



Napoleonic Scholarship

The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society

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J. David Markham
President

Wayne Hanley
Editor-in-Chief

Illustrations



Front Cover: A yew wood snuffbox with a painting of Napoleon on porcelain, circa 1810-1815. On the verso of the plaque there is a signature: Girard Pinxit. This is a very rare and superb example of the well-listed Parisian female artist, Mme Louise Girard, who was known for her paintings on porcelain. Her work can be seen in the Museum of Bordeaux and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, among other places.



Back Cover: A large bronze clock of mercury gilt bronze and patinated bronze, circa 1815-1820. It is signed 'PONS,' a watchmaker (1773-1851) and is stamped indicating it was sold by Gillion in Paris. The clock is characterized by its imposing sculpture of Napoleon on horseback, modeled somewhat loosely after David's *Napoleon Crossing the Alps*. The clock measures approximately 19x12x6 inches.

Both pieces are from the David Markham Collection.

Article Illustrations: Most images are from the David Markham Collection.



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THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL NAPOLEONIC SOCIETY

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
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International Napoleonic Society Aims and Goals

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- The purpose of the International Napoleonic Society is to promote the study of the Napoleonic Era in accordance with proper academic standards. To this end, the goal of the International Napoleonic Society is to gather the leading minds in this field for the purpose of creating, reviewing, commenting upon, making awards to, and financially supporting Napoleonic Scholarship.
 - The International Napoleonic Society will sponsor periodic International Napoleonic Congresses to give scholars and students the opportunity to meet and share the results of their research and studies. These Congresses will be held throughout the world. To date, Congresses have been held in Italy, Israel, Georgia, France, Poland, Canada, Malta, The Netherlands, Russia, Cuba and Belgium, and have attracted some of the world's foremost Napoleonic Scholars. We may also sponsor and support smaller meetings and/or joint meetings with other scholarly organizations.
 - The International Napoleonic Society will encourage the publication of work of academic merit. To this end we will provide the opportunity for scholarly articles to be published in our journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship*, as well as on our website. We may also support the publication of works of academic merit, as well as the reprinting of important material no longer easily available.
 - It is important that original documents, as well as material available only in languages not commonly read by western scholars, be made available to Napoleonic Scholars. We will therefore encourage and support the translation and/or publication of such materials, including in our journal and on our website.
 - The INS may sponsor lectures, tours, the granting of scholarships, the production of exhibitions and other displays, and other academic and/or cultural activities as deemed appropriate.

Message from the President



It is with great pleasure that we send you the 2016 INS Journal. This is our second journal produced under the excellent leadership of our editor-in-chief, Wayne Hanley. It is also our second digital PDF journal, which allows us to share it easily with worldwide audiences. Finally, it is our second journal produced by our production editor, Edna Markham. While I admit to a certain bias, I think all will agree that she has once again done an outstanding job.

A number of the papers in this issue were presented at our INS International Napoleonic Congress held in Dublin, Ireland, in 2016. That was, largely thanks to the outstanding efforts of Derek Byrne, one of our best congresses ever, with a very high quality of academic papers.

Speaking of our congresses, this year's will be in the beautiful city of Trier, Germany, 10-14 July 2017. Located on the banks of the Mosel River across from Luxemburg, Trier is the oldest city in Germany and is noted for, among many other things, its impressive Roman ruins. Our friend and colleague, Bill Chew, has helped organize the congress. We will have three days of papers and two days of touring under his expert guidance. It is a congress not to be missed! Additional information can be found in this journal and will also be posted on the INS website and emailed to you.

Finally, it is with great sadness that we note the passing of our friend and colleague, Mordechai Gichon of Israel. Mordechai was a great friend for many years, and his charm and wit made any visit a delight. I will personally miss him, and our field is diminished by his absence. Our colleague, Allon Klebanoff, was a very dear friend of Mordechai and is a very dear friend of mine, and his obituary for Mordechai appears later in this journal.



J. David Markham, President

Knight of the Order of the French Academic Palms

Message from the Editor-in-Chief.



I am pleased to present the new volume of *Napoleonic Scholarship* and its wide-ranging articles on the Napoleonic era:

The first two articles offer insights to Napoleonic governance in Italy. In her article, Adeline Beaurepaire-Hernandez examines French imperial efforts to court and control Italian elites, while Doina Pasca Harsanyi explores Napoleon's attempts to raise and maintain military units in northern and central Italy. The next four articles are based on presentations made at the 13th INS Congress in Brussels (2015). In the first of these, Alasdair White examines the cultural importance of the Duchess of Richmond's Ball (and courtship rituals) on the eve of the battle of Waterloo, and in her article, "Dancing into Battle and Not Out Again," Susan P. Conner reveals the often overlooked role that women played in both the French and Allied armies at Waterloo (and it was not only dancing at the Ball). Next, William L. Chew provides a glimpse of how an American diplomat (future-president John Quincy Adams) occupied his time in the cultural capital of Europe during the Hundred Days. And in the last of this quartet of papers, Zachary M. Stoltzfus demonstrates the importance of Napoleon's various libraries, especially his mobile libraries which accompanied him on campaign.

The next two articles examine the role of the press in the Napoleonic (and post-Napoleonic) era. Richard Siegler analyzes how the future emperor used *Le Moniteur* to prepare the French public for the return of monarchy, and in her article, Suzanna Caley traces the legacy of and fascination with Napoleon in the American press. Next, Sam A. Mustafa explores the impact of Napoleon's economic exploitation (plundering) of the Kingdom of Westphalia, and Nika Khoperia shows the military contribution of Georgians who both fought for and against France. Eugene Chalvardjian's contribution to this edition of *Napoleonic Scholarship* revisits the legacy of Napoleonic warfare in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini. Rounding out this edition are two papers presented at the 14th INS Congress in Dublin (2016). In the first, Maureen MacLeod offers insights to the role of the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur at Écouen, the first secular educational institution for girls in France. And rounding out this volume, J. David Markham discusses Napoleon's would-be Irish physician on St. Helena, Dr. James Verling.

It is my hope that you will find these articles as enjoyable and informative as I have.

Wayne Stanley, Editor-in-Chief

INS Congresses

The International Napoleonic Society hosts academic International Napoleonic Congresses around the world. These congresses attract scholars and students from a wide range of backgrounds, giving them the opportunity to meet and share the results of their research. Here are Congresses we have hosted in the past as well as those planned for the near future:

Upcoming Congress

Napoleon and Germany

Trier, Germany

July 10-14, 2017

Future Congress

Oslo, Norway

July, 2018

Past Congresses

Shades of 1916: Ireland in Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe

Dublin, Ireland

In cooperation with the Government of Ireland, Trinity College Dublin and The Napoleon Society of Ireland

11-16 July 2016

Endings and Beginnings: The World in 1815

Brussels, Belgium

In cooperation with Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 6-10 July 2015

Napoleon and Revolutions Around the World

Havana, Cuba

In association with *La Muséo Napoleónico* and the *Office of the Historian of the City of Havana* 7-11 July 2014

Old World, New World: Momentous Events of 1812–1814

Toronto, Ontario, Canada 29 July–2 August 2013

Napoleon's 1812 Russian Campaign in World History: A Retrospective View

In cooperation with the Institute of World History (Russian Academy of Science)

Russian State University for the Humanities, Association Dialogue Franco-Russe

State Borodino War and History Museum and Reserve

Moscow, Russian Federation 9-13 July 2012

Napoleonic Europe at its Peak

In cooperation with the Foundation Top of Holland (City marketing Den Helder),

The City of Den Helder, The Royal Netherlands Navy and Fort Kijkduin

Den Helder, The Netherlands 4–8 July 2011

Napoleon and the Transition to the Modern World

San Anton, Malta, 12–16 July 2010

Napoleon, Europe and the World

In cooperation with the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts

Montréal, Québec, Canada 8–12 June 2009

Napoleon and the Mediterranean

In cooperation with the City of Ajaccio, the General Council of Southern Corsica, and
the Territorial Collective of Corsica

Ajaccio, Corsica, France 7–11 July 2008

Napoleon and Poland 1807 – 2007

In cooperation with the

Slupsk Pedagogical Academy and the Polish Historical Society

Slupsk, Poland 1–5 July 2007

Imperial Glory: Austerlitz and Europe in 1805

In cooperation with the city of Dinard, France

Dinard, France 9–16 July 2005

Napoleon's Campaigns and Heritage

In cooperation with the Napoleonic Society of Georgia

Tbilisi, Georgia 12–18 June 2000

Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1799 – 1801

In cooperation with the Israeli Society for Napoleonic Research

Tel Aviv – Yafo – Jerusalem – Acco 4–10 July 1999

Europe Discovers Napoleon: 1793 – 1804

Cittadella of Alessandria Italy 21–26 June 1997

List of Contributors

Adeline Beaupaire-Hernandez is the author or co-author of two books and numerous articles on the Napoleonic era. Her doctoral thesis at the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne (“Élites et notabilités dans les départements méditerranéens sous le consulat et l'empire”) is the elites and notables of Southern France during the Napoleonic era.

Doina Pasca Harsanyi has also authored two books and a dozen articles, not only on the Napoleonic era, but also on literature and the history of food. She holds a doctorate from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is a professor of history at Central Michigan University.

Alasdair White is a management consultant, journalist and university lecturer, specializing in performance management, managing people and leadership. He is the author of a half dozen books on management and Napoleonic history (especially Waterloo) and is a Fellow of the International Napoleonic Society.

Susan P. Conner is *professor emerita* of history and former-provost and vice president for academic affairs at Albion College in Albion Michigan. She holds a doctorate in history from Florida State University. A specialist in 18th- and 19th-century French history, she has done extensive research on gender roles and the social and political status of women in 18th- and 19th-century Europe. Conner is the author of *The Age of Napoleon (2004)* and has authored numerous book chapters and peer-reviewed articles.

William L. Chew III is professor of history and associate dean at the Vesalius College in Brussels (Belgium). He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Universität Tübingen and has focused his research on imagological studies of French and American perceptions of each other in cultural and historical sources. He has authored or co-authored six books and numerous articles on a host of topics from history to travel literature and education.

Zachary M. Stoltzfus is a doctoral candidate in history at Florida State University with a focus in Modern European History and the Napoleonic Era. He earned a Masters in European Studies from the Katholieke Universiteit (Leuven, Belgium) and completed his BA in history at Millersville University (Pennsylvania). His primary interest is in the ongoing political changes in Europe during and after the Napoleonic Era, and he has presented papers at several academic conferences, including the 2015 INS Congress in Brussels.

Richard Siegler is a doctoral candidate in history at Florida State University with a focus in the Napoleonic Era. He has presented papers at several academic conferences, including at the annual conference of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850. His article is based on a paper delivered at a recent meeting of the CRE.

Suzanna Calev recently graduated from Simmons College with a dual Masters in History and Library Science with a concentration in Archives Management. Her MA thesis (on which her current article is based) is on the American fascination with Napoleon during the early republic and the era of the War of 1812.

Sam A. Mustafa is a professor of history at Ramapo College of New Jersey and holds a doctorate in history from the University of Tennessee. The author of four books and multiple articles, he specializes in German history and the Napoleonic era. The current article is based on a paper given at a recent meeting of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850.

Nika Khoperia is a native of Georgia and a graduate student specializing in Medieval Studies and military history at Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia). He has co-authored (with Alexander Mikaberidze) several works on Georgians in the Napoleonic Era.

Eugene Chalvardjian holds a doctorate in history from the University of Montreal. He specialized in military history and has taught a course in contemporary European history at the University of Montreal. This article is and except from thesis, *Impact de l'art de la guerre napoléonien dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle* (2012).

Maureen MacLeod is an assistant professor of history at Mercy College (New York) and completed her doctorate in history at Florida State University with a dissertation entitled "A Society in Flux: Female Education and Societal Transition in Early Nineteenth Century France, 1799-1830." A version of her current article was presented at the 2016 INS Congress in Dublin.

J. David Markham is president of the International Napoleonic Society and Knight of the Order of the French Academic Palms. Among his numerous publications on Napoleonic history are *Imperial Glory: Bulletins of Napoleon's Grande Armée 1805-1814* (Greenhill, 2003), *Napoleon's Road to Glory: Triumphs, Defeats and Immortality* (Brassey's, 2003), *Napoleon for Dummies* (Wiley, 2005), *Napoleon and Dr. Verling on St. Helena* (Pen and Sword, 2005), and *The Road to St. Helena: Napoleon After Waterloo* (Pen & Sword Military, 2008). He has also written numerous articles, appeared on a number of TV documentaries, and co-hosted the podcast, Napoleon 101. A version of his article was presented at the 2016 INS Congress in Dublin.

Italian Notables and Political Constraints under the First Empire

by Adeline Beaurepaire-Hernandez

On 4 June 1805 (15 Prairial Year XIII), Napoleon received a delegation of senators requesting the annexation of the Ligurian Republic to the French Empire and wrote down in his correspondence: “I received this morning the deputation of the Senate of Genoa. From this particular moment Genoa is ruined.”¹ On 9 October 1796 (18 Vendémiaire Year V), the Aristocratic Republic of Genoa concluded an agreement with the Directory. According to this document Genoa lost its independence in the sphere of financial and military affairs. On 27 May 1797 (8 Prairial Year V), due to the unrest of Genoa’s population against the French, Bonaparte was furious and threatened its government:

If after the expiration of twenty-four hours from the receipt of this letter ... you do not disarm the populace—who will be the first to turn against you once they have understood the terrible consequences of having strayed because of you—the Minister of the French Republic will leave Genoa and aristocracy will have existed. Not only will the heads of the senators assure me of the security of all the French staying in Genoa,

¹ Napoléon to Decrès, letter 10203 in Napoléon Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale: Boulogne, Trafalgar, Austerlitz, 1805*, vol. 5 (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 377.

but I also expect that all of the states of the Republic provide me a guarantee of French property.²

In reality, Bonaparte had already thought to change the Genoese government: He needed an agreeable and compliant government. In order to reach an agreement the Genoa government sent him a deputation of three of its members to Mombello. Having signed a convention on 5 June 1797 (17 Prairial Year V) the Aristocratic Republic of Genoa became the Ligurian Democratic Republic, modeled on the Year III Constitution. A provisional government was set up on 14 June 1797 (26 Prairial Year V), composed of 22 members chosen by Bonaparte for their “wisdom and moderation”: “Your Serenity [Doge] will find below a list of the people who, in accordance with our agreement, I thought proper to choose as most likely to form the provisional government.”³

² Napoléon to Brignole, Doge of Genoa Republic, letter 1589 to in Napoléon Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale: Les Apprentissages, 1784-1797*, vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 965. “Ici tu mets le é mais tu écris partout ailleurs "Napoleon" sans le é. Pourquoi?: j'ai mis les références des livres avec l'accent mais dans le corps du texte comme c'est de l'anglais je ne les ai pas mis.”

³ Napoléon to Brignole, Doge of Genoa Republic, letter 1642 in Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale*, 1: 989.

The Ligurian Republic henceforth became a satellite state of France. Other examples demonstrate the opposition to the changes orchestrated by the French government. On 18 December 1799, the First Consul wrote to Talleyrand:

A provisional government has just been established in Genoa ... [and] it includes nine people who seem to be appropriate. It is essential ... to know our membership ... It is necessary that this response be framed in such a manner so as to give us the freedom to incorporate the Ligurian Republic to France within a few months.⁴

Giovanni Assereto pointed out that in Liguria “the democratic regime was a kind of imported merchandise” dictated by Bonaparte at any point.⁵ All these events prompted the Ligurian Democratic Republic to seek to be incorporated into the French Empire. The organizing decree was promulgated on 6 June 1805 (17 Prairial Year XIII). It divided the *ci-devant* Republic into three departments, from West to East: Montenotte, Genoa and the Apennines. The transposition of the French administrative model took place under the control of Champagny, a

⁴ Napoléon to Talleyrand, letter 4794 in Napoléon Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale, La Campagne d’Égypte et L’avènement, 1798-1799*, vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 2005).

⁵ In letter 2214 of the 11 November 1797 (21 Brumaire Year VI) Bonaparte wrote numerous instructions for the territory’s administration and Constitution’s amendment. Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale*, vol. 1: 1278-81.

Minister of the Interior and Archtreasurer Lebrun. Although the transposition of the French administrative model to Ligurian territory seemed to be well controlled, Napoleon wanted this issue to be handled delicately: “M. Archtreasurer is doing his best here. He is the most suitable person for the government of this country.... He possesses all the necessary qualities to be in charge in Genoa.”⁶

This example illustrates how Bonaparte imposed political constraints on the first territory beyond the Hexagon, which finally, under the pressure of events, was incorporated into France. Drawing from administrative and private sources, I propose in the following essay to analyze the various forms of coercion that the French Empire exercised on citizens residing in the Italian peninsula. My primary goal is to identify the reactions of local notables, with a particular focus on the different forms of opposition they erected to Bonaparte’s imposed form of government. We will examine this dynamic of imposition and resistance between French authorities and the Italian populace in two specific arenas: political pressure applied on the Italian administration and social coercion applied on ordinary people.

⁶ Napoleon to Cambacérès, 1 July 1805 (12 Messidor Year XIII), letter 10366 in Bonaparte, *Correspondance Générale*, Vol 5.

Knowledge of Italian Notables Postures and Pressure of Regime.

The Empire was in need of men who approved of the French regime, requiring their influence and their capacity to make their citizens to accept a new system. In order to better understand the attitude of the Italian elite towards the new power, the Empire created an impressive set of surveys that evaluated each potential candidate to a government post on both moral and personal grounds; French administrators complemented these raw statistics with qualitative comments and personal remarks. The candidates were evaluated with terms such as “zealous,” “attached to the government,” but also “ordinary talent” and “useless, not respected.” Using these tables and reports on the notable’s abilities, administrators wanted to influence notables and make them accept the regime.

At the same time it should be notes that the French government strove to preserve continuity and political stability in the region whenever possible by promoting the old elites. Thus, in the department of

Montenotte, former western part of the Republic of Genoa, authorities

“used such leverage as placing in the elites and in the various regiments children of powerful families who had shown opposition to engage and link them by their efforts; ... we place confidence only in the friends of the French party, we protected them and our strategy seems to have had a salutary effect....⁷



We can consider that in this case the distribution of posts was a mechanism to create clients of the French government. The regime’s hope was to replace a previous system of local patronage that was linked to honors and political favors to one that could serve as the basis of political stability and that was anchored in the adhesion and acceptance of a new political system.

The patronage of the members who participated in the Empire’s offices took the form of political coercion. This can be clearly seen in two case studies, that of

⁷ Archives Nationales (A.N.) (Paris): F⁷ 3682¹⁷.

François Tonduti de l'Escarène in Tuscany and the interaction between the Empire and the older Roman patrician families. François Tonduti de l'Escarène was an Italian notable from Nice and married to Flore de Théas, a descendant of an Old Regime noble family. On 12 May 1808, Tonduti de l'Escarène was appointed by imperial decree as Secretary General of the Department of the Mediterranean in Livorno (Tuscany had been divided three months earlier into three departments).⁸ This nomination was a result of the recommendation of Baron Capelle, former General Secretary of the Alpes-Maritimes, who was appointed to the Consular Administration after his amnesty and was, himself a new prefect of the Mediterranean Department.⁹ Tonduti de l'Escarène's private correspondence shows that despite the fact that he participated in the imperial administration, he was quite anxiety-ridden by a new promotion that would be seen by other notables as a sign of the Emperor's favor.

⁸ Départements of Arno, Mediterranean and Ombrone.

⁹ A.N. (Paris): F¹bI 174^o.

In a letter to his brother-in-law in early June 1808, Tonduti de l'Escarène explains the dilemma of his recent promotion:

... On the one hand [I have] six thousand francs, a pleasant stay in a land where people are the sweetest in the world, a hope of advancing my career ... and finally having removed from my reputation the stain of a former noble and *émigré* during the Revolution ... On the other hand [this position also brings] disturbance, displacement, neglect of my personal affairs ... [and] living apart from all of my friends and family.¹⁰

He recognizes that because of his recent appointment, "I'll be cleared of all my political sins [but] if I were to have refused my career would be over for the rest of my life... Nowadays we are assured that it is quite unusual to refuse a favor of the Emperor. All this embarrasses me a lot and you will believe without difficulty that my anxiety is extreme."¹¹

¹⁰ Antoine de Tonduti de l'Escarène to his brother-in-law Jean-Baptiste de Théas, 6 June 1808, letter, Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes (A.D.A.M.) (Nice): 025 J 0275,

¹¹ Antoine de Tonduti de l'Escarène to his brother-in-law Jean-Baptiste de Théas, 6 June



This private letter reveals the principal mechanisms and constraints imperial clientelism created. We have here an example of a patron-client relationship which strongly distresses Tonduti de l'Escarène who decided to accept this relationship against his will. Capelle was a superior of Tonduti both in Nice and Livorno, and thanks to his support, l'Escarène proceeded to his new functions in the administration and as a result he stopped being considered a political suspect. But this process did not work mechanically. Tonduti de l'Escarène preferred to remain in a lower position in his hometown of Nice, rather than being promoted to another department. He knew perfectly well that the letter of “friendship” written by Capelle was just for his employment acceptance, so political pressure was a crucial element. As his letter shows, he felt implicit pressure to accept because of his former status as an aristocrat and *émigré*, and he feared that not accepting would result in him becoming a suspect in the eyes of the regime. For these reasons, Tonduti de l'Escarène went to Livorno from 1808 to the end of 1813.

The second illustrative example of how imperial pressure impacted local elites can be found within the regime's pressure on Roman patrician families. In 1809, following a request from the Emperor,

1808, letter, Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes (A.D.A.M.) (Nice): 025 J 0275.

Joachim Murat obliged the Roman “*Consulte Extraordinaire*” to send to Paris members of Roman families who had been opposed to a new regime. The Emperor hoped that, upon meeting him and after their arrival in the first city of the Empire, the patrician families would understand both what an honor it was to be distinguished by the Emperor and the very important advantages loyalty to France would provide. A deputation of eight members was sent to Paris: The princes Spada, Gabrielli, Torlonia and Bracciano, the Duke of Braschi (the nephew of Pius VI), the previous Pope, the Duke of Nemi, the Earls Mariscotti and Falconieri, along with the knights Palombi, and Travaglini of Spoleto.¹²

In the Roman archives there is a revealing report dated 16 June 1810 that explains the reasoning for the great expense of this delegation. Penned by a certain de Gérando—a member of the *Consulte extraordinaire*—the 180,000 franc cost for this trip is justified in the following manner:

... The expenditure will appear undoubtedly excessive. But the regulations were connected to delicate considerations, [and] these deputies [were] from the most distinguished men of the Roman States [who] gave a useful example to public opinion in a decisive moment, really served to their

¹² A.N. (Paris): F¹cIII Rome¹

country showing their zeal to be worthy representatives of their fellow citizens....¹³

Despite the fact that this delegation spent more than triple the sum that French authorities had initially allocated, the Duke of Braschi ensured the Consulte that the Emperor, as well as the Minister of Finance, had given the order to reimburse those expenses, but since the former did not clearly communicate his wishes, De Gérando proposed that the Consulte solicit new instructions from the Minister. In this episode, the members of the Roman delegation did not enter into open opposition with the Empire and its representatives, but they put clearly embarrassed them, voluntarily or not it is difficult to say. In the end, the Duke of Braschi rallied to the French regime, was appointed Grand Cross of The Order of the Reunion, and became mayor of Rome, a nomination he held until 1814.

The Problem of “Obligatory Sociability”

The Empire created multiple spaces for socialization, be they institutionalized like academies or more informal settings like theatres and balls. These forms of social life affected both women and men. But women faced particular constraints from the regime which were linked to the socio-professional status of their spouses. Wives had to fulfill a duty of representation even if it was not always pleasant. Flore de

¹³ Archivio di Stato di Roma: Miscellena Governo Francese Cl.

Théas, the wife of Tonduti de l’Escarène examined above wrote to her grandmother: “I will have more troubles, because they made me fear that due to my husband’s status we’ll be visited by some distinguished people of the city and among them there are many Jews; ... ”¹⁴ and that he must “return again to dine with the prefect who made us very forcefully to do that, I must admit that this is not an amusement for me....”¹⁵

These episodes of social life and these social places are not an attribute of “national” events, but? they are also important in the local sphere to lead the life of society. Thus, in the department of Genoa, where persistent tensions between representatives of the old and new elites existed, the prefect tried to get them together in order to reach an agreement. The role of women was quite important. During her stay in Genoa, Flore de Théas recounted her visit to “ ... Madame de la Tourelle’s society, the prefect’s of Genoa wife, who lived in the former palace of the Doges, ... when we came there we could see very few people, especially the Genoese went there instigated by politics and not in a large number....”¹⁶ This idea finds echo in Friedericke Brun’s *Letters from Rome*: “Be it also stated to the credit of the Roman women that only those were present who could hardly absent

¹⁴ Flore de Théas to her grandmother, 17 July 1808, letter, A.D.A.M. (Nice): 025 J 0285, Livorno.

¹⁵ Flore de Théas to her grandmother, 17 July 1808, letter, A.D.A.M. (Nice): 025 J 0285, Livorno.

¹⁶ Flore de Théas to her grandmother, 17 July 1808, letter, A.D.A.M. (Nice): 025 J 0285, Livorno.

themselves because of their connections and their husbands.”¹⁷ This example gives us an idea of the social role of a woman. More or less directly, she had to consolidate the position of her husband. By the various circles of sociability that she maintained, the wife of a public man confirmed the place of her husband in the social order and represented him without going beyond some social norms.

This sociability seen as a constraint was not unknown to French administrators. The Prefect of Genoa had experience with the Maternal Charity Society.¹⁸ Founded in 1788 by Marie-Antoinette, the institution disappeared in 1794 before resurfacing in 1801. Bonaparte tolerated it and finally supported

it officially with his 5 May 1810 decree. The Maternal Charity Society was then chaired by Empress Marie-Louise and provided with 500,000 francs. Women had complete oversight of this organization, and they decided on the allocation and sending of relief funds to women (typically mothers of poor families who were married or widowed).



JAS BACHASSON MONTALIVET
(COMTE)

*Pair de France, Ancien Ministre de l'Intérieur
Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur
Chevalier de l'Ordre Royal de l'Éléphant de Danemarck
Né le 5 Juillet 1766 à Sarraguenne, Dep^t de la Moselle.
A Paris, chez, Citoyen, Rue des Francs-Bourgeois, N^o 5, F. S. G.
Dessiné.*

The Minister of the Interior, Montalivet, followed attentively the development of this institution in the departments. From the vantage point of those in power, the participation of the affluent in this organization combined with the common subsidy to help the poorest individuals, seems to attest to the adherence to the political wishes of the

Emperor. “A society that SMI deigned to preside to offer to the most laudable ambitions the ways to be distinguished that you have to leave unknown to your citizens. Invest yourselves in your relationship with the wealthier classes and make them feel that this is a good opportunity for them.”¹⁹ Despite pressure from the Minister on the prefect and

¹⁷Translation: http://sophie.byu.edu/sites/default/files/editor_uploadsfile/texts/English%20Trans.%20Brief%20aus%20Rom/letters-from-rome-set-1.pdf p.9 (Accessed on 27 July 2015).

