charles Le Brun's lesser work, *Feast in the House of Simon*. Over Canova's protests, the exchange was executed. The Louvre's largest canvas, the *Marriage of Cana* hangs today across from Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*. Italian "primitives" were so little understood, they were not restituted and became part of the Louvre's Italian art collection. Among the works that remained

in France were paintings by Pietro Perugino, Raphael's early teacher. Considered a less significant artist at the time than he is now, many of his pictures were deemed unsuitable for the Louvre and sent to various provincial museums. Perugino's *Marriage of the Virgin* remains on view at the Museum of Fine Arts in Caen. When Canova returned to Rome, doubts surfaced about his effort. Of 506 pictures taken to France, only 249 were recovered, 248 stayed in France, and nine were declared missing, but in Canova's defense, Pius allowed many paintings to stay in Paris and gave Louis XVIII a number of sculptures. He did not want to antagonize the restored Bourbon who seemed poised to reverse two decades of anti-clericalism.

The Russians under diplomat Karl Robert Nesselrode refused to consider repatriation. It turns out that Tsar Alexander I had a vested interest in the situation. In October 1815, just as Napoleon was arriving at Saint Helena, the frigate *Archipelago* arrived in Russia with thirty-eight paintings and four Canova sculptures from Malmaison. After Joséphine's unexpected death in May 1814, Alexander bought her art collection from her children for 940,000 francs. He hung the paintings in the new Malmaison Hall of the Hermitage in St. Petersburg. Twenty-one of the pictures, including four Claudes and Rembrandt's *Descent from the Cross*, came from the 1806

¹⁵ Andrew McClellan, *Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins of the Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris* (Berkeley, Los Angeles,

and London: University of California Press, 1994), 200.

French confiscation of the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel's collection. In 1829, Alexander's youngest brother Nicholas I would buy another 30 of Joséphine's paintings from Hortense. Since 1918, when the Bolshevik government signed a peace treaty with Germany and Austria, German negotiators have demanded the return of the paintings. The pictures remain in the Hermitage.

On 25 September, the aide-de-camp of the prince of Schwarzenberg, commander of the Austrian troops, informed Denon that the Arc du Carrousel was to be dismantled. The bronze horses of Venice had starred in Paris's Festival of Liberty in July 1798. Denon arranged for the ancient horses to be placed atop Napoleon's triumphal arch. Now Denon protested that as a public monument, the arch fell outside the restitution agreements. but two days later, Austrian troops closed off all the streets leading to the Arc du Carrousel and the Tuileries, dispersing protesters. To the indignation of the French, the Prussians climbed Percier and Fontaine's elegant marble arch and took down the famous bronze horses of St Mark's. Louis XVIII reportedly observed the scene from a window at the Tuileries Palace. It took an entire day to get two of the horses down from the top of the arch. English engineers were seen cavorting in the chariot. Rumors spread that English soldiers had scraped the gilding off the horses (the scoring was purposefully done in antiquity). By 1

October, all four steeds were removed; the chariot and figures of Victory and Peace lay on the ground in pieces. Four grey horse replicas would replace the originals.

The *London Courier* published an eyewitness account: "I just now find that the Austrians are taking down the bronze horses from the Arch. The whole court of the Tuileries, and the Place du Carrousel are filled with Austrian infantry and cavalry under arms; no person is allowed to approach; the troops on guard amount to several thousands; there are crowds of French in all the avenues leading to it who give vent to their feelings by shouts and execrations ... the number of cannons of the bridges has been increased." The day after the horses were removed, the *Courier* reported that "The public mind of Paris still continues in a state of extreme agitation; the public appear every day more and more exasperated against the Allies... The stripping of the Louvre is the chief cause of public irritation at present; ... the Grande Galerie of the Museum presents the strongest possible image of desolation; here and there a few pictures giving greater effect to the disfigured nakedness of the walls."¹⁶ Stendhal summed up his compatriots' bitterness. "The allies have taken from us 1,150 pictures. I hope that I am allowed to note that we acquired the best of them *by a treaty*, that of *Tolentino*...The allies, on the other hand, took our pictures from us *without a treaty*."

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¹⁶ Plant, *Venice*, 210.

¹⁷ Mainardi, "Assuring the Empire," 160.

Before Venice's bronze horses left Paris, Austria's Francis I asked Canova for his opinion on where they should be installed. The sculptor suggested that pairs of the horses could flank the main entrance to the Doge's Palace, directly across from San Giorgio Maggiore, but Count Leopoldo Cicognara, president of Venetian Academy, insisted the icon be returned to its original home, the façade of St. Mark's Basilica. After arriving in Venice on 7 December, the horses crossed the lagoon by raft and were taken to the Arsenale for repair. At some point, the decoration on their collars was lost. The bronze lion from the column on the Piazzetta was also returned, but required extensive repairs after being smashed into seven dozen pieces during its removal in Paris. The following April, the lion was reinstalled atop its column. On 13 December, the eighteenth anniversary of the horses' removal, a raft with Austrian and Venetian standards came around the eastern end of Venice carrying the famous bronzes. With Austria's Francis I in attendance, Cicognara addressed the crowd. To musket shots and cannon fire, the horses were lifted and repositioned at their place on the Basilica's loggia. In 1982, following their restoration, the ancient horses were moved inside the Basilica, replaced by replicas outside.

Britain's George IV and the Duke of Wellington likewise ended up with Napoleonic memorabilia and two very famous commissions by Napoleon. The Prince Regent, later George IV, collected prints, drawings and works of art relating

to the battle of Waterloo. He turned a medieval courtyard at Windsor Castle into the Waterloo Chamber, lined with Thomas Lawrence's portraits of monarchs, military leaders, and diplomats involved in the epic battle. In his portrait of Pius VII, Lawrence included the *Laocoön* and *Apollo Belvedere*, celebrating the return of the classical masterpieces to the Vatican.

A grateful Louis XVIII presented George IV with an extraordinary Sèvres table commissioned by Napoleon in 1806, part of a set of four presentation tables designed to immortalize his reign. Six years in the making, the *Table of the Great Commanders* features an elaborately decorated top, painted in imitation of sardonyx, with heads and scenes resembling ancient cameos. The central profile of Alexander the Great is surrounded by a dozen smaller heads of antiquity's renowned commanders and philosophers including Caesar, Augustus, Constantine, Trajan, and Hannibal. George IV prized the table so highly that it became a required backdrop for his official state portraits.

In his quest to rid France of all images of Napoleon, Louis XVIII sold Antonio Canova's monumental *Napoleon as Mars the Peacekeeper* to the British government. Napoleon had discussed the commission with Canova during his sittings at Saint-Cloud in 1802, expressing his strong preference to be portrayed in his military uniform. Canova insisted the figure be nude, arguing it elevated the work from portraiture to what he considered the nobler genres of history and mythology.

Despite his better judgment, Napoleon deferred to the renowned sculptor, saying “No rule can be imposed on Genius.”¹⁸ In April 1811, an embarrassed Napoleon rejected the heroic nude statue and had it hidden from view. Five years later, the marble left for London where it was presented to the Duke of Wellington as a thank you for defeating Napoleon. Installed in 1817 at Apsley House, Wellington’s London residence, the 13-ton marble still stands at the foot of Robert Adam’s grand staircase.

Louis XVIII also gifted Wellington souvenirs from Napoleon’s Hundred Days: embroidered flags of the French departments paraded on the Champs de Mars in June 1815, along with a spectacular

Egyptian-style Sèvres porcelain service ordered by Napoleon for Joséphine. To complement Canova’s colossal marble of Napoleon, Wellington assembled painted portraits of the emperor and his family members, including Joséphine and siblings Joseph and Pauline Bonaparte. With the return of the art, Wellington fulfilled his goal of giving the French “a great moral lesson.” Yet when asked to name the greatest captain of the age, the British war hero famously replied: “In this age, in past ages, in any age, Napoleon.”¹⁹

¹⁸ Valérie Huet, “Napoleon I: A New Augustus?” in *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture, 1789-1945*, ed. Catharine Edwards (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 58.

¹⁹ Andrew Roberts, *Napoleon: A Life* (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), 518.



Laocoön and his sons, marble, early first century B.C.E., Vatican Museums, by Jean-Pol Grandmont via Wikimedia Commons.



Venus de' Medici, marble, first century C.E., Uffizi, Florence, by Wai Laam Lo via Wikimedia Commons.



Marriage of Cana, Paolo Veronese, 1563, Louvre.



The Horses of St. Mark's Basilica, Venice © Scaliger, Dreamstime.com.

Napoleonic Memorabilia (Napoleonics) in the House of Blücher: “Hero of the Day” the Field Marshal Blücher and Napoleon’s Carriage from Waterloo at Raduň Chateau

by Marian Hochel

The richness and diversity of *napoleonics* deposited at Czech chateaus, managed by the National Heritage Institute in the Czech Republic, were mentioned in the study published in the previous issue of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.¹ The role of the chosen noble families was brought to mind. Their members were engaged in high state positions, held significant military and diplomatic posts and were in direct contact with Napoleonic France. By doing so, they were strengthening their social status, boosted their influence on current affairs and were providing social prestige to their family. They were directly participating in the formation of the family memory where Napoleonic war events, in which these personalities participated, were permanently embedded. This was demonstrated not only by the self-presentation of these partakers or of their descendants through works of art, but also through collectable artefacts which were directly related to Napoleonic wars.

This study looks more closely at the noble family of the Blüchers which together with

the Metternichs, Liechtensteins or Schwarzenbergs affected the historical events in the crucial moments of Napoleonic wars and reinforced its family prestige as well as their social status on the international scale.² The Blücher family interest in *napoleonics* is supported by several exhibits associated with the Silesian Chateau of Raduň (*Radun*) located nearby Opava (*Troppau*) in the historical Czech Silesia in the current Czech Republic, not in Belarus or in Polish Wrocław as often incorrectly stated (see Fig. 1). The Blücher family and their residency in the Czech lands represent the historical memory of Napoleonic times and primarily of year 1815. In the family memory a memory of a renowned family ancestor – the Prussian field marshal Gebhard Leberecht Blücher von Wahlstatt (1742-1819), who distinguished himself mainly in the last three years of Napoleonic wars, was revived. Blücher family received Raduň Chateau through marriage of his grandson Gebhard Bernhard Blücher von Wahlstatt (1799-1875) with the owner of the mansion Marie Larisch-Mönich (1801-1889) which took place October 29, 1832 in a spa resort Bad Warmbrunn at the foothills of the

¹ Marian Hochel, “Napoleonic Memorabilia as the Mediator of Historical Memory in Chateau Collections in Lands of the Bohemian Crown,” *Napoleonic Scholarship. The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society* 9 (December 2018): 51–77.

² This paper was made in terms of the Support of foreign mobility of academics and support of international relations among departments of the Faculty of Philosophy and Science of the Silesian University in Opava in 2019.

Krkonoše Mountains (Cieplice Śląskie-Zdrój).³ The life story of a generally renowned Prussian marshal, who participated in the final military defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, is an evidence of the fact that in the period called “*between the times*” or “*the age of transition*” it was possible to build through one’s efforts and remarkable ambitions a career which surpassed boundaries and was permanently taken down into European history and collective memory. This year (2019) we commemorate the 200th anniversary of Marshal’s death.

Gebhard Leberecht was born in Rostock to a family of Mecklenburg’s large landowners, in the current region of Mecklenburg – Western Pomerania on the coast of Baltic Sea. His theoretical education was not at a high level, he was educated by practice and mostly military one, where he was active as soon as the beginning of the seven years’ war. He and his brother joined the Swedish army and in 1758 were gradually appointed into the rank of a cornet (*cornette*) in the squadron of Hussars in a light cavalry. In 1760 he was captured by the troops of the Prussian army which he joined soon after that and drew attention to himself by great bravery. In 1762 he was appointed to second lieutenant (*sous-lieutenant*), later lieutenant (*lieutenant*) and that year he fought in the

battle of Freiberg in Saxony under the command of the Prussian prince Heinrich (1726-1802), the brother of the Prussian king Frederick II the Great. In 1770 Blücher was allocated to troops which guarded the Polish border. A year later, being dissatisfied for not getting another army promotion, he was asking for leave of absence in considerable length. Frederick II disliked his conduct and in 1773 Blücher was dismissed from the army. He married a daughter of the Polish royal guard officer and attended to finishing his mansion Groß-Radów.⁴ In 1784 he was appointed a nobility representative in the regency of the province Pomerania with its seat in Stargard. He took interest in Freemason predominantly in its ethical and humanitarian aspect. He joined the local Masonic Lodge and gradually became its respectable member. Despite his civil engagement, he had to re-join the Prussian army in 1787; the Prussian king Frederick William II appointed him the commander of the squadron of his former regiment in 1787. The same year Blücher participated in pacification of Dutch rebels, which he was asked to do by the local government. The revolutionary wars enabled him further promotion in his military career. In 1793-1794 he operated as a lieutenant colonel (*lieutenant-colonel, Oberstleutnant*) in the army of the Duke of Brunswick who was involved in fights with the French

³ To the history of the family, see Friedrich Wigger, *Geschichte der Familie von Blücher, I.–II. Band*, (Schwerin, 1870-1879).

⁴ The first wife Karoline Amalie von Mehling (1756-1791) gave Blücher seven children. The

second marriage of Blücher with Katharina Amalie von Colomb (1772-1850), whom she married in 1775, was childless.

revolutionary army; Blücher was promoted to a major general (*major-général, Generalmajor*). He noted his experience from the war campaigns from 1793-1794 in the form of a diary and later published it under the title *Campagne-Journal der Jahren 1793 u[nd]. 1794* (Berlin, 1796). After signing the peace treaty in Bâle in 1795 which ended the war of the first coalition in favour of France,⁵ in 1795 Blücher took the command of a special military unit responsible for supervision over respecting the neutrality in north-Germanic regions. In 1801 he was appointed a lieutenant general (*lieutenant general, Generalleutnant*) and in 1802 he was assigned to occupy the Münster bishopric which was supposed to, considering the admission of the Principal Conclusion of the Extraordinary Imperial Delegation of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, recompense Prussia the losses made by annexations of the left bank of the Rhine by France.⁶ In 1803 the Prussian king appointed Blücher to a military governor of the city, upon the request of the episcopal authorities and the cathedral chapter in Münster, while Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein (1757-1831) took over the civil administration. Since then Blücher became for a long time a vigorous opponent of France and of Napoleon Bonaparte in

particular, at the same time he identified himself with the Prussian state and accepted his identity. In 1805 he wrote up his memoir document (*Pensées sur la formation d'une armée nationale*) where he commented on the introduction of general and compulsory military service in Prussia. On October 14, 1806 he belonged to the defeated in the battle of Auerstaedt and organized a withdrawal of the rear guard of the army under the command of Friedrich Ludwig zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1746-1818). Nevertheless, not even the consecutive capitulating affected Blücher's determination which he did not make secret and which resulted from his patriotic enthusiasm: "Our misery must strengthen us in our courage and our will."⁷ He was taken to Hamburg as a war prisoner where on March 8, 1807 he was traded for a French general Claude-Victor Perrin (1764-1841) who was captured by Prussian troops. On 30 May 1807 Blücher landed with a special unit in Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania to try and support the Swedish troops; he took part in irrelevant fights which ended by peace on 21 June 1807. He was appointed the governor of Pomerania and New March (*Neumark*) and focused on the army reform. In 1809 he was unsuccessful in his try to make the Prussian king join Austria and the Allies of the Fifth coalition. Unlike the

⁵ Based on the peace treaty signed between the French Republic and the Kingdom of Prussia on 5 April 1795, Prussia ceded the Rhine territories westward from Rhine to France.

⁶ *Hauptausschluss der außerordentlichen Reichsdeputation* – the resolution which was delivered at the assembly of the German Empire in Regensburg on February 25, 1803 about the

liquidation of ecclesiastical principalities, secularisation of monasteries and media coverage of free imperial towns.

⁷ "Notre malheur doit uniquement nous renforcer dans notre courage et notre volonté." Roger Dufraisse, *Blücher*, in Jean Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon, I*, (Paris, 1999), 252.

other patriots, he did not leave for exile and by that he expressed his disappointment. He asked for permission to retire but the Prussian king Frederick William III appointed him the chief commander of the cavalry and the canon of the cathedral in Magdeburg. As soon as in 1811 the French authorities requested that he is suspended and he had to leave Berlin.

On 28 February 1813, when Prussia yet again raised their arms to fight against the French, Blücher took over the command of the troops operating in Silesia. He was subject to the command of the Russian army in terms of allied forces of the Sixth coalition; on 2 May, his troops were defeated by the French at the battle of Großgörschen and on 20 and 21 May at the battle of Bautzen. After coming to truce in Pleiſswitz (*Pläſwitz*) on 4 June, he was appointed a supreme commander (*général en chef*) by the Allies of so-called Silesian army counting 100,000 men. This army consisted of 61,220 Russians with 236 cannons and 37,200 Prussians with 104 cannons.⁸ Blücher surrounded himself by very capable officers – Chief of the General Staff (*chef d'état major général, Chef des Generalstabes*) Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) and Chief of the Main Staff (*quartier-maître général, Generalquartiermeister*) August Neidhart von Gneisenau (1760-1831).⁹ Therefore

with regards to their abilities it was, according to certain opinions, hard to judge objectively Blücher's genuine military merits in the campaigns of the anti-Napoleonic coalition.¹⁰ After the death of Scharnhorst in Prague, who died as a consequence of the wounds from the battle of Großgörschen, Gneisenau was appointed the chief commander of Blücher's headquarters. In the military operations they both preferred the policy of offense lead to extremes. Since August 1813 Blücher suggested to march to Paris whilst the Allies were not even considering this option. He repeated his intention after his victories on 26 August at Katzbach (*Kaczawa*), on 3 October, at Wartenberg (*Wartenburg*) and on 16 to 19 October at Leipzig, on the grounds of which he was appointed the Prussian supreme field marshal (*Generalfeldmarschall*). He deliberated a direct attack of Paris after the seizure of Kaub and liberated Rhine on the night of 31 December 1813. Blücher's success on Rhine actually ended the French dominance of the Germanic countries and entered the German history as a significant milestone; in the world of art it became – just like the personality of the marshal – the motif processed in art (see **Fig. 2**). The event was spectacularly captured in 1859 by a famous German painter of historical and battle scenes Wilhelm Camphausen

⁸ Milan Švankmajer, *Čechy na sklonku napoleonských válek 1810–1815* (Praha, 2004), 93.

⁹ Oskar Regele, *Generalstabschefs aus 4 Jahrhunderten. Das Amt des Chefs des Generalstabes*

in der Donaumonarchie. Seine Träger und Organe von 1529 bis 1918 (Wien – München, 1966), 48–49.

¹⁰ Dufraisse, *Blücher*, in Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, I, 252; and Lucian Regenbogen, *Napoléon à dit. Aphorismes, citations et opinions* (Paris, 2002), 291.

(1818-1885)¹¹ in his romantic concept. The second plan in the central part of the composition of his oil painting is dominated by marshal Blücher seated on a horse, facing the observer, captured with an eloquent gesture – with a pipe in his hand he is pointing to the chateau of Pfalzgrafenstein where he is directing his soldiers, he is challenging them to cross the Rhine and march to Paris.

Blücher did not mean to withdraw or advance too carefully according to the plans which *generalissimus* Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg (1771-1820) was enforcing. Hans-Joachim Schoeps (2004) pointed out that the Prussian field marshal often rushed into battles individually and according to a renowned general, military strategist and theoretician of war Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) his Silesian army became “a steel spike of a heavy metal block which the colossus cleaved.”¹²

Blücher and his army were mostly moving separately from the main part of the allied army on their campaign. The allied army was commanded by Schwarzenberg; in Brienne 29 January 1814 he had to withdraw, but on 1 February 1814 in La

Rothière he made the French retreat. Notwithstanding the numerous problems following his campaign, he did not succumb the appeals for a general withdrawal; his Silesian army marched together with the main part of the allied army to Paris and on March 30, Montmartre was conquered. Marshal was made to retire by his advancing eyesight disease accompanied by depression and psychic problems. “Bad physical condition of old Blücher,, commented the situation Clausewitz.¹³ On 2 January 1814 Blücher resigned on the executive post of the chief commander and on 3 June, he received a title of a prince *ad personam* from the Prussian king Frederick William III.¹⁴ Part of the promotion was an amendment of the coat of arms and the particle *von Wahlstatt*. In the princely diploma for Blücher amongst the merits we can read: “(...) Our memorable field marshal von Blücher, in his happy and fortunate end of the fights, has credits for the country and the great and holly Prussian and German issue and all the allied powers and also for Us and Our monarchy....”¹⁵ On 11 November 1814 the monarch dedicated marshal Blücher secularized mansions Krieblowitz,

¹¹ Wilhelm Camphausen, *Blüchers Rheinübergang mit der 1. Schlesischen Armee bei Kaub im Januar 1814* [translated – Crossing the Rhine by the Blücher Silesian army at Kaub on 1 January 1814], oil on canvas from 1859, Mittelrhein-Museum in Koblenz, Inv. No. M 489. Another version of Camphausen’s oil painting from 1860 is deposited in the collections of *Staatliche Museen zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Nationalgalerie*.

¹² Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Dějiny Pruska*, (Praha, 2004) (from the German original *Preußen*.

Geschichte eines Staates, [Berlin, 1966], translated by Šárka Stellnerová and František Stellner), 120.

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, *O válce*, (Praha, 2008) (from the German original *Vom Kriege*, translated by Zbyněk Sekal), 215.

¹⁴ The title of a Duke spread onto all male members of the family on October 18, 1861.

¹⁵ Pavel Koblasa, *Archiv knížat Blücher von Wahlstatt*, in *Rodopisná revue* on-line, roč. 14, 2/2012, 4.

Zirkwitz, Groß-Zauche, Tarnast, Schawoyne and Lutzine in the Prussian Silesia. The local territorial possessions amounted the surface area of 1,337 hectares.¹⁶

Blücher monitored the developments at the Congress of Vienna and was dissatisfied with its decisions which according to him did not take into account the Prussian interests. Being invited by the prince regent, the future-to-be king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the king of Hanover George IV, he left for England where he received a warm welcome; the University of Oxford awarded him with a certificate of merit *doctor honoris causa*. Napoleon's return from the island of Elba mobilized the old marshal and he yet again returned onto the scene into the front lines of anti-Napoleonic coalition. He was appointed the chief commander of the Prussian army whereas Gneisenau was chosen for the Chief of his Staff.

One of the first tasks which Blücher had to fulfil was to suppress the rebellion of Saxon troops in Liège at the beginning of May 1815. When Napoleon appeared in Belgium, Blücher tried to stop him at Ligny but on 16 June 1815 he was defeated. It was the last Napoleon's victory. It was then

when Gneisenau commanded the army to withdraw – but not to Rhine but north towards the town of Wavre (*Waver*). This enabled the chief Prussian field marshal Blücher hit the crucial moment on 18 June 1815 at the battle of Waterloo and help the chief commander of the allied forces Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) in a close battle to reach the crucial victory. Blücher, not taking a rest, he marched to Paris this time which he entered on 3 July 1815.¹⁷ He was appointed by the Allies to the post of the army governor of the town *intra muros*. He was extremely harsh and vindictive towards the French; he treated them callously. In 1814 he made a threat to blow up *Pont d'Iéna*.¹⁸ He was dissatisfied with the wording of the second Parisian peace treaty which was, according to him, too gentle towards the French. When the Napoleonic wars finished he travelled between his mansion Krieblowicz (*Krobielowice*) near Wrocław (*Breslau*), spas Carlsbad (*Karlovy Vary, Karlsbad*), where he sought treatment, and Berlin, where he was offered a grand neo-classicist palace on the corner of *Pariser Platz Nr. 2* and *Königgrätzer Straße Nr. 140* at the very proximity of Branderburg Gate by king Frederick William III for his loyal service and merits in Napoleonic wars, especially at

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ To Blücher's war merits in crucial moments of the Napoleonic wars in 1813-1815 for more detail see Frank Bauer, *Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher. Der Volksheld der Befreiungskriege 1813-1815* [Kleine Reihe Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813-1815, Sonderheft 7], (Potsdam, 2010).

¹⁸ The construction of the *Pont d'Iéna* over the river Seine was order by his decree from Warsaw

the Emperor Napoleon I in 1807 in tribute to his victory over the Prussian army at the battle of Jena on 14 October 1806. The French politician and diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838) managed to rescue the bridge. For more details see Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Talleyrand. Le prince immobile* (Fayard, 2006), 508–09.

the battle of Waterloo.¹⁹ In 1817 Blücher was appointed a member of the Prussian State Council whose meeting he took part in every day.²⁰ He died on 12 September 1819 at his Silesian mansion Krieblowitz where his persona is commemorated by a mausoleum with a family tomb.²¹

Long after his death, there appeared various views of his commander qualities. Napoleon himself doubted them. He remembered the Prussian marshal when he was on the island of Saint Helena in relation with several war campaigns as his companions Emmanuel de Las Cases (1766-1842), Gaspard Gourgaud (1783-1852) and also Henri-Gatien Bertrand (1773-1844) recorded in their memoirs.²² In 1817 Napoleon told the English surgeon Barry Edward O'Meara (1785-1836) that he valued Blücher's determination and

dedication at war, however, he despised his commander skills:

Blücher is a very brave soldier, a fine hotshot [(sabreur)]. He is like a bull which closes its eyes and rushes ahead not seeing the danger. He made millions of mistakes and were it not for the circumstances, he would have imprisoned him on several occasions just like many on his army. He is persistent, tireless, and fearless and he is really devoted to his homeland; but he has no talent for being a general."²³

The Prussian war theoretician and analyst of war strategies Clausewitz valued Blücher's initiative rather than his commander skills, which was to a certain extent what he agreed on with Napoleon: "Although being weaker than Schwarzenberg, Blücher was a more

¹⁹ The buiding of the palace was damaged seriously at the end of the Second World War and in 1957 it was taken down.

²⁰ To the biography of the field marshal Blücher see Wilhelm Burckhardt, *Gebhard Leberecht v[on]. Blücher, preussischer Feldmarschall und Fürst von Wahlstatt: Nach Leben, Reden und Thaten geschildert*, (Stuttgart, 1835); Tom Crepon, *Leberecht von Blücher. Leben und Kämpfe. Biografie*, (Berlin, 1988); Hans Hausscherr, *Blücher von Wahlstatt, Gebhard Leberecht Fürst*. In *Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB)*. Band 2, (Berlin, 1955), 317–319; Wolf Karge (ed.), *Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher und seine Zeit*, (Rostock, 1992); Michael V. LEGGIERE, *Blücher. Scourge of Napoleon*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014); and Johannes Ssherr, *Blücher: Seine Zeit und sein Leben*, Zehn Bände in drei Abtheilungen, I-III, (Leipzig, 1887).

²¹ Jörg Kuhn, *Das Mausoleum Blüchers in Krieblowitz*, in *Mitteilungen des Vereins für die*

Geschichte Berlins, 88. Jahrgang, Heft 4, Oktober 1992, 79–88.

²² Emmanuel de Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* (Points n° 677: Éditions du Seuil, 1999), I: 55 and 543; Emmanuel de Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* (Points n° 678: Éditions du Seuil, 2008), II: 920, 1145, 1148, 1150, 1151, 1183, 1233, 1471, and 1514; Jean Tulard (ed.), *Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène. Par les quatre évangélistes Las Cases, Montholon, Gourgaud, Bertrand*, (Paris, 2012 [1981]), 267, 539, and 617.

²³ „Blücher est un très brave soldat, un bon sabreur. C'est comme un taureau qui ferme les yeux et se précipite en avant sans voir aucun danger. Il a commis des millions de fautes et, s'il n'eût été servi par les circonstances, j'aurais pu différentes fois le faire prisonnier, ainsi que la plus grande partie de son armée. Il est opiniâtre et infatigable, n'a peur de rien et est très attaché à son pays; mais, comme général, il est sans talent.“ Regenbogen, *Napoléon à dit*, 290.

significant opponent due to his initiative, and so the centre of power was rather within him and it carries along everything else.”²⁴ Hence according to Clausewitz if the Russian general Michail Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818) had headed up the Silesian army in 1814 instead of the initiative Blücher and Blücher would have stayed in the central army under the command of Schwarzenberg, the field march would have ended up in failure.²⁵ Clausewitz also drew attention to the fact that it was Bonaparte who

absolutely nowhere assessed the initiative of old Blücher. It was only at Leipzig where he defeated him; at Laon he could have destroyed him and the fact it did not happen was down to the circumstances Bonaparte could not allow for; finally at Belle-Alliance he stroke him down like a destructive lightning.²⁶

Blücher’s “(a spirit of) initiative” was in the eyes of his contemporaries balanced by his sharp temperament, rudeness and vindictiveness. The vices of the Prussian field marshal for which he was notorious for, were mentioned in relation to the

events of 1815 in his memoirs, published post-mortem under the heading “Memoirs from Beyond the Grave” (*Mémoires d’outre-tombe*), by the famous writer and politician and the pioneer of the French romanticism François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848):

Around Malmaison the Prussians were lying in wait, Blücher, drunk by wine, stumbling, was commanding to take hold of Bonaparte, to hang the conqueror who was stepping the kings on their necks. I am afraid the rate of fate, rudeness of manners and the rapidity of rise and fall of today’s heroes will deprive our times of the nobility of history: Greece and Rome did not clamour to hang Alexander [Macedonian] or Caesar.²⁷

Despite all his vices, Blücher became a folk hero of liberating wars. As the commander of the Prussian army he had, apart from Wellington in Belgium, a major merit in the victories of the war which was related to as the “Great,” lead for freedom against Napoleon I and the “French invaders.” It was Blücher who took part in victories of Allies in the “Battle of Nations” at Leipzig and in 1815 at the crucial moment he

²⁴ Clausewitz, *O válce*, 114.

²⁵ Clausewitz, *O válce*, 581.

²⁶ Clausewitz, *O válce*, 470.

²⁷ François-René de Chateaubriand, *Paměti ze záhrobí* (from the French original *Mémoires d’outre-tombe*, [Paris, 1989-1998], translated by Aleš Pohorský), (Praha, 2011), s. 353. V původním znění viz: „(...) les Prussiens rôdaient dans la voisinage de la Malmaison; Blücher, aviné, ordonnait en trébuchant de saisir, de pendre le

conquérant qui avait mis le pied sur le cou des rois. La rapidité des fortunes, la vulgarité des mœurs, la promptitude de l’élévation et de l’abaissement des personnages modernes ôtera, je le crains, à notre temps, une partie de la noblesse de l’histoire: Rome et la Grèce n’ont point parlé de pendre Alexandre et César.“ François-René de Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d’outre-tombe, Tome quatrième*, (Paris, 1860), 31.

rushed to help the Allies to contribute to the final defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo on 18 June. The term “Waterloo” actually went down in history as the synonym to a total military disaster.²⁸ For Blücher the term did not have a pejorative meaning, on the contrary—it sparkled his name, it gave his name recognition and social prestige. He received an honorary epithet “Marshal Forward” (*Marschall Vorwärts*).²⁹ It was Blücher himself, known for his personal and also commander strength who drove his soldiers forward disregarding other Allies’ fleets, which often turned out to be a tactical and strategic error.³⁰ Despite this, Napoleon recognized his significance when during the internment on the island of Saint Helena in November 1816 admitted that Wellington could not win had it not been for Blücher:

I am being reassured, (...) that it is because of him I am here and I believe it. (...) My fall and fate which I was predetermined to provided him with big fame and also to all his victories and yet he doubted that. Ah! He owes a beautiful candle to the old Blücher: had it not been for him, I do not know where His Grace, as

they call him, would be; but I would most certainly not be here.³¹

What is certain though is that Napoleon’s name kept alive alongside with the name of the Prussian marshal, a famous predecessor of the family and Napoleon’s defeater, in what the Blücher family remembers and after the final defeat of the French Emperor and his exile, as well as one of the war trophies in the shape of Napoleonic memorabilia (*napoleonicum, objet napoléonien*) was kept in the property of the family. Its historical and monument value was confirmed at the moment of its acquisition. In the victorious battle at Waterloo, the Prussians acquired Napoleon’s carriage which was prepared at Genappe and marshal Blücher had this capture moved to his mansion Wahlstatt (*Legnickie Pole*). Later the carriage was transferred to the mansion Krieblowicz (*Krobielowice*) in the Prussian Silesia where the famous marshal was buried. Gebhard Leberecht, the 3rd duke of Blücher family (1836-1916), had the carriage moved to Raduň. In his request dated 30 January 1901, about the duty-free transfer of several carriages from the family’s mansion on the German land (Krieblowitz) to his summer

²⁸ Pavel BĚLINA, *Napoleonské války – předěl v dějinách mezinárodních vztahů a vojenského umění*, in Ivan ŠEDIVÝ, Pavel BĚLINA, Jan VILÍM, and Jan Vlk (eds.), *Napoleonské války a české země*, (Praha, 2001), 43.

²⁹ Clauswitz, *O válce*, s. 705; and Schoeps, *Dějiny Pruska*, 120.

³⁰ Petr Havel – Andrej ROMAŇÁK, *Radeckého působení v čele generálních štábů (1809–1815)*, in ŠEDIVÝ – BĚLINA – VILÍM – VLK (eds.), *Napoleonské války a české země*, 154.

³¹ „On m’assure (...) que c’est par lui que je suis ici, et je le crois. (...) Ma chute et le sort qu’on me réservait lui ménageaient une gloire bien supérieure encore à toutes ses victoires, et il ne s’en est pas douté. Ah! qu’il doit un beau cierge au vieux Blücher: sans celui-là je ne sais pas où serait Sa Grace, ainsi qu’ils l’appellent; mais moi, bien sûrement, je ne serais pas ici.“ Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, I: 1514.

residency on the Austrian side of the border (Raduň), he mentioned “at the mansion Krieblowitz the carriage of Napoleon I which my great-grandfather field marshal Blücher captured after the French fleeing after the battle of Waterloo in 1815.”³² The Blücher family cherished Napoleon’s carriage of the berlin type (*landau en berline*) as a precious relic. It was to commemorate the heroic act of their renowned predecessor, a war trophy but also a relic from 1815 symbolizing the epoch of the “great history” when marshal Blücher became famous. From the symbolic meaning and historical value of this family relic, which as time went gained the estimated price, was also derived its museum value. It was actually tested by time.

In 1902, with regards to the wealthy contacts in Great Britain which were ongoing since the times of the renowned field marshal Blücher, the family considered giving the carriage to king Edward VII (1841-1910), the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of India, from the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (*Haus Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha*), at the occasion of his coronation. The British military attaché in Berlin wrote to the personal secretary of the king: “[Duke Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher] would be very pleased if the King

would accept [Napoleon’s carriage as a coronation gift] and that some label like the one enclosed be attached to it. (...) It is the identical carriage out of which Napoleon jumped after the battle of Waterloo leaving his hat, coat and sword inside (...).”³³ Nevertheless, the circumstances did not allow for this to happen. In 1913 the carriage was, together with other *napoleonics*, exhibited in Wrocław at the occasion of centennial anniversary of the victory of anti-Napoleonic coalition (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain and Sweden) at the “Battle of Nations” at Leipzig.³⁴

In 1916-1926 there was a very dramatic dispute between marshal’s great-grandsons Gebhard, the 4th Duke Blücher von Wahlstatt (1865-1931), who planned to transfer the carriage to his German estate, and his younger brother from his father’s second marriage Count Lothar (1890-1928) who in 1912 gained Raduň’s mansion of the area of 1,587 hectares with the chateau and all the facilities who wanted the carriage to stay where it was. The younger of the two, Lothar, argued during the lawsuit that he received the carriage from his father as a gift, however, he lost the lengthy dispute. Yet he locked the carriage at the basement depot of the House of Officials in the Raduň Chateau and he refused to hand it over to the court officials. A dramatic sibling

³² Eva KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, (Kroměříž, 2015), 70.

³³ Anthony de la Pour, „Phaeton Chariot(s): The Mystery of Napoleon’s Waterloo Carriage,” *The Carriage Journal* 29 (Spring 1992): 158.

³⁴ Céline Meunier, *Le landau en berline de Napoléon*, in Jean Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon. Les mystères du butin de Waterloo*, (Paris, 2012), 70.

dispute over a valuable Napoleonic memorabilia at an estimated cost of one hundred thousand Czechoslovak crowns commented on the period journal prompted the State Heritage Office for Moravia and Silesia on 23 December 1924 to send a letter addressed to the Raduň estate direction, saying that “the Office was warned by journal news that the so-called Napoleon’s carriage, deposited in Raduň, is to be taken to Germany for the intervention of a bailiff.”³⁵ The preserved concept of the manuscript response confirms that the carriage is actually to be delivered by court judgment, but it is not known “whether and when it will be. It would be good if the export of this carriage, which is very well hidden in Raduň, was banned by the authorities.”³⁶ At the same time, the unknown writer of this manuscript pleaded for an early intervention. This also happened, because on 4 February 1925 the State Heritage Office announced to the General Direction of the Blücher Estates in Bravantice that, according to the law, “the export of all artistic and historical monuments is prohibited and only rarely is such an export permitted. Napoleon’s carriage is one of the valuable monuments and it is therefore necessary to present everything to export to the State Heritage Office and ask for a possible permit.”³⁷ However, Prince Gebhard defended against this statement and argued that this was not an export, but only a transport of the carriage to his own residence. Nevertheless,

Count Lothar had no intention to surrender, he locked the carriage in the House of Officials in the Raduň Chateau and according to the recollections of old-timers he even protected this family memorabilia using a gun with blank cartridges. Ten years from filing the lawsuit the State Heritage Office for Moravia and Silesia informed the attorney of Duke Gebhard on 13 August 1926 that the Ministry of Education and National Edification allowed the Heritage Office to issue a permit for an export of the carriage on the condition that the office receives photographs of the carriage in the size of 18 x 24 taken from different angles, three copies of each. It was clear to everyone that the photographs could not be taken in advance. The written communication between the attorneys was suggesting that the relations between Count Lothar and Duke Gebhard are very tense, so for that reason it would be appropriate to withdraw the carriage on the execution basis and make the photographs inland. The attorney of Count Gebhard was supposed to take the carriage over on 20 October 1926 and manage all that was needed. The exact time of the export of the carriage is not documented and the old-timers evidence varies. One thing is clear though – the significance and museum value of Napoleon’s carriage was known to everybody in spite of incomplete and sometimes misinterpreted information which spread with this lawsuit.

³⁵ KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, 106.

³⁶ KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, 106.

³⁷ KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, 107.

To give an example, a teacher of Czech who taught the last generation of Raduň Blücher family Jan Hykl remembered a statement of his student Hugo Blücher von Wahlstatt (1913-1948), the son of Count Lothar that the family sold the carriage in 1932 to France because they were in need of money to pay for central heating at the chateau. A former Opava police managing director Jan Wiedermann left a different testimony:

The carriage was stored as part of Blüchers' property at the Silesian chateau in Raduň near Opava. In 1927 the carriage was released to German government on the basis of their request. Before it was released to Germany, I had the carriage photographed to the order of at that time Land Silesian President Josef Šrámek. I kept two photos as souvenirs.³⁸

They were then in 1961 dedicated as part of his inheritance to the historical site of the Silesian Museum in Opava by Jaroslav Wiedermann.³⁹ A former police director Wiedermann, however, mistakenly

assumed that it was Napoleon's carriage captured at the battle of Leipzig in 1813.⁴⁰

Only one historical photograph of Napoleon's carriage on a cardboard is preserved at Raduň Chateau. It was bought out into the local collections in 1992 from a private possession (see Fig. 3). It was originally assumed that it was taken in 1920 in front of the House of Officials at Raduň Chateau.⁴¹ A more probable variant, however, is that it was made earlier – soon after the carriage was transferred on 2 March 1901 from Prussian Krobietowice to Raduň via Krnov. The photograph was taken by an Opavian photographer Florian Gödel (1956-1916) who was popular with Opava nobility as a documentary photographer of interiors and exteriors of noble homes.⁴²

However, what happened to Napoleon's carriage after the lawsuit finished? It is sure that it was transferred from Raduň in 1934 and displayed as one of the crucial exhibits at the exhibition in Arsenal (*Zeughaus*) in Berlin.⁴³ The exhibition which was called "Blücher's pray" (*Die Blücher-Beute*), took over the same concept which was adopted

³⁸ KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, 107-08.

³⁹ Both photographs are in the historical sub-collection of the Silesian Museum in Opava, Inv. No. M 103/1-2.

⁴⁰ Jiří ŠÍL and Eva KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Kočár, který ukořistil hrabě Gebhart Blücher po bitvě u Waterloo*, in Ilona Matejko-Pererka (ed.), *Země a její pán. Struktury vlády a její projevy na území Rakouského Slezska do konce první světové války*, (Opava, 2014), 370, Cat. No. B4-32.

⁴¹ Jiří ŠÍL and Eva KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Kočár, který ukořistil hrabě Gebhart Blücher po bitvě u Waterloo*, in Ilona Matejko-Pererka (ed.), *Země a její pán. Struktury vlády a její projevy na území Rakouského Slezska do konce první světové války*, (Opava, 2014), 370, Cat. No. B4-32.

⁴² KOLÁŘOVÁ, *Příběh raduňského zámku*, 70.

⁴³ Robert von Arnoldi, *Une relique touchante, compte rendu de l'exposition du Zeughaus, 1934, musée militaire de Berlin*, in *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, XXVII^e année, tome XLV, juillet – décembre 1939, 230–231.

at the exhibition in Wrocław (*Breslau*) in 1913. Artefacts that the Berlin Arsenal managed to gather were supposed to present symbolically “the victory of Germany over France” and it met with a great resonance. Until 1973 when Napoleon’s carriage of the *landau* type was lent to the Malmaison Chateau, it was not presented to the public.⁴⁴ After 1944, as a result of the Second World War, it was evacuated to the south and kept by the family of Fürstenbergs in Donaueschingen currently in the State of Germany Baden-Württemberg. The Blüchers owned Napoleon’s carriage from Waterloo for more than 150 years before they decided to return it to the French. First, the heir of the renowned marshal considered selling the carriage into the collections of the local museum but eventually he agreed only with a lending. According to the contract of the deposition from 6 August 1793, concluded between the Duke Blücher and the French state:

Duke Blücher hereby declares the deposition of the carriage called *landau*, part of Emperor Napoleon I equipment, gained in the evening of June 18, 1815 in Genappe by the troops of Duke Blücher after the

battle of Waterloo, coming from the property of Duke Blücher, at the National museum at Malmaison Chateau. After the period of five years from signing this contract, the carriage will become the property of the French state with the reservation of the advisory committee and the art committee of the national museums.⁴⁵

For it to be absolutely clear from the article that it is only a deposition with the commitment of a gift, the last part of the text was adjusted on 31 October 1973, respectively abridged into this form: “After the period of five years from signing this contract, the carriage will become the full property of the French state.” On that day at 11 o’clock an official ceremony was held, where Napoleon’s carriage which arrived to Malmaison in a good shape on 17 October 1973 was passed over.⁴⁶ Duke Blücher and his daughter were present at the ceremony, together with the general director of the museums of France (*directeur des Musées de France*), members of the board of governors of *Conseil d’administration de la société des amis de Malmaison*, His Emperor Highness Prince Napoleon, prince and princess Murats and princess Eugénie of Greece. The

⁴⁴ Michael Autengruber and Laurence Wodey, *Histoire du « butin de Blücher »*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 106.

⁴⁵ „Le comte Blücher déclare par le présente déposer au Musée National du château de Malmaison la voiture, dite *landau*, des équipages de l’Empereur Napoléon I^{er}, prise à Genappe, au soir du 18 Juin 1815, par les troupes du prince Blücher, après la bataille de Waterloo, provenant de la succession du prince Blücher. À l’expiration d’un

délai de cinq ans, à dater de la signature du présent contrat, la voiture deviendra pleine propriété de l’État français sous réserve de l’agrément du comité consultatif et du conseil artistique de la réunion des musées nationaux.” Meunier, *Le landau en berline de Napoléon*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 70.

⁴⁶ Gérard Hubert, *Un précieux dépôt entre à Malmaison*, in *Revue du Souvenir napoléonien*, 273 (janvier 1974): 22–23.

ceremonial reception with the commitment of a significant acquisition for the local museum had great resonance in press and also on television. The conservator of the museum received a great number of letters from enthusiasts but at the same time from biting critics pointing out the fact that the carriage is not genuine. The former principal conservator (*conservateur en chef*) at the Compiègne Chateau, Max Terrier, in relation to the published article in *Revue du Louvre* where he explained all the important circumstances and evidence reassured that it most certainly is one of Napoleon's carriages.⁴⁷ After Duke Blücher's death in June 1975 (he died aged 75), the advisory committee of the national museums approved of the acquisition of the carriage which became part of the French national collections at the museum at Malmaison Chateau (see Fig. 4).⁴⁸ It was lent to the United States of America to an exhibition dedicated to Napoleon which took place in Memphis in 1993.⁴⁹ In 2012 a special exhibition was dedicated to Napoleon's carriage. It was held at the National museum of the Legion of Honour and of orders of chivalry (*Musée national de*

la Légion d'honneur et des ordres de chevalerie) in Paris.⁵⁰ It was in that year, 2012, when a bicentenary anniversary of the production of this carriage was commemorated. The carriage was originally intended for Napoleon's Russian campaign.

The light carriage of the *landau en berline* type was order for Napoleon I on 1 January 1812; it was made together with other eight carriages by court carriage builders Cauyette and Getting whose workshop on *rue des Martyrs* was commissioned to prepare the carriages for the Russian campaign.⁵¹ However, on the day of Emperor's departure on 9 May 1812, the carriage was not ready. It was delivered to the House of Emperor (*Maison de l'Empereur*) on 12 June, and it cost 11,561 francs and it reached the imperial staff in Vilnius.⁵² It was not his first imperial order for Getting—he also made, for instance, the coronation carriage and elegant carriages used at the marriage ceremony with the archduchess Marie Louise in 1810. On the carriage, currently deposited in the carriage house at Malmaison Chateau, there can also be found Getting's production label with

⁴⁷ Max Terrier, *Le landau de Napoléon et son histoire*, in *La revue du Louvre et des musées de France*, 1975, N°2, 105–116.

⁴⁸ Rueil-Malmaison, Musée national des châteaux de Malmaison et Bois-Préau, Inv. No. M.M.75.12.1.

⁴⁹ Meunier, *Le landau en berline de Napoléon*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 71.

⁵⁰ Laurent Ottavi, *Le butin de Waterloo reconstitué au musée de la Légion d'honneur*, on-line: <https://www.napoleon.org/histoire-des-2-empires/articles/le-butin-de-waterloo-reconstitue-au-musee-de-la-legion-dhonneur/>, cit. 2. 11. 2019.

⁵¹ In more detail to the preparations of this campaign see François Houdecek, *La Grande Armée de 1812: organisation à l'entrée en campagne*, (Paris, 2012); Frédéric Masson, *Composition et organisation des équipages de guerre de l'empereur Napoléon en 1812*, in *Carnet de la Sabretache*, vol. 2, 1894, 9.

⁵² Alphonse Maze-Sencier, *Les fournisseurs de Napoléon 1^{er} et des deux Impératrices d'après des documents inédits tirés des Archives nationales, des archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères et des archives des Manufactures de Sèvres et des Gobelins*, (Paris, 1893), 111.

numbers 429 and 301 which he was assigned by the Master of the Horse (*Grand écuyer*) Armand de Caulaincourt (1773-1827) and which refer to the general register of imperial stables (*Écuries impériales*).

The axle of the carriage was painted amaranth red and the grooves were gilded, the *panneaux* on the cabin were painted dark red, the cabin was also gilded and decorated with ornamental leaf borders. The cabin curtains were decorated with the state coat of arms of the First Empire, topped by the imperial crown. The composition is elegantly complemented by little imperial crowns. The cabin has a comfortable English form based on the latest fashion style to provide with more comfort; it was especially adjusted for Napoleon I while the axle remained robust, it was constructed by French carriage builders but made from English components which enabled to turn the carriage in 90 degrees. The doors, with wider windows than was common in carriages of this type, opened wide and were watertight. The leather sack at the front part of the carriage could change shape into a bed and the Emperor could take a rest

during the journey. The bonnet was extensible, the windows could be lowered and so the carriage could ride open. This enabled the Emperor to watch the horizon or communicate with the people who accompanied him on horses or on the other hand he could keep privacy and work or take a rest in the interior. There was storage space which was of an advantage – the front one on the axle for the case with Emperor's foldable field bed, the back one in the interior for a vanity case (*nécessaire*) and a case for bottles of wine or liqueurs. The lanterns, which provided sophisticated lighting, did not survive.⁵³

The carriage was used during the Russian campaign, it avoided catastrophes which followed the haul and it again drove out on 10 June 1815 to serve the Emperor. On 17 June, it was probably at the mansion Caillou with other equipment and on June 18, on the day of the crucial battle, the carriages remained gathered except for one carriage of the *dormeuse* type. This carriage was left near the battle field and got caught in mud when driving into Genappe before it was seized by the Prussian major Heinrich Eugen von Keller (1783-1842).⁵⁴ The

⁵³ Jehanne Lazaj (ed.), *Le bivouac de Napoléon. Luxe impérial en campagne*, (Ajaccio – Milan, 2014), 22–23; Céline Meunier, *Berline de Waterloo*, in Bernard Chevallier (ed.), *Musée national des châteaux de Malmaison et Bois-Préau*, (Paris, 2006), 98–99; Meunier, *Le landau en berline de Napoléon*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 67; Thierry Lentz, *La prise des voitures de Napoléon par les Prussiens au soir de Waterloo*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 55–66; and Xavier Aiolfi, *Après tout, je ne suis qu'un homme... Napoléon intime*, (Paris, 2008), 172–74.

⁵⁴ Later this carriage was transferred to London where it was, in 1816, exhibited before it was destroyed. It burnt during a massive fire in Madame Tussauds Museum in 1925. There only remained the axle which was in the collections of Malmaison Chateau in 1975, Inv. No. M.M.D.26.1, and six keys to this carriage which the *premier piquer* and Napoleon's cocher Achille Thomas-L'Union Archambault (1792-1858) took with him, Inv. No. M.M.40.47.4687–4692.

carriage of the *landau* type, Emperor's personal carriage, drove out of Caillou with the other carriages on the orders of general Étienne Radet (1762-1825), the Grand Provost of the Central Headquarters (*grand prévôt du quartier général*), due to their momentary needlessness. The convoy set on towards Genappe where it was unyoked and awaited other orders.⁵⁵ Napoleon, when the battle was decided, made orders, as the imperial etiquette ordered, to yoke his *landau*, the light type of the carriage with the foldable bonnet for a quick movement between two wings of the army or two scenes of the battle. However, the circumstances did not allow for him to leave in the carriage. He played for time. Not to be captured, before the arrival of the Prussian soldiers, he got out of the carriage and continued on a horseback. Several cavaliers helped him to make his way out. It was the night from 18-19 June 1815. His *landau* was seized – just like other four carriages of the House of Emperor – raided by the Prussian troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment in direct proximity of Genappe without knowing then of its extraordinary importance.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Report of Radet, 19 June 1815, quoted in Jean Thiery, *Waterloo*, (Berger-Levrault, 1943), 245.

⁵⁶ Cavalrymen of the 2nd squadron of Branderburg Uhlans, their commander was lieutenant Golz and the battalion of fusiliers of 25th Infantry Regiment under the command of major von Witzleben soon joined the fusiliers of 15th infantry regiment together with captain von Humbracht under the command of general von Keller.

⁵⁷ Meunier, *Le landau en berline de Napoléon*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 67.

The seized carriages were gathered nearby Villers on 20 June 1815 whilst the carriage of the *dormeuse* type was taken to Quatre-Bras by Keller. The general had it transferred from there to Düsseldorf where his wife, baroness von Keller, was awaiting it.⁵⁷ On the same day the field marshal Blücher, the chief commander of the Prussian army, captured the carriage of the *landau* type. He was convinced it could be the carriage in which Napoleon was almost captured and where there allegedly were his personal things and other valuables. He rewarded the soldiers who handed the war trophy over to him on the morning of 9 June 1815 “as a sign of the most gracious respect and remembrances of the great pursuit,”⁵⁸ and in a letter from the battlefield of Belle-Alliance he informed his wife that “[Napoleon's] medal decorations which [the Emperor] wore were just handed over to me. There were seized in one of his carriages.”⁵⁹

⁵⁸ „...als Zeichen der ehrerbietigsten Verehrung und Gedenkezeichen an die ruhmvolle Verfolgung (...).“ E[rnst]. H[einrich]. Ludwig Stawitzky, *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25^{sten} Infanterie-Regiments und seines Stammes, der Infanterie des von Lütow'schen Frei-Corps*, (Koblenz, 1857), 104.

⁵⁹ „...Seine Orden die er selbst getragen sind mich soeben gebracht. Sie sind in einen seiner Wagen genom, (...).“ Enno von COLOMB (ed.), *Blücher in Briefen aus den Feldzügen 1813-1815*, (Stuttgart, 1876); Brief LV., Schlachtfeld la Bellealliance, sine dat., 150.

On 20 June 1815,⁶⁰ Napoleon's *landau* carriage was to be seized by Blücher who was moving between Gosselies and Soire-sur-Sambre. As a “Hero of the Day” intoxicated by pride from the final victory over Napoleon, he sent his wife Katharina Amalia (1772-1850) an exaggerated message:

Napoleon fled at night without his hat and sword. I will send the hat and sword today to the king; his richly decorated ceremonial coat [and his] carriage are in my possession, as well as his field-glass he watched us through on the day of battle; I will send you the carriage, it is a pity that it was greatly damaged; all his treasures and precious items have become the booty of our troops, there was nothing left of his equipment; many soldiers shared 5–6000 thalers of the booty; [Napoleon] was in his carriage to withdraw when he was surprised by our troops, he fired from there, mounted a horse without a sword, let his hat fall, and escaped protected by the night, but

heaven itself knows where [he has gone].”⁶¹

The field marshal was not satisfied only with material booty. The reputation of the French Emperor as an invincible commander was long shaken, therefore Blücher decided to attack against a more sensitive point and win a major trophy – Napoleon's honour. He was not there when the Prussian troops looted the captured carriages of the French Emperor, his house and staff, nor could he know that the hat, coat, and sword, as well as captured medals and other valuables, had not been in the seized *landau* carriage. Therefore he spread an even more fictitious version of this untrue story, which was supposed to spread across Europe and amaze by his dramatic fable: the moment the Emperor stepped out on the footstool of his carriage, the Prussian officer reportedly stepped over the opposite door; Napoleon frightened of an unexpected encounter with such a fearsome adversary, the loser fled, losing his hat and his sword. Blücher ordered the Chief of his General Staff, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760–1831) to include this story

⁶⁰ The dating of the letter of June 20, 1815, is mentioned in a re-edition of Blücher's Correspondence of 1913 (*Blüchers Briefe, vervollständigte Sammlung des Generals E[nno]. v[on]. Colomb; hrsg. von W[olfgang]. v[on]. Unger, [Stuttgart, 1913]*), in the original edition of 1876 the letter's date is on June 25, 1815 in Gosselies.

⁶¹ „(...) Napoleon ist in der Nacht ohne Hut und Degen entwischt, seinen Hut und [seinen] Degen schicke ich heute am König, sein überaus Reicher Staatsmantel, sein Wagen sind in meinen Händen, auch sein Perspektiv, wodurch er uns am Schlachttage beseh[e]n, besitze ich; den Wagen will ich dir schicken, es ist nur Schade, daß er

beschädigt ist, seine Juwelen und alle seine Preciosen sind unseren Truppen zur Beute geworden, von seiner Equipage ist ihm nichts geblieben, mancher Soldat hat 5–6000 Thlr. Beute gemacht, er war im Wagen um sich zurückzugeben, als er von unseren Truppen überrascht wurde, er sprang heraus, warf sich ohne Degen zu Pferde, wobei ihm der Hut abgefallen, und so ist er wahrscheinlich durch die Nacht begünstigt entkommen, aber der Himmel weiß, wohin. (...)“ Colomb(ed.), *Blücher in Briefen*; Brief LVI., Gosselies den 25. Juni 1815, (Dictirt.), 151–152.

in his first report, which he also edited and spread.⁶² The scene has become a sensation as well as a popular iconographic theme for art, as illustrated by several graphics, paintings, and drawings that soon appeared and projected the degraded image of the defeated French Emperor by striking means of then widely spread anti-Napoleonic cartoons. The scene was conceived even more dramatically by artists and writers than the rumours of the battlefield or the memories of some witnesses: Napoleon's coachman pierced by Prussian bayonets and Napoleon fleeing on horseback often without his hat, sword or his honour.⁶³ Another theme was also popular - the immortalization of the field marshal Blücher with the war booty, as it was romanticized in the spirit of period historicism by the Berlin painter Rudolf Eichstaedt (1857-1924), focusing on genre, portrait, and historical painting.⁶⁴

Marshal Blücher, as well as other actors who had participated in a war campaign culminating successfully on the battlefield at Waterloo in June 1815, were impressed by the idea of building his image on the fragmented image of the defeated French

Emperor. It was understandable; they lived in a turbulent time of wars and heroes, and now they were claiming to enjoy Napoleon's bask in the glory. They wrote their letters and memoirs to tell the world: "*I was there.*" The captured war trophies, valuables and personal items of Napoleon and his imperial house, *Napoleonic Memorabilia*, guardians of historical memory, kept in their dwellings and presented at jubilee exhibitions were to be their witnesses. As Michael Autengruber and Laurence Wodey (2012) pointed out, "the legend also demanded that all the booty be found in the Emperor's car, as this increased the charm of the items and the prestige of their new owners."⁶⁵ Indeed, history has always been used to agree with victors in war.

Napoleon's carriage *landau*, which was brought to his estate by Marshal Blücher, was destined to become a bearer of the myth, conceived by the field marshal himself in the contours of period romanticism, and then be kept in the family memory of the Blüchers. The first blows to this myth in the world arena were dealt by Napoleon himself, who, in exile on the island of Saint Helena, waged his last battle

⁶² Stawitzky, *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25^{sten} Infanterie-Regiments*, 124–125.

⁶³ Such an iconographic program is offered on an engraving of English origin from 1816, or by an engraving of German origin, kept at the Fontainebleau Chateau; the reproduction see Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 64–65.

⁶⁴ A transfer of Eichstaedt's painting under the title *1815 Blücher empfängt bei Genappe die erbeuteten Orden, Hut und Degen Napoleons* [translation *Blücher takes possession of Napoleon's orders, hat and sword after the Battle of Waterloo, 18*

June 1815] was made by J. Arndt. A copy of a painting by Eichstaedt is also kept in *Musée de la Légion d'honneur* in Paris, see Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 77.

⁶⁵ „*La légende voulut aussi que tout le butin fût trouvé dans la voiture de l'empereur, car celle-ci augmentait la magie des objets et le prestige de leurs nouveaux propriétaires.*“ Autengruber and Wodey, *Histoire du « butin de Blücher »*, in Tulard (ed.), *La Berline de Napoléon*, 79.

with a historical memory, culminating in the posthumous publication of his memories in 1823; in 1817 he did not hesitate to designate Blücher as a general without talent when speaking to Edward Barry O'Meara. In 1857, less than 40 years after the death of Marshal Blücher, Ernst Heinrich Ludwig Stawitzky, captain of the 25th Prussian Infantry Regiment (*Hauptmann im 25^{sten} Infanterie-Regiment*), dealt this myth another blow. Based on period reports and reports by major Konstantin von Witzleben (1784-1845) and other direct participants at the Genappe events, he put the records straight. According to him, the fact that the Emperor, who intended to travel from Genappe to Quatre-Bras and Philippeville in his carriage, jumped up near Genappe at the last minute as the Prussian tirailleur approached the carriage, the information was information previously appearing in publications, but which was disproved by the revision of historical facts related to the period reports of the campaign in 1815. For its obvious impossibility, it was subject to critical analysis. Stawitzky proved that the French Emperor had left Genappe on horseback at around ten o'clock in the evening, while the first Prussian soldiers arrived only an hour later; so they could not directly chase the French Emperor, nor surprise him in the chariot. The "Hero of the Day" field marshal Blücher arrived in

Genappe only half an hour before midnight.⁶⁶

Today we live at a different time, trying to understand the past without prejudice; more important than myths is real knowledge. Therefore we examine the traces of the past so that we can understand the past itself. Napoleon's Waterloo carriage *landau* appropriated by the field marshal Blücher as his war booty was also freed from the myth attributed to him by historical events and their main actors. More than a well-deserved reputation for being a war trophy acquired under dramatic circumstances, which had accompanied the carriage for decades in the history of mentalities in the Blücher estates, it began to be internationally understood as a museum value bearer in the field of museums and cultural heritage protection due to its extraordinary historical significance. Thus, in 2012, commemorating the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's Russian campaign, it was presented as part of an exhibition project in Paris as the carriage of Emperor Napoleon I, which was used and which successfully returned from this campaign before returning to serve the Emperor in 1815, and as one of a few carriages captured in Genappe survived looting and remained preserved to the present days. As a gift from the Blücher family to the French state, it was in 1975, one hundred and sixty years later, released from its destiny to be a

⁶⁶ Stawitzky, *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25^{sten} Infanterie-Regiments*, 98–101 and 124–125.

war trophy and enriched the French national collections as important *Napoleonic Memorabilia* (*napoleonicum*, *objet napoléonien*) and exceptional museum exhibit at Malmaison Chateau. Although it lost its status of rare family memorabilia of a renowned ancestor, attributed to it at the

Raduň Chateau, however, it became important memorabilia of common European history, referring to the prominent figures of politics and military that shaped and influenced it during and after the Napoleonic Wars.



Fig. 1 Raduň Chateau located nearby Opava in the historical Czech Silesia, Czech Republic (National Heritage Institute – Raduň Chateau)



Fig. 2 Gebhard Leberecht Blücher von Wahlstatt (1742–1819), portrait, oil on canvas, Karl Dudde, 1913 (*National Heritage Institute – Raduň Chateau, Inv. No. RD 55*)



Fig. 3 *Historical photograph of Napoleon's carriage from Waterloo on a cardboard preserved at Raduň Chateau, Florian Gödel, 1901 (National Heritage Institute – Raduň Chateau, Inv. No. RD 2584)*



Fig. 4 *Napoleon's carriage (berline en landau) from Waterloo at the Malmaison Chateau, Cauyette and Getting, 1812 (photo by Marian Hochel)*

Napoleon's Sarcophagus Made of “Russian Porphyry”

by Nataliya Tanshina

On 15 December 1840 the epochal event took place in Paris, which was called by Victor Hugo the “monumental nonsense”: the ceremonial reburial of the remains of Napoleon Bonaparte. After long negotiations with the British government, the son of King Louis-Philippe, Duke of Joinville, on the ship of *Belle Poule*, delivered the remains of the Emperor from the Isle of St. Helena.¹ “I desire that my remains rest on the banks of the Seine, among the French people I have loved so much,” thus, almost twenty years after death, Napoleon will was fulfilled. Napoleon's coffin, after the solemn funeral ceremony, was installed in the chapel of St. Hieronymous the Cathedral of Invalides. However, the issue of the construction of the tombstone stretched for another long twenty years, and the history of the sarcophagus was most directly related to the French expedition to the North of Russia. Why did it happen to go so far and make such a difficult enterprise? The fact is that the architect of the sarcophagus, Louis Visconti, proposed to perform it from the red ancient porphyry, which previously covered the remains of the Roman emperors and was generally considered the Royal stone. But where to find porphyry? Roman opencast mines

were exhausted. There were attempts to find it in Greece, Corsica, in various areas of France – everything was in vain. When the plans were almost changed, it became clear that porphyry was in Russia and Finland, from St. Petersburg to Paris the samples were even sent.

That time the famous French Explorer and scientist, Louis-Antoine Léouzon Le Duc was arranging an expedition to the North of Europe, planning to visit Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Russia (Léouzon Le Duc studied the Nordic countries for nearly forty years and made 20 trips. When he was very young, he was in Finland. He made a commented translation into French of the national Finnish epic *Kalevala*. Among others, he wrote the works *Tsar Alexander II, History of Northern Literature, National Poems of Modern Sweden*.² Léouzon Le Duc was already in St. Petersburg from September 1840 to September 1842 and collected data on the literature of Northern Europe. The Ministry of the Internal Affairs decided to seize the opportunity to entrust Léouzon Le Duc with the operation and transportation of porphyry.

About that expedition, which lasted three years, we know from Léouzon Le Duc's own work: *Memories and Impressions of*

¹ N. P. Tanshina, “The ‘Napoleonic Legend’ in France in the Years of the July Monarchy,” *New and Newest History* 5 (2016): 26-44.

² Louis-Antoine Léouzon Le Duc, *Souvenirs et impressions de voyage dans les pays du Nord de l'Europe, Suède, Finlande, Danemark, Russie*. 2 ed. (Paris: Librairie Ch. Delagrave, 1896), 4.

Traveling to the Nordic Countries: Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Russia (Souvenirs et impressions de voyage dans les pays du Nord de l'Europe, Suède, Finlande, Danemark, Russie). The chapter of that book, dedicated to the journey of porphyry to Russia, was published in 1873 in the form of a small brochure: "Napoleon's Sarcophagus in the House of Invalides" (*Le sarcophage de Napoleon en son tombeau des Invalides*).³ Note that the French in the Nineteenth Century actively mastered the northern territories. In the late 1830s, an international expedition to the Russian North was planned under the direction of J.-P. Gaimard with the participation of the Russian scientists. However, that expedition did not take place.⁴



Louis-Antoine Léouzon Le Duc

Léouzon Le Duc chose not the best time to travel to Russia. The 1830s-1840s were a very difficult period in the history of the Russian-French relations. This was due to Nicholas I's rejection of the July monarchy

regime. The fact that the Emperor considered the "king of the barricades" Louis-Philip to be the usurper of the throne, who "stole" the crown of the young Duke of Bordeaux, grandson of Charles X. But this hostility to the King and the July monarchy did not spread on the Emperor Napoleon, to whom the king had the unalterable respect.

So, at the end of August 1846, Léouzon Le Duc was in the Russian capital. He visited St. Petersburg, where he was primarily interested in the Institute of Mining Engineers (modern Mining University). Of all the sights his attention was attracted the Alexandrian column and to St. Isaac's Cathedral, which was under construction at that moment, both being the creations of his

countryman Auguste Montferrand (for Léouzon Le Duc the technical side was of great importance: the Alexandrian column was made of Finnish granite, in the construction of St. Isaac's Cathedral

³Louis-Antoine Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage de Napoleon en son tombeau des Invalides* (Paris: Typographie Georges Chamerot, 1873).


⁴N.P. Tanshina, "Joseph-Paul Gaimard and the failed Russian-French Arctic expedition," *The*

Arctic: History and Modernity. Proceedings of the Second International Scientific Conference (April 2017): 26-34.

granite, marble and porphyry were used).⁵ Léouzon Le Duc was especially interested in the caryatids of St. Isaac's Cathedral, the granite blocks weighing two thousand pounds (33 tons), which were delivered by Ladoga. The work on erecting the columns was very long, which was due, according to Léouzon Le Duc, both to technical difficulties and to the peculiarities of the national character: as it is known, according to the Frenchman, the workers are incredibly lazy and extremely careful.⁶ Léouzon Le Duc visited the workshops for stone cutting and grinding in Peterhof and studied the possibility of transporting blocks in Kronstadt.

First, it was decided to search for porphyry on the island of land, located 180 kilometers to the West of St. Petersburg, between

Estonia and Finland. Léouzon Le Duc was there during his last trip, where he had to stop because of the storm, and knew about the vast mineral wealth of the island. The island, however, still had to be reached by the Russian roads, always being amazing to foreigners, including Léouzon Le Duc. "Our worst back roads compared to local are beautiful and well maintained highways," he wrote.⁷ Because of the poor condition of the roads, vehicles constantly broke down; the Frenchman broke the carriage, had to move into a postal cart; a few miles later—in an even more primitive cart. Finally, wet and flinched to the bone, Léouzon Le Duc arrived in Vyborg. Italian engineer Bugatti, accompanying him, who had long settled in Russia, and another assistant, laughing at the pampered Frenchman,



Island Hogland

⁵ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 15.

⁶ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 16.

⁷ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 18-19.

encouraged him with the screams: "Long live Napoleon!"⁸

Then through the Gulf of Finland they got to Hogland—15 leagues by the sea on a small barge over four days, where it was possible to hide only be in the captain's cabin. Finally, he reached the island, on which were two villages—Northern and Southern. As an ethnologist, Léouzon Le Duc was interested in the customs of the local population. According to him, there lived 640 people who spoke Finnish and Estonian, who adhered to the Lutheran religion. "Immune to the revolutions taking place in the world, they live peacefully, going fishing, which serves as a means of

livelihood and earnings. They have a pastor, the head, managing on behalf of the Russian government" (These lands became Russian since 1710).⁹ Porphyry on the island was in abundance; the locals made it the foundation for their huts; however, the stone of the necessary color and homogeneity was not found there.¹⁰

Then Léouzon Le Duc had to go to Olonets province (Olonets province is an administrative unit of the Russian Empire; the provincial town of Petrozavodsk region). According to him, there was also porphyry. Local roads were even worse: "What I was saying about the state of the roads between St. Petersburg and Finland,



Village Choksha, Karelia

⁸ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 19.

⁹ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 23.

¹⁰ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 24.

only weakly characterizes the local roads.”¹¹ “Is it possible to call it roads? Meanwhile, with the exception of three or four highways, this was the state of all Russian roads.” Finally they arrived in Olonets district, settled in the house of a farmer in the village under the name of Ignatius. Here Léouzon Le Duc began to examine the banks of the Onega Lake and the river Svir (Svir is a big river in the Northeast of the Leningrad region, near its administrative border with the Republic of), on foot, then on horseback, then on a boat, then in a cart. He was sleeping on a bench, eating “peasant black bread,” “experiencing all the hardships of the impoverished and the wild life.”

Léouzon Le Duc did not like the local population. In his opinion, “the inhabitants of the Olonets district have nothing inherent from the Finnish pure and pristine nature.” Most of them are stone carvers, real artists who sell their products in towns where, according to Léouzon Le Duc, they are infected with greed and other vices. Among those who avoided this contagion, there are many naive and superstitious people. So they abstain from tobacco, because they say Christ never smoked. Others, pointing to the stones, pointing to the mountain streams, with all the seriousness claim that they rise from the turmoil of the earth in the Holy Friday. “Some rich peasants like to decorate altars with the most remarkable gifts. I saw with

what zeal, with their own money, they built real basilicas.” They speak Russian, mixed with old Karelian and Finnish, in Olonets district. According to Léouzon Le Duc, men are very handsome, but women are exceptionally unattractive; he did not meet any pretty girl.¹² However, such judgments are characteristic to nearly all French, who traveled to Russia.

Like all foreign travelers, Léouzon Le Duc presents anecdotes in his works, giving them for a clean coin. For example, he tells the story of how Peter I, having met once in these parts a fat man, who could not lose weight, sent him with a note to Prince A. Menshikov, from where he was sent directly to work in the mines, where for two years he became as lean as a rail. And when the tsar saw him in the mine, he allegedly said to him: “I hope you are happy with me. Did you get rid of excess weight! What a slim waist! Excellent treatment, isn't it?! Go, and remember that work is the best cure for your illness!”¹³ In the view of the French, the Emperor was talking with the men only using the pronoun “You.” According to Léouzon Le Duc, Peter the Great, overdid with mercy in respect of his unfortunate subject. With the same success he could take a trip to Russia for a few weeks without any food except that he found while traveling. And, of course, he would not have found anything.

¹¹ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 24-25.

¹² Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 29.

¹³ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 31.

But back to the events of 1846, in a place called Shoksha (Ancient Vepsian village in Prionezhsky district of the Republic of Karelia, founded in 1563. Veps are small Baltic-Finnish people living in Karelia, Vologda and Leningrad regions) Léouzon Le Duc found a mine with undeveloped red porphyry, homogeneity and color which fully met all the requirements. It was necessary to start mining the mineral, but for this it was necessary to obtain the permission of the Russian authorities, and then to agree on its extraction and transportation to France.¹⁴ Both tasks were very complex. According to Léouzon Le Duc, he was at the center of the conflict of competence of the two administrative centers, which depended on obtaining a permit. As a result, the necessary document had to apply directly to the Emperor Nicholas.

As Léouzon Le Duc wrote, he prepared a document that Prince Volkonsky, Minister of the Imperial court, presented to the Emperor at the meeting of the State Council. The Emperor, starting to read, said with a solemn voice: "What a fate! We struck the first fatal blow to this man with the fire of our ancient and holy capital, and they came to us to ask for his grave!" According to Léouzon Le Duc, Nicholas ordered that the French be given every assistance, and that the tax for the development and extraction of porphyry from the French was not levied.¹⁵ As

Léouzon Le Duc wrote, between Russia and Napoleon the highest compromise was eventually reached: "Throughout his life, he in vain tried to turn the Empire of the Kings in the most beautiful trophy of his glory. As a result, the great captain, after his death, received at least the most beautiful decoration of his grave."¹⁶

Perfectly aware of the difficulties of the expedition, including bureaucratic, Le Duc tried to interest the Russian government: the traveler knew that in St. Petersburg there was a collection of French manuscripts from the archive of the Bastille, exported from France by the Russian diplomat P.P. Dubrovsky (after the assault of the Bastille on 14 July 1789), the archival documents stored in the prison were thrown out into the street and literally dragged away. Some of the documents got to the Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Paris and a passionate collector of the manuscripts P. P. Dubrovsky. It is not known for certain whether he himself visited the Bastille in those days, stuffing, like others, pockets of manuscripts, or bought up what was possible. Then Dubrovsky took them to Russia. These documents became the basis of the current Russian national library and are in the Department of manuscripts of the Russian National Library. In France, the first information about Dubrovsky's collection appeared in 1806, but then did not attract much attention. Only since the mid-

¹⁴ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 33.

¹⁵ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 34.

¹⁶ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 12.

Nineteenth Century the French began systematical study of these documents.¹⁷ In 1812, during the Patriotic war, it was decided to transport them to Olonets district, where the French, if they had reached St. Petersburg, could not find them.¹⁸ However, Léouzon Le Duc did not know that the manuscripts were returned to the capital in December 1812. Manuscripts ordered by the Minister of Education were evacuated to Karelia in September 1812. “All manuscripts and the best books” in the amount of 150,000 volumes were packed in 189 boxes and sent by water to the North. Already in December, the documents were returned to 108 carts. The total weight of the cargo was 3,219 pounds.¹⁹

According to Olenin’s report there were no losses (boxes were never opened). But in fact, apparently, some documents disappeared (for example, in the early 1840s there emerged one letter from the collection of the Depot manuscripts). But even if the losses were, they were single and certainly not of a large complex. As time in 1842, someone



Louis Visconti

published the material about this letter. Maybe Léouzon Le Duc read it and decided there were a lot of them.

What was the price of the question? In the French newspapers they wrote that the Emperor made a gift to France. Indeed, the concession for the development of porphyry was ceded to France (according to Léouzon Le Duc, the patent cost 6 thousand francs). As for mining, taking into account the costs of operation and transportation of porphyry, it cost the French about 200 thousand francs. But Léouzon Le Duc had to admit that thanks to the patronage of the Emperor all the administrative obstacles were overcome, and from now on

all the doors were easily opened to the French.²⁰ Engineer Bugatti went to work with great zeal and energy. Léouzon Le Duc himself, sick of the accumulated fatigue, was forced from time to time to return to France. In his career he was replaced by the attaché of the French Embassy Cazener, who recorded the progress of work. Léouzon Le Duc was very pleased with the result: it was

¹⁷ Lyublinskaya A. D., *Bastille and its library // French Yearbook*. 1959. (Moscow: Nauka, 1959), 104-26.

¹⁸ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 17.

¹⁹ *The Imperial Public library for a hundred years, 1814-1914* (St. Petersburg: Imprimerie Kirschbaum, 1914), 71.

²⁰ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 35.

possible to obtain uniform blocks for the sarcophagus box and its interior decoration, as well as to extract a giant block for the lid and cornice.²¹

When all these solid, homogeneous, red-colored blocks were extracted, each of them was separated by a piece for comparison. When the tone matched, the block was closed and painted. In order to find 15 suitable blocks, it was necessary to revise about two hundred blocks. As a result of these works, the landscape around the lake changed beyond recognition: “The shores of Lake Onega, speckled with mines, are now a picture of a terrible natural disaster, worthy of the memory of the famous dead man, to whom they gave the grave.”²²

How was the creation of the sarcophagus of Russian porphyry perceived in France? In fact, after the publication in 1843 of the book by the Marquis de Custine, Russia’s reputation was thoroughly tarnished, and Russophobic sentiments were very common in the French society. According to Léouzon Le Duc, most Newspapers reacted to the idea of creating a sarcophagus of the Russian porphyry in a hostile way. Someone blamed the Russian origin of the mineral; others found porphyry brittle. They wrote that red porphyry in abundance could be found in many areas of France, and, accordingly, it was absolutely useless to go after it in such a distant expedition. According to Léouzon Le Duc, all those doubts did not affect the

result; architect Visconti organized a special competition, so that the most competent experts could express their opinion. In the pages of his work, Le Duc leads the position of the member of the French Academy, Professor of the Museum of Natural History Cordier. In his opinion, only the Egyptian porphyry was matching with the Russian porphyry in its quality. Such a saturated color of red antique shade, as in Russia, nowhere else could not be found. In addition, the Russian porphyry was very strong, homogeneous, with clear and smooth edges, ideal for polishing, interspersed with quartz that provided excellent shine.²³

The extraction of porphyry was completed; no less difficult task remained – to transport it to France. The way was as follows: through Lake Onega, River Svir, Volkhov, Ladoga Canal, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic and Northern seas, and finally through Le Havre by the Seine to Paris. The season of year was very unfavourable for this enterprise, because autumn already entered the rainy season and storms.²⁴ In the beginning, the cargo was almost destroyed on Lake Onega. Barely blocks were immersed in a specially prepared barge, a terrible hurricane came; the ship lurched and many of the blocks came off and sank. A large part of the cargo was saved, however, the transport of the porphyry was postponed until the next year. Finally, after three months of difficult journey porphyry was taken to Paris, to the

²¹ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 35.

²² Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 36.

²³ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 37.

²⁴ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 38.

embankment d'Orsay, where the citizens could admire them. Then blocks were delivered to the Cathedral of Les Invalides where left on the shipyard for two more years. There, with the help of a steam machine, the stone was shaped like a sarcophagus.²⁵

The work on the creation of the sarcophagus and reconstruction of the interior dragged on for twenty years. During this time, France managed to change several regimes. In February 1848, during the revolution, the July monarchy collapsed; the Second Republic was established in France. In 1849 the nephew of Napoleon, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte came to power as President and became, in December 1852, Emperor Napoleon III.

The tomb of the Emperor Napoleon under the dome of the Cathedral of St. Louis of Les Invalides was inaugurated only on April 7, 1861, by the Archbishop of Paris, in the presence of Napoleon III, surrounded by the princes of the blood, marshals, top officers, members of the Council of State and other important personalities. Sculptor Visconti did not live to inauguration.²⁶

As for Léouzon Le Duc, he visited Russia back in 1852 and wrote three more books about our country: In 1853 there was his work "Modern Russia", republished in 1854 and "Russian question." In 1854 "Russia and European civilization" was published.²⁷ The works were written before and during the Crimean War, which largely determined their anti-Russian rhetoric. Famous French researcher of Franco-Russian intellectual relations Michel Cadot considers the work of Léouzon Le Duc hostile to Russia. In my opinion, this is true for the last books of Léouzon Le Duc, but as for the work, which describes the journey to the North of Europe and the expedition to Russia for porphyry, it is hardly possible to talk about Russo-phobic tone. I agree with M. Cadot, which is more typical for French authors retelling of anecdotes and well-established clichés. As to the fact that roads are bad and the bureaucracy is insurmountable, we do know it ourselves. It took another thirty-five years ... and even Emperor Nicholas II stood with his head uncovered at the sarcophagus of Napoleon Bonaparte.

²⁵ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 39.

²⁶ Léouzon Le Duc, *Le sarcophage*, 7-8.

²⁷ M. Cadot, *La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française. 1839-1856* (Paris: Fayard, 1967), 156.



Napoleon's Sarcophagus, Hôtel des Invalides

“Metternich’s Delicate Dance of 1813: Diplomacy Between Eagles”

by Paul van Lunteren

Introduction

At the end of 1812 it became clear that Napoleon had lost his campaign in Russia. In his attempt to stop the Tsar from trading with Great Britain, he had lost a large part of his army. Napoleon knew that his powerful image in Europe had been ruined drastically. Therefore, he rushed to Berlin, even though his army was still in retreat. Napoleon planned to build up a new army in order to start a fresh campaign in the spring of 1813. In the meantime, the Russian Army marched to the west. At the close of the year, a Prussian corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, joined the Russians at Tauroggen (nowadays Tauragė in Latvia).¹ This step brought the Prussian government in a state of embarrassment. Prussia was bound to the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, making it an unwilling ally—but still an ally(!)—of the French empire.²

This changed rapidly during the first months of 1813, when the coalition against Napoleon got expanded with two new members. Great Britain succeeded in luring Sweden into the coalition, while Russia persuaded the Prussian king to take the

gamble.³ At the end of March 1813, France was at war with four countries and Napoleon faced a hard time. The British still controlled the seas, the combined armed forces of Prussia and Russia gathered in Poland and Sweden prepared an expedition to the mainland. At the same time French forces were still bogged down in the bloody civil war in Spain.

Until then, one major power remained out of the conflict: the Austrian Empire. For four years, Austria was in a certain way also bound to France, although it was offered more freedom to act than, for instance, Prussia. Nevertheless, Austria was humiliated by Napoleon in the short war of 1809 and the House of Habsburg was bound to the French dynasty through the marriage of archduchess Marie Louise with Napoleon in 1810, but in the spring of 1813, Austria was confronted—like the rest of Europe—with a new reality and it had to make a choice concerning its position.⁴ Should it join the war against Prussia and Russia or should it remain neutral? An alliance gave the French emperor the support of 250.000 soldiers, while observing neutrality meant that the Austrian borders could easier be defended

¹ Adam Zamoyski, *1812. Napoleons fatale veldtocht naar Moskou* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2004), 464.

² Eckart Kleßmann, *Napoleon und die Deutschen* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2007), 128 and 130.

³ In doing so, Great Britain agreed with a future Swedish occupation of Norway and, therefore, sealed the fate of Denmark. Sweden annexed Norway in 1814.

⁴ Franz Herre, *Napoleon. Eine biographie* (München: Kreuzlingen, 2006), 156.



Berlin

Stahlstich v. C. E. Weber

1838

C.W.N.L. FÜRST VON METTERNICH
Kaiserl. Oesterreich. Staats-Kanzler

Verlag der Richterschen Buchhandlung in Berlin.

against the French. A third scenario, to join the war on the side of Prussia and Russia, seemed hazardous, because in the case of defeat there would not be any guarantee for the Habsburg Monarchy.

Clemens von Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, was faced with this dilemma in the spring of 1813. He was desperate to maintain a certain balance between France and Russia, but on the other hand knew that things were changing rapidly.⁵ It became a delicate case concerning diplomatic ties and interests with France and the Allied countries. How did he react to this? Which steps did he take? And how did he deal with the balance between the belligerents? In this article Metternich's 'delicate dance' of 1813 is examined.

"The first steps on the floor"

Metternich started his 'dance' at the end of May 1813. At that point, the Prussian and Russian armies were pushed into a defensive position along the River Spree after they were beaten in the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. But the war was not lost yet. Both sides paused in order to strengthen its forces.⁶ Metternich expected an Allied retreat towards Silesia which, in that case, would drive Austria literally into a corner. For him, the defeat at Bautzen

was the sign for Austria to make a choice regarding the conflict:

I had made my choice. The point was this—to prevent Napoleon's onward march, and to remove all uncertainty as to the decision of the Emperor from the minds of the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William. The Russian army was much demoralized; it had but one wish—to get back into its own territory.⁷

In the Laxenburg Castle near Vienna, Metternich proposed to Emperor Francis that he should join the Austrian forces in Bohemia. Austria might have been officially a neutral player in the conflict, it nevertheless assembled its main army in Bohemia. Metternich hoped that, when the Austrian Emperor joined this army, his presence alone would exercise a serious impression of Austria's independent position in the conflict, both on France as on Prussia and Russia. At the same time, Austria could not afford it to challenge unnecessarily one or the other party. Therefore, Metternich had to take this step slowly and carefully.

On 31 May, Emperor Francis left the capital of Vienna for Gitschin (now: Jičín). Meanwhile, Metternich dispatched couriers

⁵ Charles Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 504.

⁶ David Hamilton-Williams, *The Fall of Napoleon. The Final Betrayal* (London: Brockhampton Press, 1994), 31.

⁷ Clemens von Metternich, *The autobiography 1773-1815* (Welwyn Garden City: Ravenhall Books, 2004), 176.

to the Allied headquarters in Silesia and to the city of Dresden, where Napoleon was staying. They delivered the message that Austria was prepared to be a mediator in the conflict.⁸ In doing so, Metternich started to maneuver Austria on the ‘dancefloor’ of European politics.

On 2 June, while on their way to Gitschin, the Emperor and Metternich met Karl von Nesselrode near the town of Czaslau (now: Čáslav) in Central-Bohemia. Von Nesselrode was the Russian ambassador to Berlin and had been sent by Tsar Alexander I in order to inform him about the Austrian stance in the conflict.⁹ But his visit came for Metternich a little bit too soon, for as he had not contacted Napoleon at all, so in order to buy some time, Emperor Francis sent Von Nesselrode back to his master with the following message:

Go back, and tell the Emperor [...] and the King of Prussia, that you met me on my way to the headquarters of my army in Bohemia. I beg the Emperor to choose a point on the frontiers of Bohemia and Silesia, to which I can send my Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to make him fully acquainted with my decision.¹⁰

⁸ Zamoyski, *De ondergang van Napoleon*, 71-72. Metternich sent his couriers to count Ferdinand Bubna von Littitz, who was the Austrian ambassador at Dresden.

⁹ Zamoyski, 72. The Tsar longed for a ‘categorical decision’ from the Austrian Emperor, and ‘on paper.’

¹⁰ Von Metternich, 178.

The next day, the Austrian Emperor and his Minister of Foreign Affairs arrived in Gitschin. For Metternich, this moment was a precarious one. He could offer the Allies nothing, because he had not received an answer from the French. As long as the French point of view was unknown, Austria was in no position to act. So, in his careful approach of the two belligerents, Metternich was temporarily capable of nothing, but this changed rapidly when Metternich was informed that the French had rejected the Austrian proposal of becoming a mediator in the conflict. It was a reaction that Metternich had expected: “I was convinced that the answer of the French minister would be an evasive one; and this was the case.”¹¹

Nevertheless, France created a possibility for Metternich to step up in his careful ‘dance’. Napoleon proposed the Allies a truce for seven weeks, in order to strengthen and reinforce his army. The Prussians and Russians accepted this offer eagerly.¹² On 4 June, the Armistice of Pläswitz was agreed; the truce lasted until 20 July.¹³ During this period France got full control over Saxony, while the Allies could retreat safely behind the river Oder. Both sides were now able to recover from the recent campaign, while Austria got

¹¹ Von Metternich, 179.

¹² E.M. Almedingen, *The Emperor Alexander I* (London: The Bodley Head, 1964), 147; and Zamoyski, 69-70.

¹³ Wolfram Siemann, *Metternich. Staatsmann zwischen Restauration und Moderne* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010), 46.

considerable time to build up its army. According to the German historian Franz Herre, Napoleon gave the initiative away at Pläswitz (now: Paszowice).¹⁴ From that moment, Metternich could coordinate his ‘dance’ with the belligerents.

The next thing Metternich wished, was clarity on the true intentions of the Allies, and in particular that of the Russians. Metternich knew that the Tsar, whom he regarded as an ambivalent monarch, was not keen on the Austrians. His distrust about the Austrian stance in Europe was fueled by the marriage of Marie Louise with Napoleon and the refusal of Vienna to enter into a secret treaty with Russia in 1811. Metternich tried to convince the Tsar that Austria was sincere in its effort to bring peace in Europe:

As I could not and would not give up the project in which alone I saw safety, I explained to the Emperor that I was ready to lay the whole plan before him, but must not raise any false hope that we could ever give it up, or even make any substantial change in it. I insisted on the absolute necessity of the mediation of Austria, the formal acknowledgment of which I desired to obtain from him.¹⁵

But the Tsar had his doubts: What will become of our cause, if Napoleon accepts the mediation? Metternich estimated this

chance small, but in that case the negotiations would almost certainly fail for Napoleon would show ‘to be neither wise nor just.’ On the other side, if Napoleon rejected the proposal of mediation, Austria would join the coalition. The Tsar was not convinced immediately, so Metternich proposed a Russian officer to be stationed at the Austrian headquarters in order to inform the Tsar about the (future) plan of operations. It was this proposal that was decisive enough. The Tsar “seemed exceedingly well pleased: he considered this to be a guarantee of our intentions.”¹⁶ On 20 June, Metternich returned to Gitschin. His meeting with the Tsar had been important for him. The main target of this diplomatic dance between the two sides, was to buy time for the Austrian army to strengthen its positions. In the end, the Tsar had put faith in Metternich’s plan: his ‘delicate dance.’ Now that the tsar was reassured, Metternich could focus on the other belligerent in the conflict: France.

Back in Gitschin, Metternich found an invitation from his French colleague, Hugues-Bernard Maret, the Duke of Bassano. Metternich’s visit to the Tsar was noticed by the French. Now, Napoleon wanted to speak personally with the foreign minister and so he invited him to come over to Dresden. The invitation did not come as a surprise: “This step, which I had foreseen, was a proof to me that Napoleon did not feel strong enough to break with us openly. I begged the Emperor to allow me to accept

¹⁴ Herre, 256.

¹⁵ Von Metternich, 181.

¹⁶ Von Metternich, 182.

the invitation; and immediately informed the Russo-Prussian cabinet assembled at Reichenbach [now: Dzierżoniów], in Silesia, of the matter.”¹⁷

A bold step

Now perhaps the most difficult phase of the dance started. Metternich had to present himself, on behalf of the Austrian Empire, as an independent participant in the conflict, even though Napoleon knew that he had made contact with the Allies. In addition, Metternich could not announce in advance that Austria would join the war in favor of the Allies. In short, Metternich had to continue the play of the impartial negotiator, but he did not go unarmed. In his conversation with the Tsar—and earlier also with the Prussian chancellor Karl von Hardenberg—Metternich had unofficially promised that Austria would join the war in favor of the Allies, if Napoleon would not accept the demands of the Allies. In fact, Metternich brought the French Emperor an ultimatum. So, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs set off for Dresden the same day, he was prepared (again) for the next phase of his delicate dance. In his memoirs, Metternich writes that by that time the French nation was split into two parties, namely the Revolutionists and the Royalists:

The first party lamented the precarious position in which

Napoleon’s love of conquest had placed their interests; the latter, not yet daring to raise their heads, waited with anxiety to see the result of the new campaign, for which the nation had just made new and enormous efforts. The French army sighed for peace. [...] The appearance of the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs at Napoleon’s head-quarters could, under such circumstances, only be regarded by the leaders of the French army as decisive in its results.”¹⁸

Napoleon was staying in the Marcolini Palais, outside of the city of Dresden.¹⁹ Metternich was welcomed here on 26 June by Marshal Louis-Alexandre Berthier, who guided his guest to the reception room. There, in the middle of the room, Napoleon awaited his guest. Even before Metternich could deliver his message, Napoleon confronted him with the prospect of a war with Austria. The Emperor pointed out to him that the Prussians and Russians were defeated at Lützen and Bautzen and that he would gladly fight the next battle near Vienna.²⁰

The verbal attack of Napoleon only strengthened Metternich’s position. ‘I felt myself, at this crisis, the representative of all European society. “Peace and war,’ I answered, ‘lie in your Majesty’s hands. [...]’

famous conversation between Napoleon and Metternich did not take place in Paris, but in Dresden.

²⁰ Hamilton-Williams, 34.

¹⁷ Von Metternich, 182-83.

¹⁸ Von Metternich, 184-85.

¹⁹ On the contrary to popular movie industry, for example the 2002 TV Mini-Series *Napoleón*, the

The world requires peace. In order to secure this peace, you must reduce your power within bounds compatible with the general tranquility, or you will fall in the contest.”²¹ Napoleon was furious and sounded combative. He claimed that it was only his generals who longed for peace. The army remained loyal to him. “‘In one night,’ the Emperor said, ‘I lost thirty thousand horses. I have lost everything, except honour and the consciousness of what I owe to a brave people who, after such enormous misfortunes, have given me fresh proofs of their devotion and their conviction that I alone can rule them.’”²² Metternich remained calm and stipulated the acceptance of the offer of mediation by Russia and Prussia. Then he named four points, which had to be accepted by Napoleon, if he wanted to conclude a peace. On behalf of the Allies, except the British, Metternich demanded:

- 1) The dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon six years earlier.
- 2) The enlargement of Prussia
- 3) The restitution of the Illyrian provinces to Austria
- 4) The re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns

Again, Napoleon’s reaction sounded combative. He took Metternich with him to another room where he showed him information about the number of troops of

the Austrian army. For more than an hour, the gentlemen talked about statistical data, but with no result in getting a better understanding of each other.

Then, the two returned to the reception room. There, Napoleon changed the subject. Metternich noticed this step and found it remarkable. Napoleon did not mention the mediation by the Austrians, but—instead—his campaign in Russia. According to the Emperor, this campaign had failed due to the time of the year. By changing the subject, Napoleon tried to take the lead in the conversation. Metternich, who was still performing his ‘dance,’ knew that he had to come back to the proposals:

After I had listened to him for more than half an hour, I interrupted him with the remark, that in what he had just told me I saw strong proof of the necessity of putting an end to so uncertain a fate. “Fortune,” I said, ‘may play you false a second time, as it did in 1812. In ordinary times, armies are formed of only a small part of the population, today it is the whole people that you have called to arms. Is not your present army anticipated by a generation? I have seen your soldiers: they are mere children.’”²³

Again, Napoleon opposed the idea that he had already lost his empire and, with it, his

²¹ Von Metternich, 185-86.

²² Von Metternich, 186.

²³ Von Metternich, 189.

status. The conversation lasted for several (in total: nine!) hours, but without any view on a result. In the end, Metternich left the palace. “No one had ventured to come into the room. Not one pause of silence interrupted this animated discussion, in which I can count no less than six moments in which my words had the weight of a formal declaration of war.”²⁴ At the door, Napoleon grabbed Metternich on the shoulder, stating that Austria in no scenario would make war with France. “‘You are lost, Sire,’ I said quickly; ‘I had the presentiment of it when I came; now, in going, I have the certainty.’”²⁵

Starting a new dance

A continental peace with Napoleon was not reached in Dresden. The only benefit of the conversation was the fact that Metternich had persuaded the Emperor to extend the armistice until 10 August.²⁶ That date was important for the Austrian High Command, because the army would be fully mobilized around that time.²⁷ For Metternich, this was an enormous result in his ‘dance’ between France, Russia and Prussia—all in the mood for war. Metternich had bought Austria the time it needed to prepare itself for battle, but a new problem arose on the horizon. Great

Britain had been kept ignorant about the proposals of the Allies, but nevertheless regained the information via the Prussians who hoped for continued, financial support from London. Not surprisingly, the government in London was not amused about this separate initiative. This informed Prussia and Russia that it was no longer prepared to subsidize them with equipment and money, unless the interests of London were recognized.

For Metternich, this was an unpleasant development, because it urged him to deal with the mighty position of the British. The Allies—especially Prussia—needed the British funding, so it was necessary to keep the money flow. Britain had to be known in the process. This became even clearer when the news of the British victory at Vitoria came through.²⁸ On 27 June, Austria semi-officially joined the Allies in the Treaty of Reichenbach. It agreed to the four points, which Metternich had mentioned to Napoleon and promised that it would join the war, if France did not accept these conditions. But war was not declared yet. The armistice lasted till August 10 and in the remaining time, Metternich had to continue his role as a mediator. The dance was not finished yet!

²⁴ Von Metternich, 191.

²⁵ Von Metternich, 192.

²⁶ Von Metternich, 195. This extension was reached several days later. In the meantime, Metternich stayed in Dresden where he (indirect) maintained contact with Napoleon.

²⁷ Hamilton-Williams, 35.

²⁸ Peter Snow, *To War with Wellington: From the Peninsula to Waterloo* (London: John Murray,

2010), 203. On 21 June, Wellington defeated the army of King Joseph near this Spanish town, resulting in the rushed retreat of the remaining French forces to the Pyrenees. According to Peter Snow, Metternich told Arthur Wellington later that his victory at Vitoria had determined the Allies to pursue the war.

Metternich invited all parties by the middle of July for a congress in Prague, to discuss the four points. All sides agreed to this proposal, but not with great confidence. The Allies at first did not believe that Napoleon would agree with this proposal. But he did, and so the diplomats were sent to Prague.²⁹ Napoleon saw the congress as a diversion, for he hoped to make separate deals, especially with the Tsar. For Metternich, the congress was also a diversion as he was trying to win additional time for the Austrian Army to build up its forces. He reassured the Allies that the congress would not succeed, because he would place additional demands on the table on their behalf, Great Britain included.³⁰ In the Bohemian capital, the congress got off to a slow start. The French conducted a delaying tactic. For example, Napoleon sent diplomat Louis Marie de Narbonne-Lara to Prague, but he had no negotiating mandate and therefore it would have been impossible to conclude a treaty. So, a new representative was sent for: Armand de Caulaincourt, the Duc of Vicenza, who arrived on 28 July in Prague.³¹ Precious time had been lost, because there were only thirteen days left until the end of the armistice.

And so, the ‘dance’ of Metternich entered its final phase. As the chairman of the congress, he proposed a written procedure.

²⁹ Prussia sent Wilhelm von Humbolt, while Russia was represented by Johann Protasius von Anstett. Naturally, Metternich was present on behalf of Austria.

³⁰ Hamilton-Williams, 31; and Zamoyski, 79. Great Britain wanted Napoleon to quit the Low

This meant that all proposals to be made by the participants, had to be worked out on paper. The same would apply to the reactions on the proposals. By prescribing this procedure, Metternich aimed to prevent secret negotiations between individual representatives and, in that way, coordinate the course of the discussions. The French delegation did not accept the proposed procedure, de facto resulting in the failure of the congress. Metternich knew that there was not enough time left for a new round of negotiations. On August 7 he deliberately offered a new proposal, knowing that Napoleon would never agree with the content. In the new proposal, for which Napoleon only had three days to respond to, Austria again demanded the four points mentioned earlier in Dresden. But now, these were added with the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, the restoration of Prussia within the borders of 1806 and the mutual guarantee of the territorial status of all the involved states. Napoleon has never answered to this new proposal. The armistice ended unnoticed on 10 August. Two days later, Austria declared war on France.

Conclusion

The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs showed in 1813 that he was a good ‘dancer’ in the diplomatic field. Metternich had to

Countries, respect Britain’s maritime rights and give up Hanover and Spain.

³¹ Somerset de Chair, ed., *Napoleon on Napoleon. An autobiography of the Emperor* (London: Brockhampton Press, 1992), 229.

deal with several monarchs, whose empires had all their own interests. It meant that he had to maintain contacts with different ‘eagles’: the eagle of France, the eagle of Russia and the eagle of Prussia. From the end of May until August 12, Metternich played the role of mediator in the conflict. In that delicate dance, two key words characterize his acting: control and coordination. As a mediator, his first challenge was to seize control and hold it. The second challenge was to coordinate the reactions of the participants in the conflict. It was a dizzying task. The first step of this ‘dance’ was in Czaaslau, when Metternich sent Von Nesselrode back to the Tsar. The arrival of the Russian ambassador came too early, so by sending him back, Metternich had bought himself time. He started to take over control. Metternich proposed the Armistice of Pläswitz, in order to buy some more time. While the Austrian army could mobilize in Bohemia, Metternich created for himself the possibility to work on both parties. First, he had to convince the Tsar of the true intentions of Austria. The moment he succeeded, Metternich reassured himself of the willingness to

cooperate of the Allies. Again, he had expanded his control over the situation.

A big challenge for Metternich was his conversation with Napoleon in Dresden, for the Emperor was not an easy opponent to talk with. Metternich stayed with his mission, even when Napoleon started to talk about another topic. Later, in Prague, Metternich showed again that he wanted to control the talks. The congress was his proposal, so he did not permit the ambassadors of the involved countries to talk separately or secretly, behind his back. The balance between the belligerents was dealt by Metternich through control and coordination. Unnoticed, Metternich deprived all parties the private initiative, so that he could create the most favorable situation for the Austrian Empire. Vienna got a lead in the Sixth Coalition in the summer of 1813. Years later, Napoleon would state that Metternich’s attempts at mediation were only “a pretext—the Court of Vienna had already entered into engagements with Russia and Prussia.”³²

³² De Chair, 228.

Daniello Berlinghieri and the Hundred Days: Italian Diplomat at the Congress of Vienna

by Gilles Bertrand

Daniello Berlinghieri made a trip from Florence to Vienna and stayed in the Austrian capital during the Vienna Congress, including the Hundred Days. His point of view is that of a diplomat relegated to a subordinate political position during this famous Congress which was intended to put an end to the 22 years of revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.¹ The noble Sienese is in charge of defending in Vienna the interests of the Order of Knights of Malta. Even as a representative of a tiny entity compared to the main states of Europe, he is still a legitimate congressman, which allows him to describe the context, the stakes and the daily life of such an event with great acuity and knowledge. From the letters he sent to his friend and distant relative Anna Martini, who stayed in Siena, a clear picture emerges of an experience told week after week while many participants hoped to reach the conclusion of the treaties. The letters share us with the experience of a minor historical actor whose name does not appear in the indexes of most of the history books that deal with this

Congress. Berlinghieri presents himself as the kind of anti-hero he became after the decision he made in accepting this uncomfortable position. As he reminded his friend Anna on 1 January 1815, he accepted to represent the Order of Malta without enthusiasm but such a decision was probably driven with a sense of duty, or more likely to his friendship for his fellow missionary, the balì Antonio Miari. In any case, as a walk-on actor, as an onlooker who does not expect either a reward for his career or great results for the benefit of the Order, he demonstrates a great freedom of judgment. This situation recalls, at an earlier time, the case of the ambassador of Lucca Carlo Mansi (1682-1750), analysed by R. Sabbatini.² Berlinghieri does not have many interests to defend, given the Order of Malta's catastrophic financial situation and the strength of the interests of other European powers on an island whose position was strategic. His letters offer us an original and valuable testimony on the Vienna Congress and on the effects

¹ This text, with the exception of passages on the Hundred Days in the second part and of some adjustments here and there, is a translation into English of G. Bertrand's contribution, "Un viaggiatore, diplomatico ed erudito, nella Vienna del Congresso del 1814-1815: lo sguardo di Daniello Berlinghieri," to appear in *Un viaggio a Vienna. Lettere del Senese Daniello Berlinghieri to Anna Martini, 1814-1815*, edited by Barbara Innocenti

(Florence: Firenze University Press). We warmly thank the publisher for accepting this publication as a preview.

² Renzo Sabbatini, *L'occhio dell'ambasciatore. L'Europa delle guerre di successione nell'autobiografia dell'inviato lucchese a Vienna* (Milan: Franco Angeli), 2006.

of Napoleon's ephemeral return during the Hundred Days.

Writing and Travelling: The Testimony

There are several ways to give a written account of a travel experience. Alongside the diary written on the spot, either in the evening or with a few days' delay, the literary form known as the romantic travel narrative developed during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. At the same time there was a great vogue of autobiographical memories and memoirs, often written long after the trip.³ On the other hand, correspondence remain widely practiced and is a classic modality of writing that both establishes a dialogue and submerges the recipient in the current state of the travel experience. It was in great use in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the point of sometimes becoming a fictional artifice and structuring texts used as travel guides: It is for example what happened for Misson's *Nouveau Voyage en Italie* (*New Travel to Italy*), published in 1691) and for the rewriting by the President de Brosses of his *Lettres familières* (*Familiar Letters*), published in 1799 but handwritten copies of which had circulated for several decades after his trip to the Italian peninsula in 1739-1740. In the second half of the Eighteenth Century, the letters of Lady Montagu (1763), Mme. du Boccage (1771) and President Dupaty (1788), which Stendhal constantly blamed for their

artificial nature, were also snapped up by the public. With regard to Berlinghieri, his letters are real and not intended for the public. Still handwritten to this day, they give us back the emotions and projects in the form in which they were lived, before any eventual a posteriori reconstitution. This is what makes them valuable to the historian.

This correspondence is composed of 51 letters of variable length addressed from 12 August 1814 to 14 July 1815 by Berlinghieri mainly to Anna Martini, his relative and friend who stayed in Siena. It's a very rich corpus, even though it's a shame we did not keep Anna's letters, which his correspondent described on 2 February 1815 as "Sévigné italienne." On the Berlinghieri side, the subjects of the letter exchange are divided into three recurrent registers, present in varying proportions according to the letters. The first concerns the affirmation of an intimate and affectionate bond with Anna and the evocation of private affairs about relatives who stayed in Siena or Berlinghieri's state of health. The second register relates to expressions of the enjoyment and curiosity of the traveller who is anxious to discover places and landscapes, to observe festivals and to tell his walks. Finally the letters contain a sober account by the diplomat who analyses what is happening in the Austrian capital and the way in which the great machinery of the Vienna Congress

³ Roland Le Huenen, *Le récit de voyage au prisme de la littérature* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne, 2015); and Damien Zanone, *Écrire*

son temps: les mémoires en France de 1815 à 1848, (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2006).

unfolds over time. Of course Berlinghieri is bound to say only the minimum, given the slowness of the discussions and perhaps, sometimes, a duty of reserve inherent in the function of a diplomat.⁴

The period from 1 March to 22 June 1815, which corresponds to the Hundred Days, occupies nearly one third of the volume of letters Berlinghieri sends to Anna Martini, with 19 letters out of 51, one of which is addressed to both Anna and her husband on 15 April (“Most beloved friends”). We will not dwell here on the fact that four letters from the previous fall and winter have other recipients. Three are for Anna Martini’s husband, Antonio Riniero de’ Rocchi, Rector of the Siena Hospital, and another one is for his son Alberto Rinieri de’ Rocchi.⁵ In these letters the tone is more distant, although the objects are quite similar to those dealt with in the letters reserved for Anna: private and Sieneese affairs, relations of visits to Vienna or the surrounding area, analysis of the general political situation.

In this correspondence, of which we only keep Berlinghieri’s mailings, a significant part comes from the outward journey and a shorter section from the return journey. It

⁴ On strictly diplomatic correspondence, distinct from the private correspondence in question here, see Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

is in addition to the account of the stay in Vienna, which occupies the majority of the letters : to be exact, from the seventh, dated 4 September 1814, to the forty-eighth letter, sent on 24 May 1815. This one is the last written report from Vienna even if it actually narrates a stay in Baden and continues to recount the journey to northern Hungary made in early May.⁶ At both ends of the correspondence the precise and attentive relationship of a traveller in Europe from 1814-1815 is offered to us, and we know that this period is a time favourable to recompositions in the way of living the travel experience.⁷ The travel experience is commented on by Berlinghieri step-by-step, sharing fairly equally the attention throughout the journey between the cities and the countryside. On the way there, a form of encyclopedic attention is dedicated to cities with their buildings and history, as well as to the cultivated areas that Berlinghieri constantly compares to the hills of Tuscany. In Ferrara or Arqua are mentioned some literary memories. Then the traveler is confronted with areas that sometimes annoy him and sometimes surprise him with their variety when passing through the Alps via San Daniele, Pontebba and Villach. On this journey and for example in Monselice, Berlinghieri

⁵ The four previous letters are those of 28 December 1814, 7 February 1815, and 15 and 25 March 1815.

⁶ It is the letter of 12 May that really closes the narrative on the stay in Vienna, even if the last letter dated Vienna is that of 24 May 1815.

⁷ Nicolas Bourguinat, Sylvain Venayre, ed., *Voyager en Europe de Humboldt à Stendhal. Contraintes nationales et tentations cosmopolites, 1790-1840* (Paris: Nouveau monde éditions, 2007).

expresses an enthusiasm that would not leave him in Vienna for the panoramas, the overviews and the “picturesque” points of view. One thinks of the excitement felt by travelers from northern Europe who were travelling to Italy at that time. Sometimes his way of writing deviates from the main scheme, when he borrows from the tradition of the sentimental journey in verse and prose and decorates with two poetic pieces the letters written since the spa of Baden on 30 May and 15 June 1815. This insertion recalls the brief poems in which the passers-by of the Great Saint-Bernard Pass evoked their state of mind in the face of nature by signing the register of the hospice kept since 1812 by the Augustinian Fathers.⁸ But it remains exceptional. Most letters are dominated by regular prose, revealing above all an art of observing and analyzing personal experience.

The Austrian destination was not new in the Europe of the Grand Tour and it was one of the earliest where the cosmopolitan vocation of the tour across the continent transformed into more modern, scholarly or patriotic travel modalities. It was common for members of the European elites to pass through Vienna during their training journey from northern European countries to Italy or from Italy to the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon world, but more specialised

trips began to develop from the second half of the Eighteenth Century. Many civil servants, lawyers, doctors, professors and clergymen from northern Germany and even more from southern Germany flocked to Austria and Bavaria, whose intense mobility F. Knopper analysed between 1730 and 1803.⁹ The Universal Travel Bibliography of G. Boucher la Richarderie, published in 1808, also highlights a sudden editorial swelling of descriptions and travel relations in Austria and other Habsburg possessions from the 1770s onwards, often but not exclusively in German language: these were distributed between mineralogical journeys to Carinthia, Carniola, Transylvania, Hungary, and “glances” at Vienna or “excursions” in its surroundings.¹⁰

Berlinghieri’s journey is situated in a different perspective from that of the voyages of knowledge that led the young and not so young nobles, mineralogists and literary people to Vienna. As this was a diplomatic mission, the traveller should not spend too much time on the outward journey and the return journey was also distinguished by the eagerness to be reunited with his family and fulfil certain obligations. The path of the outward journey lasts from 14 August to 5 September 1814, so it takes three weeks as does the return journey, from 18 June to 9

⁸ This register continued to be used until 1970 (Archive of the Great Saint-Bernard, 2866/1-36).

⁹ Françoise Knopper, *Le regard du voyageur en Allemagne du Sud et en Autriche dans les relations de voyageurs allemands* (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1992).

¹⁰ Gilles Boucher de la Richarderie, *Bibliothèque universelle des voyages* (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 1808 and Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), Second part, sections VI et VII in II: 267-94 and 370-88.

July 1815. But this relative brevity does not prevent Berlinghieri from being a curious mind of everything he can see and from proposing, especially in the first letters to Anna Martini, a kind of formal model of the travel relationship. In those of the return, the commentary limits itself to mentioning the stages, referring to the German spittle, some people met and the projects on arrival in Tuscany. The proximity of the reunion with Anna justifies not going into the details of the descriptions, “since we will be able to do so orally in a few days’ time” (7 July 1815).

This very silence only better indicates the meaning of the preceding letters, which aim to make present what distance prevents from living together and that imagination, so much praised in the letter of 2 February 1815, would not be enough to represent itself in the absence of support. The report of experiences and everyday life is striking because of the precision with which the places are commented on at each stage. There is no reference to previous guides or travellers’ relationships, but Barbara Innocenti’s notes to the edition of Berlinghieri’s letters being published in

Florence show us how interesting it is to compare Berlinghieri’s precise descriptions with those of the guides, relationships and descriptions of the time. She mentions Büsching’s *Géographie universelle*, often reprinted in the last decades of the 18th century, Pinkerton’s *Modern Geography* of 1802, Johann Pezzl’s *New Description of Vienna* or Richard Bright’s *Travels from Vienna through lower Hungary*, both published in 1818.¹¹

The propensity for a travel of curiosity also manifests itself during the long Viennese stay, which Berlinghieri punctuates with numerous visits. It is revealed in the description of the Habsburg capital, its places of relaxation and pleasure including first the Prater and in the expression of a taste then very much in vogue for English-style gardens. This need of curiosity also projects itself on spaces outside the city, on the countryside and villages crossed in present-day Slovakia. Beyond his walks in the city, Berlinghieri sometimes made excursions to imperial villas such as that of Luchsembourg (letter of 20 December 1814). In the last few weeks, the traces of the stay in Vienna are gradually

¹¹ Anton Friedrich Büsching, *A new system of geography: in which is given a general account of the situation and limits, the manners, history, and constitution, of the several kingdoms and states in the known world, and a very particular description of their subdivisions and dependencies, their cities and towns, forts, sea-ports, produce, manufactures, and commerce*, carefully translated from the last edition of the German original (London: A. Millar, 1762); Anton Friedrich Büsching, *Géographie universelle*, 14 vols. (Strasbourg: Bauer, 1768-1779); John Pinkerton, *Modern geography, a description of the*

Empires, kingdoms, states and colonies, with the oceans, seas and islands in all parts of the world (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1802); Johann Pezzl, *Nouvelle description de Vienne, capitale de l’Autriche, précédé d’un précis historique sur cette ville et suivie de ses environs* (Vienna: à la Librairie de G. de Moesle, 1818); and Richard Bright, *Travels from Vienna through lower Hungary, with some remarks on the state of Vienna during the Congress in the year 1814* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1818).

disappearing in favour of the trip to Pressburg and northern Hungary which took place from May 3 to 8 but is told until May 24, then the thermal stay in Baden on which the correspondence ends so that Berlinghieri seems to take directly from Baden the way back to Florence.¹²

Travel also means practical conditions, adventures and anecdotes. We follow the evolution of meteorology from letter to letter, marked by the surprise of winter's sweets and punctuated by comparisons with the Tuscan climate. The winter of 1815 proved to be much less rigid than Berlinghieri had feared. The disease, on the other hand, affects the traveller, who is in turn a victim of jaundice,¹³ stomach and digestive problems¹⁴ and especially a fracture of the arm from which he has difficulty recovering, forcing him to write with his left hand or to ask his companion Miari to write some letters in his place. It was at the beginning of his stay in Vienna that Berlinghieri suffered the car accident that caused him a head injury and especially this breakage of his arm. About this episode, he recounted a story similar to that of the Marchioness Boccapaduli 20 years earlier, when her car had overturned on his way back from Benevent to Naples.¹⁵ The accident of the Sienese diplomat

occurred on 28 September 1814 when he returned from Kahlenberg Hill where he had gone to satisfy his desire to enjoy a wide panorama. He only reported it on 13 December, when he felt he had recovered from it, so as not to scare his correspondent. However, the after-effects are long-lasting since he still speaks of them as justifying his spa treatment in Baden in May 1815.¹⁶ To these physical difficulties he sometimes attributes his extended station in Austria, in competition with the political reasons of the Congress which lasts forever and is struggling to reach its conclusion.

The Vissitudes of the Congress and the Consequences of the Hundred Days

The first element that is obvious, and which stands out with particular force since it is a correspondence, is the duration of the congress, and especially the way in which its temporality could be perceived from within, from the point of view of the "extras" who did not participate in the decisive sessions reserved for the representatives of the eight greatest European states. The pace of the Congress is marked by its unpredictable nature. By allowing us to measure how its various stages were felt throughout the Congress, the correspondence reveals that it takes as long to start as it does to finish, causing

¹² The travel relationship in Pressburg and northern Hungary is spread like a kind of soap opera in letters dated 8, 12, 14 and even 24 May 1815.

¹³ Letters of 17 and 23 January and 2 February 1815.

¹⁴ Letters of 12 August 1814, 7 February, and 11 and 25 March 1815.

¹⁵ *Una marchesa in viaggio per l'Italia. Diario di Margherita Boccapaduli, 1794-1795*, edited and presented by Gilles Bertrand and Marina Pieretti (Rome: Viella, 2019), 268-71.

¹⁶ In the spa town of Baden he says he can finally clench his fist perfectly (letter of 30 May 1815).

boredom and annoyance for the secondary actor Berlinghieri, who has become a distant observer and almost a passive witness.