¹⁸ On the Maternal Charity Society, see Christine Adams, *Poverty, Charity, and Motherhood: Maternal Societies in Nineteenth-century France* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010); and Gabriel Vauthier, “La société maternelle sous l’Empire,” *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, 6 (1914), 70–83; and on philanthropy Catherine Duprat, *Usage et pratiques de la philanthropie. Pauvreté, action sociale et lien social, à Paris, au cours du premier XIXe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris: Histoire de la Sécurité Sociale, 1996).

¹⁹ Letter, 28 June 1810, Archivio di Stato di Genova: Prefettura Francese 73.

consequently from the prefect on his citizens, the Italian notables did not wish to enroll in a charitable society framed by the Empire. Indeed, on 4 August 1810, just before the end of the subscription period for the Maternal Society, seventeen ladies were members from the entire department and eight only subscribed for the suggested 500 francs/year subscription.

Unlike the Italians, French notables understood through the participation of their women that they could be distinguished in the eyes of the imperial administration. Faced with their zeal, the prefect used French women to advance his cause with the Genoese ladies, but as revealed by Henriette de Reboul, it was without success: “Mr. Prefect, ... I made several visits to all the ladies who appeared to me in a position to enter in the maternal society. I talked to them and made them talk to their husbands. They all told me that they were mothers of families so their children had to have all their attention and all their wealth.”²⁰ The lack of enthusiasm forced the prefect to postpone meetings of women who were members even a year after the establishment of the subscriptions. By the end of 1811, the state of the Maternal Society of Genoa had not yet evolved: over half of the women did not participate, although they all had the possibility to do so.²¹ He sent a personal invitation to

²⁰ Letter, 18 December 1811, Archivio di Stato di Genova: Prefettura Francese 73.

²¹ Inventory of 15 December 1811.

twelve of them who lived in the city of Genoa, in the hope that they would attend a meeting of this society.²² But even after this appeal, only three additional ladies donated to the Society and another four excused themselves for not attending a meeting for an unspecified “slight indisposition.” Obviously the prefect was not fooled, and the sub-prefect of Genoa wrote in one of his letters the real reasons for this lack of enthusiasm for a charitable society: “[M]y entreaties remained unsuccessful throughout most of my district [because of] the current circumstances, the stagnation of trade, the damage the moving column has made, [and] the ever increasing price of wheat.”²³

We have seen the particular forms of political constraint that surrounded Italian notables under the First Empire. The French tried to quell opposition and convince Italians to accept the French system by using such methods as distributing titles, nominations and decorations like the Legion of Honor or the Order of the Reunion. In fact, the Order of the Reunion—created on 18 October 1811—is, a perfect example of the symbolic instruments of this policy.²⁴ The Emperor realized that the Legion of Honor was plethora. Then the Order of the Reunion was reserved for subjects from the attached departments (the Netherlands, Hanseatic cities, Piedmont,

²² 12 December 1811.

²³ Letter, 31 December 1811.

²⁴ Jean-Luc Stalins, *Ordre Impérial de La Réunion* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1958).

Genoa, Tuscany and Rome) that distinguished themselves in the exercise of judicial, administrative or military service. In a letter to Cambacérès on 12 August 1811, Napoleon explained his intentions: “One might say, in the preamble, that the services rendered to the former sovereigns are rewarded as a service to ourselves, which will result in the old families being convinced that they exercised the rights of this order, something that is political and adequate.”²⁵ Women were also the subject of these constraints. This obligation was felt by a need to represent rank and the station of her husband. Social issues and career, however, should never require one to forget the essential distractions related to social life, where it is impossible to calculate everything.

²⁵ Napoléon to Cambacérès, 12 August 1811, letter 18022 in Napoléon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* (Imprimerie Impériale, 1867).

Between Glory and Good Sense: Resistance to Conscription and the National Guard Experience in the States of Parma, 1805-06

by Doina Pasca Harsanyi

The Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, commonly referred to as the States of Parma, had a peculiar trajectory during the French-dominated period (1796-1815). Three Bourbon family pacts placed the duchies under joint French-Spanish custody and a Bourbon dynasty ruled Parma since 1748 when Philip, the son of Spain's king Philip V, became Duke of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. His marriage with Louis XV's daughter Louise Elisabeth consolidated the Spanish-French agreement over Parma which lasted until the beginning of the French Revolution when Spain became the default sole guardian of the duchies. In 1796, as he was leading the Army of Italy in the Piedmont and Lombardy, Bonaparte counted on the neutrality of the Spanish Bourbons to clear his way through Northern Italy. Consequently, he refrained from occupying the duchies, which remained untouched by the revolutionizing whirlwind that was rapidly changing their neighbors in the region. Instead, a peace treaty signed in Paris in September 1796 left Duke Ferdinand on the throne, while the French army was granted free passage and the right to requisition supplies throughout the Parmense territory. As First Consul, Napoleon continued to rely on Spain's neutrality and left Parma out of the administrative schemes that followed the second invasion of Italy. By the Treaty of

Aranjuez (1801) the duchies were formally ceded to France in exchange for a large part of Tuscany, renamed Kingdom of Etruria.¹ Duke Ferdinand was allowed to remain in Parma. His unexpected death in 1802 gave Napoleon the opportunity to bring the duchies closer to the French administrative web, although their status remained undecided. Moreau de Saint-Méry, nominated Administrator General with full powers upon the duke's death, was supposed to act as a prefect although he had neither the title nor the formal prerogatives of a prefect. With this nomination, Napoleon put the duchies out of his mind, or so it seemed to Moreau de Saint-Méry who governed unhindered for four years, until the summer of 1805 when the emperor spent 24 hours in Parma.

The short visit to Parma, a week after his coronation, left a bad impression: Napoleon found that the duchies were not contributing to the empire's coffers as he thought they ought to.² This conclusion prompted frequent subsequent working

¹ To compensate for the loss of sovereignty, duke Ferdinand's son became king of Etruria under the name Louis I. In 1807, however, when Spain's neutrality ceased to be of any use to Napoleon's designs, the Kingdom of Etruria was dissolved and reorganized as three departments of the French Empire.

² A detailed account of this 24 hours visit in Mario Zannoni, *Napoleone Bonaparte a Parma nel 1805* (Parma: MUP Editore, 2006).

visits from financial inspectors who checked the administration's books and made sure its financial obligations were met. The pretense of autonomy evaporated in July 1805, when the duchies, henceforth referred to as the States of Parma and Piacenza, were included within the jurisdiction of the 28th Military Division, head-quartered in Genoa under the command of General Louis Antoine Choin de Montchoisy.³ Further up, the chain of command included General Jacques-François de Menou, commander of the Transalpine departments, *Architrésorier de l'Empire*

³ Imperial Decree issued on 2 Thermidor, an 13 (21 July 1805) at Saint Cloud. The decree also lists the financial contributions Parma was supposed to raise and clarifies that the general administrator has the same functions as a prefect in France. *Décret Impérial sur l'Organisation des Etats de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla*. No. 876 in *Recueils des Lois et Décrets*, 4^{ème} série, no. 53 (Nancy: Vigneulle, an XIII /1805/): 419-27. This was a de facto annexation; the juridical annexation will occur in 1808. In several letters to Talleyrand, Viceroy Eugène and Maréchal Berthier Napoleon hesitated between maintaining some form of autonomy for the States of Parma and annexing the territories to the empire. The insurrection made him decide to put the states under a temporary military regime under the General Junot (*Notes pour le ministre de la Guerre. Paris 5 Février 1806*, in *Correspondance de Napoléon 1er. Publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Henir Plon 1858). Vol. 12, p. 9 #9754. Uncertainty over the status of Parma-Piacenza accounted at least partially for Moreau's inability to establish a coherent chain of command. In the only monograph on Parma under Napoleon, Leny Montagna underscored the confusion and endless possibilities for procrastination such uncertainty produced at all levels of the administration. Leny Montagna, *Il dominio francese a Parma (1796-1814)* (Piacenza: Stab. Arti Grafiche G. Gavari di D. Forono, 1906), 35-49.

Charles François Lebrun, Governor of Liguria, and finally Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy as of Napoleon's coronation as King of Italy on May 26, 1805. Inclusion in the Military Division came shortly after the imperial decree of 8 Prairial, an 13 (28 May 1805) which ordered the formation of a company of gendarmerie under the command of Captain Lanault. The company was identical with those in the interior of the empire, with brigades distributed throughout the territory (each important commune had to accommodate at least one brigade of 6 men).⁴

These important changes indicated that Napoleon had decided to integrate the territory in the French state beyond the expectation of financial contributions, without formally changing Parma's status—it remained a nominally autonomous state under heavy French control, but still not integrated into the French administrative web. The presence of the gendarmes foreshadowed military recruiting, considering that gendarmes were primarily tasked with preventing desertions, arresting fugitives, and securing the smooth functioning of the

⁴ Archivio di Stato di Parma, *Carte varie amministrazione militare 1804-1816*, Busta 67. The decree reads: Milan Palace, 8 Prairial year 13 (28 May 1805)

“Napoleon, following the report of the minister of war, decrees: A company of imperial gendarmerie will be established in the States of Parma, Piacenza and Guastall—salaried and administered in the same way as the companies of gendarmerie established in the interior of the empire.”

conscription process. Indeed, as soon as the company was organized in Parma, the Imperial Decree of 27 Prairial (16 June 1805) stipulated that starting with the year XIV, conscription laws were to take effect there like in any department of the empire: The States of Parma (population about 300,000 in 1805) were to contribute 100 men in 1806, to be enlisted in the battalion of *Tirailleurs du Po*. Shortly, the numbers were revised upwards to 200 (Imperial Decree of 8 Fructidor, an 13 (14 August 1805), for a total participation of about 1,000 by 1809.⁵ Administrator General Moreau de Saint-Méry was responsible for meeting these targets, with the aid of the newly formed company of gendarmerie.

The two hundred recruits were expected to join the French army sometime in 1806. In the nearer future, Parma and Piacenza were assigned behind the front duties such as safe passage of troops, readily available hospitals and recovery centers, well organized lines of supply for food-stuffs, horses, and especially mules. The latter, essential for household the economy in mountain regions, turned out to be the one

⁵ Details in Francesco Frasca, 'Parma' in *Reclutamento e Guerra in Italia Napolenica*. Prefazione André Corvisier. Introduzione Gabriele de Rosa (Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1993), 90-97. The decree was published in Parma in French the same day: "*À compter de l'an 14 le Duché de Parme sera soumis aux loix de la conscription militaire comme les departemens de la France. Le contingent est fixé à 100 hommes*". Archivio Comunale Parma *Gridario*, 27 Pratile anno XIII (16 June 1805).

hurdle too many and shortly fueled the fires of rebellion as discussed later. For the better part of 1805 the various fiscal impositions and steady administrative reorganization failed to stir any notable opposition. Passive resistance in the form of avoiding taxation was probably the most widespread response: The *Gridario* for 1805 lists several stern reminders from Parma and Piacenza's governors that taxes must be collected hence citizens must pay their assigned contribution. Conscription, the main source of public discontent throughout French dominated territories, was not set to begin before 1806; in terms of public order, the administration was more concerned with deserters crossing into Parma from the Kingdom of Italy than with potential domestic rebels. This relative calm came to an end in November 1805 when Prince Eugène demanded, almost casually, that the States of Parma contribute 12,000 men, recruited from the ranks of the local militia, to the reserve camp in he was organizing in Bologna. The effort to build two regiments of National Guards awoke an apparently placid country, to the dismay of French and Parmense authorities alike. A brief overview of the police structure in the states of Parma will help explain why this was the case.

Old and New Police

On account of the duchies' peculiar status, Parma's law and order system remained outside the reorganization process at work throughout the kingdom of Italy. Upon his

nomination Moreau found a tangled web of traditional practices that he did his best to ignore so long that domestic peace was not disturbed. After the events that shook the duchies and cost Moreau his job, it fell to Eugène Nardon, nominated prefect in May 1806, to untangle the complicated layers of local policing. Nardon's report to his immediate superior, Governor General Maréchal Pérignon, is a remarkable synopsis, the result of six months of assiduous investigation.⁶ Nardon identified two main branches that continued to operate under Moreau's administration just as they had operated under the Bourbon dukes: A Military Department (*Département militaire*) headed by a Lieutenant General responsible for the security of the towns and the country side, including the supervision of foreigners, the strict observance of curfews, and the arrest of vagabonds, subsequently turned over to the Supreme Council of Justice in Parma. The Lieutenant General had under his orders the militias, the *Corpi delle Milizie Urbane e Foresi dei Ducati di Parma, Piacenza, e Guastalla*, consisting of the vast majority of able bodied male citizens, called to duty when needed in their local communities, for a period of 25 years starting with their 18th birthday. Typically, serving in the militia was not supposed to interfere with an individual's normal occupations. Since the Farnese era, these formations were organized in two companies (*Fucilieri e Canonieri*) for each

⁶ Rapport Général sur la Police secrète des Etats de Parme et Plaisance, Parme, Premier décembre 1806. ANP F/1^e/87.

main city (Parma and Piacenza) with a command structure comprising a captain, a lieutenant, and under-lieutenant each. The country-side was divided in 10 *terzi*, each headed by a colonel. The militia colonels and lieutenant-colonels were supported equally by the state and by the local communities; all men above 14 were responsible for owning a firearm and were supposed to report for duty when called by the colonel of their *terzo*. For rank and file members, service was voluntary, on a rotation basis, always uncompensated (although paying for replacements was acceptable)—and not an overbearing one, considering that no complaints were registered until 1805.⁷

The second branch, described by Nardon as the Criminal Department (*Département Criminel*)—essentially the institution of the *sbirri*, of sinister reputation—performed more sustained, semi-professional police service. The *sbirri* were tasked with enforcing the penalties handed down by the Lieutenant General and the Supreme Council of Justice, carrying on arrests and even executions, and generally sniffing around public places in order to intimidate and arrest potential anti-government trouble-makers. This kind of

⁷ For details see See Ettore Carrà, *L'Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico*. (Piacenza 1806-1814. Piacenza: Tip.Le.Co, 2005), 91-107 and Mario Zanoni e Massimo Fiorentino, *L'esercito farnesiano dal 1694 al 1731* (Parma: Palatina editrice, 1981), 119. Pietro Cavagnari explains the system of *milices payantes* in his *Exposé rapide sur la position actuelle de la ville et Etat de Plaisance* (14 Juin 1805): each male citizen over 14 owning a gun at home can serve in the militia. ANP F/ 1^e/ 85

police, concluded Nardon, could not be anything but “vicious, meaning abandoned in the hands of a class of individuals poorly paid, disrespectful and bereft of good character; [this police] could not but spark off a great number of abuses, so it was known to all that it had become a place where its different agents speculated at will.”⁸

Nardon wrote this report after the insurrection had been tamed. The picture of chaos and entrenched corruption in the duchies’ old system served as justification for his own plans of revamping the police. Nardon’s unabashed contempt for the old ways of doing things notwithstanding, his report describes accurately the lack of accountability and clear goals that made policing, rural policing especially, notoriously lax and haphazard; he was also correct to point to Moreau de Saint-Méry’s acceptance of the status quo: Moreau left the old militia system in place and only transferred the functions of the Lieutenant General to the Governors of the two main cities, Parma and Piacenza. Therefore, the colonels and lieutenant-colonels of the *terzi* reported to the French place commanders (General Marion in Piacenza and General Le Soulier in Parma) who were also supervising their payments, but otherwise

⁸ Rapport Général sur la Police secrète des Etats de Parme et Plaisance, Parme, Premier décembre 1806. ANP, F/1^e/87. On the *sbirri* and the various layers of local policing in Italy see Michael Broers, “*Sbirri* and Gendarmes. The Workings of a Rural Police Force” in *Corpi armati e ordine pubblica in Italia (XVI-XIX secoli) a cura di Livio Antonelli e Claudio Donati*. (Soveria Manelli: Rubbetino editore, 2003), 203-11.

they carried on as usual. This was consistent with Moreau de Saint-Méry general policy of duplicating, rather than replacing traditional institutions. In fairness to Moreau, he had no mandate to dismiss local institutions. Placing them under the strict control of new French administrative units was a sensible but haphazard course of action for which Napoleon himself, rather than Moreau, was responsible considering that it took an insurrection for the Emperor to decide Parma’s status.

Volunteer National Guards

The relatively low number of recruits included in the conscription decree of 27 Prairial (16 June 1805) probably reflected Napoleon’s doubts regarding the military potential of the duchies, since he did not trust the abilities of native officers who had not yet served under French command.⁹ Viceroy Eugène, however,

⁹ Napoleon’s correspondence with Prince Eugène throughout the months of August through December 1805 is interspersed with direct orders as well as advice on how to transition the armed forces in Parma, such as they were, into the French army. Most of the officers having served under the Bourbons and unwilling to join the French army were simply pensioned off. See Napoleon’s letter to Berthier, on 13 July 1805 in *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 11, p. 11 #8978: “The State of Parma is outside the military system of the Empire. The fortresses, the [military] places, the corps of engineers, all are run, commanded by Parmense officers; this must stop. Yet, my intention is to do no harm to any of these former military men, whose conduct towards us was correct throughout the Italian wars. Order the administration of the ammunition to take control over the powder factories in the State of Parma, as of those in Genoa, and to get them working at full

eager to have all Italian regions share in the war effort, had fewer hesitations: By the fall of 1805 he was counting on significant Parmense participation. While Napoleon weighed different strategies and accelerated the training of his *Grande Armée* at the Boulogne camp, his viceroy kept an eye on the Anglo-Russian forces landing in the Kingdom of Naples. To meet any possible threat, on 5 Frimaire, an 14 (26 November 1805) Eugène issued a decree establishing a Reserve Camp between Bologna and Modena. This camp was to be formed of the National Guards of the Kingdom of Italy reinforced by National Guards from the States of Parma and Piacenza, all under the command of General Pino, Minister of war of the Kingdom of Italy. Each department in the kingdom was expected to furnish between 500 and 1,000 men. Assembling the approximately 15,000-strong force in the Kingdom of Italy was an onerous task. Recruiting officers employed a mix of carrots (National Guards who completed the 27-day training period were paid the same stipend as line troops) and sticks (arrests and various fines) to little avail.¹⁰

capacity. Also, give orders that the corps of military engineers take over the fortifications of Parma, of Piacenza, of the Bardi castle and other small forts in the region. Compile a list of all the Parmense officers employed in these places; their pay is very mediocre; that of colonels is, I believe, no more than 80 or 100 francs; you will forward me this list so that I take a decision. In the meantime, they keep their pay, according to their grade and their employment.”

¹⁰ Resistance to enlisting was so widespread that by November 1805 officers limited the calls to very young men, less likely to have family or employment commitments. Even so, by January

This may be the reason why Viceroy Eugene hoped for greater success in territories not yet integrated into the Kingdom and thus less exposed to previous rounds of military conscription. The quota for the States of Parma was therefore set at 12,000 (for a population of less than 400,000). These men were to be recruited from the traditional militia. Lieutenant-Colonel Scipione Ferrante, Colonel to the Headquarter of General Fontanelli, named *organizzatore delle truppe parmigiane* for the occasion, was sent to Parma to shape the future 12,000 volunteer militia members into two National Guards battalions fit to join the viceroy's reserve camp. During the preparations for the decree, Eugène sent Moreau explicit instructions:

I heard, M. Moreau de Saint-Méry, how well organized are the national troops in the duchies you are administering. The moment has arrived when, these troops being used in the defense of their homes, they will also be offered the opportunity to demonstrate all their attachment to, as well as their zeal in the service of, the Emperor. I invite you to select and bring together, from the great number of National Guard troops, a corps of about twelve thousand men; they should be ready, as soon as possible, to execute the orders His

barely 8,000 recruits could be counted, in less than desirable shape. Pietro Crociani, Virgilio Ilari, Ciro Paoletti, *Storia Militare del Regno Italico (1802-1814)* (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito. Ufficio Storico, 2004) II, 832-35.

Majesty might have for them so that they can defend their country and maintain it in peace and good order.¹¹

As soon as he received Eugène's directives, Moreau sent circular letters to all five regional military commanders asking them to expedite recruitment. The recruiting itself was delegated to the colonels of the *terzi*. Nowhere in his writings did he show any sign of hesitation concerning the feasibility of such plans. This was not the regular conscription into the army, which, as stated above, aimed to raise no more than 100 men initially. Still, that recruiting militia members—men of all ages, serving voluntarily in their immediate communities for routine policing duties—presented considerable challenges did not seem to have occurred to Moreau.

Prince Eugène's call to organize National Guards for joining the reserve camp at

¹¹ Letter to Moreau de Saint-Méry, dated 24 Brumaire, an 13 (15 November 1805) included in Prince Eugène's letter to Napoleon dated 19 November. *Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène publiés, annotés et mis en ordre par A. Du Casse* (Paris: Lévy, 1858) I, 445-46.

Bologna was answered in two ways: A relatively small number of volunteers enlisted and sought to become, openly and vocally, part of the French forces; a much larger number, unimpressed by the siren calls to glory, saw the appeal to serve as an unacceptable intrusion in their lives. Thus, Moreau's office was swamped with contradictory requests: One stream affirming the enthusiastic wish to join the French army and partake in its destinies via the National Guards regiments joining the viceroy's reserve camp, and another—soon to become a flood—amply showing that the very notion of an active National Guard serving under the command of French officers triggered resentment, revulsion, and ultimately active rebellion.



La Gloire

The prospect of glory did warm a few hearts in the states of Parma. A number of former members of the dukes' guards and members of the militia corps called on the Administrator General nearly every day between mid-November and mid-December 1805, begging for his 'blessing.' On the surface, recruitment went smoothly

at first: Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrante received the allegiance of a number of officers led by a certain *Colonel* Agostino Botti, a veteran of the ducal regiments and colonel of the *terzo* San Donino.¹² He turned out to be a ruthlessly ambitious character; yet, all other officers seemed to accept his authority unconditionally and for the months of November-December 1805 and January 1806 he was the chief coordinator and most enthusiastic point man for Prince Eugene's planned Parmense battalions. He besieged Moreau with letters detailing his attempts to organize two battalions, Infantry and Cavalry. Each letter pledged his and his fellow officers' zeal to leave their mundane tasks in order to serve the viceroy. Moreau was all too happy to relay these proofs of enthusiasm to the viceroy, who in turn believed things were going so well that on 29 Brumaire (20 November 1805) he reported to Napoleon the upbeat news that: "In just a few days, thanks to the efforts of Moreau de Saint-Méry and to the great enthusiasm for Your Majesty, I will have at my disposal 12,000 men of good will and animated by the best of dispositions."¹³ Prince Eugène sounded just as optimistic two weeks later when he informed Napoleon that several young Parmense officers had sought him out, eager to join the reserve camp: "I am especially pleased by the militia members

¹² Ermanno Loevinson, *Gli Ufficiali Napoleonici Parmensi* (Parma: Pubblicazioni del R. Archivio di Stato Parma. La Tipografica Parmense, 1930), 17.

¹³ Letter to Napoleon 29 Brumaire, an 13 (20 November 1805), *Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène*, I, 449.

of Parma and Piacenza; several young men, without being directed to do so, have approached me and asked me to call on them for service [in the reserve army]."¹⁴

Indeed, the freshly constituted National Guards marched from village to village, trying to persuade more men to join them and even collecting certificates of good behavior along the way.¹⁵ On 20 December

¹⁴ Letter to Napoleon, 2 December 1805, *Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène* I, 463. He also reported that hospitals were organized in Parma, as planned. In Moreau's diary, the entry for 13 Frimaire, an 13 (1 December 1805) mentions a letter from Parmense officers under Colonel Botti's command informing him that they had called on Prince Eugene to allow them to follow him at Padova. Gabriela Tambini, *Moreau de Saint Méry. Journal III. Parte II*. MA Thesis. Università degli Studi Parma. Facoltà di Magistero. Corso di Laurea in Lingue et Letterature straniere. Relatore Carminella Biondi (1982/83), 977.

¹⁵ A hand-written note dated Mirandola 16 December 1805 states that: "The municipality/Certifies to all concerned that the National Guard of Parma, consisting of two battalions of infantry and one squadron of cavalry and one company of sappers has passed through this town on the day of 25 and spent the following night; the troops have maintained a sage and good conduct without giving any reason for objections. Truthfully, Tabachi P(ietro) and Cuviani (Curiandegno) ... 30 December 1805 ... the Corps of National Italian Troops under the command of Honorable M. Ferrante with all his officers and soldiers have behaved with good discipline not giving any reason for the slightest objection, in virtue of which this certificate has been released." In fede Tabachi P(ietro) and Cuviani (Curiandegno) Same note (and exactly the same text) from the date 28 December 1805, from the Municipalità Saclatta, signed In fede Francisco Pellagazzi and amministratore municipali Manfredi; from 29 December 1805 (in a similar text) from the municipalità di Badia, signed by Presidente B. Dente. Further afield, on letter-headed paper from the Municipalità Provisoria di Este, dated 30

1805, 64 officers and NCOs penned an official letter to Prince Eugène, calling on him to become the patron of their regiments:

The National Guard of Parma and Piacenza, called under the auspices of Your Serene Highness, cannot but feel moved by internal feelings towards your excellency, representative of a nation that only wishes to emulate the sons of the one at whose name Rome, Athens, Sparta and Carthage bow their heads. The honor bestowed on [us] to be able to serve the Homeland under the banner of the First Hero of the century and to see [ourselves] regrouped with other Nations from the ex-Venetian state, greatly prompts our souls to aspire to distinguish ourselves and to show to our August Sovereign that filial gratitude that we are eager to demonstrate, if You would accept our present plea and render to our nascent army the patronage that we are yearning for; without which we

December 1805, a report that the Corpo di Truppa Nazionale Italiana comandata dal Nob. S.or Ferrante con tutti li suoi ufficiali e soldati si sono diportati con tutta la morigeratezza non avendo dat occasione al minimo ricalmo per cui le viene rilasciato il presente; another note certifying good behavior by the Truppa Nazionale di Parma sotto la Commanda di Ten Colonello Scipione Ferrante is issued on 11 January 1806 by the Municipalità Provisoria di Conselvo. All these documents in Biblioteca Palatina, *Manoscritti Parmensi* 543 *passim*.

will see that our efforts would not be enough to reach the hoped for goal.¹⁶

The obsequious tone hardly concealed the creeping anxiety: The viceroy, surely, did not need renewed expressions of commitment and loyalty, he needed numbers. Botti and his fellow officers were unable to deliver such numbers because the vast majority of militia members did not share the same martial dreams and simply refused to sign up. Yet, the prince expected 12,000 men from the duchies at the beginning of January.¹⁷ In a subsequent letter to Moreau (undated, most likely late December 1805) the enrolled officers took a moment to thank Moreau for having been: “like a father who... inspired us to leave our homes, who pulled us out of our inertia, who advised us to lead a useful life, and laborious, worthy of a man and of a citizen.” But, alas, the rolls had no more than 700 men—very short of the number requested by Viceroy Eugène—so the letter ended on a rather desperate note, beseeching Moreau to do whatever it took to motivate other young

¹⁶ Letter published in the *Gridario* 1805. Archivio Comunale di Parma. Botti signed as commander and the letter was endorsed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrante.