The major dates clearly emerge in this picture, the author of which notes the uncertainties: from 13 September 1814 it appears to him that “everything is covered with an impenetrable mystery” and that “the very duration of the Congress is the subject of assumptions and bets.” First scheduled for 1 October, the official opening was postponed to 1 and 3 November 1814. Nevertheless, the negotiations had already begun before this deadline, even if Berlinghieri placed them under the sign of slowness, even “stagnation” (letter of 22 October 1814). We are thus following step by step the implementation of a method, the same one that leads to the establishment of a Management Board chaired by Metternich and composed of variable geometry Commissions, including the representatives of the four, five and eight main European states. Berlinghieri does not go into the details of the committees and he makes less of an administrative report than he highlights the vagueness and changes that occur every day when it is set up. No mention is made of Talleyrand when on 9 January 1815 he obtained the admission of France to participate in the private councils of the other four powers, Austria, England, Russia and Prussia. On the other hand, from 16 November onwards, our author gives the results of which the excluded from the major powers, considered as “accredited

to Congress,” could have been aware, listing the points that were resolved and those pending. The case of Genoa was quickly resolved, that of Parma and Piacenza took more time and the main problem was the fate of Poland and Saxony, which was clearly the reason for an extension of the Congress in December: Poland finally moved on to Russia, but the Congress was still stalled on 20 December on the issue of Saxony and the compensation to be given to Prussia. Despite an apparent acceleration at the beginning of January, the little representative of stateless order that is Berlinghieri never ceases to get impatient with the “dictatorship” exercised by the eight main powers (letter of 10 January 1815) and the “stagnation” that he still observes on 23 January.

What strikes most in his narrative is the passive position and total submission to the goodwill of the great ones. Berlinghieri knows that if the Order of Malta were to obtain something, it would not become richer for it (letter of 1 January). On 11 February, he begins to hope that “during Lent our fate may be decided” and six days later he reports that the fate of Saxony is about to be resolved, but not that of Bavaria and of all the Italian territories. The alternation between the hopes of ending and the continuous extension of the Congress makes it look like a lunatic and unpredictable organism. The letters express this situation in pretty phrases such as “we are like birds on the branch” or “this Congress [...] has more phases than the moon” (letter of 25 February). The

diplomat was all the more attentive to the developments involved in March 1815 with Napoleon's return from the island of Elba, since the emperor was in danger of subjecting the Italian peninsula to new military operations, postponing the possible date of the conclusion of the Congress and thus the much desired return to Tuscany.

The correspondence with Anna Martini thus offers a vision of the interior rarely accessible on the Vienna Congress—that of the minor participants, who formed a large micro-society. Alongside princes and representatives of royal families, there were two hundred and sixteen heads of diplomatic missions at the Vienna Congress, to which were added all kinds of advisors and secretaries. Certainly Berlinghieri is relatively discreet and remains on the reserve when it comes to revealing to his friend the progress of the negotiations concerning Malta: Moreover, he says absolutely nothing about the failure of the mission of the two representatives of the Order of Malta to recover the island, which will not be returned to them. As we know, it will remain in the hands of the English



Talleyrand (JDM)

who have been in control since 1800, two years after the landing of Bonaparte's troops. Either the diplomat hides behind decisions that are the sole responsibility of the main rulers, or he abruptly interrupts his narrative and does not go into more detail on the policies of the great powers: "Let us interrupt here, because this is not a subject to be dealt with by letter," he cuts short on 15 March 1815 before returning to private affairs after having mentioned Bonaparte's "mad enterprise."

The letters of 11, 15 and 18 March, 12, 15, 18 and 22 April and finally 12 May all express Berlinghieri's precise fears regarding the upheavals and the prospects for a return to war that may affect Italy following Napoleon's landing in Antibes on 1 March and his arrival in Paris on 20 March 1815. The

shock was immediately expressed on 11 March, before Berlinghieri tries to interpret the reasons that led Napoleon to make his attempt:

I'll also add this other piece of paper to the letter to tell you what you can imagine, that is, that for four days now we've been in great suspension because of the last madness done by

Napoleon. Last night we knew, when a courier arrived, that he had landed in Antibes, rejected from that city and had gone to Cannes to settle down, we didn't know what he was drawing further. If it was a desperate frenzy, as I tend to believe, he will soon be surrounded and put in a position to no longer worry in the future. If it is a warped canvas, and that you find advocates to support, it's bad for France, where a civil war will light up; but the attentive and armed Europe will not let the evil overflow outside. I praise the sky that has not come to Italy, where it was feared that the matter of fire was at noon, or perhaps still at north wind. What anxiety would I be if he had attacked there! At every moment we will have news, meanwhile the operations of the Congress remain drowsy. Some of the main ministers had gone to Presbourg, where the King of Saxony is, to receive from him the act of accession to what the Congress had decided on his fate, but I feel that he is having difficulty in many things. I do not know whether these ministers are back at this time. The day before yesterday the Empress of Russia left us.¹⁷

Berlinghieri made very harsh judgments about the emperor, whose enterprise he

considered either desperate or crazy. The possibility of his imminent death is not even ruled out. On 15 March, he believes that Napoleon's return is likely to accelerate Congress' decisions, but what bothers him above all is the uncertainty that currently results for Italy's future:

You people, to what I hear, make the Congress finished although I believe that the crazy enterprise of Bonaparte, which perhaps by now will have ceased to exist (since the news from Parigi bring that in the Council of the King his death has been decided, and not having found followers it will be difficult for him to avoid it) I believe, I say, that his crazy enterprise, having served to unite more closely the souls of these sovereigns, will lead much to the solicitude of the operations that remain to be done, and perhaps will retain the effects of the liberal maxims, excellent in themselves, but sometimes pernicious in application, which reign in some of the most powerful. Soon I think we will come out of the uncertainty over a great point that matters to the peace of all of Italy, and we will see what effect the Austrian troops have on this. That's enough about that, which is

¹⁷ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e*

siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

not subject to be dealt with by letter.¹⁸

We are just before Murat's proclamation of Rimini on the independence of the Italians, which will take place on 30 March 1815. Berlinghieri feared on 18 March that some foreign power would invade Italy.

You may well imagine that here they are in some anxiety about the news we receive, which don't entirely meet our expectations. It is not so much the present that gives us thought, but what could happen next, and this exposed part of Italy is particularly close to my heart, if it should occur to anyone to have the take it by storm. I console myself with the illusion that I sometimes hear different news, and it would be bad if they were not already such when this letter of mine shall come to you. In that state of affairs you will not expect me to tell you about the Congress, or about the time of my return. [...] Lord Wellington is preparing to leave.¹⁹

After Rimini's proclamation, Berlinghieri's fears seemed to be borne out. Italy was a source of concern because it was becoming again a military field of operations. On 12

¹⁸ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

¹⁹ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e*

April, it seems inaccessible to return from Vienna for our Tuscan eager to get back there.

What I feared, and what made me more impatient to leave here, happened. Between you and me there are two armies. I would not have avoided this even if I could have moved right away that I wrote you to do it, but this was absolutely impossible, and only yesterday I had the audience in which the emperor himself advised me to wait a little longer. In the meantime we hope that in a few days things will come to some sort of conclusion, which, whatever it may be, will always be at least partly happy for me if it allows me to reunite with the people who are close to me.²⁰

The time was definitely right for war and Berlinghieri noted that the discussions were not progressing in Vienna. However, on 15 April, he remains convinced that the crisis will be short-lived and hopes above all that Tuscany, his homeland, will escape the war.

Here every day couriers arrive and we are better informed of what is happening in France and Italy than how these politicians cheat on each

siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

²⁰ Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

other, often torment themselves and spend their time saying puns. I understand and share the restlessness that you must feel about the movements that you feel around you and perhaps at this time you feel with yourselves, and this, more than anything else, makes my absence bitter. I know that on day 4 the G.D. [Grand Duke] was in Pisa, that 2000 Neapolitans had ordered rations in Cortona, that the King of Naples had with his letter assured the G.D. that he would respect the Tuscan territory if he had not left it, that the G.D. had sent the letter of the King to the general commander of the column of Neapolitans. I now look forward to the rest, but I do not dare to hope that while everything burns with war, our country alone will have the fate to wait for the decision without trying the military offenses. In any case, I believe that the crisis will be very brief, and at this hour could perhaps be consumed.²¹

If Tuscany comes into conflict, three days later he expressed hope that at least Siena should not see any soldiers passing through.

You can believe what my mind is about hearing that they are fighting

²¹ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

²² See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les*

in Tuscany. Siena, at least thank God, is not in the way of the troops. Now I should wait for something decisive, which perhaps happened as I write, and then I will take my resolutions, of which I will inform you immediately.²²

Berlinghieri was quickly reassured about Italy's fate. He is now talking to Anna Martini about the fight against the Napoleonic regime in France, which he considers to be a much more arduous undertaking. However, by 22 April, the end of his mission in Vienna now seems very close to him.

I am a little bit quieter now that the road to Bologna is free and I suppose Tuscany is free too. I hope that the Austrian army, which strengthens itself every day in Italy, will not allow another run like the one that happened. The dispositions of mind shown by the people are another reason for serenity. The good General Bianchi²³ is in charge of following those who retire. He will probably have a little work to do around Ancona, but for a short time the Sicilians and the English will cooperate for their part, the matter will soon be over. It would be good if

usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

²³ Federico Vincenzo Ferrari Bianchi (1768-1855).

that's the way things were in France! But what happened to the Duke of Angoulême²⁴ proves that there is nothing to hope for with that nation, except for the strength of all the foreign weapons, which will be immense and ready to operate all together towards the end of May. Now I am not waiting to leave until I have the security of having nothing else to do for my mission, which I already have more than a chance. Anyway if we talk about our business in this remnant of congress, it will be only to reserve it for another congress to be held at the end of the war.²⁵

In Vienna one only talked about the Seventh Coalition, the one that will defeat Napoleon in Waterloo on 18 June 1815. As early as 13 March, six days before Napoleon's arrival in Paris, the powers gathered in Vienna had declared him outlawed and a few days later Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia had begun mobilizing 150,000 soldiers. In Berlinghieri's eyes on 26 April, this war could only aim to restore Louis XVIII to the throne.

Then the main affair among all is that of the war which is about to take

²⁴ In March 1815, Louis of France (1775-1844), Duke of Angoulême, was on an official trip to Bordeaux when he learned of Napoleon's landing in Golfe Juan. He raised a small army in the South of France, achieved some local successes, but failed and had to dismiss his division before considering emigrating.

²⁵ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les*

place, on which one would like a second declaration to be agreed upon in addition to the first, from which the world could know that all the allies are in agreement, since in the intention of doing so again in the title and in the purpose. In my opinion there is only one aim who makes it legitimate and indeed holy, that of putting the Bourbon family on the throne, because if Napoleon is not usurper, to make him a personal war would be more disrespectful than justice and if he is usurper the nation is rebellious and must not rest until it receives its sovereign. Otherwise it would come to confirm the maxim that the whim of peoples is enough to change the dynasty, and everyone sees the consequences. The conclusion as far as I am concerned is that I cannot leave with my own convenience until I am formally told that our business will not be dealt with for now and I believe it will never be said to me, until the Congress is dissolved.²⁶

Berlinghieri's departure remains suspended until the conclusion of the Congress, where discussions seem to be clarifying between the major European powers without him

usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

²⁶ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

knowing anything about their content. He cannot interrupt his stay in the Austrian capital until he has received the signal, even if he has no illusions about it and is no longer waiting for a decision on Malta's fate. On 12 May 1815, he writes:

I was right to fear. All that remains is for me to confirm to you my new good health and what else I do not know what to say to you, while the conferences between the principal ministers continue daily, but nothing transpires, and not even the precise time of the departure of the sovereigns is known. However, this should not be delayed beyond the current month, as the troops are approaching the theatre of their operations. On the things of Italy for three or four days now, it is being said that nothing new has happened ; I hope that this will be the case, even if, according to the state of affairs, some new things should have happened.²⁷

Taking place within the long duration of the Vienna Congress, the Hundred Days are mainly perceived by Berlinghieri for their effects on the Italian situation. We know that this diplomat lost among the 220 other diplomats present at the Vienna Congress

certainly does not expect much from the Congress itself. The Hundred Days, the duration of which he cannot predict, are in his view above all a source of additional complications insofar as they prolong a congress that was already going on forever. They throw further grains of sand into its complex machinery. Berlinghieri's fear of a new destabilization was followed by resignation and then by an increased desire for refuge in his small homeland. The Hundred Days precipitate and accentuate a desire to cultivate his personal garden, which he had in fact been nurturing since the beginning of his stay in Vienna.

What results does the Congress achieve from Berlinghieri's point of view? He makes the distinction between the great manoeuvres he observes on the side of the main powers and the derisory crumbs, not to say the total lack of consideration that characterizes the knights of the Order of Malta, who are in immense financial and moral difficulties since French troops occupied the island in 1798.²⁸ As a counterpoint to the success of the consultation strategy that made the Vienna Congress so strong, establishing this new order called "European concert," we see throughout these letters a form of resignation.²⁹ This reflects on the possible

²⁷ See Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi, Olivier Rouchon, ed., *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

²⁸ See François Marie de Corbeau de Vaulserre, *Relation de la prise de Malte en 1798, par un témoin oculaire* (Grenoble: J. Baratier, 1820).

²⁹ Georges-Henri Soutou, "L'émergence d'une nouvelle Europe," in *Le Congrès de Vienne ou l'invention d'une nouvelle Europe, Paris-Vienne*

date and itinerary for the return to Florence, which will depend “on too many things that do not depend on us” (11 March 1815). Significantly, the date of the final act of the Convention, signed on 9 June 1815 by the European Parliament, was not mentioned by Berlinghieri. In fact, this major event took place between the letter of 30 May 1815 sent from Baden and that of 26 June 1815 when, from Venice, Berlinghieri recounted his departure from Baden on 18 June and his journey “of six days to come here, running day and night.”

Apparent Pleasures and Disenchantment

On the Congress of Vienna we have various informants to whom we will now have to add the letters of Berlinghieri, who also reports on 29 November 1814, in French, the famous formula of the prince of Ligne: “How do you expect him to walk, if he always dances?” The socialities of the Congress have been widely described by the correspondence of Metternich and Talleyrand, and even more so in the *Memoirs of the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* of Count Auguste de La Garde (1783-1853), close to Juliette Récamier and a relative by marriage of the Prince de Ligne,

1814-1815, catalogue of the exhibition of the Carnavalet Museum (Paris: Éditions Artlys and Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international, 2015), 114-25.

³⁰ It is in 1843 that appeared in two volumes in Paris, by A. Appert, the *Fêtes et souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne, tableaux des salons, scènes anecdotiques et portraits, 1814-1815* of Auguste de La Garde. It was followed by the edition of the

to which several notes in this edition refer.³⁰ La Garde’s remarks focus on the frivolous side of the congress, leaving aside political allusions, and may contain confusion, since at the end of his life the author had to sort through three close stays he had made in Vienna, the first in 1807-1808, the second in 1812 and the last in 1814-1815. Nevertheless, they are a colourful and indispensable reference. Barbara Innocenti also compares Berlinghieri’s comments with those of the Geneva financier Jean-Gabriel Eynard (1775-1863), whose journal published in 1914 describes her participation in the Congress as private secretary to the delegates of Geneva Pictet de Rochemont and Ivernois, thus in a context quite similar to that of Berlinghieri and Miari. Other sources of course exist, which have not been used in Innocenti’s edition of Berlinghieri’s letters. Karl Bertuch (1777-1815), in his *Journal of the Congress of Vienna*, emphasizes the cultural dimension of these multiple assemblies behind which was hidden an activity of surveillance, control and espionage.³¹ Another example is the testimony of the Saxon upholsterer and galloon manufacturer Heinrich Wilhelm Richter (1789-1848). During a trip from 1811 to

Souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne, 1814-1815, with an introduction and notes of the earl Fleury, (Paris: H. Vivien, 1901, reissue 1904). Two others editions had been first held in English: *Journal of a nobleman; comprising an account of his travels, and a narrative of his residence at Vienna, during the Congress* (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831 and Philadelphia: Key and Biddle, 1833).

³¹ Karl Bertuch, *Tagebuch vom Wiener Kongress*, herausgegeben von Hermann Freiherrn von Egloffstein (Berlin: 1916).

1819 through Germany and Austria, he arrived in Vienna on 17 September 1814 and lived there for a year, taking advantage of the economic boom that such a gathering of individuals brought about.³²

The backdrop of the celebrations, ceremonies and audiences that animated the Congress of Vienna is reflected in many of Berlinghieri's letters. As so many accidents occur during the journey, there are reports of illness or death, the most famous of which remains that of the prince of Ligne (letters dated 13 and 20 December 1814). The diplomat certainly reveals to us that the rhythm of balls, concerts, "paintings," "sleigh rides" and other shows diminished: At the beginning of February 1815, with the entry into Lent, only the balls remained, "really cold and inanimate compared to our own" (7 February). The dynamics of a spa resort where all the sovereigns of Europe met, experienced as much in Vienna as in Baden, continued to manifest itself until the end, however. This logic of entertainment



Metternich (JDM)

clearly emerges from the references to the need to take care "to run the streets and countryside of Vienna" while waiting for something to happen (26 April 1815). The originality of the Tuscan diplomat's comments lies in the mix between his interest in describing the festivities and the boredom they inspire him. This duality highlights the power of the link he maintains with his native land and its inhabitants, which Anna Martini embodies with some other correspondents. It also gives an idea of the political significance of celebrations and ceremonies that were highly useful in building peace for the major European powers, as J.-P. Bois points out, but ultimately had little impact on the Order of Malta, whose interests Berlinghieri was supposed to defend.³³

There is something in the account of Berlinghieri's letters that makes us live something of the atmosphere of Dino Buzzati's *Tartar Steppe*: Anna Martini's friend would like to leave Vienna but can't do that until he has obtained to meet

³² [Heinrich Wilhelm Richter], Kurt Marholz, ed., *Ein Handwergsbursche zur Kongresszeit in Wien. Reisebericht aus der Biedermeierzeit*, Vienna, Bergland Verlag, 1962, quoted in Heinz Lunzer, Victoria Lunzer-Talos, *Abroad in Austria. Traveller's*

Impressions from Five Centuries, exhibition catalogue (Vienna: Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), 138-41.

³³ Jean-Pierre Bois, *La paix: histoire politique et militaire, 1435-1878* (Paris: Perrin, 2012), 483.

Metternich with whom the meeting is slow to materialize, as he still says on 26 April. In the course of his letters, Daniello Berlinghieri does not only reveal the infinite slowness of the procedures and the submission of small delegations to the goodwill of the princes. He also tells his friend some thoughts about the limits of human action. He says he is doing his duty, but expresses a deep sense of helplessness: he believes that the outcome of the Congress “won’t be able to hurt us because it does not depend on us” (5 September 1815), that the fate of the Order of Malta will depend “on the system that will be adopted in general” and on Providence, “much more than on the small efforts we can make” (22 October 1814). His maxim is to “do whatever it takes to get as little harm as possible out of the circumstances” (2 February 1815). He therefore considers that we should not worry “about what is happening but only about what we are doing, without which it is not possible in this world to have a moment of rest” (25 March 1815). In doing so, he advocates a form of disillusioned wisdom and tactical caution, which does not deny the possible role of individuals in history but brings everyone back to the extent of this possibilities in his own context. In the shadow of the Vienna Congress, where he occupied only a tiny place, Berlinghieri kept in mind the need for man to cultivate his tranquility and avoid working for his misfortune. This is what the prospect of

returning to Tuscany represents for him, symbolized by the resort in Petriolo, continuously called for during the nine months of his stay in Vienna.

In this quest for individual happiness, the desire to return home is evident, but the life Berlinghieri later led is not reduced to it. While he returned to Siena in the summer of 1815, where he continued, as before his mission to Austria, to take care of the University, he also served the Grand Duchy of Tuscany abroad, becoming resident minister in Paris from 1826, then Ambassador in Brussels in 1837. It was in Paris, and not in Tuscany, that he died in 1838. Alongside his ever-aware curiosity and desire to get to know other countries, his Viennese correspondence of 1814-1815 shows, however, how strong the feeling of belonging to the small country remained in him, reduced to the dimensions of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, if not to the city of Siena alone. Everything about Berlinghieri evokes, from Vienna to Tuscany, this “Italy of Italy” whose genesis L. Mascilli Migliorini has reconstructed in contact with the eyes of foreigners, even if these realities were beginning to be assimilated to the broader territorial reality of a peninsula which, despite the wishes of the great European powers who shared it in Vienna, was soon to vibrate in tune with the Risorgimento.³⁴

³⁴Luigi Mascilli Migliorini, *L’Italia dell’Italia. La tradizione toscana da Montesquieu a Berenson* (Florence: Casa Editrice le Lettere, 2006).

Also, in his letters sent to Anna Martini at least once a week, Berlinghieri uses the only weapon at his disposal to compensate for the months of waiting and humiliation suffered by the princes and ministers meeting in Vienna. This weapon consists of an exceptional ability to observe and describe, to report events, to make a state of mind sensitive. But it also resides in the art of allusions that so often lead him to compare the Germanic world to Tuscany.³⁵ Despite his positive vision of certain parts of Viennese life, the discreet affirmation of a feeling of superiority, or at least of well-being in Tuscany, can be seen throughout all of this correspondence. Far from

expressing a desire to blend into the foreign land, Berlinghieri opposes the customs, the ways of dancing, the organization of landscapes and sociability by constantly marking against the Germanic world his preference for the universe that is familiar to him. In doing so, while the Hundred Days worry Berlinghieri especially for their consequences on peace in Italy, his correspondence becomes the place of manifestation of a founding nostalgia for an identity, where the very failure of his mission accomplished to the end contributes to reinforce the living depth of the sense of self.

³⁵ Here are some examples, among others: “it’s something else than Valiana and Cortona” (18 August 1814); “the Brenta river, bigger than the Arno in Pisa” (20 August); “by beautiful hills more and more similar to those of Tuscany” (20 August); “very beautiful season, which looks like a beautiful month of October in our country” (August, undated); “[Clagenfurt] is a little smaller than Livorno” (24 August); “Vienna is hidden from us by a line of low and bare hills, which are similar to those of Collelungo” (24 August); “We have here a season as we experienced in Siena in mid-December” (5 September); “I miss this stay and I only think of your company and my home” (December, undated); “It is the Kahlenberg, which in relation to Vienna is more or less located like the Montagnuola in relation to Siena” (13 December); “Yes, your dear Petriolo is worth much more than

these boring magnificences” (1 January 1815); “I am not, and I never will be, made for the world in which circumstances have projected me” (17 January); “This return is for me an absolute need: I am sedentary, not a bird of passage” (25 March); “This is a time when everyone must stay as much as they can at home” (28 March); “The gardens [of Schoenbrunn] [...] are disproportionately larger than those of Boboli” (26 April); “In Eisenstadt] I have not seen on this side of the Alps a landscape that has reminded me more of the beautiful regions of Tuscany” (24 May); “But nothing compensates me for the impatience I have to be with you people” (15 June); “Styria, which I was delighted with and which in another aspect of nature and art I find just as beautiful as the most beautiful parts of Tuscany” (26 June).

The Austrian Diplomat Baron von Stürmer and his Brush with Napoleon and Napoleonists

by Peter Hicks

Bartholomäus Baron von Stürmer (born in Pera on 26 December 1787, died in Venice, 8 July 1863) became a diplomat following in his father's footsteps. Born on Boxing Day in Constantinople 18 years after the birth of Napoleon, Bartholomäus studied at the Oriental Academy in Vienna, originally a part of the University but which soon mutated into training school for diplomats. It is today oldest diplomatic school in existence. Though non-nobles were admitted, they were lodged separately. The noble Stürmer entered this hot house for diplomatic training (a maximum of 16 admittances per year) at the remarkable young age of nine. Language learning (naturally Oriental tongues) was the heart of the teaching here, along with the 'noble' subjects of riding, fencing, dancing, music. A director and two Prefect supervised the studies of an average of 20 to 30 students on an individual basis. Contemporaries called the students there "Apprentice diplomats", though not all would become diplomats. Baron Thugut (a non-noble) famously became Foreign Minister and was made a Baronet.¹ Stürmer emerged aged 20 (in 1807), though not without having worked briefly in French-occupied Vienna in 1805 for the Baron Rudolf Wrubna-Freudenthal, an energetic

opponent of the French occupation both before and after Austerlitz. In 1806, Bartholomäus returned to the bosom of his family to work for his father in Constantinople. In 1811, he was sent to the Austrian legation in St Petersburg, finally looking after the diplomatic correspondence of general Schwarzenberg during the Russian campaign and up to Waterloo. Clearly his close relations with Schwarzenberg led to his appointment on St Helena (though shortly before going to the island he was appointed to a post at the legation in Florence).

The political situation

In the aftermath of Waterloo and the presence of the allies in Paris, Britain (as top dog) set about arranging the new order in France. One minor problem to be resolved was: what to do about Napoleon? Barely a month after the victory in Belgium and just as Napoleon was boarding *Bellerophon*, Lord Liverpool was thinking ahead, noting to Castlereagh on 15 July: "If you should succeed in getting possession of his person, and the King of France does not feel himself sufficiently strong to bring him to justice as a rebel, we are ready to take upon ourselves the custody of his person on

¹ Heinrich Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, *A short history of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna: Training for international careers since 1754*, s.l.

[but (Vienna: Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 2008)], 11-13.

of my own, which, upon reconsideration, appears to be open to much objection."⁴

Liverpool and Castlereagh were not however to have their way, and the Commissioners were to be included in the treaty of 2 August. The agreement began as follows:

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

NAPOLEON Buonaparté being in the power of the Allied Sovereigns their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of Russia, have agreed, in virtue of the stipulations of the Treaty of the 25th March 1815, upon the measures most proper to render all enterprize impossible, on his part, against the repose of Europe;

The [...] Plenipotentiaries have agreed upon the following points and Articles:

Article I.—Napoleon Buonaparté is considered, by the Powers who have signed the Treaty of the 25th March last, as their prisoner.

Article II.—His custody is especially entrusted to the British Government.

The choice of the place, and of the measures which can best secure the object of the present stipulation, are reserved to His Britannic Majesty.

Article III.—The Imperial Courts of Austria and of Russia, and the Royal Court of Prussia, are to appoint Commissioners to proceed to and abide at the place which the Government of His Britannic Majesty shall have assigned for the residence of Napoleon Buonaparté, and who, without being responsible for his custody, will assure themselves of his presence.

Article IV.—His Most Christian Majesty is to be invited, in the name of the four above-mentioned Courts, to send in like manner a French Commissioner to the place of detention of Napoleon Buonaparté.

Article V.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, binds Himself to fulfil the engagements which fall to Him by the present Convention.

Article VI.—The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within fifteen days, or sooner, if possible.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention, and have

⁴ Duke of Wellington (ed.), *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of*

Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. (London: Murray, 1864), XI: 55.

affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at Paris, the 2d August, in the year of our Lord 1815.⁵

Bilateral treaties with identical articles (written in French) were signed by each power, Metternich Plenipotentiary for Austria, Nesselrode for Russia, and Hardenberg for Prussia. Castlereagh and Wellington, both in Paris at the time, signed for Great Britain.

The Commissioners

The commissioners were: Montchenu for France, Alexandre [Antonovitch] Ramsay de Balmain for Russia, and Bartholomäus von Stürmer. The Prussian commissioner, Johannes Ludwig Léopold Mund, in the end never made the journey. Stürmer was accompanied by his young wife, suspected (probably incorrectly) by swashbuckling British politician and spy, Sir Robert Wilson, as being strongly attached to Napoleon, and the botanist Philip Welle. Welle, deputy-head gardener at Schönbrunn, had been sent to St Helena at the suggestion of Alexander von Humboldt, a close friend of Aimé Bonpland, the

coauthor of the *Voyages aux Régions Equinoxiales*.⁶ However, Welle was not all he seemed. In his bags he bore a message from the mother of Napoleon's valet Louis-Joseph Marchand (she worked at Schönbrunn as nanny to the young King of Rome) to her son Louis-Joseph, but also, crucially, a lock of the King of Rome's hair. When Hudson Lowe learned that the letter had been delivered without his permission, he accused Stürmer of being aware of the situation and asked for Welle's expulsion from the island. Whilst on the surface suspicious, Welle's mistake (if it was one) would appear to have been in fact an innocent one. Most importantly, it remained peripheral to Stürmer's duty as Commissioner. It will not form part of this paper.

The Stürmers left Portsmouth on 21 April 1816 aboard *Orontes*, arriving on 18 June 1816.⁷ It was decided to board the Stürmers on *Orontes* despite the fact that the two other commissioners sailed on *Newcastle* because the former were a couple and Balmain and Montchenu were bachelors. The Stürmers would therefore benefit from greater comfort.

⁵ This is the English translation laid before the British House of Commons in 1815.

⁶ See Emilio Ocampo, *The Emperor's Last Campaign* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 64, n. 39.

⁷ Haus- Hof- und Staats-archiv, Vienna, Staatenabteilung, England, box 14, Varia 1815-1817, 14; Stürmer to Metternich, Orotava, Teneriffa, 4 May 1816, mentioning the departure, see Hanns Schlitter, trans. Jacques St-Céré, *Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène : Rapports officiels du*

Baron Sturmer (Paris: à la Librairie illustrée, s. d. [but 1888]), 4-5. See also Rudolf Agstner, *Austria and its Consulates in the United States since 1820*, 78-82. Las Cases in the *Mémorial* noted the arrival of *Newcastle* and *Orontes* on 17, but Stürmer dated his first dispatch to Vienna announcing his arrival the day following the ship's arrival with the words "I've just set foot on land", see Schlitter, *Napoléon op.cit.*, 6.

We know of Napoleon's initial reaction to the Commissioners from the proto-version of the *Mémorial* published recently by a team from the Fondation Napoléon. On 25 July 1816, during a conversation with the Admiral Pulteney Malcolm, "the emperor briefly moved him [the Admiral] when, referring to the commissioners he spoke of the improbability of him receiving them. 'In the end, Sir,' he said to him, 'you and I, we are men; I appeal to you. Can it be that that the emperor of Austria, whose daughter I married, who solicited this marriage on bended knee, to whom I returned his capital city twice, who is confining my wife and son, can it be that he is sending me his commissioner without one single line of writing for me, without even a tiny fragment of a health report on my son? Can I receive him? Can I have anything to say to him? It's the same as for Alexander's commissioner, who has given himself the glory of saying that he is my friend, with whom I have only had political wars and not personal quarrels. It is all very well for them to be sovereigns, but we are all no less men; I demand no other title at this moment! Ought they not all to have a heart? Believe me, Sir, that when I impugn the title of general, it cannot offend me; I am only declining because to accept would be to agree that I had never been emperor; and here, I am defending not so much my own honour as that of others. I am defending the honour of those with whom I was linked, with this title, by treaty or alliance of any sort. The only one of the commissioners which I could possibly receive would be that of Louis XVIII, a

king who owes me nothing and whose commissioner was for a long time my subject. That commissioner is merely acting in accordance with circumstances beyond his control. Indeed, I would receive him tomorrow, were it not that I feared the bad accounts that people would probably give of the meeting and the foolish colours in which they would not fail to paint such a circumstance, etc.'"

Stürmer had not yet been a year and a half into his time on St Helena, when according to the traditional story, Metternich plucked him from the island to make him consul general for Austria in Philadelphia, Sturmer leaving St Helena on 11 July 1818 aboard *Northumberland*. After a brief time in the US, he was then to be appointed at the diplomatic mission Rio de Janeiro. Whilst this story has been much told, closer investigation reveals errors in the traditional account and a much more interesting story thereafter.

Sturmer, Metternich and St Helena

Perhaps the first question to be asked is: why was Stürmer chosen to be Commissioner? Though I have not found this story told elsewhere, the answer in fact lies in a letter written by Metternich to his daughter Marie on 9 August 1815 and published in the Austrian minister's memoirs. "Stürmer" he wrote, "is asking for the position as Austrian commissioner on St Helena. He is hoping to marry here, take his wife with him and return after two or three years. I find that he is correct. He is young - he will be making a superb voyage.

He will see the Cape of Good Hope and the island of St Helena; they say this place is one of the most beautiful in the world, and he will be much listened to when he comes back. It is true he will get a tan, but that does not change much; he is already pretty dark skinned. I shall go and see whether the Emperor consents to his project. He will not have much competition.”⁸

It would also appear that Metternich was intimately involved in Stürmer’s hasty wedding before boarding *Orontes* in April 1816. On 10 January 1817, as a postscript to one of his commissioner’s missives, Stürmer wrote to Metternich thanking him for being the architect of his happiness in the form of Madame Stürmer. “The goodness with which your Excellency deigned to take an interest in my marriage will never be effaced from my memory. We, Madame Stürmer and I, will be forever in your debt”.⁹ Their close friendly relationship was to characterize all of their interactions.

As for Baroness Stürmer, she was a very colourful creature. Ermance Catherine Boutet, was born on 25 February 1798. She married Stürmer (eleven years her elder) aged 17 in 1815. And Basil Jackson referred to her as “an exceedingly pretty Parisian, but *voilà tout*”.¹⁰ Las Cases recounted the

story of her early years in later versions of the *Mémorial* for the date 20 August 1816. According to Las Cases, she was the daughter of the employee of the war ministry who came to the house to teach his son Latin. When the Latin teacher asked Las Cases if he could find Ermance a position as a governess, Madame de Las Cases took the girl under her wing; she was apparently charming and pretty. They invited her to the house a few times in the hope she might make some acquaintances. Las Cases goes on to explain why on St Helena he was not happy with her.

When he discovered her presence on the island, Las Cases delightedly sent his servant round to her at Rosemary Hall (not far from Longwood House) hoping for news from home. On being rebuffed, Las Cases was furious. As Las Cases tells the story, Napoleon laughed in his face, calling him a poor judge of psychology. Of course, she would not want to make contact with you, roared Napoleon. In fact, you are her enemy, he went on. You knew her when she was nobody, and now she is a German (in fact Austrian) countess! The Countess for her part noted that she had been polite to Las Cases, but the damage was done. Basil Jackson also implies that Ermance was venal. In his memoir, he refers to an incident where she attempted

⁸ Klemens Wenzel Lothar, Fürst von Metternich, *Mémoires, documents et écrits divers laissés par le prince de Metternich, chancelier de cour et d'État; pub. par son fils le prince Richard de Metternich, classés et réunis par M. A. de Klinkowstroem* (Paris : E. Plon, Nourrit et cie, 1886), II: 527, pièce 203.

⁹ See Schlitter, *Napoléon op.cit.*, 68.

¹⁰ Basil Jackson, *Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer, chiefly relating to the Waterloo campaign and to St. Helena matters during the captivity of Napoleon* (London: J. Murray, 1903), 139.

(unsuccessfully) to get Gourgaud to give her a diamond studded pin. Jackson tells the story thus: "The house occupied by Baron Stürmer and Count Balmain was within a short walk, and we occasionally visited it, but were never asked either to luncheon or dinner, although great professions were made of desire to show Gourgaud kindness. The Baroness was fond of jewellery, and a fine diamond pin worn by the General was much admired. "You must make me a present, as a memorial of our friendship; let it be an *épingle, car ça pique et ça attache*" was her modest way of evincing her longing desire to possess the diamond; but it proved a failure, as may well be imagined."¹¹

Why did Stürmer move on?

During Stürmer's stay on the island there were many rumours that armed men were coming to whisk Napoleon away. Already in 1816, the Austrians alone had intercepted secret messages to Napoleon. The Austrian government communicated a letter to British ambassador in Paris, Charles Stuart, who informed Castlereagh as follows: "a letter [...] has been intercepted by the police of Vienna, [...]"

addressed to General Morand at Cracow. This letter contains an obscure allusion to St. Helena, Ascension, and Philadelphia; and a reference to future communications in cipher...."¹² In late 1816, the *Anti-Gallican* published a coded letter addressed to the fallen emperor, and the Austrian embassy in London sent to Vienna what they could decipher (this time (unlike earlier) refusing to share the intel with the British). Letter to Prince Esterhazy from Vienna, 4 December 1816: "Monsieur de Neumann [the Austrian diplomat in Paris] sent me the following papers by the last courier. He thinks that they are a diplomatic code, and I hurried to send them to our decoders. You will see, Prince, that several pages have been decoded [...] The contents of the decoded passages are sufficient to prove that it is a correspondence with Napoleon. The news given to him is a nature to prove that the correspondent has a desire to make Napoleon wait patiently, that he should not lose all hope, and that he should have good courage, and that they could facilitate an escape for him, which fortunately for us, we think more than impossible..."¹³ The *Anti Gallican* published another coded letter on 24 November 1816, but which this

¹¹ Jackson, *op. cit.*, 151.

¹² Quoted in Forsyth, *The Captivity of Napoleon*, I: 310-11.

¹³ Hanns Schlitter, *Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden vom Sturze Napoleons bis zu dessen Tode* (Vienna: Tempsky (aus dem Archiv für österreichische Geschichte separat abgedruckt), 1888), 21 and n.1: « Monsieur de Neumann m'ayant envoyé par le dernier courrier les petites feuilles ci-incluses, qui lui ont paru renfermer un chiffre diplomatique, je me suis empressé de les soumettre

à nos déchiffreurs. Vous verrez, mon Prince, que plusieurs passages ont été déchiffrés; ceux qui ne le sont pas, n'ont pu l'être faute de matériaux... Le contenu des passages déchiffrés suffit pour prouver, qu'il s'agit d'une correspondance avec Napoléon. Les nouvelles qu'on lui donne sont de nature, à prouver plutôt dans le correspondant le désir de le tenir en haleine, et de l'empêcher de perdre tout espoir de salut, que de le mener sur des bonnes voies, et qui pourroient lui faciliter une fuite qui heureusement nous paroit plus qu'impossible... »

time the Austrian diplomats in London could not decipher. They sent it to Vienna hoping for better luck there.¹⁴

The Austrians were aware of the jealousy with which the British wanted to be sole guardians of Napoleon. Indeed, the St Helena governor, Hudson Lowe, throughout Stürmer's time on the island made it almost impossible for him to complete the mission of making sure that Napoleon was actually present, thereby putting into practice (but without making it explicit) the British refusal of the presence of the Commissioners, so clearly expressed by Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh. Here, in the question of the clandestine messages sent via the *Anti Gallican*, the Austrians alone concocted a plan to write a generic coded message for publication in the same journal, in the hope that those who were sending the messages in the *Anti Gallican* would reveal themselves further.¹⁵

Fears of escape were real. Major General Sir H. Torrens wrote to Earl Bathurst on 22

July 1815 regarding St Helena, noting that: "The island being within the tropics, the wind is *fair for India*, at *all* times; and a ship cutting her cable at night, would drift out

of the bay with amazing rapidity, and be quite out of sight in the morning. While I was at St Helena, a vessel left the harbour in this manner, in defiance of all the guns of the garrison."¹⁶

Possibly the most important moment in terms of Stürmer's continued presence on the island was the unexpected arrival of the vessel *Blossom*. It

arrived on 8 January 1818 causing "general agitation".¹⁷ On 14 March, Stürmer noted that the news it brought was in fact the failure of Latapie's uprising in Pernambuco in Brazil designed to provide a vessel to rescue Napoleon from the island.¹⁸ Simultaneously, Baron Stürmer sent to Prince Metternich an account of conversations held with Gourgaud, which Metternich forwarded to Lord Bathurst:



Sir Hudson Lowe (DJM)

¹⁴ Schlitter, *Napoleoniden op. cit.*, 23 and n.2.

¹⁵ Schlitter, *Napoleoniden op. cit.*, 27.

¹⁶ Wellington (ed.), *op. cit.*, XI: 51.