¹⁷ “*Je vais former un régiment d’infanterie d’une partie des gardes nationales et j’espère avoir douze cent hommes dans la Garde Nationale de Parme et Plaisance, qui a marché. Je pourrais lever un bataillon. Je vais prendre mes mesures pour qu’il en soit formé un autre dans ces états.*” Letter to Napoleon, Padoue, le 2 Janvier 1806, in *Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène*, vol. II, 45.

men to join.¹⁸ Louis Duplessis, a French national living in Parma, offered solutions built on the pedagogical virtues of the French example. Sensing the bad impression the low number of recruits might make, he wrote directly to Prince Eugène with advice on how to portray National Guard recruiting as a benevolent gesture meant to benefit the very people currently resisting it: “His Serene Highness can, if He wishes, build in the States of Parma, in less than three months, a regiment of infantry of fifteen hundred men and one or two squadrons of cavalry.... The Parmense people are good, obedient and poor; they a martial soul and will make good soldiers when moved out of their habitual surroundings.” Why? Because Duplessis, relying on his insights into the Parmense character, was sure that: “*Le peuple Parmesan est doux, docile, et pauvre, il a l’âme martiale il ne faudrait que le dépayser pour en faire de bons soldats.*” It would take no more than a small gesture of interest on the part of the prince and the perspective of a real military career to persuade peasants attached to their fields to join the French army; the example of French soldiers would do the rest:

It would be desirable that His Serene Highness be so good as to issue an address to the people of the three states where he will say that, deeply touched by their destitution, He

¹⁸ Letter to Moreau, *Mss. Parm. 543*, f. 93. The letter is countersigned by Scipione Ferrante. Botti signs again as commander of all officers.

believes extending a paternal gesture opening the military career to all. It would be beneficial to allow that the eager soldier be admitted, after a certain probation period, in the elite troops....¹⁹

Duplessis even managed, after more than a week of persistent knocking at the door, to obtain a brief audience with the prince who indeed expressed his lack of confidence in the Parmense and doubted that they could levy even 1,500 troops. “*Est-ce que vous ne savez pas qu’ils sont révoltés?*” Eugène asked, prompting Duplessis to put in his two cents and reiterate his call for a direct appeal to the Parmense people’s dormant military aptitudes.²⁰ The Prince declined to get involved but Duplessis, Botti and their comrades pressed on; eventually, they persuaded Ferrante to approve the formation of a two-battalion regiment on

¹⁹ Louis Duplessis à Son Altesse Sérénissime Le Prince Eugène, Vice-Roi d’Italie Padoue le 6 janvier 1806. Pushing the sycophancy even further, Duplessis even offered to carry such a proclamation around the country and read it in public himself. Signed: “*Je suis avec profond respect et une grande adoration, de son altesse sérénissime le plus fidèle et le plus zélé, le plus respectueux de ses serviteurs, Duplessis.*” *Mss. Parm. 543*, f. 11.

²⁰ Letter from Louis Duplessis to Moreau, Conselvo, 11 January 1806, relating this interview and asking Moreau to intercede with the Prince on their behalf: “*Tous les officiers vous proclament leur père, ils demanderont votre protection.*” *Mss. Parm. 543*, f. 49. Suggesting that indeed officers counted on future service, Botti wrote to Moreau, also on 11 January and also from Conselvo, seeking assurances that he will have the same military grade (Colonel) in the new regiments and intervened for one of his protégés, a certain lieutenant Gandolfi. *Mss. Parm. 543*, fos 34-35.

the simple promise they will bring in new recruits.²¹ On 19 January they all took the Oath to the Viceroy (*Giuramento*) administered by Ferrante, the minutes of which were sent to Prince Eugène the same day. Overjoyed, Botti reported their success to Moreau; it was a bad omen that he also felt compelled to add, in the very same letter, that an unidentified person from Piacenza had infiltrated their ranks and was spending his time asking recruits why on earth were they not deserting since so many have done so and returned to their homes, without having been disturbed in the least.²²

Botti and his fellow officers were right to worry: Their regiment—and their joy—did not last more than a couple of days. Napoleon had severe doubts on the usefulness of National Guards in general and ordered Eugène to dismiss them in the

²¹ This information comes from two letters from General Fontanelli to Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrante, dated: Piove di Sacco, 8 January 1806: Dal generale Fontanelli al Tenente Colonello Ferrante Comandante della Piazza e organizzatore delle Truppe Parmigiane a Conselvo: “*Per ordine di S.A. sarà formato delle Truppe Nazionale di Parma e Piacenza un Regimento di due Bataglioni che sarà completato mediante reclutamento negli stati di Parma.*” More details follow (on uniforms, for instance) the same day, from the same to the same, same signature. *Copie conforme* for both: Louis Duplessis, chef de bataillon. The cavalry battalion was scheduled to leave on 12 January to go to Piove di Sacco. *Mss. Parm. 543*, fos. 19-20. The final contingent lists by name all officers for 9 companies of 8 battalions of 80 men, Colonel Agostino Botti being again listed as commander. *Mss. Parm. 543*, fos 171-72.

²² *Mss. Parm. 543*, f.226. Letters not dated, marked as received on 28 and 29 January 1806.

entire Kingdom of Italy and especially in Parma-Piacenza:

The new levies of troops have to be executed with method and care; their force is not in their numbers, but in their suitable make-up. I recommend that you make sure to recover the weapons wherever possible.²³

On the day Botti and his fellow officers took the oath, the Emperor ordered the repression of the insurrection and also reiterated his order that the National Guards be disbanded:

My Son, the 27 ad 28 military divisions lack troops. Send the 3rd light infantry to Parma and the 67th to Alexandria. If the Hanover Infantry is under your orders, send it to Parma as well; finally all necessary forces, putting all these troops under the command of General Junot, who leaves today for Parma with extraordinary powers. Expedite your orders by extraordinary couriers. I imagine you have already fired all the national guards.²⁴

Shortly thereafter, Napoleon sent clear instructions on how any pretense of volunteer self-recruiting should come to an end and all Parmense military personnel placed under direct French command:

²³ *Correspondance de Napoléon premier*, XI, #9660, 8 Janvier 1806.

²⁴ Letter to Prince Eugène, Stuttgart, 19 janvier 1806. *Correspondance de Napoléon premier*, #9682, XI, p. 544.

Among the individuals who are part of the military contingent of the States of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, those who are less than forty years of age will be admitted to serve in their grade; those of the same age who have not yet had the opportunity to serve and more generally those who are now under fifty years of age will be assigned to the forts under the jurisdiction of the place commanders, with the same retribution they used to enjoy in their current position. Among those older than fifty years of age, the officers will maintain their wages and NCOs and others will be compensated according to the French laws.²⁵

Accordingly, Prince Eugène dissolved the newly formed regiments and nullified their oath as soon as he received Napoleon's dispatches. "Just born and suddenly killed off" (*pena nati e morti*) Botti sobbed, announcing the unbearable news in yet

²⁵ "Notes pour le Ministre de la Guerre", Paris, 5 février 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9754, XII, p. 9. The other three paragraphs of this brief order informs the minister of war that the states of Parma and Piacenza will have a separate military organization, under General Junot, for no more than three years, during which all work on military installations is to be suspended while regional commanders take their position in the territory.

another desperate letter to Moreau, beseeching him to intervene and save their regiment.²⁶

Moreau was in no position to intervene on behalf of others. General Junot, appointed to take over the duchies on January 19 had arrived in Parma on the evening of 25 January. He was amiable enough to allow Moreau to gather his possessions and leave

with a few shreds of dignity left, but there was no doubt that, from that moment on, the only person in charge was Junot, who had no

intention to go against Napoleon's wishes or give any latitude to local military men. On the contrary, persuaded that Botti had roughed up many potential volunteers and thus destroyed whatever good will the French have been able to build in the area,

Junot made a point of firing him and even issued a formal order taking away his very right to bear arms:

5 March 1806. The Governor General of the State of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla orders that: Colonel Augustin Botti, who until now has fulfilled the functions of Colonel of the *terzo* of Val Tidone is removed from his functions, with special

²⁶ Letter from Botti to Moreau dated Piove de Sacco, 29 Gennaro 1806; letter signed by all the officers, dated Piove di Sacco, 3 March 1806. *Mss. Parm.* 543, f.236 and 240-41 respectively.



Junot

interdiction to carry any kind of uniform or military distinction. The General in chief of the Government is responsible for executing this order.²⁷

The other officers had the option to reenlist in the new regiments reorganized by the new Administrator-General Nardon and serve under French commanders, an option that many took. Louis Duplessis's recommendation that the Parmense had to be *dépaysés* in order to become good soldiers was in the end followed to the letter, although not in the way he wished and anticipated.²⁸

Personne ne Veut Marcher

By the time the Parmense National Guard units were dissolved and melted into the French army, the insurrection was in full swing. From the very beginning, parallel with Duplessis' and Botti's vows of loyalty, requests for exemption crowded the Administrator General's desk: A doting father assured that his son was preparing for "studies at the academy" and should therefore be exempt; a village shopkeeper

wrote a moving letter that painted the disaster likely to strike his family should their only son be called to volunteer; one Joseph Ferrari asked for an exemption for one son, on account of his other son already serving as dragoon Napoléon; another seemingly better off villager simply petitioned to have his son excused without giving a reason. An Antonio Ghirardelli, member of the militia, wrote on 27 January 1806 to ask to be relieved from service on account of being the head of a family with one daughter and two unmarried sister—and he pointed to Prince Eugène's stipulation that only members who volunteered for service will march to the reserve camp.²⁹ All in all, for the entire month of December 1805, until late-January 1806, Moreau could not doubt the general attitude towards joining the National Guards: *personne ne veut marcher* is the laconic, dejected conclusion for almost every entry of his angst-ridden diary during these frantic weeks. Not that the officers lacked the will to do all that was in their power, from flattery to threats—Junot detected a real problem when he blamed muscled recruiting tactics for triggering the insurrection. Duplessis' penchant for soft power was not shared by his fellow National Guardsmen who generally believed fear worked best. Colonel Botti, the man in charge, repeatedly asked to be allowed to capture

²⁷ Archives du Ministère de la Défense, C-4-41. According to a number of entries in Moreau's diary, Moreau's circle of friends suspected that Botti's dismissal was part of a web of intrigues brewing among Parmense notables vying for the favors of the new French administration.

²⁸ Broers noted that Napoleon never considered even trying to rely on the Parmense forces '...whose officers were quickly replaced by Frenchmen, whose units were dissolved and whose ranks were integrated into French units, disappearing without a trace.' Michael Broers, "Noble romans and Regenerated Citizens: the Morality of Conscription in Napoleonic Italy 1801–1814." *War in History* (2001) 8, no. 3: 249-70 (253).

²⁹ Tambini *Moreau de Saint-Méry, Journal – III (1805)*, 880-906. Ghirardelli's letter, dated Bussetto 27 January 1806, in *Mss. Parm. 543*, f. 215. There was one official exemption for the militiamen and the *sbiriri* guarding the salt mines at Borgo San Donino.

deserters and then enroll them forcibly; since arresting deserters was the job of the gendarmes, he was not granted permission—but he did so anyway.³⁰ Such abuses intensified wild rumors that Prince Eugène wanted to make the militia march in order to kill them off (as posters in the market warned citizens) or worse: Captain Dallasta asked Moreau to issue a special proclamation to dispel the fear that ‘the Austrians will eat [the recruits] alive.’³¹ Those who signed up—under duress most of the time—added the force of experience to the already negative image of the National Guards. Reports detailing an unstoppable wave of desertions from barely formed National Guard units, mutinies due to miserable garrison conditions (vermin was a recurring complaint) and uncertainty about the length of service hit the General Administrator’s office daily, culminating with a dry note on 22 January 1806, from militia Lieutenant Colonel Giacopelli:

³⁰ There is one record of him arresting a Piacentino fugitive suspect, Giacomo Crespi, sometime in January 1806. *Mss. Parm.* 543, f.240-241. In a very obsequious letter to Moreau dated 21 January 1806 Botti asks Moreau to allow them to arrest deserters, or they will never be able to meet the target fixed by the viceroy; next day, he reported he was unable to stop a desertion, but: *siamo in campagna aperta*. Letter dated 22 January, 1806, *Mss. Parm.* 543, f. 182.

³¹ “President Crescini brings me the original of a hand-written poster placed this morning on a pillar in the wheat market... It is presented as a copy of a letter by His Imperial Majesty to Prince Eugene, with orders to send the militia on their way to massacres.” Entry of 12 Frimaire (3 December 1805) in Moreau’s diary. Tambini, *Moreau de Saint-Méry, Journal – III (1805)*, p. 993; Dallasta’s request in the same entry, p. 887.

Militiamen do not want to serve anymore and “declare themselves dismissed.”³² To better understand why, the Governor of Piacenza, Francesco Ferrari, sent a certain Leonardi, quartermaster (*maréchal de logis*) in an undercover mission through the villages around Piacenza. Posing as an ambulant seller of ribbons, Leonardi listened and took note; his report announced, in straightforward fashion, that the ordinary peasants who formed the bulk of the militia simply did not want to join and prefer to be killed at home.³³

*The Janus Face of Army Recruiting?*³⁴

The contradictory responses the viceroy’s call to arms reflect the inherent duality of the French occupation, at once inspiring and oppressive, reformist and exploitative. The eagerness of officers and NCOs who answered his call encouraged Viceroy Eugène to wax lyrical about the

³² Several anonymous reports dated 26 January 1806, *Mss. Parm.* 543, f. 210; the daily entries in Moreau’s diary throughout December 1805 and 1806, give summaries of messages from regional leaders, all reporting widespread resistance to the calls for enrolment in units meant to join the reserve camp. Dominique Faidherbe, *Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV- 1806 de parte I*. Università degli Studi di Parma. Facoltà del Magistero. Corso di Laurea in Lingue e Letterature Straniere. Relatore Carminella Biondi. 1982/83, 154.

³³ Dominique Faidherbe. *Moreau de Saint-Méry, Journal IV Parte I*. MA Thesis. Università degli Studi di Parma. Facoltà del Magistero. Corso di Laurea in Lingue e Letterature Straniere. Relatore Carminella Biondi (1982/83), 38.

³⁴ I borrowed the term from Alexander Grab: ‘The Janus Face of Napoleon’s Rule: Reform and Exploitation’ in Alexander Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 19-33.

enthusiasm for the emperor amongst Parma's youth. He had reasons to believe this was true, considering the tone of the letters he was receiving. Two hundred years later, we may agree partially with Eugène's optimistic take on the situation. Nonetheless, as Eugène also knew, hostility to conscription was widespread in the Kingdom of Italy and the annexed territories. Yet, the ranks of the army were at least partially filled and while many joined because they saw no other choice, many harbored loftier sentiments. What may have moved the 700 volunteers in Parma? Through the unctuous obsequiousness of their letters transpires a yearning for adventure, for something bold to do, that may or may not have been stirred by love for a fatherland not their own—or for an emperor not (yet) their own. Napoleon made a point of sending all over the French controlled territories the famous *Bulletins* that brought to one and all the exploits of the French army.³⁵

³⁵ It was well-known that the *Bulletins* offered a chronicle of glory not just factual information. Yet, there was always a public for this modern *Illiad*, as Jean-Bertaud termed the ensemble of the *Bulletins'* narrative. They were widely read and they certainly spoke to the imagination even though readers doubted their factual accuracy. For a recent analysis see Jean-Paul Bertaud, 'Napoléon journaliste: les bulletins de la gloire' *Le Temps des Média*, 2005/ I (no. 4): 10–21. In examining the emotional appeals to soldiers in the *Bulletins* Alan Forrest has noted that: "The soldiers listened because this was a language they wanted to hear, a discourse with which they could related. But also it was also the only language they were allowed to hear, such was the strict regime of censorship which Napoleon had instituted." Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men. The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (Hambleton: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006): 74.

Wide-eyed youth could read rousing stories about the great deeds of the Great Army, with the hardships of a soldier's daily life barely an afterthought. It is not at all surprising that the mystique of glory would appeal to young men long starved for action under Duke Ferdinand's stiflingly dull rule. In fact, 700 volunteers was not a bad record for the roughly 400,000 population of the States of Parma. The impression that the States of Parma were struggling to recruit volunteers was mainly due to Viceroy Eugène's unreasonably high demand and to the officers' ensuing overzealous push to meet the target numbers. (By way of comparison, volunteer service went considerably smoother in regions of the Kingdom of Italy where lower demands, adapted to local conditions, put less pressure on the population).³⁶ Had only the willing volunteers' letters and reports remained in the archives, historians could have easily concluded that the Empire was a welcome presence in the locals' lives, full of opportunities for self-fulfillment beyond the low horizons of their small country. Indulging, briefly, in counter-factual history, it is not unreasonable to question

The section on the *Bulletins*, Wayne Hanley has dissected the origins and formidable efficiency of the propaganda mechanism under Bonaparte before it became Napoleon: Wayne Hanley, *The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796 -1799* (New York: Columbia Press, 2005), 71-78.

³⁶ After the failure of raising a Reserve Army based on National Guards, the viceroy enacted less ambitious and more pragmatic, case by case policies of mobilizing National Guard units for limited tasks. Crociani et al., *Storia Militare del Regno Italico*, II: 836.

whether the rebellion would have even started in 1805, had recruitment been executed by more experienced officers rather than militia commanders, in less callous and less antagonistic ways, hence less alarming for the affected communities. Napoleon certainly believed so when he scolded his viceroy for having set the Apennines on fire with his haste and misplaced expectations:

You have disbanded my camp in Alexandria and executed levies of national guard with so much haste that you have set the entire Italy aflame. Be more prudent and carry yourself with circumspection.³⁷

But if recruitment methods grew more and more aggressive it was because, much to the chagrin of eager volunteers, enthusiasm for joining any branch of the French, or French-led, military did not carry the day. As everywhere else, across the States of Parma, conscription met with revulsion and defiance—and in the minds of most people, volunteer National Guard service was no different from mandatory enlisting in the army.³⁸ The overwhelming negative response to repeated calls to join the viceroy's reserve army illustrates

³⁷ Letter to Prince Eugène, dated Paris, 4 février 1806. *Correspondance de Napoléon premier*, #9745, XII, p. 5.

³⁸ For quick reference on fierce opposition to conscription in Italy see Alexander Grab, "Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy 1802-1814" *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era. A revolution in military affairs?* Eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick Schneid, Harold Blanton (London and New York, Routledge, 2009), 122-34.

perfectly Isser Woloch's observation that conscription replaced taxation as the main battleground between state and society, except that it could not be harnessed by revolutionary legislation the way taxation ultimately was:

In the old regime taxation had played such a (contentious) role, and thanks to that experience Frenchmen were more or less inured to shouldering their tax burden, especially as rationalized by the Revolution. With Napoleon, conscription became the battleground, the ultimate contest of wills between individuals and locals communities on the one hand and a distant, impersonal state on the other.³⁹

It was a battle of wills that the citizens of Parma and Piacenza were bound to lose. Even so, they refused to give in and stubbornly built a wall of rejection, one 'no' at a time. When the pressure became unbearable, entire communities who had tolerated quite stoically French imposed higher taxes, requisitions and changes in the administrative structure, rose in rebellion and challenged not just military service, volunteer or not, but the very legitimacy of French rule in their part of the world. Proving that indeed, they preferred to die at home rather than chasing glory on military battlefields of

³⁹ Isser Woloch, "Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society," *Past and Present*, 111 (1986): 101-29 (101).

the emperor' choosing, the lowly folks of the Apennines dared to defy the master of all Europe in a desperate move that Michael Broers aptly called the last stand of the Old Regime.⁴⁰

The French authorities, beginning with General Junot, approached the rebellion as an instance of grave incompetence that enabled brigands in the area to disrupt a quiet region. Botti's punishment had a certain Machiavellian quality. Loathing of forcible enlisting—and it seemed that villagers saw little difference between National Guards and the army proper—could be blamed on inept and heartless local militia colonels such as Botti rather than on French army personnel. There is no doubt that Botti was a violent man who vastly overstepped his mandate; but in punishing him publicly, Junot gave a measure of satisfaction to local grievances and redirected the ire of the people away from the French while attempting to portray French imperial officials as agents of legality. He was following up on one thread of the official narrative which accepted as legitimate—if overblown—complaints over brutal recruitment tactics. This small concession prepared the way for the larger narrative of repression built on the assumption that French power generated the efficient rule of law and order.

⁴⁰ "The Last Stand of the Old Regime" in Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814. Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 80-93.

Dancing in the Time of War: The Expatriate British Social Elite in Belgium during the 1815 Campaign

by Alasdair White

The Impact of War

In December 1806, the French Revolutionary Wars were over: Napoleon had been crowned Emperor of France, he had imposed the Continental System that banned trade with Great Britain and had started the Napoleonic Wars.¹ This had two significant effects on the British: it radically changed the economy of the nation, and it confined the majority of the people to their island home. Although little had changed socially and culturally, there was increasing social and political unrest.

Perhaps the most significant impact was the demand for war materials and this pushed the economy from being agrarian towards being a manufacturing and industrial one. This ushered in a period of price stability before inflation rose sharply in 1812-13 as the Continental System really started to bite and then, with the fall of Napoleon, a period of deflation caused a 31.8% decline in prices creating a rising number of bankruptcies.²

¹ This paper was presented at the International Napoleonic Society Congress in Brussels, Belgium in July 2015. Editor's note: This paper originally used the APA citation style, so did not include page numbers.

² Data taken from various sources and modelled by www.whatsthecost.com suggests that between 1806 and 1811 prices rose by just 7.1% before rising

Manufacturers became enormously wealthy and many even started banks; the population began to urbanize significantly, attracted by the economic possibilities offered by the mill owners and other manufacturing activities; agricultural employment declined as labor-intensive work was mechanized; and landowners faced a relative decline in wealth as their tenants left the land for the cities. And with economic pain came a rise in social unrest.³

The social elite continued much as they had always done: Families with sons sought to increase their land holdings through advantageous marriages and purchases, while those with daughters struggled to find them husbands, rich or otherwise. But the rising financial cost of land ownership and the corresponding decrease in rental income, the increase in agrarian labor costs, and the struggle to maintain status together with the ruinous cost of the elite's lifestyle with its horse racing, gambling, alcohol consumption, parties, pursuit of fashion and the cost of dowries all combined to force many families to take out mortgages, often at

15.7% in the period 1812-1813 and then falling by 31.8% in the period 1814-1816.

³ Jenny Uglow, *In These Times—Living in Britain through Napoleon's Wars 1793-1815* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014).

high interest rates.⁴ Essentially, many in the upper social classes were living well beyond their means but had no intention of changing their way of life. The result was inevitable and many of the social elite found themselves suffering financially, forced to sell off unmortgaged assets and losing others to foreclosure. The rich were getting poorer and the growing middle classes were growing richer in one of the biggest mass transfers of wealth ever experienced. Napoleon's economic confrontation with Great Britain was having the unintended effect of acting as a social leveler.

Then Napoleon Fell from Power

Napoleon's decision to invade Russia against all advice and the known facts resulted in the loss of nearly 550,000 men to starvation, cold, wounds, desertion, and imprisonment. This effectively destroyed the Grande Armée, and France lost a significant percentage of its male population of fighting age. Despite this, Napoleon rushed back to France and, still popular, immediately raised another army of 400,000 to invade what is now Germany where, at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, he was soundly beaten. The Russians and the Prussians pursued him and the

⁴ Data taken from various sources and then modelled for *The Guardian* newspaper (10 January 2013) show that bank interest rates remained at 5% annually from 1719 to 1821 and did not reach either that level or consistency again until 1914. Mortgages were, therefore, at a historically high interest rate during the Napoleonic era reflecting concerns over lending during a period of intense change.

remnants of his army back to Paris; the British, having beaten the French army in Spain, invaded across the Pyrenees; and in April 1814 Napoleon was forced to abdicate. In a bizarre example of the politics of the era, he was sent to the island of Elba in the Mediterranean as its Emperor.

The result was felt in a number of ways. Trading restrictions were removed, easing the economic problems in Britain, and travel restrictions were eliminated, allowing the social elite to escape their problems at home and to establish themselves in cities in which it was significantly cheaper to live and where they could not be pursued by their creditors. Many of these newly expatriate British established themselves in Brussels, which was a great deal cheaper than London and had the added attraction of a small but established British military presence.

The Marriage Market

The army was officered almost exclusively by members of the British social elite, most of whom had purchased their ranks or owed their positions to rich and powerful patrons. This made British officers socially very desirable as future marriage partners, so wherever there was an established military presence there was a plethora of young females trying to attract attention, together with their mothers trying desperately to establish them as suitable marriage material.

The pursuit of eligible and socially acceptable marriages was essential for the continuance of the socio-economic model of the elite in that it enlarged the asset-based wealth of the “landed classes” by bringing in additional lands as part of the marriage settlements, and establishing dynastic family relationships. For the younger sons of the “landed classes,” marriage to an heiress or to an acceptable female with a large dowry was one of the few ways that they could aspire to becoming estate-owning gentry in their own right. For those families with a surfeit of females, marriages into and upwards within the social elite brought social status and security; it could also ease the burden of “launching” younger daughters as this could be accomplished with the aid of the elder daughter’s status and new family. All in all, achieving a “good marriage” was an economic essential as well as a social one.

The British Officer: A Desirable Commodity

So what really made army officers attractive as marriage partners? Generally speaking, elder sons, those who would inherit under the primogeniture model in

use at the time, were encouraged to engage in the “family business” of the estate, getting married (usually quite young) and producing a male heir. If they were successful in fathering sons, then their own younger brothers had little or no chance of inheriting much beyond a small house and estate or a reasonable sum of money, and so these young men looked around for an occupation that offered excitement, an opportunity for advancement, as well as the chance of contracting a “good marriage” to an heiress. In Napoleonic times, the Royal Navy provided lucrative opportunities for prize money but not for meeting potential marriage partners; the best opportunities were, therefore, in the Army, either in the Peninsular under Wellington or in the colonies, especially India, and in all of these there was the possibility of prize money:

Prize money was ... available to the army. It was paid in respect of guns and public stores seized after the capture of enemy towns. There was also a payment for head money, based on the numbers of enemy soldiers captured. In India an important part of the army’s prizes derived from



confiscation of the native prince's treasure.⁵

In general, army officers usually had social status and connections, prospects of prize money, glorious and gaudy uniforms, and were altogether very "dashing." And parties, visits to the country, riding, promenading in the park in the latest fashions, purchasing trinkets, attending the theatre and flirting, often outrageously, with the many officers was just the thing to entertain the young ladies.