¹⁷ Schlitter, *Napoléon op. cit.*, 47.

¹⁸ Schlitter, *Napoléon op. cit.*, 169-70.

Stürmer.— What did he say of the colonel Latapie affair and the pretended attempt to rescue him?

Gourgaud.— He says that it could be true, but that he knows those people, that they are just adventurers, and he would never have put himself in their hands.

Sturmer.— Do you think he could escape from here?

Gourgaud.— He has had ten chances to do it, and he has one at this very moment in which I'm talking to you.

Stunner.—I must confess, I think it impossible.

Gourgaud.—Really! What can you not do when you have millions at your disposal? But in the end, despite the fact that the Emperor has treated me badly, I will never betray him. I repeat, he could escape on his own and go to America when he wants; I will say no more.

Stunner.—If he can do it, what is stopping him? The important thing is to be out of here.

Gourgaud.—We have all advised him to do it. He has always rebutted our arguments and resisted. However

unhappy he may be here, he secretly enjoys the importance given to his detention, and the interest shown to it by the Powers in Europe, to the minutest attention given to his every word, etc. He has said to us more than once, "I can no longer live as a private individual; I would rather be a prisoner here than free in the United States."¹⁹

Whilst Basil Jackson thought that Gourgaud was messing with Stürmer,²⁰ we can guess that he took the remarks, at least in part, seriously. Already a year earlier, we find Stürmer requesting a posting in Philadelphia and subsequently Rio de Janeiro, precisely the places around which plans to rescue Napoleon centred. Coincidence? I think not...

On 10 January 1817, Stürmer noted in his dispatch to Metternich how it might be interesting for him to go to Philadelphia. No Austrian diplomat had ever been there, he opined, and his present situation would make this occasion unique. "I would only like to stay for two or three months", he continued, "just enough time for him to ascertain useful notions regarding a government that may in the end attract the attention of everyone. I shall also learn to recognize their dispositions and opinion regarding Bonaparte (it is always the Americans we fear here) and this would be

¹⁹ William Forsyth, *History of the captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena; from the letters and journals of the late Lieut.-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe, and official documents not before made public* (London: J. Murray, 1853), III: 393. Oddly enough, this part of

the important missive from Stürmer to Metternich (transmitted to Bathurst) does not figure in Schlitter's publication. See also Jackson, *op. cit.*, 151 ff.

²⁰ Jackson, *op. cit.*, 151-52.

in a sort of completion of my mission. I shall make it my business to get information on the notable foreigners there, their projects and hopes, something that will not be devoid of interest. But your Excellency can easily guess that I could only undertake this journey at His Majesty's expense, furthermore not a great sum. [...] Prince, please consider in your wisdom my project and honour me with a reply.”²¹ Six months later, Metternich sent a letter to Ritter von Stahl, president of the Commercial Court Commission, dated 5 October 1817, recalling Stürmer from St Helena and appointing him Consul-General for North America:

That appointing an I.R. Consul-General in the North American free states has been regarded as useful on all sides and has already received imperial authorisation. However, as presently, apart from commercial interests, which said Consulate-General will have to look after, political events too are more and more intervening in the general affairs of our part of the world and as it would be important for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have a reliable overall view thereof, I consider it urgently necessary that this post—although presently only of consular status—will be entrusted to a civil servant with adequate experience in the diplomatic field. I

believe to find the qualifications necessary in my view in the I.R. commissioner on the island of St Helena, Baron Stürmer, who speaks French, Italian and English, and who in his career up to now has had the opportunity not only to acquire sufficient knowledge in the diplomatic field, but during his service in Constantinople and St Helena practical experience, in trade and navigation as well. Should Your Excellency not object to this choice, I would take care to suggest in the most humble submission which I am in the process of drafting immediately anyway also his appointment as consul-general in North America. I am looking forward to your Excellency's views and, on condition that Y.E. are in agreement with my proposal outlined above, request that Y.E. will in the meantime see to it that the consular instructions and other papers are prepared to gain time, in such a way as to enable Baron Stürmer to travel from his present post without delay directly to North America.²²

Conclusion

So there we have it. Despite the fact that later historians have noted how Stürmer was indignant about a posting to the US, he

²¹ Schlitter, *Napoléon op. cit.*, 67.

²² Haus- Hof- und Staats-archiv, Vienna, StK Staatskanklei, box 205, letters to Commercial

Court Commission 1817 VII - 1819 V, Metternich to Stahl, 5 October 1817.

had in fact suggested it to his boss. Perhaps it was the length of time and not the posting itself that irked Bartholomäus so much. Be that as it may, moving from the fount of all Napoleonism itself on St Helena, Stürmer took up a posting in the hotbed of Napoleonist resistance Philadelphia

(residence of Joseph Bonaparte to boot), finally heading on to Rio de Janiero, a mere six days by boat from St Helena. But the danger was over. He did not know it, but five months later, Napoleon would be dead. And the legend would be set free from St Helena, never to be reimprisoned.

The Voice of Duty: Collaboration and Ideology in Napoleonic Italy (Parma–Piacenza 1805-1810)

by Doina Pasca Harsanyi

On 8 Fructidor an 13 (26 August 1805) Pietro Albesani (1768–1823) was nominated Imperial Prosecutor at the Court of Criminal Justice in Piacenza. Henceforth, he was one of the two most prestigious magistrates in the States of Parma during the Napoleonic period (the other one was Enrique Mastelloni, Imperial Prosecutor at the Court of Criminal Justice in Parma since 1804). A graduate of the University of Torino, Albesani obtained this prestigious position on the strength of his career in the Piedmont and, after 1801, in the service of the French.¹ He came to Piacenza with three-year experience as Prosecutor at the Criminal Court in Marengo and arrived just in time to witness the outbreak of the anti-French uprising that rocked the territory from December 1805 to March 1806.² Maréchal Pérignon, Governor of the States of Parma from 18 September 1806 to 23 July 1808, drew a glowing portrait of this model functionary:

M. Albesani has always proved to be a man of character, energetically

taking the side of justice. His forcefully articulated opinions in favor of the French government and of the new institutions have unavoidably brought forth hidden enemies, whose intrigues he now fears.³

Indeed, Albesani was much more than a competent magistrate and dependable employee: He supported French government institutions out of genuine conviction, a conviction rooted in fundamental distrust of the good judgment, moral codes, and general aspirations of the masses he wished to shepherd on the path of law and order. From the beginning of the insurrection, the Imperial Prosecutor took a dim view of the insurgents' motives and goals. The first local reports he obtained (in late December 1805) described how villages were calling each other to rebellion by sounding church bells (*campana a martella*) but insisted that all such actions were the work of unknown brigands descending from the mountains on peaceful communities

¹ Not much is known about him outside his service on the bench. A brief biographical notice in Luigi Mensi, *Dizionario biografico piacentino (1860-1980)* (Piacenza: Banca di Piacenza, 2000).

² For quick reference, see the still very useful monograph Vincenzo Paltrineri, *I Moti contro Napoleone negli Stati di Parma 1805–1806* (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1927).

³ Maréchal Pérignon to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Naples 10 November 1808. Archives Nationales

Paris (henceforth ANP) BB 5/302. Maréchal Pérignon served as Governor General of the States of Parma from September 1806 to July 1808 and was nominated Governor of Naples immediately afterwards. He wrote the letter of recommendation cited here because Albesani expected to be reassigned as the States of Parma were reorganized as a department of the Empire (Dipartimento del Taro) in 1808.

who by themselves never meant to cause any trouble. Echoing the French discourse of brigandage, village mayors and commissioners composed narratives that relied heavily on the trope of simple-minded, childlike rural folk, inherently innocent because unable to organize revolts or formulate coherent grievances. It was indeed the only realistic way of restraining the repression launched as soon as French authorities became aware of the events.⁴ General Marion, military commander of Piacenza, had no reservations. Upon reading the reports Albesani shared with him, he concluded that only French forces—alas, not readily available—were capable of simultaneously defeating the rebellion and assisting the victimized population: “I despair that lack for troops prevent me from helping these unfortunates,” he wrote in his lengthy first letter to Albesani.⁵ The necessary troops arrived shortly, led by General Abdullah Menou, Commander in chief of the Departments of the Alps and Marengo. As he raced towards the Piacentino, Menou saw a clear link between insurgents and brigands, implicitly absolving most peasants who were neither:

My dear friend, the Prince has sent 3,000 infantry soldiers and a cavalry

⁴ I discussed the topic of strategic paternalism in “Brigands or insurgents? Napoleonic authority in Italy and the Piacentino Counter-insurrection of 1805-1806” *French History* 30 (March 2016): 51–76.

⁵ General Marion to Albesani (A Monsieur le Procureur Général Impérial près de la Cour Criminelle de Plaisance), Piacenza 2 January 1806. ANP BB 18/871.

regiment under the orders of General Pouget. These troops are under my command. I will tell General Pouget to leave a few troops Parma; afterwards he must go to Castel San Giovanni. I will march on Voghera with other soldiers and several pieces of artillery. We will comb the mountains and we will not leave on brigand, one insurgent behind. As I climb down from the mountains I will stop to greet you in Parma.⁶

A week later, Menou confidently wrote that the troubles had been dealt with as expected. All that remained to do was to punish exemplarily the guilty few and forgive the deluded many:

The troubles in the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, in the Apennins, in the department of Marengo, towards Bobbio, have been almost entirely placated. The mutineers are returning their weapons and return to their villages. But there are a few chiefs who deserve neither grace nor pardon and we will seize them shortly; they will be turned over to the Military Commission.⁷

The Governor of Liguria and Arch-treasurer of the Empire Charles-François

⁶ General Menou to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Torino 11 January 1806, Biblioteca Palatina Parma (henceforth BPP) *Manoscritti Parmensi* 543, f.37.

⁷ General Menou to Minister of Interior Champagny, Torino 19 January 1806. Champagny confirms receipt and thanks Menou. ANP F/1e/85.

Lebrun, de facto ruler of the States of Parma since the beginning of the uprising, explicitly invited the people of Parma–Piacenza to save themselves by attributing any wrongdoing to brigands:

Impostors push you to delinquency; brigands want to associate you with their crimes so as to escape the reprisals of the law. Separate your cause from theirs; chase them away; be again what you were before: submissive to the public order, obedient to the voice of honour (...) Ah! Do not force me to shed the indulgence of my character and to strike those whom I have promised to make happy! Think of the perils that threaten you! Armed forces surround you: one word is enough and, innocent or guilty, all of you will be punished. Return, I beseech you, to your homes and, while there is still time, listen to the voice of a father.⁸

The Imperial Prosecutor's voice emerged as the only discordant note. He read the same reports French officials read but failed to

detect any distinction between hapless masses and ferocious brigands. On the contrary, his suspicions were awakened as early as 1 January 1806 when he informed Minister Régnier that all local executives, from justices of peace to Piacenza's governor, outdid each other in procrastinating when he pressed them for information.⁹ This, to this mind, signaled ill will, and persuaded him that the picture of powerlessness the *podestà* projected was nothing but a ploy meant to conceal the entire population's obstinate resistance to existing authority:

The goal of each accusation is to save one's own commune and redirect suspicion on neighboring villages, pretending that bands, that some put at 200, others at 400 and even at 1000 or 2000 individuals, forced them to ring the bells and take up arms. These reports contain no details, do not indicate any culprits, and pretend (with all too obvious deceit, for they all know each other) that they have not recognized anybody. In a word, it is clear that by these

⁸ Governor Lebrun's address to the people of the States of Parma, posted around the rebel area the first days of January 1806. ANP BB 18/871. On 6 January, Viceroy Eugene issued a very similar public proclamation. Both documents are published in Archivio di Stato Parma (henceforth ASPr) *Gridario* 1805. The States of Parma were officially governed by Administrator General Moreau de Saint-Méry as of 1802. His failure to avoid or at least to suppress rapidly the insurrection prompted Liguria's Governor Charles-François Lebrun to take control of the situation provisionally, until Napoleon formally dismissed Moreau on 19 January 1806. The same day,

Napoleon nominated General Jean-Andoche Junot as Governor General of the States of Parma, with absolute powers to restore order.

⁹ Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, ANP BB 18/871. Local official argued that the imperial courts were not yet formally installed; hence, they did not need obey the prosecutor's orders. Indeed, Administrator General Moreau de Saint-Méry had been too distracted by the rebellion to install the courts in timely fashion. It was only later in January that Governor Lebrun formally inaugurated the French system of justice in the States of Parma.

reports they only try to shield themselves of the misfortunes they fear would fall on their heads. Besides, the recipients of these denunciations make no effort to follow through and discover the truth.¹⁰

Worse, not only there was hardly any material difference between ordinary peasants and brigands; local leaders remained complacent in the face of obvious misconduct, made no effort to instill discipline, and were thus just as guilty as their untutored flock:

Here, the system is so disorganized that one does not even know where to seek justice. Highway robberies are very frequent, especially from Parma to Piacenza. Even so, I have never seen a single conviction. On the contrary, the guilty are almost always set free. Since 19 September, I have proofs to show that 35 or 36 culprits were let go. For a trifle, people rebel against the gendarmerie, which is not supported by the current authorities who, on the contrary, do everything in their power to hinder its operations. At the theater, the audience mocked the Bulletins that were read to announce

the victories of the Great Army, this under the eyes of the local authorities.¹¹

To top it all, Albesani continued in the same letter, local executives foiled at every step his efforts to punish the guilty in accordance with the law. What further proof of guilt would one need?

Throughout his correspondence with Governor Lebrun and with Minister of Justice Régnier, Albesani maintained the same incredulity towards any explanation local leaders advanced to defend or rationalize the actions of their people. Like a dry-eyed, uncompromising Commissaire Javert intent on chastising the multitude of *misérables* guilty of subverting established order, his first impulse was to disbelieve anything village representatives reported. Peaceful communities terrorized by brigands? Not likely: “You will learn that eighteen communes rose in rebellion, each one pretexting it was pressured by the others.”¹² Exasperation caused by poorly understood and brutally enforced recruitment in National Guard units—an instance that all French and local officials agreed had triggered widespread discontent?¹³ Very doubtful, Albesani reckoned:

contribute two regiments, or 12,000 men in total, recruited from the ranks of the local militia, to his reserve camp near Bologna. This was supposed to be an all-volunteer force but militia commanders used harsh tactics to enroll the less willing which in the end contributed to the uprising that started in December 1805. For details on this episode, see my article ‘Between Glory and Good Sense. Resistance

¹⁰ Albesani to Governor Lebrun, Piacenza 4 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

¹¹ Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

¹² Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 7 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

¹³ In November 1805, Prince Eugène demanded, almost casually, that the States of Parma

Many believe that recruitment for National Guard units, ordered to be sent to the Bologna camp, caused the insurrection. Some add that agents of England took advantage of this discontent to push people to rebellion. Everything is possible, but what is sure, is that for a long time, in fact from the very first days the Gendarmerie was organized in the region, they (villagers) rebelled and killed gendarmes, in a word, the public mood (*esprit public*) was the same before the recruitment, which could only have prompted them to put into action evil plans they already had in mind and were concocting for a long time.¹⁴

Would the aggressive behavior of gendarmes recently inserted in the social fabric of Piacentino communities bear some responsibility for the general climate of frustration?¹⁵ Not in the Imperial Prosecutor's eyes. A series of reports detailing how gendarmes executed on the spot eight villagers who dared resist arrest because they had nothing wrong, induced Albesani to look benevolently on the gendarmes' side of the story—that the deaths in question occurred after they tried to stop a mutinous crowd from sounding

the call to rebellion (*campana a martella*). While still undecided which version told the unadulterated truth, Albesani could not help reasoning that “we cannot make decisions based on the ten informers who are all animated by the same rebellious spirit and who come forward for no other reason but to shield themselves from blame.”¹⁶

At no time did the Imperial Prosecutor find reasons to give the benefit of the doubt to local inhabitants over French police or army spokesmen. On the contrary, constantly worrying that clever peasants could easily wrong-foot culturally tone-deaf foreigners, he saw it as his duty to interpret cultural discourses and render transparent what he believed remained opaque to French eyes. What he saw, and feared the French might fail to see, was the persistent *mauvais esprit public*: reflexive rejection of any outside influence, regardless of its merits, expressed through well-practiced routines of evasion; more precisely, deviously playing dumb the better to fool any authority who may attempt to impose the rule of law on the closed village universe. Novelties such as recruitment in the National Guards could not be taken seriously as causes for discontent since they only brought to the

to Conscription and the National Guard Experience in the States of Parma, 1805-1806, in *Napoleonic Scholarship. The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society* (2016).

¹⁴ Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

¹⁵ On the difficulties related to recruiting, retaining and installing police units in the

Départements Réunis see Aurélien Lignereux, ‘Un Empire policier en trompe l’oeil’ in *Police et Gendarmerie dans l’Empire napoléonien* (Paris: Collection de l’Institut Napoléon, 2013), 75–90.

¹⁶ Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 7 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

surface deep-seated habits of defiance and impudence:

The main cause is rooted in the public mood, which was very agitated long before there was any word of recruitment among the militia... One can conclude without fear of getting it wrong that the spirits were prepared (for rebellion) and that forced recruitment only decided them to put into practice ill plans conceived long before (the events).¹⁷

Albesani was not wrong to worry about French officials' reluctance to see things his way. By their own lights, the French were not there to punish and terrorize but to enlighten and reform: This was the crucial qualitative difference between the despotic conquests of the past and the Napoleonic occupation, whose mission was to replace bad laws with good laws and put its administrative machinery in the interest of universal progress. This "bureaucratic optimism," as Broers aptly defined the ethos of French administrators, sustained the French officials in Parma–Piacenza as well.¹⁸ Philosophically, therefore, they could not accept Albesani's fundamental premise that all villagers, mayors, commissioners and priests included, united in resisting Napoleonic rule and willfully disregarded its advantages. This would

have meant treating practically the entire population as a huge criminal gang, which went against the ideal of law and order to the benefit of all. Pragmatically too, French administrators knew that they could not govern by force alone ("you can't sit on bayonets" Talleyrand reportedly quipped), hence they relied on quickly identifying the common ground between French rulers and the local ruled. For all these reasons, French administrators generally favored the strategy of *douceur*, based on the assumption that the guilty few, who must be punished severely, stood apart from the persuadable many who must be allowed time to appreciate the positive difference the Napoleonic regime brought to their lives. Albesani tirelessly warned that *douceur* was utterly inadequate to the situation:

I do not see how I could suggest methods that conform with the moderation and *douceur* typical of Your Excellency, expressed in the letters you honored me with. It seems to me that there is only solution for those who persist and who have been caught carrying weapons is to treat them as rebels (revolutionaries); for those we would arrest, it seems the best is to have them judged by the Military Commission or even better, by special courts without appeal

¹⁷ Michael Broers, 'Les Enfants du Siècle: an empire of young professionals and the creation of a bureaucratic, imperial ethos in Napoleonic Europe' in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History. From Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Peter

Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 362.

¹⁸ Michael Broers, 'Les Enfants du Siècle,' 344-63 (362).

rights. And finally, to send in exile in the colonies all suspected participants, who should be publicly shamed for their disruptive conduct and recalcitrant spirit....¹⁹

Anticipating the French penchant for at least half-believing assurances of bumbling helplessness, he made a point of underlining the long-term advantages of extreme severity: "...This is a terrible procedure but I fear that you must adopt it, despite your natural kindness; it will serve as example for other regions with similar, festering seditious ideas."²⁰ Albesani was alluding to the prevailing method of "making examples," which characterized French counter-insurgency; he was overlooking however the important counterpart to making examples: incentives and rewards for cooperation.²¹ The carrots and sticks approach—the core of French counter-insurgency techniques—made him shake his head in disbelief, because he firmly believed that carrots were wasted on people who only responded to sticks. Throughout the weeks of insurrection, Prosecutor Albesani showed nothing but exasperation when presented with reports claiming collective vulnerability and repeatedly cautioned the French against falling into the trap of unwarranted compassion. His

sternness never softened; after the insurrection, he remained equally adamant that laws must be obeyed, whether convenient or not. He compiled monthly worksheets with details on each case that came before him, complete with the sentences handed over. These meticulous records reveal a rigorous and exceptionally conscientious magistrate. Too conscientious, in fact: In the summer of 1806, shortly after the official end of the insurrection, he requested that a scaffold (*patibolo*) be erected in Piacenza's main square, reckoning that public executions would impress on the citizenry the consequences of breaking the law and the corresponding benefits of obedience. Piacenza's mayor Alberto Scotti persuaded Governor General Junot to reject this demand on grounds that it would unnecessarily aggravate a population still traumatized by recent events.²² Mayor and governor were less mistrustful, and certainly less inclined to apply radical solutions, than the Imperial Prosecutor, whose watchful eye fell on large and small issues alike. On 6 October 1806, for instance, Albesani issued a series of recommendations on how to streamline mail delivery. By then, the postal system had been aligned with Genoa's for more than a year and regulations, including each

¹⁹ Albesani to Governor Lebrun (A monsieur le Gouverneur Lebrun, Architrésorier de l'Empire) Piacenza, 2 January 1806, ANP BB 18/871.

²⁰ Albesani to Governor Lebrun (A monsieur le Gouverneur Lebrun, Architrésorier de l'Empire) Piacenza, 2 January 1806, ANP BB 18/871 (all three quotations above).

²¹ Bruno Colson, 'Counter-insurgency methods' in *Napoleon on War*, trans. by Gregory Elliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 340–46.

²² Mayor Scotti to Governor Junot, 3 June 1806 Archivio di Stato Piacenza (henceforth ASP) *Copialettere del maire*, 1806, #227. Even so, the mayor took care to praise Albesani's monthly reports.

mail carrier's daily route, had been made public since June 1806. The deputy prefects, therefore, did not appreciate the Imperial Prosecutor meddling in their own affairs. The problem was, retorted Albesani in a typical remark: "The mayors do not send people to collect the letters from the post office" and one could not simply trust they will do the right thing.²³

Albesani's industriousness and deference to the French legal and political system did not go unnoticed. The imperial officials who worked with him greatly appreciated this exemplary magistrate but could not bring themselves to embrace his grim vision of an insolent, deceitful and cunning populace, impervious to reasonable policies. Not that his superiors disagreed on the difficulties caused by the Italian masses' stubborn clinging to their retrograde customs; on the contrary: "If things did not turn out as they were supposed to, the imperial administrators knew that the backwardness of the locals was to blame."²⁴



Governor General Junot (JDM)

For Albesani, backwardness was an innate trait of character that he intended, quite literally, to beat out of the natives. Conversely, French administrators operated on the assumption that the condition was curable through exposure to French ideas and good governing practices. This is the belief Governor Lebrun expressed in one of his final letters to Minister of Interior Champagny. Announcing the end of the uprising in the Piacentino, he implicitly rebuffed Albesani's views and delivered an admirable sample of bureaucratic optimism:

Actually, the public mood in these parts is not what we imagine; ignorance combined with susceptibilities nourished by fake rumors and the habits of the Parmense government who always surrendered when threatened,

produced all the difficulties. There are many devoted citizens ready to attach themselves to the government; all will end up adopting

²³ Albesani to Administrator – Prefect Nardon, 6 October 1806. ASP Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 162. Related correspondence in the same file. Hugues-Eugène Nardon served as Administrator Prefect of the States of Parma from January 1806 to July 1810.

²⁴ John Davis, "Divided Destinies? Napoleonic Rule in Northern and Southern Italy" in *Napoleon and His Empire. Europe, 1804–1814*, ed. by Phillip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 165–84 (165). See the longer discussion in Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 118–20.

the French character and the French spirit. They are already becoming more familiar with our soldiers whose company they enjoy. All they need is timely organization, enlightened and just magistrates, a good understanding of our laws and easier ways to communicate.²⁵

There is something touching in Lebrun's faith in the power of the French state to do good in all places it imposed itself. The ambitious project of building a coherent new order in Italy and in Europe was founded in the belief that change was a matter of will and leadership: with proper guidance, people everywhere could unlearn old habits and grasp the advantages of the order of things brought in by the French, hence transform themselves and their way of life accordingly. There was a fundamental disconnect between paternalistic condescension, a key ingredient of French administrative practices, and Albesani's uncompromising disapproval. Which is why, in the end, the Imperial Prosecutor's admonitions turned into a Greek chorus: Always present, always honored, always ignored. Ironically, it was Napoleon himself who, unlike his administrators, concurred with Albesani's

²⁵ Governor Lebrun to Minister Champagny, Genoa 21 January 1806. ANP F/1e/85 and Bulletin 55, published in *Courier de Turin* on 29 January 1806.

²⁶ To General Junot (Au Général Junot), Paris, 4 February 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*. #9712, XI, 560. Throughout his six-month tenure, General Junot did his best to thwart Napoleon's calls for extreme punishment.

hardline approach. "I do not share your opinion on the innocence of the Parmense peasants. They are big rascals who caused huge trouble," wrote Napoleon in reply to Junot's letters recommending indulgence for peasants who did not know better.²⁶ Unfortunately for Albesani, these letters remained confidential and he never had the satisfaction of knowing that he and the emperor were thinking alike.

Pietro Albesani was a conscientious but otherwise unremarkable functionary. Unlike his counterpart in Parma, Emanuele Mastelloni, who earned the Legion of Honor for his work on restructuring the local justice system, Albesani did not impress as a great legal mind and never obtained any special distinction.²⁷ It was only during the crisis of the 1805-06 insurrection that he came briefly to the attention of high-level Napoleonic bureaucrats, only to fade back into administrative obscurity afterwards. Albesani was one of the countless local collaborators the French relied on to run the administrative machinery of the empire and it is under the angle of collaboration that his activities present an interesting case.²⁸ His unquestioning support for the coercive power of the state and open lack of

²⁷ Elvio Ciferi, 'Emanuele Mastelloni' in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Treccani: La Cultura Italiana* 72 (2008) http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/emanuele-mastelloni_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ accessed 01/07/2019.

²⁸ The topic of elite collaboration in Napoleonic Europe has been addressed in the collective volume *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe*, Michael Rowe editor (Basingstoke: Palgrave

empathy for the plight of rebel peasants set him apart from all representatives of local elites: aristocrats, high clergy, mayors, the provincial governor, all did their best to mediate between insurgents and the French, hoping to shield the former from the latter. Albesani, on his side, only worried about the French administration's indulgence and propensity to sacrifice long-term efficiency for the sake of immediate political expediency. In an insightful typology of collaboration, Stephen Gilliat noted that "collaborators are those who share with the resisters the notion that the coercive power in place is an obstacle to autonomous development"—the difference being in resolving how to deal with the situation, not how to define it.²⁹ Albesani believed the opposite, that local structures and hierarchies hindered harmonious autonomous development, while the coercive power in place—the French system and its policies—promoted local advancement. In Gilliat's classification, then, the mayors and governors Albesani complained about would qualify as pragmatic collaborators while Albesani

himself would fit the category of ideologically, who acted out of conviction and whose loyalty did not come at a price. Maréchal Pérignon astutely grasped the difference between his former employee's genuine allegiance and the compliant collaboration many offered while scheming behind their masters' back:

I know there are crafty and devious men who, hiding their opinions, manage to mislead the authority, and alienate the true friends of the French. This manner of intrigue is widespread in Italy, and all the more dangerous and large sections of the population enjoys taking part in it.³⁰

Albesani was also aware that his eagerness made him a target of revenge: "I know the authors of such remarks but I do not dare to denounce them because the denunciations would be pointless I would only expose myself more."³¹ If, in the face of public antipathy, he persisted, it was not for personal gain or comfort: he believed in the French civilizing mission and made it his own.³² Not content merely to reform

Macmillan, 2003). Michael Rowe has also offered illuminating insights into the pragmatism of willing collaborators in the Rhineland, insights that help grasp the dynamics of collaboration in other parts of the empire as well: Michael Rowe, "Resistance, Collaboration or the Third Way? Responses to Napoleonic Rule in Germany" in *Popular Resistance in the French Wars*, ed. by Charles Esdaile (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67–90. A useful survey on recent literature on collaboration, complete with a discussion of methodological borrowings from studies on European imperialism in Africa and Asia in Ambrogio A. Caiani, "Collaborators, Collaboration

and the Problems of Empire in Napoleonic Italy. The Opizzoni Affair, 1805–1807" *The Historical Journal* 60 (2017): 385–407.

²⁹ Stephen Gilliat, *An Exploration of the Dynamics of Collaboration and Non-Resistance* (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 185.

³⁰ Maréchal Pérignon to *Grand Juge* Régnier, *doc. cit.*

³¹ Albesani to *Grand Juge* Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

³² Caiani observed that: "The non-French Napoleonic collaborator was propelled by a mixture of motivations and complete ideological

the justice system—which was all that his French supervisors asked of him—he wished to harness the considerable capabilities of the Napoleonic state in the service of a large-scale reeducation program aimed at rooting out persistent ancient customs. Finding no easy way to accomplish this, he insistently recommended not sparing the rod, in the belief that, like an unruly child revisiting the memory of strict but well-intentioned parents, the people would thank him later. If this was indeed the case is hard to say. What is sure, is that his perspicacity did not equal his zeal. He failed to understand the higher ambitions of the Napoleonic power he admired unreservedly, which in the end thwarted his abilities to implement the policies he believed in. In fact, his intransigence was doing more harm than good, as illustrated by the objections of a reliable, but suppler collaborator, the deputy prefect (*subdélégué*) of Piacenza, Gian Battista Caravel. In a long letter expressing his own difficulties in keeping the peace, Caravel complained that Albesani risked antagonizing the population with his brusque manners: “Time and again, Albesani randomly denounces the mayors of the district, which irritates the best public servants; he tries in this way to compromise the Administration.”³³ Even worse, he insulted

repeatedly one of Caravel’s ablest assistants, who, instead, should have been praised and rewarded for obtaining the arrest of a notorious local bandit, Tomarone. No wonder that the French kept Albesani at arm’s length and while he remained in his position, he was never promoted further and never became a trusted adviser. Napoleonic officers had not doubts on the beneficial nature of their policies and did not hesitate to use force to bring about progress, as they saw it. Nevertheless, they also understood that exercising power relied on patient give and take and were prepared to close their eyes, occasionally—something the Imperial Prosecutor was simply incapable of. Consequently, his commitment was less valuable for the French efforts at state building in Parma–Piacenza than the opportunism of pragmatic collaborators who knew how to smooth the asperities of foreign rule and how to manage, rather than instantly penalize, local grievances.

Recently, a beautiful exposition in Piacenza highlighted key episodes of Napoleonic rule in the area.³⁴ The accompanying lectures that focused on the Piacentino insurrection presented those events as a collective heroic struggle in defense of national and Catholic identity. No paper mentioned Piacenza’s Imperial

commitment was decidedly rare.’ Caiani, *art. cit.*, 389. Albesani was one such rare case.

³³ Gian Battista Caravel to Administrator-Prefect Nardon, Piacenza 11 January 1808. ASP Carte del Dipartimento del Taro, 1806-1814, busta 2. Entirely reproduced in Ettore Carà, *L’Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico Piacenza 1816–*

1814 (Piacenza: Edizioni Tip.Le.Co, 2005), 69–81 (73).

³⁴ *Napoleone a Piacenza. Il prezzo del trionfo*. Curated by Massimo Baucia, Daniela Morsia, Graziano Villaggi. Salone Monumentale Biblioteca Passerini–Landi. 17 March–12 May 2018.

Prosecutor, but the tenor of the discussions left little sympathy to spare for strict enforcers of Napoleonic law and order.³⁵ I conclude that it is to the benefit of Pietro Albesani's memory that his deeds have remained buried in the archives, ignored by most historians, and that in general he led a very discreet life outside his professional duties. We only know that he remained in Piacenza and presided the regional court until the end of his life and career in 1823. The house he purchased in 1808 in Castel

San Giovanni, his natal village—and, by one of fate's ironic coincidences, the very place where the insurgency exploded in 1805—is now a museum and cultural center. A senior home, founded and bequeathed to the commune of Castel San Giovanni by one of his descendants speaks to the family's softer side, one that the stern magistrate never showed in public.³⁶ Perhaps the people did thank him, at long last.

³⁵ The section devoted to the Piacentino insurrection, titled “L’insorgenza Napoleonica e controrivoluzionaria nel Piacentino” took place on 10 February 2018. The main speakers: Marco Invernizzi, Oscar Sanguinetti and Massimo Viglione, represent a historiography point of view that, breaking with longstanding mainstream narratives, interprets Napoleonic rule as collective trauma. (The *Istituto Storico dell’Insorgenza e per l’Identità Nazionale* (Milan) is dedicated to this historical viewpoint). Accordingly, acts of anti-Napoleonic resistance are understood as subliminal manifestations of a generic Italian people's will to defend its culture, religion and very uniqueness against hostile foreign intruders—again, departing from established monographs who offer more neutral appraisals. Exemplary for the varied methodological approaches is the collective volume *Folle Controrivoluzionare. Le Insorgenze Popolari nell’Italia Giacobina e Napoleonica*. A cura di Anna Maria Rao (Rome: carocci, 1999, reissued 2002). Antonino De Francesco has argued that such dire reflections often proceed from a revisionist (if not

outright revanchist) ideological angle that does little to enhance our understanding of a complex reality: Antonino De Francesco, “Il significato delle insorgenze nella cultura politica italiana” in *Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia Napoleonica. Crisi dell’Antico Regime e alternative di costruzione del nuovo ordine sociale*. Various authors (Milan: Ares, 2001), 31–44. The historians in question reject the revisionist moniker, claiming instead to recover a segment of national memory that most academic studies ignore, regardless of the methodological approach. For an excellent survey of various perspectives and debates in the historiography of Napoleonic rule in Italy see Anna Maria Rao, “Napoleonic Italy: Old and New Trends in Historiography” in *The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture*, ed. by Michael Broers, Peter Hicks and Augustin Guimerà (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 84–98.

³⁶ In 2008 the Casa Protetta Albesani merged with another medical institution, which resulted in the present day ASP Azalea.

The British View of the French Occupation of Spain and Portugal, 1807-1814

by Tatiana A. Kosykh

The English-speaking historiography of the Napoleonic Wars in the last decades shows a special interest in the British military presence in Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War of 1807–1814. However, in most published works the main focus is still on the military and political aspects of the conflict.¹ The well-known British historian Charles Esdaile was the first to declare the need to write a new generalizing military and political history of the conflict on the peninsula and tried to do this by publishing the monograph under the title “The Peninsular War: A New History.”² In this study, Esdaile comes to a curious

conclusion: “though the British, Spaniards and the Portuguese hated one another, in the end they hated Napoleon still more.”³ Subsequent works of Esdaile and other English-speaking historians⁴ were directed to confirm or refuse this thesis.

Modern historiography of the Peninsular war is developing in line with the anthropological approach to military history and is aimed at exploring the social practice of experiencing a military conflict by witnesses of the events. In particular, this tendency is manifested in the treatment of foreign and Russian historians to imagological plots.⁵ At the same time,

¹ See for example: David Gates, *Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (London: Pimlico, 2002); Charles J. Esdaile, Philip Freeman, *Burgos in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814. Occupation, Siege, Aftermath* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Donald S. Richards, *The Peninsula Years: Britain's Redcoats in Spain and Portugal* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2002); Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Rory Muir, *Wellington: the Path to Victory 1769-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

² Charles J. Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History* (London: St. Martin's Press, 2003), X.

³ Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, 482.

⁴ Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808–1814* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Gavin Daly, “A Dirty, Indolent, Priest-Ridden City: British Soldiers in Lisbon during the Peninsular War, 1808–1813” in *History* 94 (2009): 461-82; Charles J. Esdaile, *Peninsular Eyewitnesses: The Experience of War in Spain and Portugal 1808–1813* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword,

2008); and David T. Gies, ““Such is Glorious War’: British Reflections on the Peninsular War in Spain” in *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 91 (2014): 261–72; and so on.

⁵ For more on the perception of the Spaniards and the Portuguese by the British military, see: Gavin Daly, “Liberators and Tourists: British Soldiers in Madrid during the Peninsular War” in *Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850: Men of Arms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 117–35; Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); John R. Watson, *Romanticism and War: A Study of British Romantic Period Writers and the Napoleonic Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Zack White, “From Cintra to Salamanca: Shifting Popular Perceptions of the War in the Iberian Peninsula, 1808-1812” in *British Journal for Military History* 1 (2015): 60–79; Jose G. Cayuela Fernández, ““La Mirada del inglés’. Historia y vivencias sociales de los combatientes británicos en

the problem of the perception of the French military by the soldiers of the Wellington army remains poorly understood. Is it true the aforementioned judgment of Esdaile, that British soldiers and officers in the years of the Peninsular war hated their immediate enemies — the French army of Napoleon? Undoubtedly, diaries, memoirs, and letters of the British, who witnessed the French occupation of Spain and Portugal in 1807–1814, make it possible to judge this.

The results of the analysis of these texts are offered to the attention of readers in this article.

British perceptions of the French soldiers were transformed significantly at the turn of the XVIII–XIX centuries. As the British historian C. Kennedy notes, in the diaries and memoirs of the British military at the end of the XVIII century were dominated stereotypes about the French Republican soldier as “uncouth and sloppy sans-culotte.” The soldier of the French Revolutionary Army seemed so ignorant to the British that he was hardly able to understand the ideals for which he fought.

However, Kennedy supposes that the Napoleonic army soldier, dressed in a well-fitted uniform, looked in the eyes of the British a much more understandable and culturally close figure.⁶ One cannot but agree with this thesis. But still it should be borne in mind that, depending on the used source, the British image of the French and the assessment of their policy in Spain and Portugal may differ.



In many ways, it was the British press that determined the public opinion in the United Kingdom regarding military actions in the Iberian Peninsula. Articles, notes and caricatures in British newspapers and magazines (*The Morning Chronicle*, *Morning Post*, *Caledonian Mercury*, *Liverpool Mercury* and others) consistently formed images of the enemy and ally in the public mind. An example of the British view of events in Spain is an article from the

Leeds Mercury, clearly directed against the new King of Spain, Jose I – Bonaparte. The author considered it necessary for the Spaniards to struggle against French

España y Portugal (1808-1814)” in *Historia Social* 72 (2012): 23-47.

⁶ Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, 86.

tyranny, since “people have little sympathy for those who hardly have any relation to them.”⁷ In this way, Britons saw in Jose I only the French tyrant on the Spanish throne.

The British public met with enthusiasm the news about the landing of the expeditionary corps of Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington) on the Iberian Peninsula in the summer of 1808. The events in Spain and Portugal became the focus of attention of the British press, which resulted in the appearance of numerous caricatures about military actions in Spain and Portugal. Caricature of James Gillray under the title “Spanish patriots attacking the French banditti”⁸ has received wide popularity. In the number of patriots Gillray includes representatives of all segments of the population of Spain: this is the soldiers, rushing into battle, priests and monks, leading the battle, and dressed elegantly ladies with cannonballs in their hands. However, in the center of the composition is the British Grenadier, who pierced two French soldiers with a bayonet. The actions of this military, notes British researcher Z. White, demonstrate “the superiority of the British infantryman over his French

counterpart.”⁹ Thus, the British army of Wellington appeared in the eyes of the reading public by the force destined to return the legitimate monarch to the Spanish throne, free Europe from Napoleonic tyranny, and bring freedom and civilization to ignorant Spaniards.

However, among the British, who turned out to be direct participants in the Peninsular War, the assessment of the French and their occupation policy on the territory of the peninsula was far from being so unequivocal. General John Moore, telling his brother about affairs in Spain, wrote that they “are in a very different state from what I expected, or from what they are thought to be in England.”¹⁰ The majority of British soldiers and officers was agree with general, as far as we can judge from sources that reflected the opinions of British eyewitnesses regarding the consequences of the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.

I have analyzed diaries, memoirs and correspondence of twelve British soldiers and officers of various ranks: letters from Lieutenant William Bragge¹¹ of the 3rd King’s Own Dragoons, Private William Wheeler¹² of the 51st Light Infantry

⁷ *The Leeds Mercury*, September 3, 1808.

⁸ British Museum. Museum Number 1868,0808.7664. Gillray J. *Spanish Patriots Attacking the French Banditti – Loyal Britons Lending a Lift, 15 August 1808*, https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details/collection_image_gallery.aspx?partid=1&assetid=147229001&objectid=1641299 (Date of Access: 19 September 2019).

⁹ White, *From Cintra to Salamanca*, 64.

¹⁰ John Moore, *A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain, Commanded by his Excellency Lieut.-General Sir John Moore, Authenticated by Official Papers and Original Letters*, (London: J. Johnson, 1809), 44.

¹¹ William Bragge, *Peninsular Portrait, 1811-1814: The Letters of Captain William Bragge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

¹² *The Letters of Private Wheeler, 1809-1828* (London: M. Joseph, 1951).

Regiment, Adjutant of Major-General Ferguson William Warre,¹³ letters and diaries of the intelligence officer Edward Cocks,¹⁴ diaries of the Lieutenant William Tomkinson¹⁵ of the 16th Dragoon Regiment, as well as the diaries and correspondence of the Lieutenant (later Major) George Simmons¹⁶ of the 95th Rifles. A separate subgroup of sources consisted of memoirs of the Captain John Blakiston¹⁷ of the 17th Portuguese line Infantry, Sergeant Joseph Donaldson¹⁸ of the 94th Highland regiment, Lieutenant William Grattan of the 88th Regiment of Foot,¹⁹ Captain Jonathan Leach²⁰ of the 95th Rifles, Captain William Stothert²¹ of the 3rd Foot Guards, and officer Moyle Sherer²² of the 34th Regiment of Foot.

When referring to the indicated sources, we should keep in mind the specifics of these texts. On the one hand, British soldiers wrote letters and diaries to report on personal experiences and upheavals of everyday life in wartime conditions. On the other hand, memoirs, based on diary entries

or just memories of the Peninsular War, were often published for commercial purposes in view of tastes of the reading public. For this reason, memoirs often represent a narrative with an abundance of details that may interest the reader, but they do not always reliably state the events experienced by British soldiers.

For the first time the soldiers of the expeditionary corps encountered the consequences of the French occupation in Portugal in the summer of 1808. The British who arrived in Lisbon noted that the French had tried to clean the city. Captain Jonathan Leach, who arrived in the Portuguese capital with his part from Cork, recalled it like this: the city, in his opinion, was filled with “every species of filth and dirt, in spite of the measures taken by the French to prevent it.”²³ However, the French had to fight not only with the Lisbon mud. Lieutenant William Grattan wrote that General Junot, despite all his “shortcomings as an invader,” was able to save Lisbon from stray dogs for a while,

¹³ William Warre, *Letters from the Peninsula, 1808-1812* (London: J. Murray, 1909).

¹⁴ Edward E. Cocks, *Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon. Edward Charles Cocks, 1786-1812* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986).

¹⁵ William Tomkinson, *Diary of Cavalry Officer in the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-1815* (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co, 1895).

¹⁶ *A British Rifle Man: The Journals and Correspondence of Major George Simmons, Rifle Brigade, During the Peninsular and the Campaign of Waterloo* (London: A. and C. Black, 1899).

¹⁷ John Blakiston, *Twelve Years' Military Adventure in Three Quarters of the Globe. Vol. 2.* (London: H. Colburn, 1829).

¹⁸ Joseph Donaldson, *Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier* (Philadelphia, G.B. Zieber and Co, 1845).

¹⁹ William Grattan, *Adventures with the Connaught Rangers* (London: E. Arnold, 1902).

²⁰ Jonathan Leach, *Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier* (London: Longman and Co, 1831).

²¹ William Stothert, *A Narrative of the Principal Events of the Campaigns of 1809, 1810 and 1811 in Spain and Portugal* (London: P. Martin, 1812).

²² Moyle Sherer, *Recollections of the Peninsula* (London: Longman and Co, 1824).

²³ Leach, *Rough Sketches*, 57.

ordering “to shoot everyone who was on the street after dark.”²⁴ In this respect, the British soldiers considered the French occupying forces to be the personification of order and progress. Although the British and French “civilized” nations fought each other on the battlefield, both had equally to confront the Iberian “backwardness.” This view was contrary to the ideas of the British in their homeland, who, reading newspapers and magazines, were convinced that the carrier of progress in the Iberian Peninsula is only the Wellington army.

G. Daly, however, as rightly notes the way of French army was marked by “smoke, fire, ashes, ruined harvests, destroyed buildings, refugee-congested roads and fields, and the deadroads and, of course, dead people.”²⁵ In letters and diaries British soldiers not only complained about their own difficulties, but also reported about the hardships that the people affected by the war had to endure. Wellington (JDM) restrained British.²⁹ Captain John Blakiston wrote that the French “domesticate with the families where they are billeted. They flatter the old people: they dance and sing with the young. In fact, they do *l’aimable*; while John Bull keeps aloof from the family, and conducts



Talavera in August 1809, G. Simmons noted that even “corn fields were generally laid waste by fire wherever the French had been.”²⁷ In the memoirs of the British military, the picture of the Iberian ruins looks even more depressing. So, Captain William Stothert recalled that the countryside in Portugal was a spectacle of “burning villages, of plundered cottages, of murdered peasants. The roads were covered with the dying and the dead.”²⁸

Fighting for the liberation of Spain from the French occupation, the British sometimes with surprise and disappointment had found that the locals treated the French better than soldiers in red uniforms. Often, as notes G. Daly, British officers explained this by well-established national prejudices about charming and polite French officers and on the contrary cold, alienated and

²⁴ Grattan, *Adventures with the Connaught Rangers*, 4.

²⁵ Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War*, 87.

²⁶ Warre, *Letters from the Peninsula*, 145.

²⁷ *A British Rifle Man*, 30.

²⁸ Stothert, *A Narrative of the Principal Events of the Campaigns*, 240-41.

²⁹ Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War*, 111.

himself with a degree of hauteur towards all.”³⁰

In distant regions of Spain had been occurring incidents that caused the British to be amazed. So, at the beginning of the war, confusion often arose in the Spanish province: the locals took the French for the British and, conversely, the British for the French.³¹ There is an evidence of such case from an intelligence officer Edward Cocks. In a letter of 29 April 1809, he reported that, following through the town of Monasterio, he was arrested as a French spy.³² When Cocks came out of prison, he learned that a French spy did appear in the same area earlier. Locals who did not see foreigners before met him with great enthusiasm, since they considered him a British officer. Cocks was much less fortunate.

It is interesting that their stay in the Iberian Peninsula, the British perceived as a special “civilizing” mission. According to that, they and the French were seen as a worthy and “civilized” enemy. Young soldiers and lieutenants looked at the French soldiers “with a mixture of admiration and hatred.”³³ Anti-French propaganda at home contrasted with what the British military saw in Spain. Sergeant Joseph Donaldson recalled: “How different were our feeling in this respect from many

countrymen at home, whose ideas of the French character were drawn from servile newspapers and pamphlets. ... I was astonished when I came in contact with French soldiers, to find them, instead of pigmy, spider-shanked wretches, who fed on nothing but frogs and beef tea, stout, handsome looking fellows, who understood the principles of good living, as well as any Englishman amongst us; and whatever may be said to the contrary, remarkably brave soldiers.”³⁴

In diaries, letters, and memoirs of British soldiers and officers are clearly showed their attitude towards the French anticlerical policy on the Iberian Peninsula. British soldiers were convinced that the Catholic Church was the main obstacle to progress in Spain and Portugal. Accordingly, in religious terms, the British did not see opponents in the French, because they themselves despised activity of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain and Portugal.

However, the conflict between the French and the Catholic Church in the Pyrenees received rather contradictory responses from the British soldiers. On the one hand, the British soldiers were shocked by the fact that the French were destroying religious buildings and cracking down on the clergy. Private Wheeler was amazed when he saw the bodies of a priest and a parishioner

³⁰ Blakiston, *Twelve Years' Military Adventure in Three Quarters of the Globe*, 262-63.

³¹ Danial Yépez Piedra, “Las reacciones de la población local ante presencia militar británica en la Guerra de la Independencia” in *Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea* 8 (2008): 230.

³² Cocks, *Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula*, 24.

³³ Cayuela Fernández, *La Mirada del inglés*, 33.

³⁴ Donaldson, *Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier*, 167-68.

pierced with bayonets in one of the churches of the Portuguese town of Leiria plundered by the French: "They were both on the steps leading to were the Grand Altar once stood. They had no doubt retired here thinking the sanctity of the place would protect them, but no place would shelter the innocent and defenseless from such Hell hounds."³⁵ The sight of destroyed monasteries, churches, or chapels also amazed British soldiers and officers. But despite the shock and indignation that the British experienced at the sight of the atrocities of the French against the church, most British soldiers were generally positive about the French policy of limiting the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain.

Thus, fighting for the liberation of Spain and Portugal from the French occupation, the British soldiers could personally see the consequences of the French military invasion. However, the perception of the French occupation by the soldiers of Wellington's army was significantly different from the views that dominated among the British. According the British public opinion, as a result of anti-French propaganda, the idea of the superiority of the British soldiers both over the enemy of Napoleon's army and the Spanish and Portuguese allies was rooted. The British army in this case was exclusively a bearer of progress and enlightenment, who fought for the liberation of the Pyrenees from the French tyranny of Spain and Portugal. The

testimonies of participants in the campaign are reflected another point of view. For the soldiers of the Wellington's army, the forerunners of civilization and liberal values in the Iberian Peninsula were not only the British, but also the French. According to Captain J. Leech, Lieutenant W. Grattan and Private W. Wheeler, during the French occupation of Spain and Portugal had begun urban improvement and the fight against Catholicism and the fanatical religiosity of inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula. Therefore, we can only partly agree with the statement of Charles Esdaile that the British hated the French more than their allies. British soldiers often perceived their military opponent as an "ally" in the "civilizing" mission, although they were aware of the scale of destruction which was reasoned by the Napoleon's invasion.

³⁵ *The Letters of Private Wheeler*, 51.

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Combat Performance at the End of Alliance: The Hessian–Darmstadt Contingent in 1813

by John H. Gill

The year 1813 was truly one of existential crisis for the member states of the Confederation of the Rhine or *Rheinbund*. On one side, the French emperor's enemies seemed ascendant and were pressing the Confederation princes to abandon their alliances to France. Dire threats of extinction lurked behind their diplomatic approaches; the German monarchies and their dynasties could be reduced or even eliminated should they not elect to change allegiance.¹ On the other side, Napoleon was demanding the raising of new contingents to contest control of Germany and maintain his hegemony. Although the emperor's star was clearly faltering, his aura of power remained, and France was still in a position to enforce adherence to the alliance. This essay briefly examines the military dimension of one state's experience during that tumultuous year: the Grand Duchy of Hesse–Darmstadt. Sharing many commonalities with its Rheinbund allies and indeed with France itself as Napoleon endeavored to recover from the Russian disaster, the Hesse–Darmstadt contingent can represent the experiences of many others. At the same time, investigating the

campaign of this one contingent demonstrates the value of distinguishing among the Rheinbund armies, of considering them as distinct entities rather than agglomerating all of them together with myriad other nationalities as mere “non–French” elements of *la Grande Armée*.

Background: Recovery after 1812

By 1813, Hesse–Darmstadt had been a French ally for almost seven years, having been one of the original signatories of the Confederation treaty in 1806. Its army had fought in all of the empire's major wars, including Spain, and had gained particular distinction for its role in 1809 and 1812. The latter campaign, however, destroyed the contingent. The fine regiments that Hesse had sent east numbered some 5,000 men when they marched into Russia that summer (25% above Hesse–Darmstadt's treaty requirement), but they counted only 515 effectives in their ranks according to a 13 January 1813 strength report—in other words, a loss of approximately 90%.² Beyond the appalling human casualties, of course, the contingent also lost most of its

¹ The Russo–Prussian convention of 19 March and the 25 March 1813 “Proclamation of Kalisch” specifically targeted the Rheinbund with the former threatening German princes with the loss of their states if they did not join the new alliance: Feodor de Martens, *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances*

Étrangères (St. Petersburg, 1885) VII, 81–6 and <http://www.documentarchiv.de/nzjh/1813/proklamation-von-kalisch.html> [accessed 17 January 2017].

² Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt (HStAD), G 61 Nr. 26/5, Rußland–Feldzug 1812–1813, Band 4.

wagons, muskets and other gear as well as most of its horses. On the other hand, the Hessians preserved all of their regimental colors and all six of their guns, an astonishing achievement given the conditions of the retreat and a matter of pride for the grand dukes for decades thereafter (even considering that the artillery had not made the march all the way to Moscow).³

As 1813 began, however, the grand duchy, like the rest of the Rheinbund, was called upon to raise a new contingent to meet its 4,000-man obligation under the stipulations of the Confederation treaty.⁴ Motivated by a combination of faith in Napoleon's genius (despite Russia), political pragmatism, alliance loyalty and a desire that his monarchy's sacrifices not be forgotten, Ludwig I, the grand duke, did not demur. He thus displayed none of the hesitation and equivocation evident in Bavaria and Württemberg;⁵ rather, like the Grand Duke of Baden, he immediately

issued instructions to reconstitute the required contingent by the end of March.

Creating a new army to replace that lost in Russia was a daunting task to say the least. Everything was in short supply: experienced men, trained horses, vehicles, cannon, muskets and all the other sundry necessities of an army on campaign. These alarming insufficiencies mirrored those plaguing the other Rheinbund states and,

indeed, France itself. Likewise, the extreme urgency with which the new army was to be raised, equipped and sent off to war was as problematic for Hesse as it was for France or for the other Confederation allies. One regimental commander, overwhelmed by the difficulties of getting his men in shape within the stipulated time period, wrote to the war ministry to request a

delay: "Military history will be hard pressed to provide an example of a regiment being constructed from scratch in such haste with raw troops and led against the enemy," he complained. The grand duke,



³ Fritz Beck, Karl von Hahn and Heinrich von Hahn, *Geschichte des Großherzoglichen Artilleriekorps 1. Großherzoglich Hessischen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 25 und seine Stämme* (Berlin, 1912), 178.

⁴ *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* (Paris, 1868), 19455, 16 January 1813, XXIV, 397.

⁵ Paul Sauer, *Napoleons Adler über Württemberg, Baden und Hohenzollern* (Stuttgart, 1987), 275; Anneliese Waller, *Baden und Frankreich in der Rheinbundzeit*, dissertation (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg, 1935), 144.

however, was not interested in the colonel's troubles: "All that is contained in the report is well known to me. All obstacles will be overcome through tireless energy and exertion in service and this is certainly what I expect from all my officers...The departure remains set for 26 March."⁶

Challenges notwithstanding, therefore, the infantry and artillery components of the Hessian contingent were assembled near Würzburg by mid-April. Numbering some 4,400 combatants, the contingent consisted of three infantry regiments and an artillery battery of eight pieces (six 6-pounders and two howitzers). Hesse was also to supply a light cavalry regiment, but it served separately, and we will turn to its history in a moment. It is useful to note however, that when the cavalry was added to the total Hessian contingent, the grand duchy had once again exceeded its commitment to Napoleon by approximately 25%, that is, an extra 1,000 men under arms. This seems to have been a voluntary initiative by Grand Duke Ludwig rather than a demand from the French.

Returning to the contingent's foot soldiers, these were enrolled in three regiments, two of which were rather confusingly named "Leib" and "Leib-Garde," that is "Life" and "Life-Guard," a nomenclature that led

to considerable confusion when translated into French for official reports. The third, a provisional light infantry regiment, joined the guards club in June when it was granted formal status and honored with the title "Garde-Fusiliers" for its excellent performance at the Battle of Lützen. The contingent's commander was the young Prince Emil of Hesse-Darmstadt. Not yet 23 years old, Emil was the fourth son of Grand Duke Ludwig. He had already led the Hessian troops through the horrors of the Russian campaign, earning the respect and affection of his men for his courage, stamina and willingness to share their hardships. Despite the Russian experience and in contrast to other young scions of Rheinbund ruling families, Emil remained an admirer of Napoleon and, like his father, stood high in the emperor's favor.⁷

Unlike many of the other Confederation generals, Emil had almost all of his country's troops united under his command. Where other contingents were scattered about Germany in small detachments, the Hessian brigade—with several small exceptions—fought in both the spring and autumn campaigns as a single entity. This did not alleviate battle losses, sickness or other tribulations, but it removed a major complaint constantly

⁶ Both citations from Carl Christian Freiherr Röder von Diersburg and Fritz Beck, *Geschichte des 1. Großherzoglich Hessischen Infanterie- (Leibgarde-) Regiments Nr. 115* (Berlin, 1899), 213–14.

⁷ Heinrich Ulman, "Hessen-Darmstadt am Scheideweg im Herbst 1813," *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, IX, 1913, 284; Hanswerner Ebling, "Die hessische Politik in der

Rheinbundzeit 1806–13," *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, XXIV, 1952/3, 247–49. Anti-Napoleon royals notably included the crown princes of Bavarian and Württemberg as well as Emil's elder brother, the future Ludwig II; Emil's next eldest brother, on the other hand, was serving as a staff officer in the French army.

raised by other Rheinbund monarchs and their officers throughout the existence of the alliance. Napoleon placed the Hessian brigade in the 39th Division of Marshal Michel Ney's III Corps along with part of the Baden contingent and a battalion from the Grand Duchy of Frankfurt. The latter would march off to garrison duty in Glogau during the summer armistice, but the Hessians and Badeners remained together for the duration of the war under the command of Général de Division Jean-Gabriel Marchand, an officer of middling ability, but one who had gained a reputation for good management of Napoleon's German allies during the Russian campaign.

Into Combat: from Lützen to Leipzig

Training on the march, Marchand's German division headed east as part of the new Grande Armée to meet the advancing Russo-Prussian army south of Leipzig. Along the way, the brigade was joined by a tiny band of survivors from the Russian catastrophe. These officers and men, numbering only some 150 in total, were the remnants of a battalion of Hessian light infantry that had been brigaded with the Imperial Guard in late 1812 in recognition of their valor and fidelity. Reduced over time from a battalion to a lone company by sickness, battle losses and cadres called back to Darmstadt, they forged a powerful bond of camaraderie with the French guardsmen. Looking a year ahead to 1814,



some of these Hessian light soldiers formed the escort for the contingent of Imperial Guard destined for Elba as the French troops passed through Lyon. The Frenchmen, spotting their former comrades in arms, called out warm greetings despite the drastically changed circumstances: “Look, our comrades, the brave Hessian light infantry!”⁸ Returning to 1813, Prince Emil received permission to unite this determined group of Hessian veterans with his green brigade as the 39th Division was marching into action at Lützen on 2 May. Though small, this company of hard souls served as an example of courage and endurance to the brigade’s young recruits.⁹ As one soldier observed, the fusilier regiment “received a core that distinguished itself throughout the campaign.”¹⁰

Other members of the brigade were not so steady, and the contingent seems to have suffered considerably from desertion both during its march from Würzburg and as a consequence of the confusion associated with the fighting at Lützen. Circumstances from the French/Rheinbund perspective were certainly grim in early 1813 and one veteran remembered that the local inhabitants spread wild and malicious rumors among the soldiers prior to Lützen, noting that the men were “practically

harangued” by Saxon civilians for taking up arms against fellow Germans. Similarly, the number of missing at Lützen (as many as 840 from *c.* 4,000 or nearly 20%) suggests that many new recruits took advantage of the chaos of combat to slip away (the loose term “missing” is also problematic as it could include those killed in combat as well as those who took to their heels for whatever reason). On the other hand, desertion seems to have declined significantly as the campaign proceeded. It requires further research to confirm, but it is possible, perhaps likely, that the veteran cited here reflected the situation accurately in remarking that these harangues “made little impression” because once “the disreputable who deserted out of fear” had fled, “political views no longer thinned our ranks.”¹¹ Moreover, desertion by itself does not necessarily imply political motivations; fear, homesickness, poor unit cohesion and many other factors could be more potent explanations, especially with such newly-built units.

Despite apparent desertion problems and the challenge of sending inexperienced men into desperate combat for the first time, most of the brigade performed to Emil’s satisfaction at Lützen on 2 May. The Leib-Garde Regiment, however, was the target of the prince’s severe censure. Its colonel

⁸ Wilhelm Bigge, *Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Großherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116* (Berlin, 1903), 142.

⁹ Bigge, 150.

¹⁰ Martin C. Ignaz Kösterus, *Die Großherzoglich Hessischen Truppen in dem Feldzug von 1813 in Schlesien* (Darmstadt, 1840), 9.

¹¹ Kösterus, 4–5. The commander of the Württemberg contingent specifically mentioned heavy desertion among the Hessians in April: Franquemont to King Friedrich, 29 April 1813, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, E 270 a Bü(schel) 237 (Geheime Meldungen des Armeekorps aus dem Felde an den König/1813).

was wounded while ordering a change of formation and, with enemy cavalry looming on its flank, “a sort of panicked terror spread all at once” and all of Emil’s efforts to restore the regiment to order were “fruitless.” Fortunately, he could praise “the behavior of the Leib Regiment and especially that of the fusilier battalions” in his report to his father. “They did as old Hessian soldiers are accustomed to do,” he wrote, and compensated for the poor performance of the Garde Regiment that had caused “deep embarrassment to its very brave officer corps.”¹² If the brigade’s performance was decidedly uneven, its combat debut generally left a favorable impression on the French.¹³ The III Corps operations journal could conclude that “they rivaled the French in courage”¹⁴ and Napoleon personally praised Emil, instructing him to “write to the grand duke to tell him how pleased I am with you.”¹⁵

Contrary to expectations, Lützen proved to be the only major action for the Hessian Brigade in the spring campaign. Parts of the III Corps were heavily engaged at Bautzen on 22 May, but Marchand’s Division, though present on the field, was held in reserve and suffered no losses. Posted on a height above the battlefield, the men had a “gripping view” of the

struggle, but remained “merely observers to the great drama.”¹⁶ Long marches, foul weather and poor provisions, however, caused debilitating attrition to the Hessians and, like most commanders in the army, Emil issued strict orders to curb marauding and indiscipline. Morale, however, seems to have remained good and beyond the dreary, exhausting marches, soldiers’ experiences were enlivened by occasional surprises. On the day the summer armistice was declared, for example, some men of the Leib Regiment were clustered in a barn, cleaning their muskets when Napoleon appeared unexpectedly. Displaying his renowned sense of leadership, the emperor rode over to the men, asked after their wellbeing—in German!—and praised them for the soldierly activity before pressing on towards Dresden, leaving this group of Hessians with a story to embellish to their families and fellow veterans for years to come.

The announcement of the armistice in early June evoked varying responses. One infantryman, overlooking the army’s vast encampment several days earlier, remembered “standing here deep into the night, absorbed in the view of this immeasurable camp, reminded one of the

¹² Prince Emil, Report of 3 May 1813, HStAD, E 8 B 3.10.3, Nr. 128/6, Berichte General-Kommando.

¹³ Note that the generally excellent Prussian General Staff history of 1813 erroneously claims that Emil disparaged *all* of his troops: Rudolf von Caemmerer, *Geschichte des Frühjahrsfeldzug und seine Vorgeschichte*, II (Berlin, 1909), 78, 337. In fact, the prince’s report draws a distinct difference


between the Garde and the other components of his command. On the other hand, the Prussian General Staff history may be correct in stating that some 300 Hessians went over to the Prussian side (that is, c. 8–10% of the brigade’s total strength).

¹⁴ Frédéric Koch, *Journal des Opérations du IIIe Corps en 1813*, G, Fabry, ed. (Paris, 1999), 12.

¹⁵ Ebling, “Die hessische Politik,” 253.

¹⁶ Kösterus, 25.

army of Xerxes, blinded by the glow of innumerable campfires around which the tired soldiers lay in every imaginable grouping. Viewing such power, who would have doubted that it could take on the entire world? And yet, in only a few months, this mighty army was no more!" For this Hessian veteran, Napoleon's acceptance of the armistice was a strategic error: "the courageous regarded the armistice with displeasure," he remembered, "and no few insightful soldiers foresaw the unfortunate results this would have for Napoleon." "Only the weary," in his view, "saw this as the presage of an imminent return to our homes."¹⁷



The summer ceasefire afforded the contingent an opportunity to recover from its exertions. The brigade constructed a regular "soldiers' colony" with wooden barracks, tidy streets, vegetable plots and even flower gardens for decoration.¹⁸ Daily drill and occasional larger maneuvers sharpened military skills,

¹⁷ Kösterus, 25–31.

¹⁸ Detailed amateur drawings of these barracks are in HStAD Best. G 61 N2. 26/4, Rußland–Feldzug 1812–1813, Band 3: (2–98) Tagebuch des Garde Füsiliers Regiments in der Campagne 1812 u. 1813 von GM Schmidt.

¹⁹ Strength from HStAD, G 61 N2.28/3, Feldzug 1813, Band 2. Ninety of the original replacement

while reviews by Marshal Ney and Prince Emil provided venues to demonstrate tactical proficiency and to distribute awards to deserving officers and men. A 750–man replacement detachment or "march battalion"¹⁹ arrived in July to fill gaps in the ranks with the grand duke promising his son that "they may be employed immediately" as they were "completely drilled and have already fired both blanks and live rounds."²⁰ A number of deserters and stragglers were also returned to duty. These men were greeted with "exemplary punishment" in which "some of the company commanders distinguished themselves by their talents for invention."²¹

The Hessian Chevaulegers also received a substantial reinforcement over the summer. This regiment had departed Darmstadt on 22 April with only two of its four squadrons (338 men) and the haste with which it had been organized resulted in only some 60% of its horses being fit for duty when it

detachment deserted en route (i.e., approximately 9% of those who marched out).

²⁰ Grand Duke Ludwig to Prince Emil, 9 June 1813, HStAD, D 4 27.3.4, Nr. 637/1, Briefe an Prinz Emil von seinem Vater.

²¹ Kösterus, 37.

reached Dresden seventeen days later; inexperienced riders and young, untested mounts meant that the two squadrons were severely understrength when they joined the army in the field shortly thereafter. Initially assigned to Marshal Auguste Marmont's VI Corps, the regiment was transferred to Marshal Nicolas's XII Corps in mid-May and took part in several small engagements under this command. Its second two squadrons arrived only two days before the end of the armistice, but, as the regimental history notes, "even more than the first [two squadrons], these

consisted mostly of very young troopers and remount horses whose training could in no way be considered complete."²²

The frailties of the light horse regiment were evident when it was surprised and scattered by Prussian hussars on the night of 16/17 August at the very moment that the armistice came to an end. Poorly posted, the regiment lost 75 men in this embarrassing skirmish. It performed adequately in a number of subsequent minor clashes as it accompanied Oudinot's corps during the autumn campaign, but



Suchbach del

Quarido

terminé par Hülk

N. CHARLES OUDINOT,

Mar^{al} de l'Empire, Duc de Reggio, né à Bar-sur-Ornain, (Meuse) le 25 Avril 1765.

²² Karl von Zimmermann, *Geschichte des 1. Großherzoglich Hessischen Dragoner-Regiments*

(Garde-Drägoner-Regiments) Nr. 23 (Darmstadt, 1878), 179-82.

suffered another devastating setback on 6 September at the Battle of Dennewitz. Russian dragoons, charging out of one of the dust storms that characterized that clash, caught the chevaulegers as they were deploying and totally shattered the regiment. Two days later, the officers could barely collect 190 troopers. The regiment redeemed itself by its actions during the French defeat at Wartenburg on 3 October, retrieving two captured Italian guns in a bold charge. Wartenburg proved its last major engagement, but constant skirmishing and march attrition steadily eroded its strength. On the sidelines at Leipzig, it mustered only 100 effectives when it returned to Darmstadt on 30 October after accompanying the French during the painful retreat from the Battle of Nations.²³

As for the Hessian infantry and artillery, the renewal of hostilities on 15 August brought numerous skirmishes, long marches, continued paucity of provisions and constant harassment by Prussian and Russian light troops. The Hessians were repeatedly employed on small, independent reconnaissance and foraging missions from mid-August to mid-October, sometimes with other French or German troops, but often entirely on their own. In other words, opportunities to desert as individuals or defect as units were plentiful, but no units switched sides and there is no evidence that any significant number of soldiers availed


themselves of these moments on their own after April. The brigade was fortunate to miss the French disaster on the Katzbach, but it was actively involved in the wretched retreat thereafter, yet the men frequently risked drowning to wade and swim through cold and raging torrents in order to avoid capture. Similarly, small Hessian detachments were surrounded and summoned to surrender or defect on at least three occasions, but all held to their duty and fought their way out of their predicaments. In one case, a Prussian cavalry officer sent a written note to a Hessian detachment isolated in a farmstead stating that he knew the occupants were Hessians and calling upon them to “join the general cause of the Germans.” The Hessian commander, however, replied that if the Prussian officer knew Hessians were present he should also know that “these are no deserters” and that any attack would be repelled “according to honor and duty.”²⁴ Napoleon continued to hold the Hessians in high esteem and, as in Russia, he attached a battalion (II/Garde-Fusiliers) to the Imperial Guard in August as a sign of special favor. This battalion thus separated from the brigade and we shall return to its fate after following the bulk of the contingent to the Battle of Nations at Leipzig.

²³ *Ibid.*, 197–99.

²⁴ Kösterus, 61; Prince Emil, Report of 5 September 1813, HStAD, E 8 B 3.10.3, Nr. 128/6, Berichte General-Kommando.

Though desertion does not seem to have been a major problem by this stage of the war in 1813 (it certainly did not cease altogether), the brigade's strength steadily dwindled owing to sickness and exhaustion resulting from the constant marches and countermarches in miserable weather, poor or no regular provisions, inadequate clothing, bivouacking in the rain and other privations. Indeed, by the time the brigade reached Leipzig, it numbered only some 1,800 combatants. Even adding the detached battalion with Imperial headquarters, this means the Hessian contingent's infantry and artillery mustered less than half of the 4,400 men who had assembled in Würzburg in April despite the reinforcements received in July. The diminution in strength notwithstanding, the Hessian troops and their Baden comrades would find themselves engulfed in the titanic Battle of Leipzig between 16 and 19 October, their final engagement as French allies.

Oudinot's battered corps having been dissolved in the wake of Dennewitz, Marchand's small 39th Division with the Hessians and Badeners was assigned to Now assigned to Marshal Jacques-Etienne



Leipzig - A hard nut to crack. (JDM)

MacDonald's XI Corps.²⁵ As a result, the Hessians were posted on the French left during the fighting on the 16th, but their portion of the battlefield saw little action that day or the next. As the French pulled back towards Leipzig on 18 October, however, the Hessians suffered heavily (approximately 20% casualties) but repeatedly counterattacked the advancing allies and finally retreated in good order. Emil wisely sent six of his eight guns across the Elster River during the night with a small escort to join the remnants of the chevaulegers and a collection of wounded west of the city in relative safety. In contrast, the bulk of the brigade remained east of Leipzig, withdrawing to the city's Grimma Gate at first light on 19 October and playing an active role in the final, desperate hours of combat outside its walls. As the defense collapsed late in the morning, Prince Emil and a small band of some 250 men surrendered to the Prussians near the Leipzig marketplace. The remaining Badeners did likewise and the two contingents, refusing to defect despite allied entreaties, were marched off to captivity in Prussia

²⁵ The transfer of the 39th Division with the Baden and Hessian brigades occurred on 8 September.

These concluding moments of the Hessian experience at Leipzig are worth a few words. First, the Hessians very deliberately surrendered. Rather than defecting, even in that hopeless hour, they fought to the last moment and sought to escape when further resistance was futile. The gunners manning the remaining two pieces, for example, disabled their guns and risked their lives crossing the Elster rather than give themselves up; several drowned in the attempt.

A similar situation prevailed in the fortress of Torgau. The battalion that had been detached to Imperial headquarters ended up in this city when the convoy of imperial funds it was escorting was cut off from Leipzig. Here it found a second “march battalion” of replacements that had been dispatched from Darmstadt on 5 August. These two battalions endured the manifold miseries of a grim siege as part of the fortress garrison, being entrusted with sorties and rebuffing Prussian and Saxon efforts to entice the soldiers to desertion. This situation began to change in late October after Leipzig as more and more men became convinced that the Rheinbund had dissolved and that their grand duke had switched sides: on one night in mid-November alone more than 100 men slipped out of the fortress to make their way back to Darmstadt. An officer sent to learn the grand duchy’s status returned on 23 November with confirmation that Hesse-Darmstadt had joined the allies and,

pressured by the Hessian commanders, the French commandant permitted the remaining few hundred troops to march out with their weapons and baggage under a pledge not to take up arms against France for another year.

The fate of the Hessian troops may be quickly summarized. Those captured at Leipzig—including Prince Emil—were allowed to seek the grand duke’s instructions. Ludwig, not convinced that Napoleon was truly defeated for the long term, attempted to temporize, but the progress of events precluded this option and on 2 November his representative signed a military convention to join the Allied cause against Napoleon.²⁶ Some days later, after languishing for more than a month under threats of transport to Siberia, Emil and his men were thus able to depart Prussia, returning to Darmstadt on Christmas Day 1813. The remaining Hessian cavalry, most of the artillery and a small collection of infantrymen, as we have seen, had crossed over the Elster before the disaster at Leipzig. These remnants retreated towards the Rhine, experienced several skirmishes with pursuing Cossacks and, released by the French, returned to Darmstadt on 3 November. Their losses and ordeals notwithstanding, they would soon find themselves again on the march, this time against their former French comrades and part of a contingent of 8,000 required by

²⁶ Ulman, “Hessen–Darmstadt am Scheideweg,” 285, and 295–96.

the Allies, that is, twice the size of the force Napoleon had demanded.

Observations

Having reviewed the Hessian army's participation in the 1813 campaigns, let us conclude with a few observations. In the first place, the most striking feature is Hesse–Darmstadt's remarkable loyalty to its alliance with France. This essay has focused on the military dimensions, but it is useful to at least list the major political considerations weighed in Darmstadt in 1813. First and foremost were two: Hesse's proximity to France (thus the direct threat of French military action) and, in common with the other Rheinbund princes, the fear of losing what the grand duchy had gained through its affiliation with Napoleon. But personal factors were also significant. Grand Duke Ludwig, his wife and several key members of his court harbored a significant degree of admiration for Napoleon, reciprocating the solicitous treatment they had received from the French emperor. Furthermore, according to one of the grand duchy's senior officials, Ludwig "regarded Napoleon with awe and honored him as the as the greatest commander of the age."²⁷ Despite all of the French setbacks in 1813 and even after the retreat over the Rhine, Ludwig continued to expect that Napoleon might somehow emerge victorious and thus preferred to

keep his options open as long as possible. These political and personal factors help explicate Darmstadt's persistent adherence to the French alliance until there was no other reasonable choice in 1813.²⁸

Turning to the ways in which this political decision manifested itself in the field, several points are worth highlighting. First, there are many reasons to be surprised not only by Hesse's political allegiance to Napoleon but by the steadfast behavior its soldiers evinced during this brutal, inglorious campaign. As we have seen, the army had to contend with many disadvantages in simply mobilizing its contingent and new problems arose as the men reached the theater of war. Anti-French sentiment (not the same as pan-German nationalism) and a simple desire for peace were increasing among the populace while Hessian losses in Spain and the Russian disaster cast a dark pall over the duchy's military engagement with Napoleon. The army that was hastily knocked together in the emergency atmosphere that year consisted largely of brand-new conscripts and only a tiny cadre of veterans. The old admiration of the French as the pinnacle of military professionalism and competence declined dramatically when confronted with the indiscipline of the young French soldiers

²⁷ *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Dienstleben des Hessen–Darmstädtischen Staatsministers Freiherrn du Thil* ed., Heinrich Ulmann (Darmstadt, 1878), 150.

²⁸ See Bergér, "Hessen–Darmstadts Abfall von Napoleon I.," *Hessenland*, 1902; and Ulman, "Hessen–Darmstadt am Scheidewag."

and the seemingly ubiquitous raiding columns of Allied light troops.

The Hessian contingent thus took the field in 1813 with crowds of potential disincentives shadowing its marches. Unlike some other Rheinbund armies, however, there were no unit defections and, after the first few weeks, few individual desertions despite innumerable opportunities. We can attribute this outcome to several factors. Loyalty to their prince, the culture of military obedience and a conception of soldierly honor that placed a premium on adhering to one's oaths are the strongest explanations. These, however, could only be sustained under the excellent leadership provided by the young Prince Emil and his more experienced officers. The fact that Grand Duke Ludwig clearly took a direct interest in his army, held it to very high standards and generously rewarded the worthy likely also had a significant influence on the officers and men. At the same time, there was also a practical, "realist" interest in being on the winning side and a professional desire to serve under Napoleon as part of *la Grande Armée*. Here the precipitous erosion of French discipline, the evident energy of the Allies and the steady drumbeat of defeats in the autumn of 1813 could understandably be expected to undermine the ardor of officers and men alike. Yet they stayed

with their colors and fought steadily until the very closing moments at Leipzig and through long weeks of misery during the siege of Torgau.

In conclusion, the experience of the Hessian troops in 1813 illustrates the necessity of making two distinctions when considering Napoleon's German allies. First, it is important to distinguish among the various contingents. Their commonalities are crucially informative, but their differences are equally significant. Hesse-Darmstadt, Württemberg, Saxony, Bavaria and all the others were not the same in terms of foreign affairs, domestic dispensations or military matters and we lose sight of significant differences if we cover all of their armies with one analytic blanket. Second, we have to consider the changes within each contingent over time. The Hessian brigade that fought in the 1809 war against Austria and the brigade committed to Russia in 1812, for instance, were superb and earned Napoleon's genuine respect. The contingent thrown together to meet the urgent requirements of 1813, however, was entirely different and we are well served (1) by evaluating each of these final Rheinbund contributions in its own context and (2) by not retroactively applying the impressions of 1813 to the previous versions of the armies these monarchies placed at Napoleon's disposal.