Getting to Know Each Other

One of the challenges of the marriage market was the prevailing set of social norms which decreed that young women, particularly unmarried ones, should not be in male company unchaperoned, this being for their moral well-being and to protect their reputation. This, however, meant that there were very few situations in which young men and young women could meet, get to know each other, and assess their compatibility as marriage partners without the controlling and often intimidating presence of a third party (almost always female). In a conservative era in which women were chattels and valuable assets, this was seen as a usual and sensible precaution, and besides protecting the virtue of the young woman it also ensured that they made no social gaff that would scare off a potential suitor.

⁵ Roger Houghton, *A Peoples' History 1793-1844 from the Newspapers* – www.houghton.idv.hk (accessed 13 July 2015).

But times had changed. The French Revolution had created a different set of social norms and their influence was being felt all over Europe. Women were more openly expressing themselves on the subject of who they wished to marry and the strict separation of the sexes was being broken down: the younger members of both sexes took an active and open interest, frequently physically expressed, in each other. These two very different social models were almost diametrically opposed and were expressed in the fashions, in the rules of the social game, and in the purchases that admirers made for their targets. For example, ladies' dresses in the pre-revolutionary period involved huge amounts of material and scaffolding on which to drape it. The female shape was completely hidden and a false shape structured. This had changed to a much looser, less structured shape in which the natural outline of the woman was observable and even emphasized.

The economic environment also played a part: Materials such as heavy silks and velvets were expensive, made more so by the sheer quantity involved, and so a simpler and less expensive fashion evolved. This involved much less material, less structure, lighter materials and the result was a transformation from a hidden to an exposed form. Dresses in 1814 were light, inadvertently form-hugging in the slightest breeze, had high waists to provide support for the bust now escaped from the corset, and low-cut necklines to expose the breasts and cleavage, all of which were

kept supported by sensible shoulders and sleeves. This new fashion was often referred to as the Empire line. Men's fashions had evolved as well with tighter fitting trousers that accentuated the shape of the man's legs and with the additional benefit in the mating game of drawing attention to and accentuating the groin. In addition, a front opening to the trousers made engaging in natural functions much easier.

As a result of these changes, young men and young women participating in the mating game were able to obtain a much clearer image of what their potential partners had on offer. It also had an additional benefit for those of both sexes who liked to make closer research: at the time, the concept of 'underwear' had not developed and the tighter fashions made the use of the old bulky solution of an adult version of a child's "nappy" an impossibility. A lighter, less obvious undergarment was needed, but in fact the majority did not go so far: Men tended to have long shirt tails which they could tuck around them or pantaloons, and the women used a petticoat or the new open-crotch pantalettes. This lack of constriction under the outer garments meant that those so inclined could engage in sexual activity with remarkable ease as now neither sex had to do much in the way of undressing.

"Vanity Fair" and the Not So Innocent

It is also interesting to note that being the mistress (or kept woman) of a senior

officer, or a lower ranking one if titled, was considered a cachet and enhanced the social reputation of the woman (who was displayed in public like a trophy) rather than damaged it. This is well described in the novel *Vanity Fair* by William Makepeace Thackeray, published in 1847 (but set in 1815) and in the novels of such writers as Jane Austen.

Then as now, jewelry and other trinkets were part and parcel of the courting and flirting process, and were used by the males to "purchase" their desired female and by the females to ascertain the worth and willingness of the male to compete for their affections. Many females in Brussels at the time were saddened that the males were not more lustful and forceful in their pursuit of "Vanity Fair" and many were more than willing to do a lot more than flirt: power (and money) was an aphrodisiac, and officers, especially senior officers, were a great catch for which a female would give up far more than a glimpse of a well-turned ankle or a lingering kiss on the hand. And the fact that the woman or her admirer may have been married made no difference: given that marriage was perceived as a dynastic and economic process often devoid of love or affection, adulterous sexual activity, often charmingly referred to as "dalliance," was virtually *de rigueur*. Thackeray caught this wonderfully well in a scene in *Vanity Fair* in which one of the central female characters, Rebecca Sharp, considers her future on the eve of Waterloo

having watched her husband, Rawdon, ride off to war:

... She resumed honest Rawdon's calculations of the night previous, and surveyed her position. Should the worst befall, all things considered, she was pretty well-to-do. There were her own trinkets and trousseau, in addition to those which her husband had left behind. Rawdon's generosity, when they were first married, has already been described and lauded. Besides these, and the little mare, the General, her slave and worshipper, had made her many handsome presents, in the shape of cashmere shawls bought at the auction of a French general's lady, and numerous tributes from the jewellers' shops, all of which betokened her admirer's taste and wealth. As for "tickers," as poor Rawdon called watches, her apartments were alive with their clicking. For, happening to mention, one night that hers, which Rawdon had given her, was of English workmanship, and went ill, on the very next morning there came to her a little bijou marked Leroy, with a chain and cover charmingly set with turquoises and another signed Breguet, which was covered with pearls, and yet scarcely bigger than a half-crown. General Tufto had

bought one, and Captain Osborne gallantly presented the other.⁶

Leroy was a well-established Parisian watchmaker and his work was particularly popular with the French king before the revolution and with officers of Napoleon's army. Breguet, a French watchmaker of Swiss origin, had been closely linked with the ruling elite of France since 1775 and many European leaders and men of influence also bought his work when they could.⁷ Although Becky Sharp's watches may have been second-hand, they will still have cost her admirers a great deal of money.

Balls—For Social Status and Selecting Partners

But what the young men and women wanted more than anything else was the opportunity to meet face-to-face in an ordered but intimate environment, and for that they went to balls and supper parties. These took a variety of forms with masques and dancing being the most popular. Anyone looking for husbands for their daughters or to reinforce their social position spent a great deal of time planning when to offer a ball and supper, and as the days grew longer these started to become much more frequent: attending two or three a week was the norm as the weather became warmer.

⁶ William Makepeace Thackeray, *Vanity Fair* (London: *Punch Magazine*, 1847).

⁷ Emmanuel Breguet, *Breguet Horologer depuis 1775* (Paris: Breguet, 1997).

To hold a ball required a large ballroom—one big enough for the energetic dances to take place and for the non-dancers to mingle around the outsides. Architectural research suggests that a set of stairs usually descended to the room as it would have been at street level and, in common with most architecture of the time, the ground floor of the house will have been half a floor above the street. Such a set of stairs provided a romantic frame for the young women as they approached their targets in the ballroom below.

A hostess then faced a practical problem—the house seldom contained sufficient rooms or combination of rooms in which she could have a large number guests to dine and so she would invite the most elite guests to attend a supper, rather than a formal dinner. This was considered perfectly normal: guests not staying for the supper usually had dinner before a ball. This gives the following structure to the event: socializing—dancing—supper—more dancing.

Dancing—An Emotion in Motion or a Team Sport

The dances of 1815 were not a close intimate affair but more of a team sport that called for large numbers of participants, involving a rotation of partners, lots of bowing, twirling, skipping up the lines, jumping about, all of which resulted in the need for considerable levels of fitness. The dances often involved sets of eight or similar numbers and the dance continued until all the participants were

back in their respective starting positions. All this jumping about gave everyone concerned a good opportunity to observe who was fit, light on their feet, well-coordinated and properly proportioned—all essential data for establishing who might be a good marriage partner (from a physical perspective). Such dances did not provide much opportunity for conversation until the music had stopped and the men had immediately obtained refreshments for their partners. Such refreshments were almost entirely non-alcoholic as their purpose was replacing lost fluids rather than loosening tongues. It was expected that dancing partners would remain in conversation until the next dance started, and it was considered improper and distinctly flirty and forward for a young woman to dance with the same partner more than once. In this way, mixing and conversation was effectively enforced, and each person at the ball would speak to six to eight dance partners, all under the watchful eye of the matrons and dowagers who sat around the edges of the ballroom engaging in light conversation with the older males.

The All-Important Ball Supper

All this exercise made the dancers hungry. In a 2013 reconstruction of a Jane Austen ball and supper for the BBC, the young dancers all expressed surprise at how exhausting and thirst-making the dances were.⁸ But what catches the attention

⁸ *Pride and Prejudice: Having a Ball* – <http://youtube/vHHh-Ppd8oI>

almost as much as the dances was the supper, the types and range of food and the way they were served. When the supper was ready, all those partaking would enter the room with their dinner partner and would be seated male–female–male–female around the table. In 1815, the norm for such a supper party would be the use of service à la française in which, as Prince Hermenn von Pückler-Muskau later remarked, everyone serves “... [from] the dish before him, and offers some of it to his neighbor.... If he wishes for anything else, he must ask across the table ... a very troublesome custom.”⁹ The “troublesome” nature was that it meant that everyone talked at once, polite conversation was impossible and everyone was bobbing up and down.

The “first course” dishes would include perhaps four or more tureens of different soups set at the corners of the table, entrées arranged along the sides (hence “side dishes”), two or three fish dishes, a number of main dishes or pièces de résistance of roast meats, game, poultry, and flummeries (starch-based soft dishes such as puddings—either sweet or savory—or such “afters” as crème brûlée or blancmange) all served in a variety of ways. These would already be on the table. The men would initially serve their partner first but then people would help themselves. Very often there were no

waiters to serve the food and the affair appeared as a sort of seated buffet. After this first course, some participants would return to the dance floor while the table was cleared and the “second course” would be brought in—cold meats, savories, aspics, vegetable dishes, flummeries and sweet dishes and, depending on the skills of the hostess’s cooks, pastries. Then the supper would begin anew with everyone helping themselves.

At the end of the supper all the participants would return to the ballroom for further dancing. This was usually of a less energetic and more intimate nature and the waltz was a particular favorite, especially for those who had a preference for being in close contact with a desired partner. After the last dance of the evening, often around 1:30 a.m., the guests would call for their carriages and depart.

The Aftermath of Waterloo

This, then, was the marriage market model that ensured the continuation of the socio-economic model of the social elite. For any young woman from 17 to 23 years old “in the market” for a husband, it was a high-stress and potentially exhausting process, the outcome of which was to receive an “offer” for her hand from at least one suitable young man during “the season.” And once the financial details of the “marriage settlement” had been negotiated between the two families, the engagement would be announced and the wedding planned. In 1814 and 1815, additional incentives were in play: The

⁹ Prince Hermenn von Pückler-Muskau in “Tour in England, Ireland and France ... in 1819 ... by a German Prince,” quoted in Reay Tannahill, *Food in History* (London: Review, 2002).

imminence and inevitability of war gave additional impetus to the courtship process and young women made greater efforts to attract and hold their desired target, including the bestowing of their physical favors if necessary. The young men, on the other hand, were acutely aware that this pressurized environment would soon come to an end and the opportunities for advancement in the military and the availability of an abundance of suitable and willing females would fade with the restoration of peace. Both parties had to strike while the iron was hot.

With the departure of the armies after the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815, life in Brussels became somewhat flat. The passion-inducing atmosphere of the imminence of war evaporated and although dancing continued, the absence of army officers and other eligible young men robbed the activity of its pleasure. Soon many of the expatriate social elite would follow the armies and the French king and head for Paris where the cotillion would start anew. The battlefields of

Belgium, cleared of the dead and wounded, reverted to peaceful farmland and have remained so from then on. Waterloo, however, became an instant tourist attraction with the more ghoulish travelling out from Brussels the following day. Since then hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of visitors have flocked to this small area of Belgium to witness for themselves the rolling countryside and peaceful farms that were, for a brief period, the center of a battle that cost around 10,000 dead and 30,000 seriously wounded. Slowly, over the years, buildings have been put up to accommodate the tourists, a tram track was laid from Brussels to the battlefield (and only discontinued in the 1960s), and the buildings at the center of the action, particularly the château-ferme of Hougoumont, held by the British Guards and their Hanoverian and Nassau colleagues against overwhelming French numbers, have slowly deteriorated. The dance of the marriage market has also changed and is now more of a mating game but the principles remain the same.

Dancing into Battle and Not Out Again: Women, War, and Waterloo

by Susan P. Conner

The date was 20 June 1815. According to Magdalene De Lancey, she had just located her husband in a cottage in the town of Waterloo. Two days before at the battle of Mont St. Jean, he had been mortally injured by a ricocheting cannonball.¹ Another cannonball, wrote a memoirist, had killed Marie Tête-de-Bois, a *vivandière* who had served the French armies through seventeen battles. She had raised her children as *enfants de troupe*, and she had never deserted her Emperor when he was in need. She was buried there on the battlefield, perhaps in a mass grave along with the vast numbers of soldiers and horses who had fallen as well.² Somewhere else on the field, Amelia Harris, the wife of an officer's servant, had spent the night sleeping with her son. As reported in her much later obituary, she had already huddled with her husband on the morning of 17 June, eating the flesh of a dead horse when they could find nothing

¹ See Magdalene De Lancey, "A Week at Waterloo in 1815" in *Ladies of Waterloo: The Experiences of Three Women during the Campaign of 1815* (Leonaux Ltd., 2009), 163-251. The diary was written at Magdalene De Lancey's brother's request and not published until much later. Charles Dickens and Sir Walter Scott read the manuscript and used it in their fictional works.

² Emile Cère, *Madame Sans-Gêne et les Femmes Soldats* (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et C^{ie}, 1894), 314; Raoul Brice, *La Femme et les Armées de la Révolution et l'Empire (1792-1815)* (Paris: Librairie Ambert, n.d.), 305-09; and Thomas Cardoza, *Intrepid Women: Cantinières and Vivandières in the French Army* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 18 and 80.

else.³ They sat among the dead and the not-yet-dead.

Piecing together a picture of women at Waterloo tests us to look beyond the anecdotes and beyond the book titles like *Men of Waterloo* and chapter titles like "*Vivandières, Blanchisseuses, Enfants, et Bric-à-brac.*"⁴ According to an article in *Military History* in 2006, "The female participants at Waterloo form one of the great, untold stories of the epic battle."⁵ It is impossible to know the extent of participation by women, since many of the events were not chronicled, and many women were in no official capacity. There is, however, ample evidence of women's presence: as the wives of British and Belgian officers who, for the most part, remained comfortably billeted away from the battlefield while enjoying the niceties of Brussels or Antwerp; wives of common

³ Response to "Napoleonic Wars: Women at Waterloo," citing the *Chelmsford Chronicle* (25 April 1879), at <http://www.historynet.com/?s=Napoleonic+Wars%3A+Women+at+Waterloo>. Accessed 9 June 2015.

⁴ See John Sutherland, *Men of Waterloo* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and John Elting, *Swords around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée* (London: The Free Press, 1988). It should be noted that Elting's work is widely acclaimed, and this chapter title is a woeful representation of his book as a whole.

⁵ "Napoleonic Wars: Women at Waterloo" at <http://www.historynet.com/?s=Napoleonic+Wars%3A+Women+at+Waterloo>, 12 June 2006. Accessed on 9 June 2015.

soldiers on both sides of the conflict; a few women who continued their service as women soldiers (*femmes militaires*) although they were not allowed officially in the military; significant numbers of sutlers (*vivandières*) and washerwomen (*blanchisseuses*) who served as civilian employees in the French armies or who were part of the army train of the Allies; children; local residents; sightseers and looters. Even though histories of the period tend to separate the battlefield from the domestic front, the distinction is not entirely real.⁶ Boundaries of battle shifted; villages were swallowed up in the conflicts; and roads were clogged with the fleeing, the wounded, and those who sought their loved ones.

This paper chronicles and analyzes the roles of women at the battle of Waterloo, from the opening music of the Duchess of Richmond's ball, across three days of battle, and through the retreat of the French armies. It is based on memoirs of both men and women, recollections of family members, records of the Service Historique de l'Armée (Vincennes, France), analyses of women's motives, fictionalized accounts, and illustrations and paintings.

Let us return to the opening salvos of the campaign once the French armies had

⁶ Nicholas Atkin recognizes this distinction in his discussion of fictionalized warfare in *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Twentieth-Century Europe* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), 15-16.

crossed into Belgium.⁷ There, in Brussels on 15 June, Charlotte Gordon, Duchess of Richmond, was hosting her opulent dinner and ball. The coach house had been papered with trellises and roses, chandeliers lighted the space, and the Scottish highlanders danced their reel to the enjoyment of the lords and ladies, dukes and duchesses, five princes, and a bevy of other notables. Of the more than two hundred guests, one-fourth were women, including fourteen daughters.⁸ Besides the wealth of British and Allied gentry at the ball, Brussels was swarming with British expatriates who had moved there to enjoy a less expensive life than in Great Britain. Napoleon's return from Elba had given them pause, but so little was known about his movements, including troop movements, that a party atmosphere reigned. As one writer described it, "The Peninsular campaign had been a genuine war; this had the outward appearance of garrison duty in a fashionable spa town."⁹ Picnics, sporting events, gambling, and all sorts of entertainments were the fare of the day.

⁷ Although Belgium did not exist at this time, the Principality of the United Netherlands is a rather unknown designation (as it was tenuously known at that time). I have, therefore, chosen to use Belgium throughout this paper for the location of the campaign.

⁸ Blanche Arthur Georgina Swinton, *A Sketch of the Life of Georgina, Lady de Ros, with Some Reminiscences of Her Family and Friends, Including the Duke of Wellington* (London: John Murray, 1893), 122-32.

⁹ Nick Foulkes, *Dancing into Battle: A Social History of the Battle of Waterloo* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2006), 122-23. My title is partially borrowed from this source.

When the call to arms was issued that night, nearly every house in Brussels and in the neighboring communities was affected because of the soldiers and officers who were billeted there. The Duchess of Richmond continued her ball, allegedly imploring guests to remain for additional sustenance. She was insistent, “perhaps genuinely believ[ing] that Napoleon would have the good manners to wait for her party to finish before commencing his attack.”¹⁰ According to De Lancey, some of the officers never changed from their dancing slippers and silk stockings into socks and boots.¹¹ Along the streets, according to observer Charlotte Eaton, “soldiers’ wives marched out with their husbands to the field.” She even chronicled one officer’s wife on horseback, riding out of Brussels with him.¹² In some cases “the pretty young women” who had grown attached to the billeted soldiers, in the words of Private Wheeler, likely marched out with them as well.¹³ At most street corners, women, who were slightly


¹⁰ Foulkes, 146.

¹¹ Magdalene De Lancey, “A Week at Waterloo in 1815,” in *Ladies of Waterloo*, 201.

¹² Charlotte C. Eaton, “Waterloo Days,” in *Ladies of Waterloo*, 34.

¹³ *Letters of Private Wheeler* in Foulkes, *Dancing into Battle*, 93-94.

wrapped and still in their bed clothes, searched for one last glance of a loved one who was seeking his glory and “all of the honors he was to gain.”¹⁴ Yes, there was vanity in it, which was captured well by Thackeray in *Vanity Fair*.¹⁵ On the other hand, as one observer noted, it was incongruous to see the army marching out, while Flemish peasant women arrived in Brussels with their cabbages, green peas, early potatoes and strawberries for the market, totally unaware of what was going on.¹⁶



Yet, in fact, peasants and local inhabitants had been fleeing north since the French troops crossed the border and entered their lands. Houses and cottages

were commandeered for officers, and troops bivouacked in the countryside, setting up massive campfires, and leaving behind blackened “traces in meadows and cornfields” as though those fields had been

¹⁴ Swinton, *A Sketch of the Life of Georgina, Lady de Ros*, 132-33.

¹⁵ See the fictional account in William Makepeace Thackeray’s *Vanity Fair: A Novel without a Hero* (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd, 1907), Chapters XXIX and XXX.

¹⁶ *The Battle of Waterloo: Containing the Series of Accounts Published by Authority, Britain and Foreign, and Other Relative Documents with Circumstantial Details, Previous and After the Battle* (London: J. Booth, 1815), 40.

struck by lightning.¹⁷ It was worse when the skirmishes turned into battles, and the local inhabitants could salvage almost nothing from their humble abodes. It would be another year before their crops would recover. Villages were simply “emptied out.”¹⁸ The former villagers were joined by camp followers throughout the contest. Sergeant William Lawrence noted in his journal, that during the entire night of 17 June, “thousands of camp followers were on their retreat to Brussels” instead of remaining with the armies. “The people were sometimes completely stuck in the mud,” and wagons clogged all of the roads.¹⁹ In the Forest of Soignes, north of Waterloo, they congregated and waited, because they had nowhere else to go. This was a refugee camp of women and children, all measure of farm animals, and whatever they could cart or carry away from the French troops. “It was a rude sort of encampment,” wrote one observer, and, from it, a “universal uproar seemed to prevail.”²⁰ There was also a universal fear of what the French soldiers would do. And, there were also sight-seers, particularly on

¹⁷ *The Journal of the Three Days of the Battle of Waterloo: An Account of the Campaign of 1815 from Within the French Army by an Eyewitness* (Leonaur, Ltd., 2010), 30.

¹⁸ Harold Parker, *Three Napoleonic Battles* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983), 206.

¹⁹ William Lawrence, *The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence: A Hero of the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1886), n.p. (Project Gutenberg E-book #29263).

²⁰ Charlotte Eaton, *Waterloo Days: The Narrative of an Englishwoman Resident at Brussels in June 1815* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1888), 48.

16 June before news of Ligny had circulated. Cavalié Mercer recounted, as he and his soldiers moved south to meet his wagons and other Allied troops, that “we had numerous gay visitors ... ladies and gentlemen” who were “attracted by the novelty of the scene.”²¹ Later they would join the panic, along with wagon drivers and servants who deserted their carts and baggage in the middle of the roads to flee toward Brussels.²²

Not everyone fled from harm’s way. Only a few references can be found, but in the accounts of the battle and its aftermath, we meet Guillaume van Cutsem, a gardener, and his five-year old daughter, both of whom were caught at Hougoumont on 18 June, as he continued to tend and protect his garden on the orders of its owner. When the chateau burned and the cannonade became more severe, British guards managed to spirit them away during a brief lull in the conflagration.²³ When the family returned to Hougoumont, only the chapel was not in ruins. According to reports, the roses, orange trees and geraniums were still blooming in spite of the carnage. The foliage of the turnips and cabbages also seemed untouched.²⁴ The family members

²¹ Cavalié Mercer, *Journal of the Waterloo Campaign Kept Throughout the Campaign of 1815* (London: William Blackwell, 1870), 236.

²² Gareth Glover, *The Waterloo Archive: British Sources*, vol. 3 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Frontline Books, 2011), 222.

²³ Robert Kershaw, *24 Hours at Waterloo: 18 June 1815* (London: W. H. Allen, 2013), 213.

²⁴ Mercer, *Journal of the Waterloo Campaign*, 349.

reestablished themselves in a “shed among the deserted ruins.”²⁵ Nearby at Mont St. Jean, “one solitary woman remained” in her farm cottage. She had shut herself up to protect her farm and her animals from being despoiled, although her husband had fled. Ultimately, we do not know what remained of the farm which ended up becoming a sanctuary and dressing station for wounded British officers.²⁶

Nearby was the hastily outfitted field hospital that occupied the major farm at Mont St. Jean. Serving 6,000 wounded during the immediate conflict, a number of women from the nearby Women’s Camp and even their children ministered to the Allied casualties. The best description of the Women’s Camp unfortunately is not from a memoir but rather from Thomas Hardy’s *The Dynasts: An Epic Drama of the War with Napoleon*:

On the sheltered side of a clump of trees at the back of the English position camp-fires are smouldering. Soldiers’ wives, mistresses, and children from a few months to five or six years of age, sit on the ground round the fires or on armfuls of straw from the adjoining farm. Wounded soldiers lie near the women.... Two wagons stand near; also a surgeon’s

²⁵ *The Battle of Waterloo, also of Ligny and Quatre Bras, Containing the Series of Accounts Published by Authority, British and Foreign, with Circumstantial Details, relative to the Battles ...* (London: John Booth, T. Egerton, and J. Fairbairn, 1817), 27-28.

²⁶ *The Battle of Waterloo, also of Ligny and Quatre Bras*, 24.

horse in charge of a batman, laden with bone-saws, knives, probes, tweezers, and other surgical instruments. Behind lies a woman who has just given birth to a child, which a second woman is holding.²⁷

According to stories, Mary Hallett, wife of Daniel Gale, served in the field hospital. Apparently she had been allowed to join him during the peace, and she and her five-year-old daughter had found places in the Women’s Camp as the battle raged. While awaiting news of her husband’s fate, she and daughter Elizabeth made lint for bandages and administered water to the wounded whose mouths were parched from the smoke of the battlefield and from biting off gunpowder cartridges to load their weapons.²⁸ At the time, Elizabeth was only a tyke, but in her later years, she recounted having first seen death when her mother lifted the cloth from the face of a soldier, not being sure if her mother would recognize him. His open, glazed eyes looked up at her. According to *The Sphere*, published in London and distributed on 14 November 1903, she was the last surviving

²⁷ Thomas Hardy, *The Dynasts: An Epic Drama of the War with Napoleon*, part 3, act 7, scene 5 (London: MacMillan and Company, 1910), 498, “The Same. The Women’s Camp near Mont Saint-Jean.”

²⁸ Charles Dalton, ed., *The Waterloo Roll Call*, 2nd edition (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1904), 277; and “Abstracts of a Battle: Waterloo Ladies,” *Adventures in Historyland*, (4 February 2015), <https://adventuresinhistoryland.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/abstracts-of-a-battle/>. Accessed on 9 June 2015.

British eye-witness of Waterloo.²⁹ Elizabeth's friend Barbara, also her age, sought her own father among the wounded. Of the 200 men in his contingent, 51 had died or been seriously wounded. Her father proved to be one of them. Ultimately her mother was widowed and would have to fend for herself.³⁰ There are also recollections of Barbara Moon, a four-year-old, who was somewhere in the midst of the suffering, riding in a wagon across the field of battle.³¹ Children were often with the armies because of the service of their mothers as washerwomen, seamstresses, sutlers, *and* nurses, when the need arose. It is important to note that children were, in fact, allowed as *enfants de troupe* (i.e., children of the regiment) among all armies, according to government regulations.

The encampments of the army trains were "like small cities," filled with tents, carts, women and children, surgeons and their tools and assistants, leather and boot repair, horse handlers, and a wealth of supplies and services to be purchased.³² Canteens were set up, often having the air and appearance of a street fair, to dispense drinks like *eau-de-vie*, tobacco, meat, and other comestibles. Such had always been the case in Early Modern Europe, but

²⁹ "The Last British Eye-Witness of Waterloo," *The Sphere: An Illustrated Newspaper for the Home*, vol. 15 (October 3-December 26, 1903), 154.

³⁰ Robert Kershaw, *24 Hours at Waterloo: 18 June 1815* (London: W. H. Allen, 2014), 345-46.

³¹ *Waterloo Roll Call*, 277.

³² Gunther Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 14.

what changed was the official recognition and limitation on the number of women who could travel with the armies.³³ As of 1792, the British allowed six women per company or about six per hundred men. This was reinforced by regulations in 1801 that specified that these women be the wives of soldiers, although marriage was discouraged because a wife left behind in Britain would likely be destitute. As a note, the wives of non-commissioned officers were excluded from the count. Often wives with their children accompanied their spouses to the point of debarkation, not knowing if they would be chosen by lot to accompany the troops overseas. According to one witness, on the beaches, there were "disconsolate-looking groups of women and children ... seen here and there sitting on their poor duds ... all clamoring, lamenting, and materially increasing the Babel-like confusion."³⁴ If a woman could not accompany her soldier husband, she was given a small stipend to find a place where she would live during his absence, but no other provision was made for her. On the other hand, if she could accompany her husband, she would receive rations, a stipend, and her family could remain intact.

By the time of Waterloo, regimentation had become paramount. In the case of washerwomen, even the number of shirts and socks was specified, e.g., two each per

³³ Barton Hacker, "Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A Reconnaissance," *Signs* 6 (No. 4, Summer 1981), 664.

³⁴ Foulkes, *Dancing into Battle*, 84.

week, for five pence from the pay sergeant.³⁵ What mattered was that order be maintained, so those who accompanied the troops could not include any who “are of immoral or drunken character or who refuse to work with the men.” They were still in some ways “mules to their husbands” and to the company.³⁶ Belgian women also accompanied their husbands; “several were found dead, one in particular with a child at her breast, who had brought refreshments to the field and was struck by a cannon shot.”³⁷ Other women were found in “plain female dress” lying dead next to their husbands.³⁸ Mary Dixon, a cross-dressed soldier, had allegedly served for sixteen years in the army, before dying at Waterloo.³⁹ For Therese, who accompanied Jack of the 73rd Foot (no surnames were recorded), it was fortunate that, after his death, his comrades kept her on, and his will accounted for her.⁴⁰ There were also women like Martha Deacon, wife of Ensign Deacon of the 73rd Foot who searched for

her husband through the night after Quatre Bras. With three children in tow and a dress not meant for canvassing a battlefield after dusk and in the rain, she was also very pregnant. As it was, her husband had been conveyed to Brussels, where she found him the next day. On 19 June, she gave birth to Isabella Fleura Waterloo Deacon.⁴¹ Two other births are documented as well: Margaret Tolmie and Frederica McMullen Waterloo.⁴² No one knows how many women were in the encampments at the time of the Waterloo campaign, but with a potential of six per 100 men, and a British army of 68,000, there could have been over 4000 women close to the field of battle, on its fringes, or actually in the engagement.

For officers’ wives, there is no common story. Some of them remained in Brussels, although a number made the trek to Antwerp, not without difficulty in the tenuous times. That is where De Lancey had sent his wife (whom we met earlier in this paper) on the morning of 16 June. According to her memoirs, “He wished me not to think of going along with him, because the rear of the great army was

³⁵ E. W. Sheppard, ed., *Red Coat: An Anthology of the British Soldiers during the Last Three Hundred Years* (London: Batchworth, 1952), 48-49.

³⁶ Hacker, “Women and Military Institutions,” 660.

³⁷ *The Battle of Waterloo: Containing a Series of Accounts* (1815), 232.

³⁸ *The Battle of Waterloo: Containing a Series of Accounts* (1815), 256.

³⁹ Guyonne Leduc, “Women in the Army in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” in Isabelle Baudino, Jacques Carré, and Cécile Révauger, *The Invisible Woman: Aspects of Women’s Work in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 82.

⁴⁰ Thomas Morris, *The Napoleonic Wars* in John Selby, ed. *Military Memoirs* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), 84.

⁴¹ Morris, 69-70.

⁴² Glover, *Waterloo: Myth and Reality*, 200. For more information on McMullen’s daughter, see *The Battle of Waterloo: Containing a Series of Accounts* (1815), 229. According to accounts, Private McMullen’s wife was injured as she tried to carry him off the battlefield. They both were treated in Antwerp: Private McMullen for the loss of both arms, and Mrs. McMullen for a fractured leg from a musket ball. Her heroism brought them to the attention of the Duke of York who became the child’s godfather.

always dangerous and an unfit situation for a woman.”⁴³ She was followed by others including the wife of Colonel Hawkes⁴⁴ and Juana Smith, wife of Brigade-Major Harry Smith. After one night, Juana returned to Brussels and then to the field of battle to find her husband. In her memoirs, she wrote that the uneven, cobbled, muddy road was “nearly choked” with “wounded men and horses, and corpses borne forward to Brussels for interment.”⁴⁵ In Brussels, hospitals were set up in the open air and wherever places could be found. The evening before the Battle of Waterloo, the mayor of Brussels had asked local inhabitants for mattresses, sheets, and blankets. Men laid hay in the squares, and local and British women assisted the surgeons and ministered to the injured.⁴⁶ Fanny Burney, who was sent to Brussels by her French royalist husband, recorded her fear of a French victory and the “indescribable horror” of the maimed who came to the city.⁴⁷ The battle, after all, was only ten miles away.

⁴³ Magdalene De Lancey, “A Week at Waterloo in 1815,” *Ladies of Waterloo*, 198.

⁴⁴ Glover, *Waterloo Archive*, 3: 193.

⁴⁵ Juana Smith, “Juana’s Story,” *Ladies of Waterloo*, 262.

⁴⁶ M. R. Howard, “British Medical Services at the Battle of Waterloo,” *British Medical Journal*, vol. 297 (no. 6664, December 24-31, 1988), 1655.

⁴⁷ Fanny Burney, *Waterloo Journal*, in Catriona Kennedy, “From the Ballroom to the Battlefield,” *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820*, edited by Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall (New York: Palgrave Macmillan/St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 141.

When it came to the French armies, already in 1793, the government took action declaring that only women in useful professions (*femmes utiles*) could remain in the army train. By 1800, the numbers were set at four *vivandières* per battalion, and requirements for selection included good morality, being married to a non-commissioned officer or an active duty soldier, and appointment by the administrative council. Each was required to have a *patente* (official papers) that spelled out her responsibilities, including selling her goods at a reasonable price; a full description of herself including her birth place, age, height, hair and eye color, and nose and face, and forehead shape; and a list of her belongings, including any animals, carts, or wagons.⁴⁸ She was required also to wear a white metal plaque inscribed with her name and company.⁴⁹ In her wagon, or one that she shared, she would typically have letter paper, buttons, boot lace or cord, and she would be seen among the troops typically with her tri-colored *tonnelet* (cask) over her neck and cups slung in a cloth sack by her side. Some *cantinières* took their *eau-de-vie* onto the battlefield in support of the troops who

⁴⁸ Copy of a *patente* from the dossier of Françoise Elizabeth [née Blanchard] Alloux, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (Vincennes), X^s11. This particular *patente* dates from 1809 and was printed to be used on all occasions with blanks for the type of service, name, battalion, regiment, belongings, and physical description. Thomas Cardoza argues that the fact that these forms were printed confirms that there were significant numbers of women in supply and service.

⁴⁹ *Carnet de la Sabretache: Revue militaire rétrospective*, 3rd series, no. 257 (May 1914), 2:316.

were under attack. Two washerwomen were also typically attached to each battalion, and there could be two *enfants de troupe* per company. Allegedly children had to be at least two years old, but babies were also a fact of life. While it is not known how many *vivandières* and *blanchisseuses* were with the French armies during the Waterloo Campaign, there could have been as many as 1000.⁵⁰ Besides Marie Tête-de-Bois, whose life is chronicled in memoirs (but not in a dossier, because she did not live to request a pension), there are only a few other references to sutlers with the French armies. One is to a Marie (no surname recorded) who was wounded earlier, lost her husband and remarried, nursed the wounded under fire, and was taken prisoner by the English at Waterloo, but released because she was Belgian.⁵¹ Another reference was to an unnamed *cantinière* in the 81st Infantry Regiment. According to an eyewitness, “her husband had his head taken off by a cannon ball, and she left us in tears.” There is nothing further in the account.⁵² And finally there

⁵⁰ Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (Vincennes), X^s11-12. These two cartons do not contain any dossiers of women who served at Waterloo, but they are a small sample of *vivandières* and *cantinières*, salvaged from petitions to the army for pensions or aid from destitution. They were collected by Léon Hennem, archivist.

⁵¹ Brice, *Les Femmes et les Armées*, 277; Sergeant Bourgogne, *Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne, 1812-1813, Compiled from the Original Manuscript by Paul Cottin* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Company, 1899), 280.

⁵² Louis Jacques Romand, *Mémoires de ma Vie militaire, 1809-1815* (Besançon: Charlin, 1981) in Thomas Cardoza, *Intrepid Women: Cantinières and*

was Regula Engel who dressed as a soldier and followed her husband on campaign beginning in 1792. When he died at Waterloo, she was also injured. Because she was cross-dressed, it was only when doctors treated her wounds that they discovered she was a woman. In her later years, she wrote her memoirs, which may be largely apocryphal.⁵³

Why did women choose this perilous, strenuous, and ultimately invisible employment? For some, it was the only way to remain with their husbands, and to calm their fears about being left alone. It was also an economic reality. Furthermore, women in supply provided important service. As Thomas Cardoza outlined in his book about *cantinières*: “They supplemented the army’s rudimentary logistics system, provided essential laundry and sewing services, and helped prevent desertion by providing in camp what soldiers otherwise desert to obtain: food, drink, tobacco, and female companionship.”⁵⁴ As sutlers, a number of them had gone from walking with the army train and carrying their supplies, to riding a single horse, bedecked with woven reed or leather saddlebags, to reasonably wealthy women with a wagon, several horses, other farm animals, and a vast array of goods to be sold. Yet, women in supply in the French armies were civilian

Vivandières of the French Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 65.

⁵³ See Jean-Jacques Fiechter, ed., *L’Amazone de Napoléon: Mémoires de Regula Engel* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1985).

⁵⁴ Cardoza, *Intrepid Women*, 89.

employees, so they did not qualify for any salaries or benefits as *vivandières* or *blanchisseuses*. They did qualify, however, for widows' benefits, which, unfortunately were reduced as a cost-cutting measure in 1809. If they did not remarry when their spouse was killed in order to remain with the regiment, they would receive a small stipend to return home, probably to penury. After Waterloo, for French women, it was also unlikely that the Bourbon regime was going to honor their petitions.

As the carnage from the battle of Waterloo was cleared over a four-day period, others noted the presence of women. Edward Cotton, who was a sergeant major, wrote that "many women were reported among the slain."⁵⁵ According to another eye-witness, French girls and women, dressed in male attire, were dead next to their "brothers, husbands, and lovers." He went on to editorialize, "This is no uncommon event in the French armies; such is the romantic devotion of the French women to those whom they love."⁵⁶ Whether it was romantic devotion, patriotism, or economic survival, there were other women as well, including a woman who was "dressed in a nankeen jacket and trousers, and had been killed by a ball that

⁵⁵ Cotton in Julie Wheelright, "Amazons and Military Maids: An Examination of Female Military Heroines in British Literature and the Changing Construction of Gender," *Women's Studies International Forum* 10, no. 5 (1987): 489.

⁵⁶ *The Battle of Waterloo: Containing the Accounts published by Authority* (1815), 256.

passed through her head."⁵⁷ In the case of women who had joined the French military as soldiers during the wars of the Revolution, most had been unceremoniously mustered out by 1793; however, some remained under cover of their regiments and cross-dressed. Because the only records that exist, beyond memoirs, are pension requests housed at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre at Vincennes, there is no way of tracing individual women to Waterloo.⁵⁸ From the extant dossiers, we nonetheless can learn that women served in the army for all of the reasons cited above, but also because service suited their temperament. One earlier woman soldier simply noted that she "had been born with male traits," and another described the woes of her previous civilian life.⁵⁹ Once the battle was over, those who had survived remained mostly invisible.

One eye-witness reported that, as soon as the sounds of the guns were over and the retreat had begun, "hundreds of anxious wives, friends, and children poured onto the muddy field in search of their loved

⁵⁷ Henry Ross-Lewin, *With the Thirty-Second in the Peninsular and Other Campaigns* (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Company, Ltd., 1904), 273.

⁵⁸ These records are found in the series XR48-49 at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre at Vincennes. They were collected by Léon Hennet, archivist of the Ministry of War. See also Susan Conner, "La vraie Madame Sans-Gêne: Women Soldiers in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies, 1792-1815," *Napoleonic Scholarship: The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society* 3 (May 2010): 14-19.

⁵⁹ Dossiers Julien and Rouget, XR48-49, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

ones.”⁶⁰ That was likely on 19 June, but during the night of 18 June, the looters had come out. Charlotte Eaton, who was in Brussels and not on the battlefield recounted, “It was astonishing with what dreadful haste the bodies of the dead had been pillaged.... The most daring and atrocious of these marauders were women.”⁶¹ Allegedly they were camp followers and peasant women who had nothing to lose and a great deal to gain from the booty they could collect.

There is no question that looting took place, followed by a trade in souvenirs and sight-seeing. It was common, as Lady Charlotte Uxbridge recounted: “Mrs. Pole wanted me rather to go to a party with her to see the field of battle today, but I do not think I could have courage *to look* if I went, and therefore I am as well at home, but *I will go*.”⁶² And, they did go and continue to go.⁶³

In the finality of Waterloo, some women went home to empty beds; others were widowed or orphaned. Some lived in economic misery; some made their fortunes; and others were never missed. Because most of these women were inarticulate, except for officers’ wives, we have few sources to aid us in reconstructing their past. Yet, along with

the counts of troops, generals, standards, horses, and cannon, we can, with some historical assurance, add more than 5000 women and children on or near the immediate battlefield. In the trenches near Mont St. Jean, thousands of bodies were burned and buried, and it remains to be known how many were women.

⁶⁰ Kershaw, *24 Hours at Waterloo*, 345.

⁶¹ Charlotte Eaton, “Waterloo Days,” *Ladies of Waterloo*, 142-143

⁶² Glover, *The Waterloo Archive*, 3: 9.

⁶³ See Stuart Semmel, “The Tangible Past: British Tourism, Collecting, and Memory after Waterloo” *Representations*, 69 (Winter 2000, special issue), 9-37.

An American Diplomat in ‘Paree’ during the Hundred Days

by William L. Chew III

John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) was the first true career diplomat in American history.¹ Exposed to the international sphere during his youth, he accompanied his father on diplomatic missions to France and the Netherlands (1778-1782). At age 14 he joined the American *chargé d'affaires* Francis Dana to Russia, serving as his secretary. As a growing young man, therefore, he not only traveled widely, but also learned French and Dutch to a high degree of fluency, while acquiring a good working knowledge of other languages. By the age of 26, he was already Minister to the Netherlands. In 1797, he was appointed Minister to Prussia and in 1809, named the first American Minister to St. Petersburg. The War of 1812 interrupted this appointment, as Adams was recalled to serve as the chief negotiator, in Ghent, Belgium, of the treaty ending that conflict. Having successfully completed his mission with its signing on Christmas Eve, 1814, he left for France, where he was to await the confirmation of his new posting as Minister to Britain. His wife Louisa and son Charles, still in Russia, would meet him in Paris.

Adams also ranks as one of the foremost diarists in American history, and his

education, intelligence, social and political position, linguistic aptitude, broad interests, and qualities as a writer make him a premier observer of his period. Adams's diary, filling 51 volumes and over 14,000 pages, was begun in 1779 and kept until shortly before his death in 1848. It ranks as an indispensable historical source and has recently been made available by the Massachusetts Historical Society in a digitized facsimile, which I have used for this study.² My transcription of his journal in France in 1815 numbers some 40,000 words and documents his activities and comments on events and conditions. Here, I will examine Adams the traveler and tourist, and in a later study, Adams the political observer.

Adams arrived in Paris on 4 February 1815 and stayed until 16 May, when he and his family departed for Le Havre, whence they embarked for England on 23 May. Thus, he was in France during most of the Hundred Days. Adams could hardly fail to write down his impressions of this noteworthy episode of the Napoleonic saga. Astonishingly, his account has so far been virtually ignored. Samuel Bemis, author of the standard monograph on Adams's diplomatic career, only devoted two pages to his stay in Paris in 1815,

¹ An extended version of this article appeared as “John Quincy Adams: American Tourist in Paris, 1815” in the journal of the *Fondation Napoléon: Napoleonica. La Revue* 18 (March 2013), 84-125. Passages reprinted with permission.

² *The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection*. Massachusetts Historical Society. www.masshist.org/jqadiaries/. Hereinafter cited as JQA Diary, followed by the date of entry.

limiting himself to a description of Adams's activities.³ The top four scholarly biographies, by Paul Nagel, Lynn Parsons, Robert Remini and Harlow Unger do little else.⁴ Together, they devote less than four pages of some 1200 pages to his stay. Nor do scholarly articles or doctoral dissertations approach the subject.

Adams was at leisure to do what he pleased, since while in Paris he was between postings. And so he was for once something of a Grand Tourist, though limited to what today would be dubbed "city-tripping" to Paris. His diary provides us with a fascinating view of the material culture of travel, transportation and sojourn; of the bureaucratic formalities such as getting passports; of the high culture of opera and theater and museum and the not-so-high-culture of the popular spectacles of tourism and urban recreational activities. Adams also spent much time networking with professional or other interesting acquaintances and contacts. Given his background, he already knew many of these from earlier travels and postings. Adams's network was impressive indeed, judging from the contact references in his journal. During his stay, he mentions having met,

socialized, or had some kind of business with 129 individuals, the majority of whom were prominent individuals including diplomats, generals, state functionaries, bankers, merchants, politicians, noblemen, scientists, men and women of letters.

Material Realities of Travel

Most American travelers armed themselves with letters of introduction from friends or business associates, who themselves had connections in France to well-placed persons. Adams, given his background, had little need for such "door openers." He did, however, have to submit to the formalities required of all foreigners entering Paris. This meant registering with the police for a residence permit, and giving up his passport for safe-keeping, for the duration.⁵ Passports in the period more closely resembled modern visas, and were limited in time and specific to a certain itinerary. At the end of his stay, Adams required a new passport to leave France and take him to London. This he received without further ado from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, personally.

³ Samuel F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of America Foreign Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 221-23.

⁴ Paul C. Nagel, *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, A Private Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Lynn H. Parsons, *John Quincy Adams* (Madison: Madison House, 1998); Robert V. Remini, *John Quincy Adams* (New York: Henry Holt, 2002); Harlow Giles Unger, *John Quincy Adams* (Boston, Da Capo Press: 2012).


⁵ Henri Auguste Ottocar Reichard, *Guide des Voyageurs en France*, 6th ed. (facsimile repr. of 1810 ed., Weimar, 1970), 101-02. By ordinance of 13 August 1800, passports issued by foreign authorities were declared invalid, requiring foreigners to register with the police. This was, of course, in the interest of Napoleonic surveillance. See Jean Tulard, ed., *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 2: 482. The procedure was maintained under Louis XVIII.

Traveling overland in France by coach meant choosing between two options. Men of moderate means took the public stage coach or *diligence*, which left according to fixed time schedules and connected major towns. The stage system had originated under Louis XIV and been instituted by Turgot, the king's Comptroller General. Regulated as a public service during the Empire, prices and schedules were fixed and could be looked up in appropriate almanacs or guidebooks.⁶ Adams, however, "traveled Post," meaning he had his own carriage, but rented post horses *en-route*. Traveling like this was not only more comfortable than using the standard diligence, but also allowed greater flexibility, as one was his own master in terms of scheduling. It was, however, about four times as expensive as the

diligence, and required one to deal with various logistics such as the ordering of horses, paying the required fees on the way, negotiating with postilions, and taking on the responsibility and costs of eventual carriage servicing and repairs.

The rate of overland travel depended on the state of roads, and the season, with its varying weather and hours of daylight. Primary roads were paved in the middle (the *pavé*), which allowed for fairly rapid rates of travel even during the rainy season, when the unpaved side-lanes (the *parterre*) turned into impassable mud. Secondary roads were often covered with pebbles, crushed to dust over time, and considered fairly

comfortable. One could expect a fair daily rate of travel, over medium road conditions and during good weather, of about 50 miles per day, or about 8 miles per hour. Under excellent road and weather conditions and without any unplanned delays or accidents, one might travel up to 100 miles in a single 24-hour period, by private coach.⁷



⁶ For an overview of public and private transport in France during the late-Eighteenth and early-Nineteenth Centuries, as experienced by American travelers, see William L. Chew III, "On the Road Again: The Material Realities of French Overland Travel in American Revolutionary and Napoleonic Travel Accounts." In Conference Proceedings *Things that Move: The Material Worlds of Tourism and Travel*, 19-23 July 2007, Centre for Tourism and Cultural Change, Leeds Metropolitan University, United Kingdom.

⁷ For road conditions, costs, rates of travel see William L. Chew III, "On the Road Again: The Material Realities of French Overland Travel in

Travelers then and now were confronted with the challenges of making their stay a pleasant one. For the purpose of orientation and planning, Adams needed a post map with all the routes served by the postal system, and all the relays and stages along the way. This handy purchase doubtless aided him in maintaining the precise tabular record of his journey.⁸ He also bought a guidebook of Paris.⁹ Adams lodged at the first-class *Hôtel du Nord*, centrally located on the *Rue de Richelieu* and in walking distance of the Louvre and Tuileries.

Adams the Tourist

Once in Paris, Adams indulged himself as a

American Revolutionary and Napoleonic Travel Accounts.”

⁸ JQA Diary, 12 March 1815. Adams does not note the precise title of his purchase. He likely bought one of the popular road maps, often combined with post route indicators, mentioned by other Americans, which included Louis Dutens, *Itinéraire des routes les plus fréquentées, ou journal de plusieurs voyages aux villes principales de l'Europe, Depuis 1768 jusqu'en 1791* (Paris, 1791)—and constantly re-edited; Henri Auguste Ottocar Reichard, *Guide des Voyageurs en France*, 6th ed. (facsimile repr. of 1810 ed., Weimar, 1970); and R.J.F. Vaysse de Villiers, *Description routière et géographique de l'Empire Français, par. R. V. ****, *Inspecteur des Postes-Relais*, 1813-1823, 9 vols. (Paris, n.d.).

⁹ JQA Diary, 18 and 26 April 1815. Adams just refers to a “description of Paris,” not mentioning a precise title. He likely bought one of the popular local guidebooks mentioned by other Americans in France, during the period, such as the *Almanach parisien ou Guide de l'Étranger à Paris; contenant une indication des choses les plus curieuses et le plus intéressantes, qui méritent de fixer l'attention d'un étranger* (Paris 1801) or the *Almanach Impérial, présenté à S.M. l'Empereur et Roi par Testu* (Paris 1808).

diligent tourist. Contrary to his native inclination—and if ever there was a Yankee with a Puritan work ethic, it was Adams—in Paris, as he put it himself, he “passed upwards three months of leisure, too unprofitably for any useful purpose, but as agreeably as any part of my life.”¹⁰ Indeed, “The tendency to dissipation at Paris seems to be irresistible,” he wrote early on in his stay. “There is a moral incapacity for industry and application; a mollesse against which I am as ill-guarded as I was at the age of twenty.”¹¹ In fact, that “spirit of dissipation” was so “inseparable from a visit to Paris,” he complained, that he hardly ever rose anymore before seven, and “often but a few minutes before eight.”¹² Yet contrary to many of his compatriots, he never censured the French for their perceived low morals, as compared to the supposedly virtuous Americans.¹³ Adams was not a facile proponent of arrogant American exceptionalism.

So, like scores of Americans before and after him, Adams visited the various museums, galleries and natural history collections available in the European

¹⁰ JQA Diary, 16 May 1815.

¹¹ JQA Diary, 12 February 1815.

¹² JQA Diary, 28 February 1815.

¹³ JQA Diary, 28 February 1815. For an extended discussion of this moral discourse, see William L. Chew III, “‘Straight’ Sam Meets ‘Lewd’ Louis. American Perceptions of French Sexuality, 1775-1815,” *Revolutions & Watersheds: Transatlantic Dialogues, 1775-1815*, eds. W.M. Verhoeven, Beth Dolan Kautz (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999—*DQR Studies in Literature* 26), 61-86.

cultural capital, some more than once.¹⁴ With his avid interest in the natural sciences, and systems of measurement and astronomy in particular, Adams's first visit was to the Cabinet of Natural History, today called the *Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle*. Founded in 1793, its collections dated back to the Seventeenth Century.¹⁵ The Louvre, as we know it today, or "Musée Napoléon"—as it was re-baptized in 1802—drew his attention next. It also captured his interest most, for he visited the museum on eight occasions. On his first visit he established for himself an overview of the collection, and later focused on the "large and valuable collection of Pictures, by the Principal Masters of the Italian, Flemish and Dutch Schools." He particularly admired "The ancient Pictures, painted before the time of John Van Eyck of Bruges, The inventor of Paintings in Oils very numerous, and in an excellent state of preservation." During another visit, he took in Greek statuary, the Italian Renaissance and the Dutch masters. Like most other Americans, for their part much less erudite than he, even Adams was overwhelmed by the sheer immensity and variety of what he saw. Adams also visited the *Salon de Paris*, the premier venue for the annually organized exposition of contemporary painting,

¹⁴ For a comparative discussion of the touristic habits and attitudes of Americans in the French capital from the outgoing *Ancien Régime* to Napoleon, see William L. Chew III, "Life Before Fodor and Frommer? Yesteryear Americans in Paris from Jefferson to John Quincy Adams," *French History* 18 (March 2004), 25-49.

¹⁵ Tulard, 2: 363.

founded in 1667. While there, he took note of the immediate impact on the exhibition of the political winds of change: "All the Bourbon pictures are removed.... Some new pictures have appeared, which before this change of Government were not admissible; among the rest a very large picture of the Battle of Marengo."¹⁶ Thus, Bonaparte left his stamp on the pre-eminent annual modern painting event, just as on the hallowed collections of the Louvre.

In a lighter touristic vein, Adams took his family to the botanical garden, or *Jardin des Plantes*. Founded by the famous naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, it had been reorganized in 1793 and renamed *Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle*.¹⁷ Within its precincts, they also looked at "part of the Animals of the Ménagerie"—opened in 1794 as one of the oldest European zoological gardens accessible to the public—which must have delighted young Charles.¹⁸ A few days later, the family went to visit the *Musée des Monuments Français*, founded by the archeologist Alexandre Lenoir in 1790 and established in the convent of the Petits-Augustins.¹⁹ Adams also took young Charles to the Mint (*la Monnaie*)—whose origins dated back to the Ninth Century, though it was not attached to the Ministry of Finance until 1796—and the *Monnaie des Médailles*, where medals were struck,

¹⁶ JQA Diary, 26 March 1815.

¹⁷ Tulard, 2: 363.

¹⁸ JQA Diary, 31 March 1815.

¹⁹ Tulard, 2: 192-93.

predominantly for the purpose of Napoleonic propaganda.²⁰ Perhaps the most powerful testimony to Adams's scientific interests is the fact that, on two occasions he attended lectures of the French Institute (the *Institut National de France*), founded in 1795. In 1815, it was composed of five academies, of which he first visited the Academy of Sciences, then the French Academy (the latter accompanied by his wife and son).²¹ At the former, attended by some thirty members (of which he only knew a foreign member, the famous German naturalist and explorer Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt), he listened to a wide variety of papers.

What with the repeated visits to the "cultural temples" of Paris, one could infer that Adams's tourist activities were exclusively high-brow. Yet like others, he was also attracted to the more popular attractions. Thus, the whole family went out to see the famous "Bastille Elephant," an unfinished monument conceived by Napoleon in 1808 for the *Place de la Bastille*, supposed to be finished as a colossal bronze. Yet only a full-scale plaster model was ever built, during 1813-15. Had the elephant been completed, it would have been cast from the bronze of captured, melted-down cannon, and glorified Napoleon's military prowess.²² Adams and his son also visited the so-called Catacombs of Paris, an extensive

ossuary holding the bones of some six million individuals, collected from various subterranean burial sites by the end of the Eighteenth Century and deposited in a series of caverns that were once the old Parisian stone mines. These were subsequently opened to the public and became a tourist attraction by the early-Nineteenth Century.²³ The Adams's also visited what was clearly the most spectacular popular attraction of their stay, the "Spectacle Instructif and Phantasmagorie of Robertson," or "Phantasmagoria," for short, a nineteenth-century multimedia *tour de force*. This was a magic lantern show (a forerunner of the modern slide-projector), but with multiple and movable projectors, accompanied by smoke and sound effects, performed in a theatrical setting with changing lighting, all designed for dramatic effect. Typically, the most fantastical spectral images, often frightening or gruesome, were projected to the "oohs" and "aahs" of the appreciative public. One can imagine the special appeal to a young lad like Charles. "Robertson" himself (actually Étienne-Gaspard "Robertson" Robert) was a Belgian magician-inventor-impresario from Liège who had established his show in Paris in 1797 and pushed the boundaries of what his predecessors had done by improved technical means, i.e. placing the lanterns on wheels and using more than one projector, situated in different locations

²⁰ Tulard, 2: 292 and 334-35.


²¹ Tulard, 2: 38.

²² Tulard, 1: 175.

²³ Mairie de Paris. *Catacombes, Histoire de Paris*. <http://www.catacombes.paris.fr/> [Accessed 11 September 2013]

throughout the theater.²⁴ A diplomatic colleague, the previous American Minister to France and later co-negotiator of the Louisiana Purchase, Robert R. Livingston, had been to see *Phantasmagoria* previously, and left the following vivid description:

I went in company with Minister & some other gentlemen to see what effect Fantasmagorie would have on us—after having examined many ocular deceptions [to include illuminated likenesses of Franklin, Voltaire and Rousseau, we] were astonished by a ventriloquist who also did voice imitations; then various magic tricks and spectres—ghosts & skeletons appeared in different parts of the room they approached very near us & then suddenly vanished from our sight [finally] rose an enormous head—the mouth opened—the eyes rolled about—then appeared an arm with a dagger in its hand & stabbed it



in the cheek the blood gushed out—the head immediately vanished—a violent storm of hail rain lightning & thunder closed the scene. I intend going again so much was I pleased with the wonderful ocular deceptions, two Ladies were present & behaved with wonderful fortitude in the infernal regions. ...²⁵

Compared with modern American tourists, Adams and his contemporaries tended to display a keen interest in technology and transportation infrastructure. This interest was informed by 18th and 19th century concerns and mentality. The young Republic lacked a canal network and looked to Europe for possible inspiration when it came to canal and lock construction. Thomas Jefferson, to name a prominent example, took pains during his voyage through the South of France, in 1787, to examine and sketch in great detail the *Canal du Languedoc*, which connected the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and was constructed during the reign of Louis XIV.²⁶ Adams, for his part, on two

²⁴ Emmanuelle Sauvage, *Les fantasmagories de Robertson: entre «spectacle instructif» et mystification*. Conférences en ligne du Centre canadien d'études allemandes et européennes (Université de Waterloo), 1 No. 2, (Décembre 2004), 1-13. http://www.cceae.umontreal.ca/IMG/pdf/CEL_010_2.pdf [Accessed 11 September 2013]. See also Robert M. Isherwood, "Entertainment in the Parisian Fairs in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History* 53, No. 1 (1981): 43-48.

²⁵ Robert R. Livingston to Mother, Paris, 12 December 1801, *Robert R. Livingston Papers*, New York Historical Society.

²⁶ For Jefferson's general touristic outlook and behavior in France, his interest in technology and the Languedoc Canal, in particular, see William L. Chew III, "Thomas Jefferson in France: An

occasions examined the ongoing works at and strolled along the *Canal de l'Ourcq*, which began on the outskirts of Paris just outside the *Porte St. Antoine*, and was constructed during 1802-25.²⁷ The Ourcq Canal made up, along with the Canals of St. Denis, St. Martin, and the *Bassin de la Villette*, the Paris canal system.²⁸

Many Americans of Adams's day were also very much interested in innovative or successful industrial processes, and liked to visit local manufactories, not infrequently with the idea of seeking out valuable information that might be applied back in America.²⁹ The old royal manufactories, traditionally producing fine China at Sèvres, and tapestries at the Gobelins, under state monopoly since the days of Colbert and Louis XIV, following the dictates of mercantilist economic doctrine, constituted major points of interest. Adams visited the Gobelins (re-opened in

1800 under Napoleonic auspices after a period of closure during the revolution) on 8 April, not even three weeks after Bonaparte's return, and once again saw immediate evidence of the political shift, for he observed "fifty or sixty workmen employed upon the achievements of the Emperor Napoleon."³⁰

On a more fundamental technological level, and given his great interest in science, Adams also paid a visit to the *Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers*, established by the Abbé Grégoire in 1794 to promote basic and applied research in the field of engineering, and to house designs and models of new machines and tools.³¹

By far the most serious of Adams's leisure activities in Paris fall into the political category, though given his professional calling as a diplomat, trained as a jurist, his particular brand of "political tourism" was so closely related to his work, that the boundaries between work and leisure were blurred. Nonetheless, these activities were comparable to the propensity of his countrymen to seek out sites such as the *Château de Versailles*, the *Grand and Petit Trianon*, the *Château de Chantilly*, the *Place de la Concorde*, the *Tuileries*, or the *Place de la Bastille*, precisely because of their historical and contemporary political significance.³² For all were very aware, not

Imagological and 'Comparative Cohort' Approach." *Selected Papers of the 2006 Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850*, eds. Frederick C. Schneid and Denise Z. Davidson (High Point, NC: High Point University, 2007), 32-42.

²⁷ JQA Diary, 28 March and 27 April 1815.

²⁸ See Tulard, 1: 380-81; and Mairie de Paris. Canal de l'Ourcq.

http://www.paris.fr/pratique/paris-au-vert/promenades-au-bord-de-l-eau/l-ourcq/rub_8619_stand_4889_port_20374. [Accessed 12 September 2013]

²⁹ For a discussion of this realistic outlook on tourism, with its practical contemporary concerns, in opposition to a more romantic interest in the past, see William L. Chew III, "From Romanticism to Realism: American Tourists in Revolutionary France," *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850. Selected Papers, 2000*, eds. Donald D. Horward, Michael F. Pavkovic and John K. Severn, 40-54.

³⁰ JQA Diary, 8 April 1815. See Tulard, 1: 879.

³¹ Tulard, 1: 513.

³² For a discussion of American "political" tourism, see William L. Chew III, "From

only of history-in-the-making during the period they stayed in France, but also of history's presence in the present through the various places and monuments related to the Revolution and Napoleon. In the event, and contrary to his countrymen, Adams did *not* go out and visit the more obvious political sites. His "political" tourism was more sophisticated. Thus, he repeatedly set out to witness military reviews of all kinds, involving both regular troops and National Guards, by Louis XVIII and by Bonaparte. Yet Adams was not a simple fan of military pomp and trappings. It is clear from his commentary that his purpose was not only to see the king in the midst of "his(?)" troops, or Napoleon "in his element," that is most definitely with "his" troops, but rather to take the pulse of public opinion, or of military loyalty to their leaders, by the reactions of the soldiers and the crowd of onlookers.³³

Imperial troops reviews were not the only opportunity of seeing the Emperor in a public setting. Formal court mass, held at the Tuileries Chapel, also offered a chance of catching a glimpse of Napoleon, and Adams was not the only American to avail himself of the opportunity, even if the men

Romanticism to Realism: American Tourists in Revolutionary France."

³³ In a further study, I propose to discuss the political aspects of Adams's stay in Paris during the Hundred Days. May the reader of the present article, therefore, patiently bear with these limited and suggestive remarks, framed within the cultural context of travel and tourism.

in the company had standing-place only.³⁴ One did, however, need either an invitation or an admission ticket, typically procured by a well-placed court insider, as in Adams's case. Witness his vivid description of the proceedings:

At ten this morning ... we went to the Mass at the Chapel of the Tuileries. The tickets were marked for half past ten, but we were obliged to walk in the Garden near half an hour before we were admitted, and then waited an hour and a half longer before the Emperor came in—The Mass then began, and lasted less than half an hour—The Music was excellent—The Opera-singers Laÿs, Nourrit and Madame Albert assisted in the performance of the Service—the lower part of the chapel, where we were, was full of company—The Ladies only were seated, on benches—I had a full and steady view of the Emperor's countenance.³⁵

By far the most "hard-core" touristic activities of the general political type, and linked to Adams's legal training at Harvard and early career as an attorney,

³⁴ So did wealthy New York socialite Maria Bayard, another American tourist during the Hundred Days, from a rich mercantile family touring France for pleasure. In her case the mass was held in the more elegant *Sainte Chapelle*. See William L. Chew III, "Maria Bayard in Napoleonic France: French Society, Early 19C Travel, and the Hundred Days as Witnessed by a Young American Woman Traveler," *Selected Papers of the 2008 Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850*," eds. Frederick C. Schneid and John Severn, 280-94.

³⁵ JQA Diary, 23 April 1815.

were his several visits to a series of French tribunals of various jurisdictions, clearly inspired by a desire to gain first-hand experience of the French judicial system, while at the same time broadening his own perspective of the law. His first was to the *Tribunal de première instance*, the first district court in civil matters, with an appeal possible to a higher court, as established and reorganized during the Revolution and after the introduction of the *Code Napoléon*.³⁶ Next, he attended the *Cour de Cassation*, or final court of appeals for civil and criminal matters, originally created by the Constituent Assembly in 1790, and reorganized under Napoleon in 1804 as the counterpart to the *Conseil d'Etat*, itself created in 1799 (at the time of the drafting of the Constitution of the Year VIII), as a court for administrative jurisdiction.³⁷ Coming from a common law system (with its juries) as did Adams, it comes as no surprise that he subsequently singled out the *Cour d'Assises* for more than one visit. The *Assises*, established in 1810 by Napoleon, but based on the previous revolutionary criminal tribunals, constituted the only court within the French judicial system, otherwise of Roman law, that used juries. The *Assises* only tried the most severe criminal cases such as homicide, rape, or armed robbery.³⁸ His final visit was to the *Cour des Comptes*, charged with monitoring the financial administration of France. Dating back in its origins to the Twelfth Century,

³⁶ Tulard, 2: 103-10.

³⁷ Tulard, 1: 578-80 and 499-509.

³⁸ Tulard, 2: 103-10.

it became a modern court of accounts in 1807, having been reformed and reorganized by Napoleon. In 1814, membership was maintained as it had been under the Emperor.³⁹ As during Adams's visit to the *Cour de Cassation*, no business-at-large was conducted, since the session was also just devoted to a formal re-institution of the court, and therefore marked by public legal formalities.

Urban Recreation

After this heavy legal fare, Adams made full use of what Paris had to offer in the way of entertainment (i.e. the always popular promenades and public gardens; spectacles such as circuses or concerts; and a wide variety of theater, opera, and ballet, always highly popular among American tourists during our period). Finally, if one just preferred a quiet evening at home with friends, there were opportunities for in-house recreation, as well.⁴⁰

Adams was a strong walker and made it a point throughout his life to take this daily exercise, if possible, and Paris offered plenty of pleasant and fashionable promenades and public gardens for strolling.⁴¹ His preferred route took him either to the Tuileries or Luxembourg

³⁹ Tulard, 1: 580.

⁴⁰ For a discussion of such activities, as undertaken by his compatriots, see William L. Chew III, "Life Before Fodor and Frommer? Yesteryear Americans in Paris from Jefferson to John Quincy Adams."

⁴¹ For an overview of the state of public gardens in Paris under Napoleon, see Tulard, 2: 73-74.

Gardens, though the boulevards also exercised their attraction.⁴² Sometimes he had the carriage hitched up and rode out, with Louisa and young Charles, for a change of scenery.⁴³ During Easter week, *tout Paris* (i.e. the Parisian upper class, composed of the *ancien* and Napoleonic nobility and the bourgeoisie) traditionally rode out in their carriages and Sunday finery for the famous *Promenade de Longchamps*, situated near the *Bois de Boulogne*. On Good Friday (24 March 1815), the Adams's decided to participate in this high society ritual of "see and be seen," but were disappointed:

We dined at two o'clock, and immediately after dinner rode out by the road of Neuilly, to the Promenade de Longchamps; we met and overtook some Carriages on the road; but at Longchamps itself ... there was not a single Carriage—absolutely nobody—We returned by the way of the Bois de Boulogne and Passy where I remarked much that remained as it was when I inhabited that Village in 1778 and 1779. and much that had since changed.⁴⁴

It had, of course, rained constantly the previous day, and Napoleon had just arrived four days earlier, so it seems even the pleasure-loving Parisians decided to stay home, just this once, leaving

⁴² JQA Diary, 11, 13, and 19 February; 26 and 30 March; 5, 10, 11, 16, 22, and 26 April; 11; and 20 May 1815.

⁴³ JQA Diary, 12, 13, 22, and 30 April 1815.

⁴⁴ JQA Diary, 24 March 1815.

Longchamps deserted.

On 6 May, Adams offered his family a special outing, particularly chosen for young Charles' delight.⁴⁵ They went to see the famous *Cirque Olympique de Franconi*, which had first been established by the Italian Antonio Franconi in collaboration with the Englishman Philip Astley, in the so-called *Amphithéâtre anglais* at the *rue du Faubourg-du-Temple*, in 1783. By 1805, however, the circus had moved, under the direction of Antonio's sons, Laurent and Henri, to new premises on the *rue Mont-Thabor*, where they opened under the name *Cirque Olympique*. The show featured equestrian acts, pantomimes, and trained "smart animals," such as the famous deer "Coco," who performed various tricks—which Adams even mentioned in his journal.⁴⁶

On one of their last evenings in Paris, the Adams's went to a special concert given by an Italian, one Mr. Moldetti, whom they had met at their hotel, where he also lodged. This turned out to be something of a spectacle, for Moldetti, the only singer of the ensemble, not only displayed an impressive range of tone, but also of voice, baffling the audience with his impersonation of a guitar:

The company was very small. Mr Moldetti sung several Duos of two voices, and one quartetto, in four. The Tenor, Basso, Counter, and

⁴⁵ JQA Diary, 6 May 1815.

⁴⁶ Tulard, 1: 834.

Treble, from behind a screen, all so different from each other that they might easily have been taken for the voices of four different persons. He also imitated the guitar, in great perfection, though in a ludicrous manner.⁴⁷

By far the most-frequented of all the urban recreational venues on offer in Paris, visited by Adams—as by most other Americans before him—was the theater. Napoleon had by decree limited their official number to eight, in 1807—though a small additional number subsequently crept in. These featured the so-called “grand” establishments: the *Théâtre Français* (aka *La Comédie Française*, with its “annex,” the *Théâtre de l’Impératrice*, more generally known as the *Odéon*), the *Opéra*, the *Opéra-Comique*, the *Théâtre Feydeau* and the *Opéra-Comique*, all of which tended to perform a fairly classical repertoire. The less prestigious, “secondary” establishments were the *Variétés*, the *Vaudeville*, the *Ambigu-Comique*, the *Gaité*, and the *Théâtre de la Porte de St. Martin*, all of which catered to the more popular taste of *hoi polloi* and included light farces and variety shows, usually by contemporary playwrights.⁴⁸

Adams was an avid theater-goer, attending one performance or another on no less than 62 separate occasions during

his stay.⁴⁹ In fact during the period 2 March to 3 April 1815, he went out to the theater every single night, for a total of 33 nights in a row! On 44 evenings, he went out alone or with friends or colleagues. On the 18 other occasions, he went with his wife, and probably took Charles along most of the time, as well.⁵⁰ During all this time, Adams saw 130 individual performances (78 at the grand and 52 at the secondary theaters), since on many nights in the lesser houses, such as the *Variétés* or *Vaudeville*, up to four short plays were performed—typically one-act comedies or *farces*—rather than one long three-act or classical five-act drama.⁵¹ He saw 11 plays twice (distributed equally between the grand and secondary houses), and two plays, even thrice (at the *Variétés*). In terms of preference of house, Adams was conservative and favored the grand theaters with a total of 46 visits, as follows: the *Théâtre de l’Impératrice* or *Odéon* (17), *Théâtre Français* (13), *Opéra* (9), *Opéra-Comique* (6), and *Théâtre Feydeau* once. The secondary theaters he

⁴⁹ JQA Diary, 6-7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18-19, 23-26, and 28 February; 2-31 March; 1-3, 5-10, 15-16, 20-21, 28 April; and 7-10, 12 May 1815.

⁵⁰ He only explicitly mentions taking Charles along twice (25 March and 28 April 1815) but also only explicitly mentions his staying home twice (24 March and 3 April 1815).

⁵¹ Of the 130 performances, I have been able to verify and positively identify all but eleven, with the aid of A. Joannidès, *La comédie-française de 1680 à 1900: dictionnaire général des pièces et des auteurs* (Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1970) and Google Books, which proved a very helpful resource indeed, since the original printed copies of many editions of over three quarters of the plays have been scanned in facsimile and published online.

⁴⁷ JQA Diary, 21 May 1815.

⁴⁸ Tulard, 2: 422-24 and 847-48.

visited on sixteen occasions, as follows: the *Variétés* (9), *Théâtre de la Porte de St. Martin* (3), *Vaudeville* (2), *Ambigu-Comique* and *Gaîté* once each.

Adams's detailed journal entries listing the names of the performances seen—almost completely identifiable as they are—allow a quite precise reconstruction of their distribution by genre, period, and author. These are suggestive not only of his taste, but also of the contemporary offering. Three-quarters of the plays he saw were comedies and roughly one-fifth, operas: These two genres together constituting over 90 percent of all the performances viewed. The rest, in descending order of frequency, were tragedy (all performed in one of the grand theaters), melodrama, ballet, pantomime, and vaudeville. In terms of period, I have in almost all cases been able to determine the year of first performance. Some 11 percent of all performances were of the Seventeenth Century (having premiered between 1640 and 1699). A notable 30 percent were first performed during the Eighteenth Century, of which the vast majority during the second half and, indeed, predominantly during the revolutionary period. Almost 60 percent were contemporary, having debuted since 1800. Of these, indeed, over 20 percent were less than two years old. The offering that Adams partook of was, therefore, very modern, and tended to be comical and musical, i.e. generally light and entertaining.

A closer look at authorship (combined

with house seen at, genre and period) allow some final conclusions as regards the cultural level of performances witnessed by Adams during his stay. As we have already seen, Adams preferred the more “serious” repertoire of the grand houses, and this is evident in their dramatists and composers. He saw theatrical performances by Molière nine times—by far the highest frequency of all the classicists—followed by Voltaire (twice), Racine, Pierre and Thomas Corneille (once each). In modern theater, i.e. that of the past decade, four names stand out: Charles-Augustin Bassompierre and Marc-Antoine Désaugiers, with seven performances each (almost all light comedies performed at the *Théâtre des Variétés*); René Charles Guilbert de Pixérécourt with four (mainly melodramas performed at the *Théâtre de la Gaîté*); and Georges Duval with three comedies (two each at the prestigious *Odéon*, one at the popular *Théâtre des Variétés*). At the opera, the classical eighteenth-century Italian and German operas dominated, with three performances each of Ferdinando Paër and Giovanni Paisiello, two of Georg Friedrich Händel and one of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Of the modern operatic composers, Louis-Luc Loiseau de Persuis stood out with four performances (including two ballets). Thus, while Adams did prefer the high cultural offering of classical theater and opera performed at the grand theaters—and most of his positive remarks on acting, stage decoration, and music was reserved for the better houses—he was far from disdaining the lighter comic fare of the lesser

establishments. Still, three days after Napoleon's return, he could not refrain from some rather *hautain* criticism of the *Théâtre des Variétés*:

All the performances at this Theatre are examples of low and vulgar humour—It is the Dutch School of the Drama. Low life, vulgar manners and language in defiance of grammar—But it is the favourite Spectacle of Paris. The house even now, when all the other theatres were deserted, was full.”⁵²

Critical theatrical aficionado that he was, performances at the grand theaters, such as the *Odéon*, also occasionally got a dose of his critique, and might be dubbed “trash,” or “worse than indifferent.”⁵³ Finally, given the frequency of his comparative remarks, it is clear that Adams not only tended to go to the theater wherever he happened to be, if available, but had a good recollection for memorable performances.⁵⁴

As we have seen through Adams's experience, Paris had much to offer in the way of urban recreation in the public sphere, from high to popular culture, serious to light entertainment. The private sphere, as well, offered opportunities for recreation at home. By this I do not mean

the usual round of dinner invitations, which for Adams were perhaps more akin to modern networking than pure relaxation, given the social and political-diplomatic circles he moved in, even though he was, formally, in between jobs. I refer rather to at-home social activities other than dining, which he mentioned on some half a dozen separate occasions. They might include dancing to the piano, played by one of the guests; or playing cards—and always whist, usually a gentleman's game, and mentioned on four occasions.⁵⁵ After these typical evenings, Adams tended to return home by midnight. On special occasions, the host might hire a professional to entertain his guests. Such was the case when the Count Laval gave a party for his daughter's birthday. The good count availed himself of the services of a certain “Monsieur le Comte a Ventriloquist, and slight [sic] of hand juggler ... for the amusement of the company.” Adams was fascinated by the man's baffling ventriloquism and dexterous tricks, devoting some half a page of his journal to their description. Not only did the entertainer succeed in removing, unnoticed, the decorative crosses from the button-holes of half a dozen gentlemen present, but he also

performed a sort of extemporaneous play, [im]personating a man, his wife, a door keeper, a neighbour and an infant with a succession of dialogues in all those voices. He had

⁵² JQA Diary, 23 March 1815.

⁵³ JQA Diary, 7 and 8 March 1815.

⁵⁴ Twice he referred to performances he had seen in Ghent, thrice to performances seen in St. Petersburg. JQA Diary, 11 and 19 February; 10 and 11 March; and 16 April 1815.

⁵⁵ JQA Diary, 10, 17, and 27 February and 4 April 1815.

an assistant, who towards the close of the Evening, affected to quarrel with him; and for some time some of the company were uneasy apprehending an unpleasant scene; it terminated however by a reconciliation upon which his assistant, composed, sung, and recited couplets in honour of the Emperor Alexander, of the two daughters and son of Count Laval, and finally of Madame de Laval, whom he concluded by calling *La Mère des Graces*, [to the applause of the company].⁵⁶

No full-dress three-hour French performance of this kind could conclude without the requisite *politesses* for the host (and paymaster), and so “The entertainment finished with verses recited by Mr Lecomte himself in honour of the family and of the company, finishing with the declaration *et l’enchanteur est enchanté* [... my italics].”⁵⁷

Conclusion

In how far, then, was Adams’s experience exceptional or fairly standard, when compared to that of his cohort, i.e. American travelers during the whole revolutionary and Napoleonic period? Professionally, Adams was part of a small, select, and influential group of top-flight diplomats, like his father. US Ministers Plenipotentiary—or Chiefs of Mission—to France alone, since the days of Adams’s

childhood, there had been eleven: Benjamin Franklin (Minister 1778-85), Thomas Jefferson (Minister 1785-89), William Short (Chargé d’Affaires 1790-92), Gouverneur Morris (Minister 1792-94), James Monroe (Minister 1794-96), Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Minister 1796-97), Robert R. Livingston (Minister 1801-04), John Armstrong, Jr. (Minister 1804-10), Jonathan Russell (Chargé d’Affaires 1810-11), Joel Barlow (Minister 1811-12), William H. Crawford (Minister 1813-15), Albert Gallatin (Minister 1815-23).⁵⁸ In addition, there were the American consular and commercial agents in the country during the period: nine in Bordeaux, one in Calais, five in Nantes and one in Paris.⁵⁹ This group of professionals was occasionally augmented by special envoys, such as James Monroe, who came to France in 1803 to help with the Louisiana Purchase negotiations, or the XYZ-Affair negotiating team, as also smaller diplomatic fry, such as couriers transporting dispatches. All told, these accounted for some 10 percent of a total of some 8-10,000 Americans in France for the whole period, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, based on an integrative analysis of police registers and other French archival sources, suggestive documents of

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, *Chiefs of Mission for France*.

<http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefs/mission/france> [Accessed 5 November 2013]

⁵⁹ PoliticalGraveyard.com, *U.S. Consular Officials in France*.

<http://politicalgraveyard.com/geo/ZZ/FR-consuls.html> [Accessed 5 November 2013]

⁵⁶ JQA Diary, 22 February 1815.

⁵⁷ JQA Diary, 22 February 1815.

other provenance in departmental archives, and impressionistic evidence in the accounts of some 50-odd American travelers, themselves.⁶⁰ Most travelers were merchants (49%) or shippers (16%) who traveled primarily for reasons of business. Fully 35 percent came from Adams's home state, Massachusetts, thereby constituting the largest single group, by state of origin. Some 10 percent were "gentlemen," i.e. planters or proprietors. It is clear, however, through my own extensive analysis of extant travel accounts, both published and manuscript, that Americans in almost all cases, when traveling for business, combined this with pleasure, i.e. touristic activities. Archival data and travel accounts indicate strongly that for this early period, as against the Nineteenth Century at large, "pure" tourism as travel solely for pleasure, hardly existed yet, with only a few exceptions.⁶¹

Adams traveled with a fair degree of style, compared to his compatriots, and this meant conducting one's overland journey in a private coach, as against the cheaper diligence—though he certainly did not have the luxury of a custom-made English coach, like Thomas Jefferson. In contrast, young Washington Irving, traveling for his health and education and on a tight

budget imposed by his father and elder brother, was forced to take the more popular conveyance. As for lodgings, Adams also ranked in the upper echelon, stopping at one of the best Parisian hotels and taking a whole suite of rooms. Had he been a resident minister, he would of course have rented an appropriate house.

As a tourist, Adams emerges as the same but different, compared to his compatriots. His eye for the countryside and avid visits to museums and galleries parallels that of other Americans, though Adams does conduct his visits with much greater depth, background knowledge, and art appreciation than most. Popular sights also attract his attention, as do technology and manufacturing processes, curiosities and popular spectacles. Like other Americans, he frequents the theater, and goes shopping. The parallel ends one when looks at the sheer frequency of his visits and his informed theatrical criticism, which mark him out as a real aficionado. Only Washington Irving comes close to Adams's record of visits to theater and opera during his own stay in Paris. Contrary to most Americans, Adams makes no time for the standard "political" sights, but instead attempts to take the pulse of popular opinion by viewing public appearances of king and emperor and observing soldiers and crowd; and by immersing himself in the French legal courts. As for shopping, classically-trained man of the world that he is, Adams buys Greek and Latin tomes, heavy reference books, multi-volume theater guides,

⁶⁰ William L. Chew III, "Americans in France during the Revolution and Napoleon," *Napoleonic Scholarship* 4 (November 2011): 97-104.

⁶¹ Cf. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *La France et les Français, vus par les voyageurs américains, 1814-1848*, 2 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1982-85).

French literature—and fine wines. These are distinct differences, marking him off in terms of education and therefore *quality* as a tourist. My proposed follow-up analysis

of Adams the *political observer* will demonstrate his outstanding stature even more, placing him in the ranks of a Thomas Jefferson or Gouverneur Morris.

Napoleon's Kindle: Libraries, Literature, and the Legacy of the Napoleonic Era

By Zachary M. Stoltzfus

*"I should like, before I die, to go back to visit the battlefield of Waterloo and try to identify the meadow where I was so neatly lifted from my horse and left sitting on the ground."*¹

-Fabrizio del Dongo,
The Charterhouse of Parma by
Stendhal

After the dust of Waterloo settled, and the terms of the Congress of Vienna put in place, the cultural memory of the Napoleonic wars continued to linger in Europe. It was a legacy that was to grow throughout the 19th Century. Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, published in 1867, found an audience of readers still fascinated with the events of sixty years prior. Lyceums, informal literary societies scattered across nineteenth-century America, continued to debate decades after Waterloo the question of whether Napoleon represented a tyrant or a visionary leader, or both. In the university setting both professors and students were active in lyceums, and records from the Pennsylvania State Normal School's Lyceum show the presentation "The banishment of Napoleon Bonaparte to the Island of St. Helena was an injustice" to be among the

most memorable topics of dispute of the 1860s.²

How was it that Napoleon still dominated literary circles some forty years after his death? Was it the grand arc of his life that explains this fascination, his meteoric rise to glory and tragic exile? These events certainly played a role in capturing the 19th-century literary imagination, indeed, they still do. However, in addition to being a subject for literary investigation, Napoleon was a proponent of literary tastes. True to form, he was not content to be merely written about; he wanted to influence what was written. While often thought of as a force for political censorship, in the realm of the literary arts the First Empire also served as a catalyst for creativity. When considering the literary legacy of the Napoleonic era, one must start with the protagonist.

Napoleon's Early Education

Napoleon's military education at Brienne was typical of military academies in France at the time. These schools emphasized history and geography, with enough Latin to read Plutarch. In the literary realm, students were instructed in

¹ Stendhal, *The Charterhouse of Parma* (New York: Liveright, 1925), 199.

² Lee Graver, *History of the First Pennsylvania State Normal School* (Nazareth: Nazareth Publishing Company, 1955), 223.

the grand historical scenes of French drama.³ Of particular importance was the rote memorization of funeral orations of past French military heroes such as Condé, Turenne, and Montausier.⁴ When taken on the whole, however, Napoleon's early education at Brienne would have consisted mainly of geography and mathematics, as these were the skills integral to the mechanics of war. Aside from this basic curriculum, little is known of Napoleon's reading habits in his youth, save for an observation he made after the 1814 Battle of Brienne, that he was almost killed by a Cossack near the very same tree he used to sit in as a boy and read the poet Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered*.⁵

Even before the revolution redrew the political map of France, Napoleon gravitated toward the writings of the *philosophes* as young officer. The memoirs of his brother Joseph recall Napoleon returning to Corsica in 1787 with a "trunk of grand dimensions" full of books. Among those listed are the works of Plutarch, Plato, Cicero, Tacitus, Montaigne, Montesquieu and Rousseau. Joseph mentions his brother "passionately

³ F.G. Healey, *The Literary Culture of Napoleon* (Paris: Minard, 1959), 16. "les belles scènes historiques."

⁴ Healey, 17-18.

⁵ Healey, 21.

admired Jean-Jacques [Rousseau]."⁶ The ideas of the *philosophes* were everywhere discussed in the lead up to the Revolution, yet were not a part of any formal education that Napoleon received. It is in his return to Corsica that Napoleon the intellectually curious reader emerges.

Undoubtedly this was bound up in his own ideas about Corsican independence, and how the writings of the *philosophes* might relate to this cause.

Napoleon and the philosophes

After having included a few lines in praise of the island in his *Social Contract*, Rousseau was asked by the Corsican Matteo Buttafuocco in 1764 to draft a constitution for the fledgling nation. That Napoleon knew of this project is unlikely. He was probably drawn to Rousseau for reasons related to style and clarity, not necessarily nationalism.⁷ Rousseau's influence is seen in Napoleon's 1786 *Réfutation de Roustan*, a tract written against the Swiss pastor and critic of Rousseau.⁸ However, by 1788, Napoleon's draft constitution for the regiment of *La Fère* shows increased skepticism towards Rousseau's ideas. By 1791, Napoleon outlined in *Discours de Lyon* clear

⁶ Hélène Renard, Anne Jouffroy, Jean Tulard, and Thierry Lentz, *Napoléon, l'intime et l'exceptionnel, 1804-1821* (Paris: Editions Flammarion, 2013), 36.

⁷ Healey, 35.

⁸ Healey, 35.



objections to Rousseau's state of nature, and instead affirmed a belief in man as a fundamentally social animal.⁹ It is also possible that as his views towards Corsican independence and Paoli cooled so too did his admiration for Rousseau. In summary, Rousseau's views were increasingly contrasted by Napoleon's own changing political beliefs, which favored the cause of the French revolution and the Convention over and above that of Corsican independence.

Things continued to change for Napoleon between the years 1793 and 1799. As a supporter of the Convention, he was loosely associated with the Robespierre family. Upon Robespierre's execution, Napoleon spent two weeks in prison, after which he was sent to the army in the Vendée.¹⁰ Finding this experience distasteful, he was transferred back to Paris in May of 1795.¹¹ It was during this interlude that he began to socialize with enemies of extreme republicanism and frequent the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, where he would read for hours on end. He also began to regularly attend the theatre. His appointment to the Army of Italy thankfully interrupted this period of

leisure, as he had grown listless and unhappy. The few proclamations and letters that he issued from Italy resemble the language of Rousseau; however, this style was *de rigour* by this time in the revolution.¹² Interestingly, now entrusted with remaking the constitutions of Italian States, Napoleon also began to reference Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* in his letters to Paris.¹³

After the success of the Army of Italy, authors began to attach themselves to Napoleon's rising star. The poet Arnault sent Napoleon a copy of his latest tragedy *Oscar*, and followed up with a personal visit afterwards in Milan.¹⁴ After his celebrated return to Paris, Napoleon organized literary discussions at his home, inviting Arnault, among others. The poet recalled later in his memoirs that Napoleon's interest in literature was primarily a pragmatic one rooted in politics.¹⁵ For example, after hearing Arnault's play *Le Vénétien* read aloud for the first time, Napoleon suggested that Arnault revise the play so as to portray the Venetian Senate as an enemy of liberty (they had, after all, opposed the French). He also suggested



⁹ Healey, 36.

¹⁰ Healey, 48.

¹¹ Healey, 48.

¹² Healey, 49.

¹³ Healey, 49.

¹⁴ Healey, 50.

¹⁵ Arnault, *Souvenirs d'un Sexagénaire*, vol. IV (Paris, 1833), 8.

that Arnault allow the hero and heroine to live instead of die at the hands of the executioner. Arnault made the changes.¹⁶

Napoleon, in many ways, was a product of his time. Like many of his generation, he grew up influenced by the *philosophes*, and became disillusioned with radical republicanism after 1794. His change of politics reflected broader changes within French society. Instead of seeing these changes as a profound break with the Republic, Napoleon chose to view them as seamless. Take, for instance, his speech on the 18 of Brumaire:

You stand upon a volcano; the Republic no longer possesses a government; the Directory is dissolved; factions are at work; the hour of decision is come ... I know that Caesar and Cromwell have been talked of—as if this day could be conquered with past times. No, I desire nothing but the safety of the Republic and to maintain the resolutions you are about to make. And you, grenadiers, whose caps I perceive at the doors of this hall, speak! Have I ever deceived you? Did I ever let you down when, in camp ... I promised you victory and plenty; and when, at your head, I led you from conquest to conquest? Now, say, was it for my own

aggrandizement or in the interests of the Republic?¹⁷

Napoleon clearly saw himself as the fulfillment of the Republic; and a case could be made for this, at least until his ascension to emperor. As a young officer during the initial stages of the revolution, Napoleon joined the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, and was elected librarian due to his love of books.¹⁸ His reading habits likewise undergirded this republicanism. However, as Napoleon moved towards the consolidation of his political authority and the campaign in Egypt, he began to view the literary arts as a vehicle for promoting a new political order, an order that was ultimately less about republican ideals and more about pragmatic politics; this transition, subtle yet profound, put him at odds with more ardently republican men and women of letters.

Napoleon and his Librarians

Napoleon's literary meetings in Paris were not merely for the debating the merits of various plays, poems, and prose; they were also to form the nucleus of an Egypt Institute, an academic branch of the coming military campaign entrusted with, among other tasks, the celebration in verse of the expeditionary force and its chiefs.¹⁹ The effort by Napoleon to enlist artists

¹⁶ Healey, 51.

¹⁷ Napoleon Bonaparte, *Napoleon on Napoleon*, ed. Somerset de Chair (London: Cassell, 1992), 155.

¹⁸ Paul Bartel, *La Jeunesse inédite de Napoléon* (Paris: Amiot-Dumond, 1954), 194.

¹⁹ Healey, 52.

and writers in the glorification of France had precedent in the rule of past French kings such as King Louis XIV and Charlemagne, who had similarly patronized the arts. Aboard the flagship *Orient*, Napoleon brought the first of his portable libraries, lending out his books to his staff officers. Arnault, entrusted with his library, was told to only allow the staff officers to borrow novels: “Let us keep the history books to ourselves.”²⁰ However, he reversed this decision mid journey, instructing: “only give them history books, men should read no other thing.”²¹ Perhaps this was a policy designed to acquaint the expedition with as much knowledge of the Levant as possible, so that they might more fully appreciate this historical weight of their mission. Napoleon was not only reading history aboard the *Orient*. He kept the poems of Ossian by his bedside and discussed the merits of *The Sorrows of Young Werther* with Arnault.²² Some have taken this as evidence of Napoleon’s interest in literary romanticism. Not strictly a romanticist or a classicist, Napoleon read widely from both literary genres.

Prior to departing for Egypt, Napoleon purchased his first chateau, *Malmaison*,

²⁰ Arnault, Book IV, 80. “*gardons pour nous les livres d’histoire.*”

²¹ Arnault, Book IV, 80.

²² Healey, 52.

where he organized his first library.²³ Charged with this task was the renowned orientalist and historian, Louis-Madeleine Ripault. Ripault was a part of the Egypt Institute accompanying Napoleon to Egypt, a group of scholars of whom the soldiers joked were to form the middle of a square in the case of attack.²⁴ Ripault, in addition to joining this venture, acted as chief librarian for the First Consul. It was his job to ensure that all of Napoleon’s eventual residences—Tuileries, Laeken, Malmaison, Fontainebleau—contained the same books shelved in the same order for ease of access.²⁵ Ripault’s duties further included appraising Napoleon of the latest literary events of importance.



Added to the ranks of Napoleon’s personal librarians were Giacomo-Maria-Carlo Denina and Antoine-Alexander Barbier. Denina was Frederick II’s former librarian and functioned as associate librarian to Ripault.²⁶ Barbier was nominated as Ripault’s successor after the latter retired in 1807.²⁷ Barbier was well known as a

²³ Antonia Dobi, “Napoleon’s Great Librarians,” *Wilson Library Bulletin*, Vol.49 (November 1974): 229.

²⁴ Dobi, 229.

²⁵ Dobi, 229.

²⁶ Napoleon was a great admirer of Frederick II. In addition to his former librarian, Napoleon acquired Frederick II’s copy of *Spirit of Laws*, rich in notations. James Westfall Thompson, “Napoleon as a Book-Lover,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, 98 (1908): 117.

²⁷ Dobi, 229.

great rescuer of books and bibliographer, having spent many years collecting manuscripts and books that were either hidden or confiscated during the turmoil of the revolution. He also had an eye for rare books, and bought numerous unique editions throughout his life.²⁸ Moreover, Barbier, through his relationship with other men and women of letters, was able to personally request certain books for the ongoing curation of Napoleon's libraries. A ledger from October of 1810 provides a snapshot of what kind of books Napoleon's librarians were procuring for their Emperor. Works included biographies of Charlemagne, Clovis, and Louis XIII, descriptive travelogues on Brittany and Corsica, as well as diplomatic histories.²⁹ Altogether, October 1810 saw 35 books purchased, at a total of 697.60 francs.³⁰ Letters from the Florida State special collections include correspondence with Francois-Xavier de Feller, the Belgian publicist, and Madame de Chastenay, among other literary figures of the day. In keeping with Napoleon's interest in history, a June 29, 1812 invoice requested four first editions of *Histoire de l'Angleterre sous Georges III*, signed by Denina and Barbier.³¹ Other requests related to

²⁸ Dobi, 229.

²⁹ "Article de librairie," 27 October 1910, Alexander Barbier and Carlo Denina, 17th-20th c. Correspondence and Documents, Special Collections & Archives, Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida.

³⁰ "Article de librairie."

³¹ "Histoire d' Angleterre," 29 June 1812, Alexander Barbier and Carlo Denina, 17th-20th c. Correspondence and Documents, Special

horticulture, including: *Arbres et Arbustes* by Henri Louis Duhamel (sold for 30 francs, now worth about \$2,000), and *Description des Nouveaux Jardins de la France et de Anciens Châteaux*.³² On military subjects, Napoleon's librarians leaned heavily on the bookseller/publisher Magimel, as evidenced by a 290 franc bill for the month of July 1810 alone.³³

Although Napoleon had a clear penchant for history, the 1808 portable library that Barbier organized reveal him to have been an omnivorous reader. Napoleon instructed that his library include 40 volumes on religion (including the Koran), 40 epic poems (including Tasso, an apparent favorite), 40 tragedies, and a hundred novels (including those by English novelists such as Samuel Richardson).³⁴ The remainder of the portable library contained philosophy and history. On the way to Wagram, Napoleon took the first of several boxes of his portable library. Despite the efficiency of

Collections & Archives, Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida.

³² "Se Traite des Arbres & Arbustes," 30 Sept 1813, Alexander Barbier and Carlo Denina, 17th-20th c. Correspondence and Documents, Special Collections & Archives, Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida, idem, "Description des Nouveaux Jardins de la France," 28 August 1810, Alexander Barbier and Carlo Denina, 17th-20th c. Correspondence and Documents, Special Collections & Archives, Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida.

³³ "Par Magimel, Libraire de sa Majesté," 26 July 1810, Alexander Barbier and Carlo Denina, 17th-20th c. Correspondence and Documents, Special Collections & Archives, Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida.

³⁴ Dobi, 229-30.

its own card catalogue system, Napoleon quickly recognized ways that the library might be reconfigured.³⁵ Desiring a more portable folio, Napoleon wrote to Barbier from *the* Castle Schoenbrunn outside of Vienna requesting a revised traveling library. This new version was to consist of three thousand books, the majority classics and/or reference works, and be printed on thin paper with almost no margins. Barbier drew up a catalogue of books and asked for six years and half a million francs to complete the project. That which Napoleon possessed of this last portable library was burned during the disastrous retreat from Russia.³⁶

In addition to carrying a lighter portable library to Moscow, Napoleon had Barbier send him any new and important works to Russia via courier service.³⁷ As reference librarian for Napoleon, Barbier was also tasked with fielding diverse reference inquiries, including: a dissertation on the tiara and its origin; the protocol for the crowning of an heir presumptive; Examples in history of emperors who dethroned popes; works on quarrels between popes and monarchs; Books on the topography of Russia and Lithuania; works in French on Charles XII in Poland and Russia, among others.³⁸ The diligent Barbier's last imperial assignment was to assemble at Fontainebleau a library to accompany Napoleon to Elba. Napoleon

chose mainly classical authors and reference works, as well copies of *Le Moniteur*, *La Bullitin des Lois*, and other official publications of the First Empire that might prove useful in writing the history of his rule.³⁹ Paraphrasing Churchill, Napoleon hoped that history would be kind to him, for he intended to write it. During the hundred days, Napoleon had the books that he had taken with him to Elba returned to the library at Fontainebleau and re-shelved according to their proper location.⁴⁰

Napoleon had a contentious relationship with some of his other librarians, particularly those of a radical republican bent. An example can be seen in the case of Jean-Claude-Francois Daunou, a renowned scholar and intellectual of revolutionary France. Shortly after his victory at Marengo, Napoleon, over dinner in the Tuileries, offered Daunou a place in the State Council, only to be flatly refused. Agitated, Napoleon explained that he was not influenced by personal sympathy in extending this offer; indeed, he only loved two or three people in the world. "And I," responded Daunou without missing a beat,

³⁹ Dobi, 230.

⁴⁰ Some of the volumes taken to Elba: *Voyage to India and Mecca ...* by Kaschmiri Abd al Karim, *History of William of Nassau, Prince of Orange ...* by Abraham Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, *Chinese Letters ...* by Jean Baptiste de Argens, *The Confession of St. Augustine, History of Ancient Astronomy ...* by Jean Sylvain Bailly, *History of the Campaign of the Prince de Condé in Flanders in 1674 ...* by Jean de Baurain. Museo Nazionale di Villa S. Martino, *Lector in Insula La Biblioteca di Napoleone All'Elba* (Livorno: Belforte Editore Libraio, 1989), 31-36.

³⁵ Dobi, 230.

³⁶ Dobi, 230.

³⁷ Dobi, 230.

³⁸ Dobi, 230.

“love only the republic.”⁴¹ Nevertheless, Daunou went on to enjoy several important librarian postings at Napoleon’s behest, including librarian of the Panthéon, and, in 1804, archivist of the Empire.⁴² Daunou always had a book to suggest in response to Napoleon’s reference questions. At Napoleon’s prompting, Daunou wrote *Essai historique de la puissance temporelle des papes* in order to strengthen Napoleon’s position against the pope, and published Rulhier’s *Histoire de l’anarchie de Pologne* as a means to discredit Russian foreign policy in that land.⁴³

Other librarians that benefited from Napoleon’s patronage included Jacques-Joseph Champollions, an archeologist and member of the Egypt expedition, and his brother Jean-Francois, the latter of whom was the first to decipher hieroglyphs.⁴⁴ Ameilhon, a dedicated republican, helped translate the Greek portions of the Rosetta stone and was named librarian-for-life of the Arsenal library.⁴⁵ The librarian Louis-Albert-Ghillain de Bacle-Dalbe was elevated to baron by Napoleon for his

⁴¹ Dobi, 231.

⁴² Dobi, 231.

⁴³ Dobi, 231. “An Historical Essay on the Temporal Power of the Papacy,” “History of Anarchy in Poland.”

⁴⁴ Dobi, 232.

⁴⁵ Dobi. 232.

services as a mapmaker and geographer. Before beginning a campaign or battle, Napoleon frequently consulted Bacle-Dalbe.⁴⁶ Napoleon also nominated François-René de Chateaubriand as head of all of France’s libraries, the idea being that this position would allow the writer the time and money to extol the Empire in prose. Chateaubriand, however, demanded too much freedom of speech, and Napoleon withdrew the offer.⁴⁷ Chateaubriand went on to harshly criticize Napoleon in his writings. Aside from banning Chateaubriand from Paris, no action was taken by Napoleon against the writer he had earlier tried to enlist.

Napoleon the Critic

While not a literary critic in our modern sense of the word, Napoleon’s opinions on literary matters were expressed in letters and patronage. Napoleon, when not on campaign, regularly attended plays in Paris. The historian F.G. Healey counts 63 plays attended by Napoleon during the

⁴⁶ Dobi, 232.

⁴⁷ Dobi, 232-33. Napoleon famously called *Génie du christianisme* “a stew.” Napoleon’s own religious praise tended to be reserved for Islam, for which he expressed a reserved admiration, and even openly spoke of converting to. Certainly he had many points of criticism of Voltaire’s play *Mahomet*. In any case, Napoleon probably admired Mahomed more as a conqueror and administrator than as a religious figure.



Consulate alone.⁴⁸ Most of these were tragedies, Napoleon's preferred genre.⁴⁹ When meeting Goethe in 1808, the conversation between the two rapidly turned toward the theatre and tragedy in particular. Goethe, Napoleon argued, should write a grand tragedy on the life of Caesar.⁵⁰ This interest in Caesar comes as no surprise given Napoleon's own imperial ambitions, and, while in exile at St. Helena, he and his companions frequently read aloud Voltaire's *Mort de César*.

Napoleon inherited from the revolution a *Comédie Française* and opera under state control. State censors banned performances concerned with the actions of kings and princes, or any other subject material considered unfavorable to the revolution. Napoleon understood the connections between the stage and public opinion, and elected to continue a policy of partial censorship begun by the revolution, albeit one that allowed the staging of plays about monarchs, such as the opera *Richard Coeur de Lion*.⁵¹ Under the Consulate, any play produced in Paris had to first obtain permission from the Minister of the Interior, a policy extended to the

departments of France.⁵² Ultimately, however, Napoleonic rule loosened the restrictions placed on the theatre by the revolution. While still maintaining the prerogative of censorship, Napoleon allowed classics of French drama to be performed anew. And, in addition to those French dramas conveniently concerned with the actions of monarchs, Napoleon had his own favorite playwrights from history that he wished to promote in tandem with imperial rule.⁵³

Napoleon liked the plays of Racine and Voltaire, yet Pierre Corneille was one of the few playwrights to earn his unchecked admiration. And of all of Corneille's plays, none garnered as much lifelong commentary and praise from Napoleon as *Cinna: ou la Clémence d'Auguste*. The reasons for this are obvious. *Cinna* is a play about an ongoing plot to kill the Roman Emperor Augustus. The plotters, including Cinna, are motivated in part by petty squabbles, lost honor, and a desire to impress the women they love. Eventually the plot is uncovered by Augustus, who magnanimously pardons them all, granting them governmental posts. The play, first performed during the reign of Louis XIV, is a rough allegory for the situation in France during that time, and

⁴⁸ Healey, 80.

⁴⁹ Healey recounts an anecdote from Napoleon's exile at St. Helena, where he would ask "Qu'est-ce qu'il faut lire aujourd'hui?" To which his companions would invariably reply "Une tragédie!" Healey, 81.

⁵⁰ Healey, 81.

⁵¹ Recall that Queen Marie Antoinette's attendance of the play *Les Evénemens Imprévus* (The Events Contingencies) in 1792 instigated a riot.

⁵² Healey, 83.

⁵³ The pages of *Le Moniteur* often included a section on *Theatre Française*, highlighting the latest playwrights, actors, and actresses. One actress, described as equally adept at portraying "alternatively queen or princess, wife or lover," likely would have had her roles limited by the censorship of the revolution. *Le Moniteur*, March 1804.

is essentially an apologia for monarchical rule. It was *Cinna*, among other classic tragedies, which Napoleon arranged for the best actors of the *Comédie Française* to perform for the Tsar at Erfurt in 1808.⁵⁴ Of Corneille, Napoleon commented: “He had guessed the politics, and, as in business, had been a man of state.”⁵⁵

Conclusion

While Napoleon deftly marshaled the stage, the poets and scholars of the Egypt Institute, and the work of his librarians towards his own political ends, there remains one literary genre in particular that eluded Napoleon, most likely for want of a qualified candidate—the epic poem. A reader of Homer and Virgil, Napoleon considered his own rule worthy of epic poetry, and evidence suggests that he often compared his own destiny to that of characters from the genre.⁵⁶ Napoleon had to content himself instead with promoting various genres of the stage such as tragedy. His rule was not characterized by literary repression, instead it was an attempted regimentation brought about

through official encouragement. “I will not suffer a clerk to tyrannize talent and mutilate genius,” he wrote.⁵⁷

Lastly, one must consider the ways that Napoleon’s rule oversaw a shift in the literary arts, namely changing ideas about the novel. While not explicitly responsible for these ideas, Napoleon cannot be entirely disconnected from sentiments such as those expressed by Victor Hugo in his introduction to his work *Cromwell*, in which the author argues that the traditional designations of comedy and tragedy belong to the past, and that the way forward was a mixing of styles and revival of realism. If there is one common theme of Napoleon’s literary criticism it can be found in his emphasis on the practical and need for grounding in the real. This practicality found its expression in his blending of the old, such as the revival of the nobility, with the new, such as the ideals of the revolution. While this often meant political expediency, such notions cannot be separated from their cultural ramifications. Take, for instance, the fact that the Battle of Waterloo represents in many ways the *first* instance of firsthand accounts of a crucial battle being recounted by ordinary soldiers for dissemination among the broader reading public. While past historical epochs saw the writings of kings, queens, and the nobility as the only sources worth preserving, the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a new era in which the impressions of

⁵⁴ Healey, 85.

⁵⁵ Healey, 89. “Celui-là avait deviné la politique, et, formé aux affaires, eut été un homme d'Etat” Healey believes that Napoleon’s admiration of Corneille was such that he would have found even a great writer such as Victor Hugo a disappointment in comparison.

⁵⁶ Napoleon frequently cited the literature of ancient Greece and Rome in his letters and everyday interactions, as was common among educated European elites of the time. After losing at Waterloo, he wrote to King George IV of England: “I come, like Themistocles, to seat myself at the hearth of the British people.” Thompson, 119.

⁵⁷ Thompson, 119.

ordinary people were given great weight—
a new modernity. As the Nineteenth
Century gave way to the works of Charles
Dickens, Stendhal, William Makepeace
Thackeray, and Honoré de Balzac, the

gritty realities of the Napoleonic Wars and
the legacy of the Empire faded into
memory, but never irrelevance, an epic
poem hidden in the pages of a thousand
novels.

A Motion for Heredity: Contextualizing *Le Moniteur's* Role in the Creation of the Empire, February-May 1804

by Richard Siegler

In 1804 a significant political shift occurred in France with the return of hereditary government to the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte and his family. In two parts, this paper explores how the Napoleonic government utilized the pages of the official journal, *Le Moniteur*, to prepare public opinion for this shift. The first illustrates how the political bureau of Hugues-Bernard Maret's state department (an area that has received little attention from historians) established a context of necessity and widespread support for hereditary government through the articles it decided to insert into the political section of *Le Moniteur*. The second half of this paper examines the crucial strands of argumentation mobilized in the legislative debate that led to the declaration of heredity on 18 May 1804. How did the bureaucrats overseeing the political news in *Le Moniteur* preempt and explain this shift in a way that presented the new change in the structure of the government as an absolutely crucial one for the prosperity of the French nation?

The Napoleonic regime was neither short of answers nor of expansive and detailed justifications. The political staff of *Le Moniteur* employed sustained coverage, conscientious timing, and precise language to package their views to the French public. The period of political news in *Le*

Moniteur—from the arrest of General Jean Moreau on 15 February 1804 to the declaration of heredity on 19 May 1804—is notably different in content printed from the issues published before and after it.¹ The official newspaper created an atmosphere of immediacy on the one hand and support on the other, through what it carefully decided to publish. The newspaper focused on three matters: An air of immediate danger to the “stability” and “tranquility” of the French nation due to the recent royalist conspiracy against the life of the First Consul; the significant achievements of Napoleon in both the international and domestic spheres; and finally the massive outpouring of support for Napoleon and his government both regionally across the physical landscape of France and hierarchically from the lowliest town officials to the powerful state bureaucrats.

Throughout this three month period, articles, discussions, and references regarding the 1804 conspiracy occupied a significant portion of the foreign and domestic political news printed in *Le Moniteur*. The complicity of generals Jean-


¹ The declaration of heredity was announced on 18 May 1804, but, naturally, it was published in *Le Moniteur* the following morning. Henceforth the dates given are the date of publication in the official newspaper.

Charles Pichegru and Moreau, England's role in the conspiracy, and organized brigandage became the most popular focal points. Within the 91-day period after the arrest of general Moreau and before the proclamation of the empire, 72 of the days contained articles referencing the conspiracy. That is a remarkable 80 percent of the daily issues of *Le Moniteur* during that span.² It was not the recent conspiracy that was quickly quashed by the diligence of the police and spy network under the Consulate that worried the bureaucrats the most. The 1804 conspiracy was only one such plot in a long line of other attempts such as the Conspiracy of Daggers and the Plot of the Infernal Machine, both of which occurred in late 1800. Rather it was the void that would be created if the regime was overthrown by intrigue or the death of Napoleon. Tribune Jean-François Curée said it best in his motion for heredity, "In this happy situation we the People of France are in possession of all rights which were the sole purpose of the Revolution of 1789, the uncertainty of the future comes as the only trouble of the

² All numbers and statistics not cited are from my own empirical reading of *Le Moniteur*.

present state."³ That is why the concern for heredity was immediate: it was not solely the threats of the recent past, but those of the uncertain future that spurred the regime to action.

The second prong of the publishing strategy that emerged between February and May in *Le Moniteur* served as a counterpoint to the invectives against the English, the arrests of conspiratorial brigands, and their subsequent trials and punishments. The foremost goal was to emphasize Napoleon's achievements as a statesman and as the leading general of France. In those two domains, his role in creating the Civil Code and reestablishing France's preeminent position on the continent were given the lion's share of attention. For example, the General Council of the department of the Seine-et-Oise wrote in their address to Bonaparte, "Like Charlemagne, Citizen First Consul, you have secured by your victories the ancient and natural borders of France; like



³ *Gazette Nationale ou le Moniteur universel*, n° 221, mardi, 11 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (1 Mai 1804), à Paris, de l'imprimerie du citoyen Agasse propriétaire du Moniteur, rue des Poitevins, n° 18.

him you acquire, by your institutions, the glorious title of restorer of the French Empire.”⁴ Featured most prominently were articles related to the Civil Code. Such articles appeared on 48 of the 91 days during the three-month period preceding the declaration of Empire.

While this 53 percent figure pales in comparison to the frequency of articles on the conspiracy, its staying power after the publication of the Civil Code on 21 March 1804 was impressive, appearing in 40 percent of the issues of *Le Moniteur* until 19 May. The Civil Code was widely praised in many of the addresses and featured prominently in the *Tribunat* speeches as a rational, accessible, and clear codification of law. The president of the *Corps Législatif*, Louis-Marcelin de Fontanes, succinctly summarized the significance of the Civil Code as, “A great enterprise designed in vain by Charlemagne, is finally completed. A Uniform Code will govern thirty million men.”⁵ This achievement, perhaps above all else, garnered the most praise for Napoleon.

The third and final part of the strategy involved the publication of hundreds of addresses to the First Consul in order to illustrate the broad based support the Napoleonic regime could count on from its own bureaucracy and that of the French public. Members of the civil service,

Catholic and the Protestant, the army, the navy, cities, local councils, members of various associations particularly learned societies, and even addresses by groups of citizens from across France sent letters to the First Consul. They often wrote about their horror at the plot against his life, what Napoleon meant to the French state, and what he meant to them, personally. On May 14, the mayor and municipal council of Orleans sent Napoleon a letter thanking him for continuing the memory of Joan of Arc by re-erecting her statue in their city and went so far as to compare the two, proclaiming, “It is you, Consul General, who, like Joan of Arc, have taken up the reins of government floating in weak and uncertain hands; it is you who has by force of success, glory and moderation, returned peace to Europe, and France to the first rank among nations.”⁶ The civil and military functionaries of Dijon went even further, claiming that the multiplicity of Napoleon’s triumphs as well as the, “boldness and brilliance of your enterprises, raised the enthusiasm of the armies to the highest degree; that of the nation was no less; and one year has barely elapsed that the fortune of Bonaparte had already passed into a proverb like that of Alexander, Cesar, and Pompey.”⁷ Throughout our 91-day period, addresses sent to the First Consul appear on 78 percent of the days and were

⁴ *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 213, lundi, 3 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (23 Avril 1804).

⁵ *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 184, dimanche, 4 Germinal, an 12 de la République française (25 Mars 1804).

⁶ *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 234, lundi, 24 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (14 Mai 1804).

⁷ *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 234, lundi, 24 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (14 Mai 1804).

published in large clusters of anywhere between 4 and 59 addresses.⁸

More than anything else, these addresses occupied a significant amount of the available space in *Le Moniteur's* issues. So much so that on 21 March 1804, the editor of *Le Moniteur*, Henri Agasse, wrote:

The number of addresses to the First Consul ... daily becomes so great, that we are forced to give up the method of publication we have adopted so far. Henceforth we propose to limit ourselves to quote the authors of those which have not yet been published, and choose from the expressions of unanimous sentiment, those opinions that seem to better characterize and paint it.⁹

To provide a sense of just how many addresses were published during the month prior to the editorial decision to change the format of the addresses, *Le Moniteur* inserted 455 of them. Of these 455, 238 (or 52 percent) were from civilian functionaries, 189 (or 42 percent) were from members of the military, 15 (or 3 percent) were from clergymen, both Catholic and Protestant, 11 (or 2 percent)

⁸ Over that 91-day period 70 of the issues contained addresses to the First Consul. The two days with the largest amount of published addresses were given supplements to fit them all. 4 February 1804 issue contained the low point of four addresses while 3 March 1804 issue contained the 59 addresses and included a supplement to the normal issue.

⁹ *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 180, Mercredi, 30 Ventôse, an 12 de la République française (21 Mars 1804).

were from the navy, and the remaining two were from the Bank of France and the *Institut National*. While the two largest government institutions, the civil service and the military were given an overwhelming preponderance of the space reserved for addresses in *Le Moniteur*, there was a deliberate attempt to present the widespread support of Napoleon. This trend becomes more evident throughout April after most of the higher ranking official's letters were already published, allowing for the foreign departments, judges of peace, mayors, line infantry regiments, and municipal councils to have their addresses enshrined in the official newspaper.

With context firmly established, the first mention of heredity in *Le Moniteur* is found on the second page of the 1 May edition with the motion for heredity from *Tribunat* member, Curée. Throughout the rest of the first week of May, the speeches from 23 tribunes on that motion were published in *Le Moniteur*. These debates occupy nearly all of the space in these issues of the official newspaper and twice require supplements to the normal edition in order to include the lengthier speeches. Many cite numerous political theorists and philosophers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Bacon, Cicero, Machiavelli, Gibbon, and Mirabeau to support their arguments. Furthermore, nearly all the *Tribunat* speeches published in *Le Moniteur* elaborate on three central strands meant to justify the creation of a hereditary empire: The political and

military context in Europe, popular sovereignty, and the continuity of heredity with the goals of the French Revolution.

The tribunes utilized the political and military context of Europe in order to illustrate two themes, namely, the novelty of the contemporary military situation where the most powerful nations of civilized Europe were allied against France and the commonality and success of hereditary rule across the large states of Europe. Tribune Gillet sets the stage with a lengthy comparison between the European military situation in the successions of the Eighth and Tenth Centuries and that of 1804. Whereas the old French kingdoms faced Mohammedan raids and barbarian hordes, the French republic is faced with the “combined efforts of civilized Europe.”¹⁰ France at the turn of the Nineteenth Century required a man capable of maintaining her position in the first rank of nations and defeating the efforts of allied Europe. That man was Napoleon Bonaparte, “who triumphed like Hannibal and Charlemagne, through the inaccessible rocks of the Alps ... who

¹⁰ Discours du c. Gillet, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

pulled together the old limits our empire....”¹¹ Yet, it was not just an outstanding individual that the nation desired, but a political system, respected by Europe, with an extensive history of stability.



What was the foundation of these powerful states of Europe, which combined their strength in the hopes of defeating republican France? It was the stability and continuity of their political systems that had established and maintained their status among the first rank of nations. Tribune

Siméon highlights this commonality and posits the question of why larger states in Europe, where there would be greater means to oppose the government of one, are continually inclined to hereditary government?¹² Tribune Duveyrier answered him calling upon the examples of history, arguing that

we well know that in the large states, the mode of temporary election, incidentally, always forced at each

¹¹ Discours du c. Siméon, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

¹² Discours du c. Siméon, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

vacancy of the Head of Government, a system of permanent alarms, individual ambitions, foreign attempts of internal revolts, revolutions, destruction. History gave us, in this regard, rare and always fatal examples.¹³

Tribune Jaubert continues this argument, “Look around us. How do the great powers of Europe constitute themselves? With a hereditary power.”¹⁴ Why should France maintain the weaker form that offers an opportunity for her European enemies to create interior disturbances? Not only should France adopt hereditary because of its success in generating stability over centuries as well as its natural synergy with large and populous states, but also to avoid the electoral system that

had proved so unsuitable during the previous decade.¹⁵

The danger of an electoral government, the alternative to heredity, was further derided by Tribune Duvidal, who referred to it as “a frightening doctrine of revolution. Each change makes clear particular ambitions, nourishes the spirit of faction, [and] opens opportunities for intrigue ... in France the doctrine of heredity is national.”¹⁶ The tribunes take this argument even farther, presenting evidence that for fourteen centuries heredity had been the “true expression of the will of the people.”¹⁷ Ironically, the short electoral experiment in France where the vast majority of people could engage in politics was derided as dangerous, while hereditary rule in the



¹³ Discours du c. Duveyrier, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

¹⁴ Discours du c. Jaubert, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 223, jeudi, 13 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (3 Mai 1804).

¹⁵ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

¹⁶ Discours du c. Duvidal, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 223, jeudi, 13 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (3 Mai 1804).

¹⁷ Discours du c. Duvidal, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 223, jeudi, 13 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (3 Mai 1804). Duvidal cites numerous historical examples and the *Cahier des assemblées bailliagères*.

hands of single family was presented as the will of the sovereign people of France and the wish of the French people in 1789.¹⁸ What evidence did the tribunes present to argue this seemingly absurd case?

The tribunes begin by blurring the line between the Republic and hereditary rule. Gillet cites Rousseau who states, “I call Republic any State governed by laws, under any form of administration that this may be,” which, of course, was the foundation of the Napoleonic regime.¹⁹ Gillet goes on to declare that the “Republic in general, this is the thing of the people ... [it] considers the welfare of the totality of its citizens,” citing Cicero’s argument that, “The Republic, is a thing of the people, whether it be produced by the one or by the nobles, or whether it is governed by the whole population.”²⁰ As his last source, Gillet utilizes the speech of the abbé Millot, a deputy of the 1484 Estates-General who declares, “A state or some government is public affairs, and public affairs is the thing of the people. When I say the people, I mean to say the collection or totality of citizens.”²¹ If a republic, such as the Consulate was a thing

of the people then would the transition to hereditary government deny the sovereignty of the people?

Most assuredly not, according to Tribune Siméon who calls on the historical examples of power transfers under Pépin and Hugues Capet and compares them to the contemporary situation in France, stating, “Nothing will be changed in the nation. We will pass on a government to the same government, so that it is only a title more in line with our grandeur, more analogous to that of which other peoples have decorated their leaders, it will acquire the force of perpetuity, and the security of the future....”²² The reestablishment of hereditary rule would not change the foundation of the republic created by the French Revolution, namely a government restrained by the rule of a uniform and just legal system. The *we* Siméon refers to is not the legislators, but the people of France, because “It is for themselves that people raise their supreme magistrates ... Heredity is rather an assurance of tranquility ... the people, the owner and provider of sovereignty, can change its government, and consequently dismiss it....”²³ Siméon even mentions the exclusion of the Stuart line in England as an example of this right. Yet, while the French government itself would remain based upon the rule of law, was the

¹⁸ Discours du c. Duveyrier, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

¹⁹ Discours du c. Gillet, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²⁰ Discours du c. Gillet, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²¹ Discours du c. Gillet, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²² Discours du c. Siméon, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²³ Discours du c. Siméon, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

principle of heredity in line with the goals of the French Revolution?

Tribune Fréville shifts attention to the events of 1789 to 1791 and, referring to heredity, asked, “In this famous era by the general enthusiasm ... which had carried the nation, would it have seemed believable that its representatives had the weakness to maintain any institution incompatible with liberty and equality?”²⁴ The error of that Assembly was not its continued support of hereditary government, but who it chose to rule in that role after Louis XVI’s flight. According to Fréville, “when the Constituent Assembly tried to place the scepter back in the such feeble hands of a dethroned king by public opinion it was, I say, at this time that the first disagreement is manifested between the Nation and its representatives.”²⁵ The choice was decried not only because Louis XVI had proved himself unworthy, but also because it went against the will of the people.

Crucially, the error was never in the desire to continue the rule of hereditary government

because the hereditary government is capable of combining itself with a free constitution, because it enters in

²⁴ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²⁵ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

its essential character no necessary connection with that odious multitude of privileges, feudal distinctions, and incoherent institutions from which the Revolution has forever rid our homeland.²⁶

In fact, in the words of Fréville, “What is indisputable is that the warmest friends of freedom would have been at the height of their vows, if the crisis that I have just mentioned had led them to found a new dynasty.”²⁷ Not only was heredity not at odds with the Revolution, but it would have been the height of their duty to create a new dynasty with a more worthy family. Fréville concludes his speech, stating, “It is by the same reasons that we desire today heredity of the supreme power; we have not ceased to be the French of 1790 that history will not accuse of a single servile concession,” with the implicit understanding that they had found a man worthy of the title.²⁸ This title was not a submission to a new abusive monarch, but one that was very much in line with the gains of the Revolution. To Duvoyrier, the people of France were merely asking for, “This ancient warranty, melted in its political system and institutions ... that gives great states, not

²⁶ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²⁷ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

²⁸ Discours du c. Fréville, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

the promise of a few years, but the permanence of centuries.”²⁹ The French people of 1789 simply wanted a “hereditary leader, institutions guaranteeing public freedom and inviolable laws ... Today we demand the solemn pact requested and promised in 1789.”³⁰ The return to heredity was the culmination of the French Revolution and the fulfillment of the desire of those who participated by assuming their ancient right to elect their leaders. This rather radical understanding of popular sovereignty was combined with the contemporary international context and heredity’s consistency with the goals of 1789 to form the justifications for the hereditary Empire.

This “week of justification” was built on the contextual foundation of the 1804 conspiracy and its counterpoint the impressive achievements of Napoleon as a statesman and general, as well as the hundreds of addresses to the First Consul, which dominated the pages of *Le Moniteur*. The Napoleonic regime utilized *Le Moniteur* as the official courier of political news during the Napoleonic period to explain and justify this sensitive shift in domestic policy from a Republican form of government to a hereditary monarchy. This was a careful and deliberate attempt to package the change

in the most positive light through extensive coverage, precise timing, and persuasive language. Following the declaration of Napoleon as hereditary emperor, the addresses and any mention of the conspiracy were abandoned, while the Civil Code was given markedly less attention during the subsequent two weeks. Just as it was said that stability would be reaffirmed in France with the declaration of hereditary rule, tranquility returned to the pages of *Le Moniteur* after 19 May 1804—business as usual at 18 rue des Poitevins.

²⁹ Discours du c. Duveyrier, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

³⁰ Discours du c. Duveyrier, *Le Moniteur universel*, n° 222, mercredi, 12 Floréal, an 12 de la République française (2 Mai 1804).

The Path to Military Glory: A Study of Democratic-Republican Fascination of Napoleon Bonaparte during the Early American Republic and War of 1812

by Suzanna Calev

American fascination with Napoleon Bonaparte continued long after the French Emperor's death in May 1821. Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a widespread expectation of American commanders and naval generals to emulate Napoleon's dress, behavior, and language as a way to portray military glory. Andrew Jackson, America's seventh president and a general, posed for an 1834 figurehead portrait that historian John William Ward described as "decidedly Napoleonic."¹ A few years later in 1846, the Mexican-American War sparked another wave of Napoleon admiration as soldiers and generals studied and imitated his military actions. Nineteenth-century American historian Joel Tyler Headley characterized General Winfield Scott in 1846 as "the Napoleon of the Mexican-American War."² During the Civil War, Napoleon's legacy continued to animate the American imagination. Stonewall Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman, and other Civil War generals were often compared to Napoleon, and General Grant

and General Lee were seen as Napoleonic, even to their disliking.³ In 1920, a U.S. poll asked Americans to name the three greatest men in history: Napoleon Bonaparte was listed along with Jesus Christ and Henry Ford.⁴ Thus, more than a century after Napoleon's reign, Americans were still intrigued by the fearless leader of France who had ambitions for his country and for his empire.

This fascination initially began at the beginning of Napoleon's military career and was held by a particular American political party: the Democratic-Republicans. The ratification of the Constitution in 1787, a political system which was according to Benjamin Franklin, "so novel, so complex, and intricate," sparked the creation of two

¹ John William Ward, *Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 122.

² Robert W. Johannsen, *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 76.

³ Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and The Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991), 234. Sobieski reflected that "no man was ever idolized by his army as was General McClellan with the possible exception of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was one of those men whose defeat did not effect [sic] the confidence the men had in him; they were ready to do, dare, and die for him." In John Sobieski, Chapter 8 in *The Life Story and Personal Reminiscences of Col. John Sobieski* (Shelbyville, IL: J.K. Douthit & Son, 1900), 384.

⁴ Blackside, Inc., "A Job at Ford's" (1993), http://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/a_job_at_ford.htm. Accessed on 3 March 2014.

political parties who interpreted the document differently: the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans.⁵ Federalists believed in a stronger central government, focusing on a social, economic, and political hierarchy that allowed only well-educated, rational men to participate.⁶ In a republic, any person had the chance for upward mobility, but Federalists believed that before individuals assumed political authority roles, they needed to acquire “requisites of social superiority,” such as property, education, social connections, and broad experiences.⁷ This aristocratic form of political rule, however, resembled too much of a monarchy for Democratic-Republicans, who believed in mobility,

⁵ Benjamin Franklin to DuPont deNemours, 9 June 1788, Smyth, ed., *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 9, 659. Accessed via http://archive.org/stream/writingsofbenjam09franuft/writingsofbenjam09franuft_djvu.txt on 4 February 2014: “But we must not expect, that a new government may be formed, as a game of chess may be played, by a skillful hand, without a fault. The players of our game are so many, their ideas so different, their prejudices so strong and so various, and their particular interest, independent of the general, seeming so opposite, that not a move can be made that is not contested.” James Madison, American statesman and fourth President of the United States, held a similar opinion expressed in a letter written to Thomas Jefferson on October 24, 1787, stating that there were so many diverse “human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle” cited in James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 October 1787, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 12, ed. By Julian Boyd, et. al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 271-72.

⁶ Robert E. Shalhope, *The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 164.

⁷ Shalhope, 104.

equality of opportunity, and careers open to men of talent.⁸ Not only did they believe in getting rid of a monarchy and establishing an elective form of government, Democratic-Republicans also believed in a moral conduct that accompanied political responsibilities.⁹ Sacrificing individual interests for the common good of the community, free consent of the majority, and equality for all were all principles that made up the Democratic-Republican Party.¹⁰ Despite these political beliefs, Democratic-Republicans were drawn to Napoleon, a neo-monarchical military ruler who had ambitions for his country and for his empire.¹¹

What does this fascination say about a newly-democratic government? While some historians argue that polarized American opinions of Napoleon evolved from the bipartisan political conflict going on within the U.S. during the early republic, other historians suggest that public opinion of Napoleon derived from geo-political self-interest regarding the balance of European powers.¹²

⁸ Shalhope, 104.

⁹ Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 46-52.

¹⁰ Wood, 53.

¹¹ I define Napoleon’s rule as “neo-monarchical” because although he did not inherit his rule but obtained it through merit and military leadership, his regime still resembled the political and social culture of previous French monarchs, thereby establishing this new form of monarchy.

¹² Historians who supported the bipartisan argument are Joseph I. Shulim, *The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte: A Study in American*

Furthermore, there are a handful of historians that argue that American interest in Napoleon initiated because he was viewed as a symbol of republican principles during the French Revolution.¹³

Opinion (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 47-54; Daniel Aaron and Howard Mumford Jones, "Notes on the Napoleonic Legend in America," *The Franco-American Review* 2 (1937): 1, 10-13; Edward L. Andrews, *Napoleon and America: An Outline of the Relations of the United States to the Career and Downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1908), 83. The self-interest argument is developed by Charles Willis Meinert, "The American Periodical Press and Napoleonic France, 1800-1815" (Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 1960), 188-92 and Elizabeth Brett White, *American Opinion of France: From Lafayette to Poincaré* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 31.


¹³ Historian Susan Dunn explains that the French people, upon learning that America had won the Revolutionary War, began to contemplate their own ideas of equality and freedom. She argues that the French primarily looked to the American Revolution as a guiding light for their own revolutionary cause, but they were too caught up in Enlightenment ideals of unity and equality so that when it came time to implement these ideals and form a sound republic, French intellectuals "possessed no practical knowledge of politics to temper their ardor for theory or warn them about the obstacles of political and social reality." found in Susan Dunn, *Sister Revolutions: French Lightning, American Light* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1999), 33-34; Historian Andrews believes Democratic-Republican fascination of Napoleon derived from Americans, particularly Democratic-Republicans, identifying with the Corsican struggle for freedom rather than their interest in the ups and downs of the French Revolution found in Andrews, *Napoleon and America*, 5; Alfred Aulard, "Napoleon Bonaparte" found in *Modern France. A Companion to French Studies*, ed. by Arthur Tilley (CUP Archives, 1967), 139: "If the name of Napoleon Bonaparte is popular all over the world in spite of all the bloodshed, it is because in him is seen the personification or the hero of the French Revolution, diffusing over the whole world the benefits of that Revolution"; John Davis (of Kansas) cites Lyman Abbott in the Outlook for 1

While these arguments help explain differing opinions of Napoleon, they fail to analyze the prevalent use of pro-Napoleonic language by Democratic-Republicans during the early republic and War of 1812. This paper explores an underlying linguistic theme of the reports on the Frenchman. I will analyze the word *glory* in American newspapers, correspondence, and diaries. I will also consider how glory manifested in works of French art and American art. I will examine what this word meant to Americans from 1796 to 1815 and what this pro-Napoleonic language reveals about a newly founded democratic republic. At the heart of these American reports lies language that contradicts Democratic-Republican ideologies of classical Republican ideals of public virtue. Although Democratic-Republicans initially attempted to uphold these republican principles for the United States government, by the late-Eighteenth and early-Nineteenth Centuries, what we see instead is an emphasis on military glory and a desire for Democratic-Republicans to obtain the same military glory for themselves during the War of 1812 and beyond. By doing this kind of linguistic analysis, I am attempting to explain how using words such as *glory* to describe Napoleon Bonaparte reveal Americans' desire to emulate these characteristics for themselves and that the origin of

December 1894 as stating Napoleon "embodied in a single person the spirit of the French revolution." See John Davis, *Napoleon Bonaparte. A Sketch* (Boston: Arena Publishing, 1896), 87.

American democracy ultimately is deeply rooted in the French military neo-monarchical regime that Napoleon established.

By the late-Eighteenth Century, Europe and America were bridging the communication gap. American newspapers played a significant role in distributing European news to the states. The rapid circulation of colonial posts and newspapers allowed Americans to stay updated on current events and military battles.¹⁴ There were at least 8,000 copies of the 13 weekly colonial newspapers delivered directly to American households on a subscription basis rather than being



¹⁴ Ian Steele, *The English Atlantic 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 209.

sold on the streets, as in London.¹⁵ Because of this delivery method, the readership at this time was not just men but literate women as well.¹⁶ The literacy rates across the American colonies varied greatly depending on the region.¹⁷ The rate at which Americans received European news varied, depending on seasonal delays, from seven weeks up to five or six months.¹⁸ While some French articles came to America already translated from England, French news also came directly from France to America, but it is unclear whether these letters were translated by

¹⁵ Charles E. Clark, *The Public Prints: The Newspaper in Anglo-American Culture: 1665-1740* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 259.

¹⁶ Clark, 259

¹⁷ According to historian Richard D. Brown, residents of the colonies north of the Chesapeake Bay were more literate than those in the South, but during the course of the eighteenth century, male literacy moved from 80 to 90 percent in New England. In the South, a similar increase in literacy also occurred among the white male population but regional gaps still remained. Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America 1700-1865* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 11-12.

¹⁸ Information on Foreign distribution from Matthew Rainbow Hale, "On their Tiptoes: Political Time and Newspapers during the Advent of the Radicalized French Revolution, circa 1792-1793," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 2009, 199. However, I did my own calculations on French news distribution on America based on the American articles I use in this paper that cite Napoleon's own words/battle letters. The Battle of the Pyramids took place on July 21, 1798 and American newspapers did not start publishing Napoleon's account of the battle until January 1799, approximately 6 months later. The Treaty of Tolentino was signed 19 February 1797 and Napoleon's article did not reach America until July 1797, five months later. The Battle of Lodi took place on 10 May 1796 and Napoleon's letter was not published until August 1796.

French individuals or Americans.¹⁹ We do know, however, that printers published foreign letters and news as they arrived, giving Americans the opportunity to read the exact letters and accounts of news from Europe. Americans read reprinted articles of foreign letters and military accounts with great detail; in fact, many publishers used page one to display foreign news and documents to ensure continual readership.²⁰ The way in which Americans closely observed foreign news at the beginning of the nineteenth century provides an idea of how their political and cultural frame of reference was transatlantic rather than simply “American.”

Although Democratic-Republicans were drawn to Napoleon’s neo-monarchical military regime, it is important to note that their initial appeal to Napoleon was because news of his involvement in the French Revolution reached American newspapers and convinced Americans of his allegiance to republican principles. The *Norwich Courier* from Connecticut

¹⁹ Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, “The American Press and the Fall of Napoleon in 1814,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 98, No. 5 (15 October 1954), 339: “During the Napoleonic Wars, French news came directly from France through privateers defying English warships, which were the only ways that Americans received newspaper reports on Napoleon.” Historian Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny explains that European news came to America through merchantmen carrying “ship letters.” The origins of the translation of these “ship letters” from French to English are difficult to determine.

²⁰ Clark, 163.

published a report from “French papers” on the Treaty of Tolentino of 1797 and inserted a quote from Napoleon saying, “He writes, ‘after having justified the confidence of