The Flight of the Eagle—But What about the Eaglet?

by Agnieszka Fulińska

On 22 June 1815 Napoleon wrote the famous words: “My political life has ended, and I proclaim my son, with the title of Napoleon II, the Emperor of the French.” Was this proclamation a possible reality, wishful thinking or a delusion? Could people such as Lafayette, had they foreseen what the Restoration would bring upon France, have changed the course of history by supporting the imperial succession? Did they restrain from acting in its favour only because they believed Napoleon had betrayed the revolutionary values, as it is often regarded, or were they simply realistic in their assessment of the situation?¹

The Chambers issued in response declarations in the name of the people and “Napoleon II,” and even a provisory government had been instituted (never to operate), but the Bonapartist party had a minority and the cause was very weak. Moreover, the main flaw of Napoleon’s vision of France in his second abdication was such that his son was in



The King of Rome (JDM)

no position to practically succeed him. Louis XVIII escaped to Gent, mere 300 kilometers from Paris, and was ready to return, while the King of Rome (or, more accurately, the Prince of Parma at that precise time) stayed a thousand kilometres farther, in Vienna, and had nothing to say in the matter of his fate, not only because he was a four year old boy.

It would have been still desirable for Austria to put the grandson of her emperor on the French throne, as it had been in 1813 and at the beginning of the Congress of Vienna: “The Austrians had not forgotten that the legitimate heir of the vanquished [Napoleon] was the grandson of their emperor. The accession of Napoleon with

the regency of the ex-archduchess would serve their interests in a natural way.”² With the conservative government in Britain and with the tsar having been persuaded by the British to support the return of the Bourbons, however, Austria was in no position to force her

¹ Cf. E. de Waresquiel’s analysis of Napoleon’s means and chances in June 1815, *Cent Jours: la tentation de l’impossible – mars-juillet 1815* (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 464ff.

² T. Lentz, *Le congrès de Vienne. Une refondation de l’Europe 1814-1815* (Paris: Perrin, 2013). All translations from French by the present author.

way. She could have hosted the Congress which decided the fates of Europe, but even with her possessions in Italy regained, she was hardly a major military player in Europe. Even in the field of diplomacy she had to give up to major powers, as it was clearly shown in Vienna.

Possibly, had one of the victors from Waterloo changed their mind, or if things had been being decided slightly later, when the public opinion in Britain was already swerving towards Napoleomania instead of Napoleonophobia, Austria might have had chances to persuade the allies to put the minor grandson of her emperor on the throne in Paris, with Marie-Louise as regent, and a group of Austrian counsellors. But the emperor Francis had already sealed his daughter's fate in June 1814, when he sent her to Aix-les-Bains, without the child, on the excuse that his presence on the French soil could be controversial. Marie-Louise admitted in one of her letters that she had intended to take little Napoleon with her, but her father presented her "with such good reasons for

leaving him in Vienna that I could not resist."³ He also sent to Savoy his faithful diplomat, the man responsible for Bernadotte's decision to abandon Napoleon, and for Murat's treason in 1814, the count Adam Albert von Neipperg. According to anecdotic material Neipperg promised the emperor to make the archduchess forget her husband "in six weeks;" and even if the saying itself can as well belong to the category *se non è vero è ben trovato*, the intentions of the Austrian emperor were clear,⁴ and Neipperg certainly made Marie-Louise forget not only her husband, but also her obsession about being proper. Even if she was not exactly sincere when during her travel to Vienna she repeatedly announced that she should join her husband on Elba (e.g. "I scorn myself for not having come with him. Even I deserted him! Oh, my God! What will he think of me? Still I will join him, even if I were to be forever unhappy"⁵), she honestly regarded it as her sacred duty as wife and empress. After the meeting with Neipperg, this attitude waned, and during the Congress, which



Francis II ivory miniature (JDM)

³ Letter of 22 June 1814, to Louise Antoinette Lannes, Duchess of Montebello, after M. Oblin, *Le vrai visage de Marie Louise, Impératrice des français, duchesse de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla* (Paris: Carrefour des lettres, 1974), 85-86.

⁴ See, for example, J. Tulard, *Napoléon II* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 93-94.

⁵ *L'adieu à l'Empereur. Journal de voyage de Marie-Louise*, ed. Ch.-É. Vial (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2015), 184.

opened shortly after her return to Vienna, she never again contested her father's will for her to remain in Parma, which was given to her as a sovereign duchy by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. For the moment being, until 1817-18, it was also to be the hereditary duchy of her son, too, but that was about to change.

Therefore, during the Hundred Days "Napoleon II" was far away from France, and it seems barely possible that the Emperor still harboured the thoughts about Marie-Louise's loyalty: She had not come to Elba (according to anecdotes Napoleon believed it was her when it was announced to him that Marie Walewska came with her son, Alexandre), and she had not made any moves that could give him hope that she had the actual intention of returning to France. Nonetheless, on his way to Paris and upon his arrival to the capital—on the fourth birthday of their son—Napoleon wrote at least twice to his wife in an enthusiastic tone, describing how easily he took back power, and how admired he was throughout France. The



third of these letters, dated to 4 April 1815, shows desperation:

My good Louise, I have already written to you several times, and I sent Flahaut [Charles de Flahaut] to you three days ago. I sent the man to you to say that all goes well. I am adored and I have all the power. I only miss you, my good Louise, and my son. Come to join me quickly via Strasbourg. The person who brings you this letter will tell you about the state of affairs in France. Adieu, my friend. All yours, Napoleon.⁶

At the same time the former empress would, however, reassure her father that her will was to remain in Austria, and that such stance would guarantee the peace in Europe. She would even ask Neipperg to redact a letter to the chancellor

Metternich, in which she "distanced herself from all projects of Napoleon."⁷

Notwithstanding, since at least July 1814 rumours about a possible return of Napoleon were disseminated in France, being aimed either at scaring the populace or at probing the attitudes. One of the

⁶ *Lettres de Napoléon à Marie-Louise et de Marie-Louise à Napoléon*, ed. by J. Haumont (Paris: Jean de Bonnot, 1970), II: 713.

⁷ C. F. de Méneval, *Napoléon et Marie-Louise. Souvenirs historiques* (Bruxelles 1845), III: 124.

recurring rumours, which troubled the royal police, was the prospective imperial coronation of the King of Rome at Easter.⁸ Newspapers all over Europe were disseminating rumours which could make one believe that the empress intended to join her husband, and France saw at least one plot serious enough to provoke a response from the state forces: The conspiracy in the north, led by generals Drouot d'Erlon and François Antoine Lallemand, of which it is unclear whether it aimed at placing the King of Rome or the Duke of Orleans on the throne.⁹

Noteworthy, the pieces of news gleaned from Austrian papers seem to try to implicate Napoleon in plots having as their goal the kidnapping of his son from Vienna. Allegedly in March (apparently before his return to Paris!) he sent a relay to get his family back—which gave the Austrians an excuse to remove Marie-Louise and her son to Hofburg. A week later the newspapers alarmed the public about “Bonaparte’s agents” active in the villages around Schönbrunn, of the



involvement of Madame de Montesquiou’s nephew as well as Talleyrand’s secretary. The press also added a piece of information which is seemingly innocent and of little consequence: that involved were the French ladies from the court of the little prince¹⁰. This appears to have served as an excuse for exiling the court of the King of Rome from Austria, which had obviously been a plan from the beginning. The count von Dietrichstein’s elaborations on the bad influence they had on the young prince only support this hypothesis.

This assumption is corroborated by a very short note, which states simply that “the nick-named King of Rome’s French Governess, it seems, was the principal agent in Bonaparte’s plot to carry the boy off to Paris.”¹¹ Moreover, yet another newspaper goes as far as suggesting that “it seems to us to have been manufactured by the Emperor Francis, to justify him for imprisoning his daughter, the Empress Maria Louisa, which it is said he

⁸ E. de Waresquiel, *Cent Jours*: 109. One may doubt if all rumours cited in this work, e.g. that of rendering the city of Lille to Britain, or of re-establishing the feudal laws and tithes in case of Napoleon’s return, actually originated from Bonapartist agents. It would seem that a counteraction was being taken by the royalists in case of such “fake news.” A popular anti-

Napoleonic song quoted by Jean Tulard which expresses the doubt in the son’s return to France, may have originated in similar milieux. Tulard *Napoléon II*, 97-98.

⁹ E. de Waresquiel, *Cent Jours*, 112.

¹⁰ The *Bristol Mirror*, 15 April 1815.

¹¹ The *Lancaster Gazette*, 15 April 1815.

has done at Pressburg,”¹² the latter rumour being purely fictional.

We also find information about a plot to kidnap the King of Rome from Vienna in Méneval’s account. Apart from the implication of the members of the Montesquiou family, he mentions the strange behaviour of the count de Narbonne, who would disguise himself for reasons unknown as a crippled man. Méneval quotes gossip that the ignorance of Narbonne’s presence in Vienna was the reason of disgrace of Franz von Hager zu Altensteig, the chief of Austrian secret police. He is, however, doubtful as to the motives of Narbonne: “I never learned the reason for Mr. de Narbonne’s disguise. He was very close to Mr. de Talleyrand. If his journey [to Vienna] had had as its goal the abduction of the King of Rome, which is not very probable, it ought to have been with the ideas of regency in mind.”¹³

All these rumours coincide with the Austrian government’s decision that the prince should remain with his grandfather’s court, and with the process of depriving him of all traces of his former life, which by that time had already begun. It is hard to assess to what extent the child was aware of his father’s fate, although a print from the time of the Congress gives some idea about

what the Empire’s partisans believed in this matter. The caption of this print, of which one copy is preserved in the Museo Napoleonico in Rome, reads as follows: “The King of Rome during a walk in the Schönbrunn park, a Kaiserlick or German [= Austrian] soldier offers him a bouquet of flowers, and asks whether the child likes to be with his grandfather Francis? Yes, answers the young prince, but I liked it more to be with my daddy Napoleon.”

In the notes on the education of the prince by the count Moritz von Dietrichstein we find two anecdotes concerning Napoleon’s exile and escape from Elba:

On the other day, during his breakfast, he said all of a sudden: “I will go aboard a ship on the sea and I will go to the island of Elba. Really, it’s not a story!” Later I learned that in winter 1815, people talked to him about the island of Elba, like the countess of Montesquiou did, when Napoleon had already left the island: “Ah, my dear child, your father escaped his prison, he is returning to the throne of France and we will come back there soon.”¹⁴

Again, one can wonder if this is an actual reminiscence, or an echo of these anecdotes

¹² *Taunton Courier and Western Advertiser*, 6 April 1814, citing “a private letter from Vienna.”

¹³ Méneval, *Napoléon et Marie-Louise*, 133ff and 195. By the time of submitting this paper I have not succeeded in verifying the rumour concerning the reasons of von Hager’s demise (Méneval writes that he was disgraced and sent to his own lands).

However, he died in 1816 in Venice, while Josef von Sedlnitzky came into the office in 1815; a coincidence which adds plausibility to Méneval’s account.

¹⁴ J. de Bourgoing, *Autour du Duc de Reichstadt. Documents inédits et oubliés* (Paris: G. Ficker, 1932), 11.

and plots that were invented in order to tighten the surveillance over the prince.



Clearly, at no moment of the Hundred Days had Austria the tiniest intent of letting the King of Rome out of Vienna;¹⁵ just the opposite: it seems that her government

fabricated plots and rumours to justify their policy towards the prince and began the process of turning him into a proper Habsburg. This leads back to the initial question: did Napoleon believe that his statement from the second abdication hold any pretences of feasibility? Had he expressed such wish before Waterloo, and especially if the timing of his return had been different, if there was no need for the Belgian campaign with the British and Prussian troops already at home, he could have counted on the allied powers considering that while he returned to power for good, it is better to allow his Austrian son become the heir. One may speculate that Francis I and Metternich could have opted for the prince remaining an honorary hostage in Vienna, officially to receive his education. With the delicate position of Marie-Louise and her affair with Neipperg, it would be a difficult decision to send her back to Paris.

And yet a couple of days after the disaster in Belgium, Napoleon proclaimed his son the new Emperor. It could have been just a symbolic gesture, of course, or a desperate act. The proclamation was recorded in official medallion production by a suitable, if unrealistic subject: on the obverse the King of Rome is portrayed as “Napoléon II Emp[ereur] des Français,” and on the reverse Napoleon offers his son to France¹⁶. The medal was designed by Nicolas-Guy-Antoine Brenet and struck by Dominique-

¹⁵ See Tulard, *Napoléon II*, 97.

¹⁶ L. Bramsen, *Médailleur Napoléon le Grand ou description des médailles, clichés, repoussés et*

médailles-décorations relatives aux affaires de la France pendant le Consulat et l'Empire, vol. 2: 1810-1815, Copenhagen 1907, cat. 1662.

Vivant Denon (i.e. by official engravers), and bears on its obverse the date 22 June 1815, therefore it is consistent with the abdication. At an unknown time of the year 1815 a series of small medals presenting “the family of Napoleon” was also issued, with the jugate busts of Napoleon, Marie-Louise and the King of Rome on the obverse, and the imperial eagle and the date March 1815 on the reverse.¹⁷ Yet another medal was struck in Lyon, with the date 27 June and signed on the reverse by the city officials, with the bust of the King of Rome carried by soldiers, and the legend “Vive Napoléon II.”¹⁸ A popular print in which Napoleon presents his son to the officials, is captioned “I proclaim my son by the name of Napoleon II.”

The print is particularly interesting, because unlike in the medal, where the child is undoubtedly a living person, the anonymous author¹⁹ made Napoleon quite realistically point at the statue of the King of Rome.

Recently a new, interesting, and slightly confusing context resurfaced: in May 1815 the aforementioned engraver Brenet had designed a medal for the coronation of the King of Rome. It showed the prince being crowned by his father and presented by the

empress (the handwritten note by the engraver leaves no doubt as to the identities of the persons). Does it mean that Napoleon planned to perform the coronation as a precaution, like it had been considered in 1813? Did he take into account the possibility of the failure of the Belgian campaign? Or was this act intended as a gesture towards Austria? More importantly: did Napoleon really believe that his son could be returned to him? Was it a policy of facts to-be-made? Hope that once the little prince is proclaimed emperor, the Austrians and the other allies will be left with no choice? With all these questions in mind, we should assume that Napoleon

counted on the success of the Belgian campaign and may have intended the coronation after his triumphal return to Paris, as a conciliatory gesture.

The case of Brenet’s design can help to solve the mystery of the so called “essai” coins, minted in the name of Napoleon II, Emperor, dated on their reverses 1816. The controversy

is whether they were struck in 1815 (after the abdication), or ... during the Second Empire, as a reminder of “Napoleon II,” and justification of Napoleon III. If there was an official design of a medal to



Duc de Reichstadt (JDM)

¹⁷ Bramsen, *Médaillier*, cat. 1697.

¹⁸ Bramsen, *Médaillier*, cat. 1668.

¹⁹ The print is labelled “A Paris chez CODONI M^e et C^{ie} rue des Gravilliers No 23”

commemorate the crowning of the first emperor's son, whatever its reason, there could have been an emission of appropriate coins intended as well, and the mint could have struck the exemplary coins (which does not mean that they were not repeated under the II Empire) in 1815 with the date of official emission set for the following year. Nonetheless, even if so, this does not solve the mystery of Napoleon's intentions and hopes concerning his son during the Hundred Days and just after Waterloo.

In the following months, the partisans of the Empire printed posters, greeting the advent of Napoleon II, but these could be very well an expression of wishful thinking. An earlier document, however, is more mysterious. On 10 April 1815, Marshal Masséna issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the south-eastern departments, in which we can read, among others: "He [Napoleon] returned among a family that cherishes him." It is unlikely that Masséna meant Napoleon's brothers here, even in the light of Lucien's rallying to his brother's side. It would seem more plausible that even he expresses the wishful thinking: the French should believe, or at least hope, that the Emperor will be reunited with his wife and son. After all the French papers were disseminating the "fake news" about the expected arrival of Marie-

Louise and her son on 4 April. The question remains: did Napoleon believe in this piece of news? In his letter from Lyon, written on 11 March 1815, he had expressed the hope that he would "take her into his arms before the end of March,"²⁰ but, as has been mentioned before, the letter of 4 April shows the waning of such hope. In his biographical account of the count de Narbonne, Émile Dard describes, unfortunately without quoting the source, a conversation between Napoleon's confidant and the emperor Francis in April 1813:

Francis II [sic!] observed, on the other hand, that the strength of the French army was based uniquely on Napoleon's genius, and that Napoleon could be killed. "France would remain," said Narbonne, "and we will have no less the King of Rome, strong by his name, by his father, and by the ancestors of Your Majesty." "Your master," answered the emperor, "does not think like this; he does not believe that the King of Rome would stay on the throne."²¹

Whether this assessment was right, we will probably never learn.

²⁰ *Lettres de Napoléon à Marie-Louise*, 708.

²¹ É. Dard, *Le Comte de Narbonne 1755-1813* (Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 2018), 226. Most of the

material cited in the chapter in question belongs to the archives in Vienna or Narbonne's correspondence.

Healthcare Reforms under the Empire

by Xavier Riaud

“I do not believe in medicine, I believe in Corvisart.” (Napoléon).


“I pay tribute to the honour and loyalty which you display.” (Wellington to Larrey, Waterloo, 1815).

Introduction


Napoleonic medicine was pivotal in the development of medical science. We continue to appreciate its fundamental principles even today. On 20 August 1798, Bonaparte legislated the *Institute of Egypt*. The doctors combined the physics and natural history departments with no more than ten members (including Desgenettes, then Larrey). Bonaparte chaired all the sessions. He continued his interest in medicine after becoming First Consul and then Emperor; thus his influence on medicine cannot be denied.¹

Antoine François Fourcroy (1755-1809)

On 8 August 1793, the Convention voted for the closing of all academies and academic societies. On 4 December, Antoine Fourcroy succeeded in getting the Convention to vote for a law that aimed to establish specialist health schools in Paris, Strasbourg and Montpellier. Fourcroy immediately began establishing these three schools, which



Medical School under the Consulate



Antoine François Fourcroy

¹ Xavier Riaud, *Napoléon Ier et ses Médecins* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012).


operated perfectly in conjunction with the adjacent hospitals.²

From 1802, Fourcroy actively campaigned for reform of the medical system and has a major influence in the law of 19 Ventose year XI (10 March 1802). This determined the length of medical studies, their approved programmes of study and, at the end, exams and the submission of a final thesis. The law of 11 April 1803, for which Fourcroy took full responsibility, resulted in the creation of three pharmacological schools: Paris, Montpellier and Strasbourg. Fourcroy wrote the Imperial University text issued on 10th May 1806, approved by the State Council on 5 March 1808, held by the decree n°3179 on 17 March 1808. He was the initiator of the *Palmes Académiques* - awards for services to education.³

Antoine Portal (1742-1832)

First doctor of Louis XVIII, his influence led the king to establish the Royal Academy of Medicine in 1820. In 1804, Joseph-Ignace Guillotin established the Academy of Medicine in Paris. After Napoleon's coronation, it was referred to as the Imperial Academy of Medicine. This institution appeared elsewhere in the Imperial Almanac of 1808. In 1810, it changed its name to the Academic Society of Medicine. Portal finally left this institution and created the Medical Circle in 1811. This creation continued to destroy

² Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.



Antoine Portal



Marie François Xavier Bichat

³ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

the society set up by Guillotin, a struggle which carried on until 1819.⁴

The Founding Fathers of French Medicine

Marie François Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) dissected up to 600 bodies to write his *Anatomie descriptive* in five volumes (1801-1803). He is the father of modern histology and a reformer of pathological anatomy.⁵

Jean Nicolas Corvisart (1755-1821) popularised patient observation, clinical assessment, anamnesis and etiological study. Pre-occupied with diagnosis techniques, he focussed on percussion techniques developed by Auenbrugger in 1761 (translation of his studies 1809). He had a pupil Laënnec, the inventor of the stethoscope (1816). In 1806, Corvisart published his reference work entitled *Essai sur les maladies et les lésions organiques du cœur et des gros vaisseaux* (*Essay on Illnesses and Organic Heart Lesions and the Major Arteries*) which was an original idea suggested by Napoleon himself during a conversation.⁶

Jean Noël Hallé (1754-1822) was a great pioneer of medical hygiene. He was an advocator of the vaccine and a campaigner for preventative medicine.⁷

In 1806, Napoleon appointed Jean Louis Baudelocque (1745-1810) the holder of the chair of obstetrics, the highest position of



⁴ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

⁵ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.


⁶ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

⁷ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.


medical specialism in France. He was considered the greatest obstetrician of his time. The Baudelocque pelvimeter measuring the diameter of the pelvis as well as the Baudelocque forceps became popular as far away as America. He made obstetrics a scientific discipline in its own right.⁸

Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol (1772-1840) was considered the creator of the psychiatric hospital in France. Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) was also a pioneer in field of psychiatry and helped that medical discipline to acquire a respected status.⁹


Joseph Ignace Guillotin (1738-1814) was the pioneer of the smallpox vaccination law. But it was Edme-Joachim Bourdois de La Motte (1754-1835) who completed the work by vaccinating the King of Rome. Antoine Augustin Parmentier (1737-1813) carries out the first vaccination experiments from 1802 and fought for the



Jean Louis Baudelocque



Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol (L)
and Philippe Pinel (R)



Joseph Ignace Guillotin (L), Edme-Joachim Bourdois de La Motte (C) and Antoine Augustin Parmentier (R)

⁸ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

⁹ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.


creation of centres against chicken pox to be open to the underprivileged.¹⁰

Alexis Boyer (1757-1833) and Raphaël Bienvenu Sabatier (1732-1811) were the pioneers of urology.¹¹

Surgery and Military Medicine

René-Nicolas Dufriche, Baron Desgenettes (1762-1837), the principal medical officer of the Great Army, brought hashish to Europe from the Egyptian countryside for experimental purposes. He inoculated against the plague and was a great hygienist who battles against many epidemics.¹²

Pierre François Percy (1754-1825), Head surgeon of the Great Army, created a transport and repatriation system for the injured, created a battalion of paramedics and nurses (1809), fought to improve the welfare of the injured and working conditions of military surgeons.¹³



Alexis Boyer (L) and Raphaël Bienvenu Sabatier (R)



René-Nicolas Dufriche,
Baron Desgenettes

¹⁰ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

¹¹ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

¹² Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

¹³ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

Dominique Jean Larrey (1766-1842), Head Surgeon in the Great Army from 1812, created schools of surgery, was an hygienist. He battled against epidemics and established an ambulance for transport and repatriation of the injured. He invented a new method of limb amputation (quicker, more efficient). In the battle of Eylau (1807), he realized 800 amputations in three days.¹⁴

MISCELLANEOUS


Jean Antoine Chaptal (1756-1832), a physician and a minister of Napoleon, understood the chaptalization of wine. Antoine Augustin Parmentier (1737-1813) was responsible of the popularisation of potatoes. Joseph Ignace Guillotin (1738-1814) promoted the guillotine to carry out death penalties as a less painful method of execution.¹⁵

CONCLUSION


If Napoleon were from outside the world of medicine, he managed the characters involved and their successes, granting them if necessary positions of nobility within the Empire by creating a new state decoration, the *Légion d'honneur*. It was awarded for unique achievements which only the greatest names in medicine can exceed.



Pierre François Percy



Dominique Jean Larrey




Jean Antoine Chaptal

¹⁴ Riaud. Image source: Bibliothèque Interuniversitaire de Santé (©BIUS), Paris, 2010.

¹⁵ Riaud.

These doctors truly excelled due to the breakthroughs they have made. Some of these advances continue to be used today. They are the founding fathers of contemporary medicine.



<i>Appendix A</i>	
<i>Physicians, Holders of the Légion d'Honneur:</i> ¹	<i>Physicians, Nobles of Empire:</i> ²
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corvisart • Boyer • Fourcroy • Desgenettes • Larrey • Percy • Cadet de Gassicourt • Bourdois de La Motte • Cabanis • Blanvillain • Chauvot de Beauchêne • Coste • Delingette • Duchêne • Fosseyeux • Gallard • Godefroy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corvisart • Boyer • Fourcroy • Desgenettes • Larrey • Percy • Cadet de Gassicourt • Bourdois de La Motte • Cabanis • Auvity • Bousquet • Boysset • Broussonnet • Chifoliau • Coste • Damelin court • Hallé

¹ Jean-François Lemaire, *La médecine napoléonienne* (Paris Nouveau Monde/Fondation Napoléon, 2003).

² Lemaire.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Heurteloup• Horeau• Jacob• Jeannin• Lancome• Lefort• Loisel• Margueron• Mariglier• Mocquot• Muraour• Parmentier• Poullain• Poumier• Rosapelly• Sabatier• Yvan, etc.		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Heurteloup• Hoin• Kitz• Lallemand• Lanefranque• Lorin• Marchant• Michel de Trétaigne• Poullet• Pelletan• Portal• Poussielgue• Renoult• Sue• Varéliaud• Vergez• Yvan, etc.
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The Silent Witnesses of Napoleon's Abdication

by Liudmila Sakharova

In the Moscow State Historical Museum, at the exposition of the Museum of 1812 there are many interesting documents and relics of the time of Napoleon. In this collection there are many weapons, uniforms, decorations, medals, oil paintings, watercolours, historical documents. Among them there are some interesting items of the period of Napoleon's abdication.



On 31 March 1814 the Allied forces led by Emperor Alexander I entered in Paris. Paris was capitulated. At this time Napoleon was in Fontainebleau. He was waiting for his marshals and was developing the plan for the liberation of Paris. But the situation in the capital was so complicated that even the marshals demanded the abdication of their Emperor. Napoleon told them his famous words: "You want peace, you will get it." Everybody knows that Emperor Napoleon signed the abdication in the room of Fontainebleau on 4 April 1814, and after that he left the office. After this act the room became historical.



Soon Allied officers entered this room. The first was Prince Peter Volkonsky (1776-1852), general-adjutant of Alexander I and the minister of the imperial court. He understood that he was in the historical room and decided to take something to remember about this historical moment. He took the pendant from the crystal chandelier of this room. Volkonsky ordered to the French jeweler to create the memorial decoration. This decoration looks like a small vase on the bronze antique spears and has an inscription in French:



“De la Chambre ou’ Napoleon Bonaparte a Abdique’ en 1814. Paris le 23 Aout 1815.” Later in Russia, this decoration was on the prince’s table in his estate Sukhanovo /Суханово near Moscow.



Russian General baron Fabian Osten-Sacken (1752-1837) was appointed these days by the Governor-General of Paris. He visited this historic room too and took three candles from a candlestick that were in the room of Fontainebleau at the time when Napoleon signed the act of abdication. When Osten-Sacken left France in 1814, the citizens of Paris presented him with a ceremonial arms set made by the famous French master Nicolas Boutet. Nowadays this beautiful set is located in the Kremlin Museum in Moscow.

The third item is the officer’s sabre and the sheath which were created in 1799 by the famous French master Nicolas Boutet. He lived and worked in the period of the



Empire. This sabre was presented to general Napoleon Bonaparte by the French Republic, when he returned from the Egyptian campaign in 1799. Its blade has the inscription: «Napoleon Bonaparte



Premier Consul de la Republique Française». The spine of the blade, «Manufacture de Klingenthal Caulaux Frères» and the scabbard «Manufacture a' Versailles Entreprise Boutet». Napoleon loved this sabre and took it into military campaigns. This sabre was with him up to dramatic events of 1814. But how did the



Emperor's favorite sabre was appeared in Russia? The fact is that Napoleon presented it to Count Pavel Shuvalov, who accompanied the abdicated Emperor to his exile to Elba Island. After the dramatic farewell ceremony of Napoleon with the guard in the courtyard of Fontainebleau on April 20, 1814 he went into exile.

Pavel Shuvalov (1776-1823) was the adjutant of the Emperor Alexander I and a participant in the wars with Napoleon. At first Alexander instructed him to guard the Empress Maria-Louise, and then he was appointed commissar of the Russian army, who accompanied the defeated Emperor Napoleon to the place of his exile. And he was obliged to guard him. This task was



difficult. During the transfer of escort in different areas of France the relation to Napoleon was different. Someone greeted "Long live the Emperor!" and someone aggressively threatened him. At some point, Shuvalov suggested him to exchange with overcoats and carriages. Such camouflage was a precaution against hostile people. Of course, Shuvalov risked his life. Later, Napoleon appreciated the noble action of the Count. He thanked him and gave him his sabre as a memorial of this trip. For a long time, the sabre of Napoleon was in the estate of the Shuvalov's family,



which preserved it as a relic of Napoleon. By the way this overcoat of Napoleon is in the Museum of military history in Vienna. And last year we saw it.



For a long time, the sabre of Napoleon was in the estate of the Shuvalov's family, which preserved it as a relic of Napoleon. In 1912, the centenary of 1812 was celebrated in Russia. There was a separate hall devoted solely to Napoleon. The sabre of Napoleon was presented at an exhibition dedicated to these events. After the exhibition, it was returned to the owners. In 1917, a revolution took place in Russia, and then a civil war began. The noble estates were burned. The Shuvalov estate

was ruined and the sabre disappeared. But it was not truly lost. Later it became known that in 1918 a soldier of the Red Army took this sabre and used it as a combat weapons in battles. Therefore, the part of the guard of sabre was lost. In 1926 a museum of Red Army was established in Moscow. The sabre of Napoleon as a sword of a Red Army soldier was transferred to this museum. Later, the museum staff read the inscription on a sabre that it belonged to Napoleon and handed it to the Historical Museum. Today, every visitor can see this sabre and other items of the Emperor Napoleon at the Museum of 1812 in Moscow.



Marshal Ney: From Abdication to the Eve of Waterloo—Buyer’s Remorse?

by Wayne Hanley, PhD, FINS

To put it mildly, 1814-15 was not the best period of Michel Ney’s life. It was also one of the most politically unstable periods in French history. At the beginning of 1814, Napoleon was emperor of France, fighting for his régime’s survival. Four months later, Napoleon had abdicated and Louis XVIII (*deux fois neuf*) began his reign. Ney, of course, played a key role in that transition by forcing the Emperor to abdicate and trying to influence the new régime. By February 1815, however, opposition to the Bourbon Restoration saw protests growing. In March, Napoleon took advantage of that unrest and made his bold gamble to take back the imperial throne. Once again Ney would play a key role: First as the last best hope to stop Napoleon’s march to Paris, and then by defecting to the Emperor’s side, leaving Louis XVIII no choice but to flee France. Marshal Ney did not relish the key roles he played during this period. If anything, the events of the previous two years had left the Marshal disillusioned and politically isolated, making him symbolic of the crises and choices faced by France during that period.

The first Bourbon Restoration began well enough for Ney. At his first meeting with Louis XVIII at Compiègne, the king reaffirmed his titles and rank. The king then flattered Ney and the other marshals, telling them that “it is upon you, Messieurs Marshals, that I always wish for support. You have always been good Frenchmen.” Adding that “Should I ever be forced to draw my sword, I would, gouty though I am, certainly march in your company, gentlemen.”¹ The king gave a banquet in their honor that included members of the old nobility and the new, which suggested a blending of the nobilities. During the festivities, Louis XVIII noted that he had taken a keen awareness in Ney’s exploits, telling the marshal that “during my years in England, ... I followed all your campaigns with the greatest interest.”² The next morning, he honored Marshal Ney by having him participate in the *levée* and giving him a private audience. Louis asked the redheaded marshal if there were any bit of advice with which to begin his reign. Ney responded, “I can only answer with one word.... Sire, order that the Imperial Guard be the Royal Guard, and your throne will

¹ Qtd. in Harold Kurtz, *The Trial of Marshal Ney* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), 84. See also Raymond Horricks, *Marshal Ney: The Real and the Romance*. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), 172-73; Éric Perrin, *Le Maréchal Ney* (Paris: Perrin, 1993), 258-59; and A. Hilliard Atteridge,

The Bravest of the Brave (London: Methuen, 1912), 166; George d’Heylli, *Le Maréchal Ney d’Après les Documents Authentiques* (Paris: Armand le Chevalier, 1869), 7.

² Qtd. in Horricks, 173.

last forever.”³ The king said that he would indeed consider it.



Marshal Ney (JDM)

It did not take long, however, before the honeymoon of the new régime came to an end, and the true character of the Restoration began to make itself known. Despite initial efforts to prove accommodating to the Napoleonic elite by conserving nearly half of the prefects, by maintaining the rank and privileges of most marshals (and even adding to their honors by awarding the Order of St. Louis to many, including Ney), and by appointing the marshals to important military commands, royal attitudes would demonstrate a different opinion from those who had led France over the previous decade.⁴ To staunch royalists near the king, however, it appeared that their long-awaited moment had finally arrived, benefiting from Louis XVIII's largess in innumerable ways. Royal favorites, many of whom had taken up arms against France and who willingly displayed contempt for those who had supported the Empire, soon found appointments to key military and civil posts. Despite Ney's advice to the king, Louis XVIII disbanded the Imperial Guard, creating two new line regiments with other members retired or scattered among the army's remaining regiments.⁵ In its place the king resurrected the *maison militaire du roi*, a body of 10,000 men comprised entirely of officers and dominated by émigrés. Ney nominated a member of his headquarters staff, Colonel Étienne François Girard, for a sub-lieutenancy for one of the companies, but the talented and loyal officer was rejected because of his lack of proper ancestry.⁶ What was occurring was a transition from

an imperial army to a royal army which, as historian Harold Kurtz notes, ceased to be the army of the nation, but of the king.⁷ The effect of this on the army and Ney was profound.

No less severe were the subtle (and not so subtle) personal humiliations suffered by Marshal Ney and his wife. Count Lavalette recalls a particular event that occurred in Fall 1814:

... I met [at the Tuileries gardens] one day a former aide-de-camp of the Emperor. We talked about public affairs, and he said to me: "I have just met Marshal Ney; I have never yet seen a man more exasperated than he against the Government. His lady was yesterday so cruelly insulted at the Tuileries that she

went home in tears. The old duchesses taxed her with being the daughter of a chambermaid. Her aunt, Madame Campan, has just lost the situation of superintending lady of the establishment at Ecouen, notwithstanding the Marshal's solicitations.⁸

Ney confronted the duchess d'Angoulême at a royal function (and in the presence of the king), telling her that "I and others were fighting for France while you sat sipping tea in English gardens ... You don't seem to know what the name Ney means, but one of these days I'll show you," words which were to have future ramifications.⁹ Not long after, Louis XVIII tried to soothe tensions by offering Ney the title of *gentleman of his bedchamber*.¹⁰ As historian

³ Qtd. in Kurtz, 84. See also Horricks, 172-73.

⁴ See, for example, Baron Antoine Jomini, *The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo*, trans. by S.V. Benet (New York: Redfield, 1860), 9-11; and Jean Tulard, *Les vingt jours: Louis XVIII ou Napoléon?* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 45-62.

⁵ Eugénie de Coucy Oudinot, *Memoirs of Marshal Oudinot, Duc de Reggio, compiled from the Hitherto Unpublished Souvenirs of the Duchesse de Reggio by Gaston Stiegler*, trans. Alexander Teixeira de Mattos (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 280-81. Interestingly, this was in keeping with Napoleon's thoughts while in exile: "If I were Louis XVIII," the Emperor said in Elba, "I would not keep Guard. I would disband it, give a good pension to the NCOs and men, and promote those who wish to continue serving to the regiments of the line" (qtd. in Kurtz, 97).

⁶ Perrin, 257-58.

⁷ Kurtz, 100-01.

⁸ Antoine Marie Chamans, *Memoirs of Count Lavalette, Adjutant and Private Secretary to*

Napoleon and Postmaster-General under the Empire (London: Gibbings and Company, 1894), 287-89. Aglaé Ney, the Duchess d'Elchingen and the Princess of the Moskowa, was indeed the daughter of Marie Antoinette's chambermaid, Madame Auguié. During the Reign of Terror and after the execution of the Queen, Aglaé's mother committed suicide by throwing herself into a well, thus avoiding the guillotine herself and preserving her property which could be inherited by her daughters. Madame Campan was her aunt and had been named headmistress of the *Maison d'Éducation de la Légion d'Honneur* by Napoleon, a school closed by the Bourbons during the Restoration thus forcing her retirement. See also Atteridge, 166-67.

⁹ Horricks, 184. See also Perrin, 260-61; Henri Lachouque, *The Anatomy of Glory* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1978), 370-71; and Austin, 129-30.

¹⁰ The king may also have been heeding the advice proffered by Talleyrand regarding Ney's concern about his personal finances and suggesting to the king that he might offer a remedy. See

Harold Kurtz notes, “Louis had a genuine wish to have the splendid and renowned figure of the Marshal at his Court and in his council, while Ney was as anxious to give the Government the benefit of his experience and advice.”¹¹ The influential duchess d’Angoulême, however, intervened before the offer could be made, telling the king that “... that marshal is no gentleman.”¹²

After such treatment, Ney made himself less visible at court, but perhaps the final blow to Ney’s short-lived role as a courtier happened during a Tuileries affair at which the Duke of Wellington was fêted by members of the new régime. According to Kurtz, the Marshal became exasperated:

“That man,” he exploded, “did well in Spain thanks to Napoleon’s mistakes, not because we had bad Generals. Just let us meet him one day when luck is not all in his favour! Then the world will see him for what he is. And now to see him flattered in this manner—in the presence of

Marshals of France—he, our country’s worst enemy!”¹³

By the end of October 1814, the marshal was so frustrated by his recent experiences with the Bourbons and the state of Parisian society that he decided to leave the capital and enter voluntary retirement at his estate of Château des Coudreaux (near Châteaudun).¹⁴ As Éric Perrin writes, “somewhat depressed, Ney took refuge with his family, ... relying on the simple pleasures of life to make his worries and disappointment fade.”¹⁵

Meanwhile the situation in France continued to grow worse under the new régime. The fall of the Empire had left the kingdom on the verge of bankruptcy. The transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy added to the economic woes, not the least because of the flood of cheap English commodities which undermined French industry. Among the émigrés, the Ultras (led by the comte d’Artois) quickly came to dominate the political agenda, threatening to undermine the political and social moderation promised by Louis XVIII’s Charter.¹⁶ The peasantry faced the

Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, 4 October 1814, Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, *The Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and King Louis XVIII during the Congress of Vienna (Hitherto Unpublished)* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881), 22.

¹¹ Kurtz, 102.

¹² Horricks, 184; and Perrin, 260.

¹³ Qtd. in Kurtz, 103-04. See also Perrin, 262-63. Perrin describes the outburst differently with Ney objecting to Wellington’s appointment as ambassador to France: If Wellington was so appointed, “why not also Blücher for Prussia and

Platov for Russia? It is an insult to the nation...” (263).

¹⁴ Chamans, 289; Ida St. Elme, *Ida Saint-Elme, Being Reminiscences by Ida Saint-Elme, Adventuress, of Her Acquaintance with Certain Makers of French History, and of Her Concerning Them from 1790 To 1815*, trans. by Lionel Strachey (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1902), 195; Atteridge, 167; and d’Heylli, 10.

¹⁵ Perrin, 264.

¹⁶ Henri Houssaye, *1815: La Première Restauration*, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin et Cie, [1899]), 109.

distinct prospect of land reform which would return some of their property to the émigrés. By February 1815 there were demonstrations in the streets of Paris and its suburbs. Pro-Bonapartist newspapers were read in the salons. In the provinces, government and church officials were openly mocked. And everywhere the political opposition grew more brazen—with isolated cases of armed resistance by the peasantry. In short, the promise and hope of the Bourbon restoration were fading rapidly.¹⁷

Then, the events of 1 March 1815 changed everything. Napoleon's sudden reappearance and the reactions of those he encountered on his march to Paris would call into question the legitimacy of Bourbon France and the loyalties of the French people, including Marshal Michel Ney. As Jean Tulard ably demonstrates in his *Les Vingt Jours*, an unenviable dilemma confronted France—would the nation rally to support the newly restored Bourbon monarchy or its former emperor? News of the “usurper's” landing reached Paris by

telegraph on 5 March, falling “like a bomb.”¹⁸

Unaware of this momentous event, the marshal had been enjoying his self-imposed semi-retirement at his estate at Coudreaux. On 6 March, however, he received orders from the Minister of War, Marshal Nicolas Soult, to proceed as soon as possible to Besançon to take command of the 6th Military District—there was no mention of Napoleon's landing. Not even the messenger knew the cause for the urgency. It was not until after he arrived at his Parisian residence and met with his attorney, Monsieur Batardy, that the marshal discovered the reason for the excitement. Ney's response was “What a pity! ... What a terrible thing! What are we going to do? Who will oppose that man?”¹⁹ Batardy responded that Monsieur, the King's brother, had already departed that morning for Lyon to confront “the usurper.” Ney next went to the Tuileries and met with the duc de Berry who informed the marshal about what he knew that had happened since Napoleon's landing. The Duke then inquired (in

¹⁷ Marie-Théodore Gueilly, *Souvenirs du Général Comte de Rumigny, Aide de Camp du Roi Louis-Philippe (1789-1860)* (Paris: Émile-Paul Frères, 1921), 82-84; and Houssaye, *La Première Restauration*, 109-10. See also Tulard, *Les vingt jours*; Paul Britten Austin, *1815: The Return of Napoleon* (London: Greenhill Books, 2002); John R. Elting, *Swords around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée* (New York: The Free Press, 1988); David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1966); Michel Désiré Pierre, *Ney du procès politique à la*

réhabilitation du “Brave des braves,” 1815-1991 (Paris: Éditions SPM, 2003); and Guillaume de Berthier de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, trans. by Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966).

¹⁸ “L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours,” Napoleon Bonaparte, *La Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par l'ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III* (Paris, 1858-69), XXXI, 68.

¹⁹ d'Heylli, 44; cf. Houssaye, *La Première Restauration*, 271; and Henri Welschinger, *Le Maréchal Ney, 1815* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1935), 14.

something of a *non sequitur*) about Ney's knowledge of a certain Colonel de la Bédoyère, but apparently did not tell the marshal the reason for the query. Ney responded that the officer had been an aide-de-camp to Eugène in Italy.²⁰ Asking the prince to convey his zeal for the king's cause, Ney took his leave, then hurried off to meet with Soult.

The minister of war brusquely instructed Ney to report as quickly as possible to his command at Besançon where he would find detailed instructions awaiting with General Bourmont.²¹ Although Soult attempted to dissuade him, Ney insisted on meeting with the king before assuming his post. According to biographer Raymond Horricks, in that late-night audience Louis XVIII cautioned Ney:

What we most desire is that France shall have no civil war, shall be given an opportunity to develop in peace and contentment. War is always a terrible thing, but it is even more terrible when brother turns against brother. I appeal to you, *Monsieur le Maréchal*, to use your great abilities and your popularity with my soldiers

to end this rash enterprise and prevent a recurrence of bloody strife."²²

Ney agreed, noting the madness of "Bonaparte's" actions and infamously promising to "bring him back to Paris in an iron cage." Whether or not he said those exact words is debatable (Ney may have said, for example, that Napoleon *deserved* to be brought back to Paris in an iron cage), but the sentiment remains, and the vehemence and sincerity with which the marshal conveyed his feelings certainly impressed those present.²³ Ney kissed the king's hand and took his leave.

That Ney would have appeared so willing to support the new Bourbon régime is not so far-fetched as it might at first seem. At times, his relationship with Napoleon had been shaky, and the marshal had played the key role in convincing Napoleon to abdicate at Fontainebleau, thus making it possible for Louis XVIII to assume the throne.²⁴ Especially early in the Restoration, he had developed a good working relationship with the new king (although not necessarily with the rest of the court), and Louis XVIII had rewarded the marshal by confirming his

²⁰ d'Heylli, 448-49; Welschinger, 15; and Kurtz, 118; Atteridge, 167; and Horricks, 189-91. Horricks, unlike the other biographers, insists that the duc de Berry did not give Ney any additional information on Napoleon's activities since landing.

²¹ Welschinger, 16; Atteridge, 167; and Horricks, 192.

²² Qtd. in Horricks, 192.

²³ Certainly, most biographers include the statement. See, for example, Atteridge, 295; Kurtz, 119; J. Lucas-Dubreton, *Le Maréchal Ney, 1769-*

1815 (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1941), 217-18; Horricks, 192; Perrin, 266-67; Frédéric Hulot, *Le Maréchal Ney* (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000), 195; and Houssaye, *La Première Restauration*, 271.

²⁴ David Chandler, ed., *Napoleon's Marshals* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 369-70. In his chapter on Ney, Peter Young noted that "Ney's dislike of Napoleon . . . should not be exaggerated," although this is probably overstating the true nature of their relationship. See also St. Elme, 199.

titles, decorating him with the Order of St. Louis, and naming him to the Chamber of Peers. Ney, who took his oath of loyalty to the king seriously, not only served as a member of the Council of War but also oversaw the reorganization of the cavalry. And most of all, France was finally at peace, and Ney was able to enjoy the fruits of his labors at last.²⁵ Napoleon's return now threatened that peace.

On the morning following his interview with the king, Ney set out to take command of the 6th Military District at Besançon and to coordinate with the comte d'Artois to block Napoleon's advance. Traveling with only his aides-de-camp, Ney arrived at his headquarters on 10 March. Nothing, however, was what he had expected. The "detailed orders" promised by Soult had not arrived. His forces had yet to be fully assembled: fewer than a thousand depot troops were at his immediate disposal, and they were without adequate ammunition. And there was no news concerning Napoleon's recent activities, except that some of Ney's troops had already defected to the Emperor's cause.²⁶ Ney wrote to Marshal Louis Gabriel Suchet (at Strasbourg): "We are on the eve of a tremendous revolution. Only if we cut the evil at its root is there any hope. But I fear many of the troops are infected."²⁷

²⁵ Chandler, *Marshals*, 370; and Atteridge, 295.

²⁶ Octave Levassasseur, *Souvenirs Militaires d'Octave Levassasseur: Officier d'artillerie et aide de camp du maréchal Ney (1802-1815)* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1914), 261; Horricks, 193-94; Austin, 197-98.

²⁷ Qtd. in Lachouque, 371; cf. Horricks, 194.

Consulting with his two lieutenants, Generals Louis-Auguste-Victor Bourmont and Claude-Jacques Lecourbe, Ney decided to advance to Lons-le-Saulnier to concentrate the remainder of his still-dispersed forces and to better support Monsieur and Macdonald in Lyon.

He arrived there sometime after midnight on 12 March only to be confronted by more disastrous news. More of his troops had defected and the townspeople of Chalon-sur-Saône had dumped part of his artillery train into the river. Ney wrote to the duc de Berry (his nominal commander who remained in Paris): "We've no news here of Bonaparte's activities. I think this is the last act of his tragedy. I should be much obliged if Your Royal Highness can give me some information, and if, above all, you would deign to make use of me."²⁸ Then the news grew even worse: Since Ney had left Paris, both Grenoble and Lyon had gone over to Napoleon "with great enthusiasm."²⁹ The fall of Lyon was a particularly hard blow because the comte d'Artois and Marshal Macdonald had withdrawn without firing a shot when they realized they could not trust the loyalty of their troops. This meant that not only was Ney's flank dangerously exposed, but also that Napoleon's ever-swelling ranks outnumbered his own command (14,000 to

²⁸ Qtd. in Paul Britten Austin, *1815: The Return of Napoleon* (London: Greenhill Books, 2002), 198.

²⁹ "L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours," 75. In his narrative of the 1815 campaign, Napoleon notes that by the time he reached Lyon, "the question was decided: The Bourbons had ceased to reign" ("L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours," 65).

about 6,000). And Ney's troops were still short of ammunition and artillery horses.³⁰

Meanwhile at Lyon, Napoleon gathered intelligence and considered his options. He quizzed Fleury de Chaboulon, his private secretary, on a host of topics: the reaction of the Bourbons, the state of public opinion, the loyalty of troops to the current régime, the location of the former Imperial Guard, and the conduct of the marshals. By this time, the Emperor had known that Ney was in Franche-Comté, and the marshal was of particular interest. "What is Ney doing? On what terms is he with the king?" asked Napoleon. "Sometimes good, sometimes bad: I believe he has had reason to complain of the court on account of his wife," came the response. The Emperor surmised the problem: "His wife is an affected creature; no doubt she has attempted to play the part of a great lady, and the old dowagers have ridiculed her.... Is [Ney] one of us?" Fleury de Chaboulon doubted it: "The part he took in your abdication...."³¹ Ney's nearby presence also afforded Napoleon an opportunity. It was true that "of all the marshals, it was him that the Emperor feared the most" but as Houssaye reminds us "Napoleon, knowing the extreme violence of the marshal, could fear some impulse from him,

but he had more to hope from his impressionable and spontaneous nature than from the firmness of a Macdonald or Suchet."³² Accordingly the Emperor devised a plan to capitalize on Ney's impulsivity and win him over. He instructed his Grand Marshal of the Palace, Henri-Gratien Bertrand, to write a letter to the marshal:

You will inform him ...of the delirium excited by my return, and of all the forces sent against me having joined my army in succession. You will tell him, that the troops under his command will infallibly follow the example of their brave comrades, sooner or later: and that the efforts he might make would have no further effect, than at most to retard the fall of the Bourbons a few days. Give him to understand, that he will be responsible to France, and to me, for the civil war and bloodshed, of which he would be the cause. Flatter him, ... but do not caress him too much; he would think me afraid of him, and require to be entreated.³³

Napoleon then proceeded to dictate order to all the corps commanders in the region to put their forces on the march to join him.³⁴

³⁰ Perrin, 269.

³¹ Pierre Alexandre Édouard Fleury de Chaboulon, *Memoirs of the Private Life, Return, and Reign of Napoleon in 1815* (London: John Murray, 1820), I: 223-24. Ida St. Elme also mentions the role Ney played in the abdication as she pondered the dilemma facing the Marshal (St. Elme, 199).

³² Houssaye, *La Première Restauration*, 300.

³³ Fleury de Chaboulon, I: 245.

³⁴ Louis-Joseph Marchand, *In Napoleon's Shadow: Being the First English Language Edition of the Complete Memoires of Louis-Joseph Marchand, Valet and Friend of the Emperor, 1811-1821*, trans. by Proctor Jones (San Francisco: Proctor Jones

For Ney—if it were possible—the pace of the crisis accelerated. By 13 March several of Napoleon’s proclamations circulated among his troops, including the famous “... the eagle flies from steeple to steeple with the tricolor until it will alight on the towers of Notre Dame.” The marshal commented “that is how the king ought to write. That is how one should talk to soldiers. That is how to stir them.”³⁵ The marshal’s aide-de-camp, Octave Levavasseur, reports that such proclamations were indeed stirring the troops (and gave royalists pause for concern).³⁶ That same day, Ney also received a letter from General Bertrand (Napoleon’s chief of staff) along with excerpts from newspapers from Grenoble and Lyon which demonstrated the reception of the emperor in those places. Delivered by unidentified soldiers of the Imperial Guard known to the marshal, Ney was greatly disturbed by the implications.³⁷ The letter informed Ney that “I do not doubt that on receiving news of my arrival at Lyon that you have placed your troops under the tricolor. Execute the order of Bertrand and come join me at Chalon. I

will receive you as I did following the battle of the Moskova.”³⁸

The marshal, however, still believed the situation was not beyond salvage. To reassure Bourmont and Lecourbe, Ney noted that “we may be fewer in number, but I will take the musket from the first grenadier (who hesitates) for my own and will make an example for the others.”³⁹ To each of his regimental commanders, Ney stressed the importance of their example: “we are all good men; we all served the Emperor with honor and fidelity; the Emperor abdicated; Louis XVIII now reigns in France; we have taken an oath to him, and to keep our honor, we will serve him with the same fidelity that we served the Emperor. I am counting on you.”⁴⁰ Indeed the orders issued to his subordinates during the period of 10-14 March reveal someone deliberately gathering his forces, attempting to maintain discipline, and preparing to use his forces to halt Napoleon’s advance.⁴¹ Despite Ney’s efforts, however, his soldiers shouted out “*vive l’empereur*,” instead of “*vive le roi*,” and by the 13th, whole units began to defect *en masse*, calling into question the loyalty

Publishing Company, 1998), 184; and Fleury de Chaboulon, I: 245.

³⁵ Levavasseur, 264.

³⁶ Levavasseur, 265.

³⁷ “L’île d’Elbe et les Cent-Jours,” 83; Horricks, 196; Perrin, 277; Kurtz, 126; and Atteridge, 300. Ney’s biographers also made a point of noting that during his later trial, Ney refused to give the identity of the two officers in question.

³⁸ Napoleon to Ney, 12 March 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte, *La Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par l’ordre de l’empereur Napoléon III* (Paris, 1858-69), No. 21689, XXVIII, 10-11.

³⁹ Levavasseur, 266; Sylvain Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d’un Cadet (1812-1823)* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1912), 148; and “Déposition du Marquis de Soran” in Arthur Chuquet, *Lettres de 1815 (première série)* (Paris: Librairie Ancienne, 1911), 250. See also Perrin, 270; and Horricks, 195.

⁴⁰ Levavasseur, 264-65.

⁴¹ See, for example, the extracts of Ney’s orders to General Mermet, “Déposition du Marquis de Soran,” and “Déposition de Renaud de Saint-Amour” in Chuquet, 213-17, 248-49, and 252.

of forces at his disposal.⁴² When the royalist prefect from Bourg (who had been recently chased out of town by Bonapartists) suggested that if the marshal questioned the loyalty of his troops, Ney might call on the Swiss for help, the marshal warned that “if foreign troops put a foot on French soil, all France would declare for Bonaparte” and refused the offer.⁴³ Napoleon would be stopped by French troops or none at all.

By the evening of 13 March, however, it began to appear that “none at all” was the choice. At around midnight, Ney received a dispatch from the mayor of Chalon-sur-Saône that the 76th regiment of the line defected *en masse*, crying “*vive l’Empereur*,” and seized Ney’s artillery park to turn it over to Napoleon. Not long after that, another messenger reported that a regiment of hussars had donned tricolor cockades and likewise declared in favor of the emperor and that the town of Auxonne replaced the white Bourbon flag with the Tricolor.⁴⁴ Levavasseur noted in his memoirs that Ney grew more restless—in a state of “the greatest perplexity”—as the night wore on, and it is obvious now that it was more than a case of receiving bad news: Ney was also experiencing a crisis of conscience.⁴⁵

⁴² See “Déposition du Baron Capelle,” “Déposition du Marquis de Soran,” “Déposition de M. de Boulongne,” and “Déposition de M. de Préchamps” in Chuquet, 233-35, 253, 256, and 263.

⁴³ See “Déposition du Baron Capelle” in Chuquet, 233 and 235-36.

⁴⁴ Levavasseur, 267-69.

⁴⁵ Levavasseur, 269.

⁴⁶ “Déposition de M. de Préchamps” in Chuquet, 263. The impact of this defection was echoed by

What went through his mind that evening can only be guessed, but the clues are suggestive. To be sure, many of his senior officers would prove loyal to Louis XVIII, but Ney’s tactical situation was questionable at best. He remained without definitive orders, and the Bourbon princes and their accompanying marshals had already retreated, leaving him in a compromised strategic position. Napoleon’s forces now outnumbered his own, and the marshal no longer could rely on the loyalty of those troops remaining under his command. At his deposition at Ney’s trial later in 1815, the baron de Préchamps (who was an eyewitness to events) confirmed the deteriorating situation: “The defection of the 76th which defected to the enemy in its entirety was a signal of general insurrection.”⁴⁶ Rumors, as well, added to the cacophony of bad news. The baron de Préchamps, for example, reported hearing that the whole army had gone over to Napoleon and that the royal family had already abandoned Paris.⁴⁷ Indeed, Ney himself had been informed by the officers of the Imperial Guard that the Emperor’s return had been prearranged, that he had, in fact, dined aboard an English warship and that he had the support of the Austrian emperor.⁴⁸ Could this all be true? There is

other witnesses at Ney’s trial as well. See, for example, “Déposition de M. de Préchamps” in Chuquet, 263.

⁴⁷ “Déposition de M. de Préchamps” in Chuquet, 264. At Ney’s trial, Préchamps noted that “the army would have served its king if it believed that the king had not abandoned its cause.”

⁴⁸ Levavasseur, 269-70. See also Austin, 197-98; and Perrin, 272.

also evidence of one more factor which may have added to the marshal's decision to join with Napoleon. John Elting alludes to it when he writes in *Swords around a Throne* that "it is said that he wrote [during the night of 13-14 March] to his wife that she would no longer have cause to weep on leaving the Tuileries," a reference to the incident in which the duchess d'Angoulême intentionally slighted Aglaé by refusing to acknowledge her title (of princess), calling her instead "Madame Ney."⁴⁹

At some point during the early morning hours, Marshal Ney decided how to deal with the situation. Since he "could [not] stop the waters of the sea with a hand," he would join the Emperor's rising tide.⁵⁰ It was not the case, as contended by David Chandler, of "the old attraction [to the Emperor] prov[ing] too strong," but rather Ney's responding to the reality of the moment.⁵¹ As Ney later explained: "I could have done nothing else; the country above all else. France was no longer for the Bourbons: we must obey the country...."⁵² His defection was not planned, but a decision made in the heat of the moment to avoid civil war. As Levasseur comments: "If Ney had calculated [the implication of his actions] on that day, he would have ceased to be himself."⁵³ Napoleon later

echoed this sentiment by noting that "the commotion was too much for a psyche like that of Marshal Ney. He was in his conduct neither rational nor calculating; as it was, it was impossible for him to resist the national *élan* of the people and of the army."⁵⁴

Early on the morning of 14 March, Ney instructed his aide-de-camp to gather the senior officers. The marshal tried to sound out their responses to his decision. After a brief meeting, Ney ordered his troops to assemble and then read a proclamation that had been sent by the Emperor which began, "Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, the cause of the Bourbons is lost forever. The legitimate dynasty is going to re-ascend the throne. Only the Emperor Napoleon, our sovereign, has the right to reign over our country...."⁵⁵ With those first surprising sentences, cries of "*vive l'Empereur*" and "*vive le maréchal*" drowned out any vocal support for the king, and "the soldiers threw off the white cockades, stamped them under foot, and replaced them with the tricolor cockades they had secreted away in their sacks."⁵⁶ In their subsequent celebrations, Ney's soldiers proceeded to rid Lons-le-Saulnier of any emblems of the Bourbons. Several officers, including Generals Bourmont and Lecourbe, however, refused to break their

⁴⁹ Elting, 639. See also Perrin, 261; Lachouque, 370-71; Austin, 129-30; and Horricks, 184.

⁵⁰ "Déposition du Baron Capelle" in Chuquet, 233.

⁵¹ Chandler, *Campaigns*, 1012.

⁵² Levasseur, 275.

⁵³ Levasseur, 275.

⁵⁴ Pierre, 132.

⁵⁵ Levasseur, 273. See also Austin, 209. The author of the proclamation remains in doubt. Was it written by Ney in the early morning hours of 14 March or was it sent by the Emperor? The phrasing seems more reminiscent of Napoleon than Ney. Certainly, Levasseur suspected that the proclamation had come from Napoleon.

⁵⁶ "L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours," 84.

oaths to Louis XVIII. Ney allowed them to depart unmolested (although he later issued orders to have several of the officers placed under simple house arrest).⁵⁷

Once the furor had died down, Ney prepared to march his men to meet with the Emperor. Arriving at Auxerre in the evening of 17 March, the marshal informed Bertrand that before he met with the Emperor, he wanted to prepare a written justification of his actions since Fontainebleau. Napoleon did not think that it was necessary, but delayed their meeting until the next day.⁵⁸ According to Marchand, “The marshal’s first moment was uncomfortable,” conjecturing that perhaps the marshal was reflecting on his pledge to the king.⁵⁹ Mameluck Ali recalls that while awaiting his reunion with the Emperor, Ney had tears in his eyes as if he were unsure of the meeting.⁶⁰ After a short wait, Bertrand ushered Ney into Napoleon’s room. Upon seeing the redheaded marshal, the Emperor said, “Embrace me, my dear marshal; I am glad to see you. I want no explanation or justification: I have [always] honoured and

esteemed you as the bravest of the brave.” After a short embrace, Ney responded,

“Sire, the newspapers have told a heap of lies, which I wish to confute: my conduct has ever been that of a good soldier, and a good Frenchman.... Your Majesty may always depend upon me, when my country is concerned.... It is for my country I have shed my blood, and for it I would still spill it to the last drop. I love you, Sire, but my country above all! Above all!⁶¹

The two talked for some time, Ney explaining that when he left Paris he had every intention of stopping the Emperor but that he had been carried along by his soldiers who would not have fought against Napoleon and the Emperor quizzing the marshal about the status of his troops and the loyalty of his generals. Ney also talked of his frustrations with the Bourbons and his hope that Napoleon would govern in the interests of the people and seek peace and warned that if he did not, Ney would become his “prisoner rather than [his] partisan.”⁶² For his part, the Emperor

⁵⁷ Kurtz, 132.

⁵⁸ Fleury de Chaboulon, I:262. Fleury de Chaboulon describes Napoleon’s arrival at Gamot’s residence: “On the mantel-piece of the first saloon were the busts of the Empress, and of her son; and in the next was a whole-length portrait of Napoleon, in his imperial robes: it might have been supposed, that the reign of the Emperor had never been interrupted” (I: 259-60). As for the written justification, no extant copy exists, but Harold Kurtz write, “While [Ney] was waiting for the Emperor, downstairs, he showed his manifesto to M. Gamot. There is no doubt that this document

existed but only Napoleon and M. Gamot ever read it” (Kurtz, 133).

⁵⁹ Marchand, 186-87.

⁶⁰ Louie-Étienne Saint-Denis [Mameluck Ali], *Souvenirs sur l’Empereur Napoléon Présentés et annotés par Christophe Bourachot* (Paris: Arléa, 2000), 104.

⁶¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, I:263.

⁶² Marchand, 187; Fleury de Chaboulon, I:263-66; Jean-Baptiste-Germain Fabry, *Itinéraire de Buonaparte de l’Ile d’Elbe à l’Ile de Sainte-Hélène, ou Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de la Seconde*

again assured Ney that his return had all been arranged with the approval of the allies and that the Empress was on her way to Paris. Later, Napoleon instructed the marshal to concentrate his forces at Dijon before marching them to Paris.⁶³ That evening in Auxerre, Ney encountered Ida St. Elme, a long-time acquaintance. When she inquired about his meeting with the Emperor, the marshal noted his optimism and the reasons for his own actions:

He would be rather hard to please if he were not! Not in his palmiest days was he ever acclaimed with such enthusiasm—which I myself felt. Anybody who blames me would have done the same thing in my place, as a Frenchman and a soldier. It was impossible for an old soldier like me not to be carried away. Besides, this outburst of the army, rising as one man, may prove as useful to France as it was irresistible to me. Under the circumstances I spoke and acted as I thought best in obedience to the interests and opinions of my countrymen.⁶⁴

Ney's actions were clearly not premeditated but committed in a moment of passion.

They would, however, have significant consequences.

When news of Ney's defection reached Louis XVIII, the king's exasperation was evident: "The wretch! He no longer has any honor."⁶⁵ The royal court was in turmoil. According to Fleury de Chaboulon, "The defection of Marshal Ney soon came to tear off the veil, and spread affright and consternation among the ministers and their partisans."⁶⁶ The king tried to salvage the situation by appealing for unity to the Chamber of Deputies, but he could not hold back the tide. He now experienced some of what Ney experienced at Lons-le-Saulnier as dispatches from still-loyal generals informed him that their troops would not fight against Napoleon. In fact, an unknown person posted a placard on the base of the Vendôme column, a supposed letter from Napoleon to Louis XVIII: "My good brother, it is useless to send me any more troops. I have enough."⁶⁷ With Napoleon fast approaching Paris and no army to stop him, Louis XVIII and his court opted to leave the capitol. Just after midnight on 20 March, he departed the Tuileries, first taking refuge in Lille before crossing the border to Ghent. That evening, Napoleon once again took up residence in the palace. Marshal Ney arrived three days

Usurpation. Tome I. (Paris: Le Normant, 1817), I: 220; and qtd. in Atteridge, 172; and Kurtz, 133.

⁶³ Marchand, 187; Houssaye, *La Première Restauration*, 318; Coignet, 387-88; [Charles Huchet] Comte de la Bédoyère, *Le Maréchal Ney* (Paris: Chalmann-Lévy, 1902. Lexington, KY:

Adamant Media 2006), 137-38; Kurtz, 133; and Atteridge, 173.

⁶⁴ St. Elme, 204.

⁶⁵ Qtd. in Perrin, 283.

⁶⁶ Fleury de Chaboulon, I: 211.

⁶⁷ Qtd. in Houssaye, 323.

later, bringing his troops from Dijon just as the Emperor had instructed him.

No sooner had the marshal arrived than Napoleon ordered him to report to Lille, ostensibly to determine the loyalty of the troops there.⁶⁸ Several days later, Napoleon expanded Ney's mission to include a detailed inspection tour of the entire northeastern border of France that would culminate in a formal report back to the Emperor.⁶⁹ Over the next three weeks, Ney visited all the frontier garrisons, evaluated their readiness and the quality of their officers, visited military hospitals, and confirmed the loyalty of political leaders. Ney's mission also had the secondary effect of portraying the Empire as fully restored. Here, after all was Marshal Ney, representing the interests of the Emperor and rallying potential supporters to the cause. When he completed the mission, he delivered his report and recommendations to the new Minister of War, Marshal Louis Davout.

Then, being given no additional responsibilities, Ney returned to his estate at Coudreaux. By this time, Napoleon had heard stories about Ney's promise to bring him back to Paris in an iron cage and had become cool toward the marshal.⁷⁰ Contemporary biographer Raymond Maiseau notes that during this period, Ney felt that he had been played by Napoleon,

⁶⁸ Raymond Balthasar Maiseau, *Vie du Maréchal Ney, duc d'Echingen, prince de la Moskowa* (Brussels: Chez PJ de Mat, 1816), I: 157.

and he did not like what he was seeing with the revival of the Empire, with the authoritarian tendencies of the Emperor, and with the likelihood of war (as the allies declared Napoleon an international outlaw and began to mobilize):

When he had decided to declare himself for the usurper, he did so only in hopes which were not realized. He had to see with the greatest difficulty all the promises that had been made to him—by the emissaries of Bonaparte at Lons-le-Saulnier, and by Bonaparte himself at Auxerre, on the accession of the powers, on the return of Marie Louise, and the peace which this event was to assure France—had been so many impostures, with events contradicting promises every day.... The marshal was so increasingly dissatisfied with the conduct of events that he asked for and obtained permission to spend some time away from Paris.⁷¹

Disillusioned by the promise of the Bourbons, he now was becoming disillusioned with the restored Empire and, perhaps, regretting the role he played in bringing it about.

Toward the end of May, however, the marshal received orders from Paris. With

⁶⁹ Napoleon to Ney, Paris, 27 March 1815, in Napoleon Bonaparte, *La Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 21734, XXVIII, 50.


⁷⁰ Welschinger, 65-66; and Atteridge, 174.

⁷¹ Maiseau, 158-59.

the army mobilizing for the coming campaign, Ney perhaps wondered if he were to receive a military appointment.⁷² He did not. Napoleon had drawn up the *Acte Additionnel* to the imperial constitution and planned a major fête on the Champs de Mars to make it public. All the great dignitaries of state were to participate, including Marshal Michel Ney. The event was scheduled for 1 June, but Ney arrived in Paris on 28 May and stopped by the Elysée Palace to seek reimbursement for expenses incurred during his inspection tour of the northeast. The marshal then visited the Tuileries where he had a telling encounter with the Emperor.

Pretending not to know that Ney had been granted leave after his mission to the frontier, Napoleon quipped, “I thought you had emigrated...” “I should have done it

much earlier,” replied the marshal; “now, it's too late.”⁷³ Had Ney's mission to Lille and the northeast been some sort of loyalty test to see if he would cross the border and rejoin the king at Ghent? Was Ney regretting his decision at Lons-le-Saulnier? Should he have followed the example of



Marshal Ney (JDM)

Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot and have abandoned his command instead of defecting? The Emperor's comments and Ney's response certainly beg the questions. The marshal's role in the ceremony on the Champs de Mars was limited: He was primarily there for show. As AH Atteridge explains, “to have left him out of it would have confirmed the current rumour that he was in disgrace and in

danger of arrest.... Napoleon could not omit so famous a figure from the ceremonial display at a time when so many of the marshals had abandoned him.”⁷⁴ The

⁷² Atteridge, 175.

⁷³ Maiseau, 160; and Atteridge 175.

⁷⁴ Atteridge, 175. Indeed, the rumor among the rank and file concerning the meeting between Ney and Napoleon at Auxerre was that it was not at all

marshal disliked being made a spectacle. According to one eye witness, during the fête, Ney appeared “sad and reflective.”⁷⁵ After the ceremony, Ida St. Elme recalls that “Ney was in a rage with everybody; he was in turn furious with the ministers, the people, and the emperor himself, because of this review.”⁷⁶ If the marshal felt out of place during the ceremony of the Champs de Mars, he was even more so three days later when he took his seat in the newly-created Chamber of Peers. His lack of political knowledge left him unprepared to participate in the debates as France mobilized for war against the Coalition.⁷⁷ He was a soldier, not a politician. Further he was a soldier without a military command. Frustrated, Ney again returned to Coudreaux, apparently ready to live life in semi-retirement.

Neither the Restoration nor the restored Empire had lived up to his expectations. Although Louis XVIII sought to accommodate the changes that had

occurred in France since the Revolution, those surrounding him proved to be more royalist than the king, seemingly interested only in rewarding their fellow émigrés at the expense of those who had served France for the last 20 years. Meanwhile Napoleon’s return had been based on lies: Far from condoning the Emperor’s actions, the Allies had declared Napoleon an international outlaw and were mobilizing for war. Ney was caught in the middle, having played no small part in creating this conundrum, adding to his sense of isolation and disillusionment. A week after arriving at his estate, however, he received a letter from the Minister of War, informing him that if he wished to be in the first battles of the coming campaign, he should report to Avesnes by 14 June where the imperial headquarters would be established.⁷⁸ Within the hour, Marshal Ney set off for the Belgian border accompanied only by an aide-de-camp.⁷⁹ But that is a story for another time.

a happy reunion but rather, “glacial” (Civrieux, 154).

⁷⁵ Silvain Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenir d’un Cadet (1812-1823)* (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1912), 159. Interestingly, not far from Ney, stood General Bourmont (who had managed to ingratiate himself with the new régime after his professed opposition to Ney’s actions at Lons-le-Saulnier and would even be granted command of a division on the eve of the Waterloo campaign). According to

Civrieux, the general appeared “pale under his tricolor cockade, perhaps meditating his next treason” (159).

⁷⁶ St. Elme, 219.

⁷⁷ Maiseau, 162.

⁷⁸ See Napoleon to Davout, Paris, 11 June 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte, *La Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 22042, XXVIII, 314-15.

⁷⁹ Levavasseur, 288.

Obituary of Susan P. Conner

It is with great personal sadness that I must announce the passing of our dear friend and colleague, Susan Punzel Conner. Susan died on 28 November 2020 at the age of 73. She had suffered from cancer for some time and passed away in a hospice in the company of her husband, Ron, and other family and friends.

Susan has long played a major role in our field of study and has been a mainstay of the Napoleonic Historical Society, the International Napoleonic Society and the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era. Susan was a scholar of the first order, often presenting papers on such non-traditional topics as the sewers and prostitutes of Paris, medical devices used for the birth of Napoleon's son and other very interesting topics. But more than that, Susan was one of the most fun people to be around in our groups. She and her husband Ron were always among the most popular of participants. I often compared her to Jack Sigler, who is also sadly departed. Both were great scholars and both had infectious fun personalities and delightful spouses, Ron and Ruth! Indeed, it was common for the six of us to get together often at our various conferences. A graduate of the Institute on the French Revolution and Napoleon at Florida State University, Susan served with distinction at several colleges and universities. Her final position was Provost and Professor of History at Albion College in Michigan, from where she retired in 2014. In 2004 she published a book, *The Age of Napoleon*, and has written and presented numerous academic papers. Susan received numerous recognitions and awards, including the Legion of Merit and the Member of Honor medals from the International Napoleonic Society.

On a more personal note, Susan has been one of my dearest friends for a very long time. She, Ron and I spent many good times together. She always supported my endeavors, and we were planning some joint academic projects for the future. One of our best times together was when they joined Edna and I for a wonderful week at my resort in Cabo san Lucas, Mexico, just two years ago this month. And that same year we had the pleasure of attending their 50th wedding anniversary party in Albion, Michigan, where they lived.

Her passing leaves a sad hole in the lives of all of us who knew and loved her. To say she will be missed is an understatement.

Meanwhile, please enjoy these photos as a way to share one last time the joy of being in her company.

RIP dear friend.

J. David Markham



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2015 - Brussels, Belgium



2016 - Dublin, Ireland



2016 - Dublin, Ireland



2017 - Trier, Germany



2017 - Havana, Cuba



2018 - Williamsburg, USA



2018 - Vienna, Austria



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
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2. Omit publisher's name and "p." or "pp." except where needed for clarity.
3. Use Roman numerals to designate volume number, but use Arabic numerals for journal volumes. (See below)
4. Use abbreviated references in the second and subsequent citations of a work. (If they are in sequence "Ibid." can be used, but not preferred).
5. Do not underline Latin abbreviations.
6. Use "passim" only after inclusive page numbers indicating a reasonable stretch of text or after a reference to a chapter, part, etc.
7. Use "idem" only when several works by the same author are cited within one note.
8. Avoid use of "f." and "ff." and other unusual abbreviations.
9. Do not use "ob.cit." or "loc.cit." Use an abbreviated reference instead (see #4).
10. Use English terms, not French ones, for bibliographic details. i.e. "vol." not "tome."
11. In notes and references do not use "cf." (compare) when you mean, "see." "Cf." is appropriate only when you really mean "compare."
12. Dates should be in format day, month, year. I.e. 16 July 1971.
13. Please note the correct format for the Correspondence of Napoleon and Wellington as well as the archival citations.

A. Published Materials

When citing books, the following are elements you may need to include in your bibliographic citation for your first footnote or endnote and in your bibliography, in this order:

1. Author(s) or editor(s);
2. Title;
3. Compiler, translator or editor (if both an editor and an editor are listed);
4. Edition;
5. Name of series, including volume or number used;
6. Place of publication, publisher and date of publication;
7. Page numbers of citation (for footnote or endnote).

For periodical (magazine, journal, newspaper, etc.) articles, include some or all of the following elements in your first footnote or endnote and in your bibliography, in this order:

1. Author;
2. Article title;
3. Periodical title;
4. Volume or Issue number (or both);
5. Publication date;
6. Page numbers.

For *online periodicals*, add:

7. URL and date of access; or
8. Database name, URL and date of access. (If available, include database publisher and city of publication.)

For websites:

If you need to cite an entire website in your bibliography, include some or all of the following elements, in this order:

1. Author or editor of the website (if known)
2. Title of the website
3. URL
4. Date of access

For an article available in more than one format (print, online, etc.), cite whichever version you used (although the printed version is preferable).

SAMPLES**Books:**

¹Donald D. Horward, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 80.

²Horward, *Twin Sieges*, 180-85 and 249-317.

Multi-volume Books:

¹Ramsay W. Phipps, *The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), I, 141.

²Phipps, *Armies*, I, 141.

Multi-Volume Works in Series:

¹Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, vol. 2 of A History of East Central Europe*, gen. eds., Peter F. Sugar and Donald Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 146.

²Sugar, *Southeastern Europe*, 146.

Articles:

¹Donald D. Horward, "Wellington's Peninsular Strategy, Portugal, and the Lines of Torres Vedras." *Portuguese Studies Review* II (1992-93): 46-59.

²Horward, "Wellington's Peninsular Strategy," 44.

Articles in Books:

¹Giles Gunn, "Interdisciplinary Studies," in *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, ed. Joseph Gibaldi (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1992), 239-61.

²Giles, "Interdisciplinary Studies," 239-61.

Napoleon's Correspondence:

¹Bonaparte to Executive Directory, 8 June 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Plon, 1858-1869), No. 587, I, 461-63.

²Napoleon to Clarke, 19 September 1810, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 16923, XXI, 127.

Wellington's Dispatches:

¹Wellington to Liverpool, 28 March 1810, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington* (London: J. Murray 1838), V, 604-06.

²Wellington to Liverpool, 28 March 1810, *Wellington's Dispatches*, V, 604-06.

B. Archival Sources

Public Records Office:

¹Hookham Frere to Lord Hawkesbury, 1 April 1802, Great Britain, Public Record Office, London, MSS (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office [hereafter FO], Portugal, 63/39.

²Fitzgerald to Lord Hawkesbury, 25 September 1804, PRO, FO, 63/40.

British Library:

¹Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, British Library, London [hereafter BL], Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

²Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, BL, Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

Archives de la guerre:

¹Augereau to Dugommier, 28 germinal an II (17 April 1794), France, Archives de la guerre, Service historique de Défense Château de Vincennes, MSS, [hereafter SHD], Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Registre de correspondance du général Augereau, Carton B4 140.

²Augereau to Schérer, 26 prairial an III (14 June 1795), SHD, Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Carton B4 142.

Archives Nationales:

¹France, Archives Nationales, AF IV, MSS, Carton 1311, dossier 1807, "Tableau des domaines dont Sa Majesté a disposé par décret du 30 juin 1807," Ordre No 4.

²Dom João to Bonaparte, 23 May 1803, Archives Nationales, AF IV, Carton 1689, dossier 2.

Archives Étrangères:

¹Lannes to Talleyrand, 14 November 1801, France, Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, [hereafter Affaires Étrangères], Correspondance politique: Portugal, MSS, vol. 122.

²Souza to Talleyrand, 1 September 1802, Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance politique: Portugal, vol. 123.

Wellington Papers:

¹Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810, Wellington Papers, University of Southampton, [hereafter WP], No. 11304.

²Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810, WP, No. 11304.

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The Grave of Napoleon

Author: Lyman Heath, an American vocalist and composer (1805-1870). The poem has also been put to music as a 'Penny Ballad,' a copy of which is in the US Library of Congress. It has also been referred to as The Grave of Buonaparte and Napoleon's Grave. I have seen it quoted in books as early as 1834. Lyman was from New Hampshire, where he worked as a shoemaker and music teacher at Littleton, among other small towns. He is buried in Nashua, New Hampshire, USA.

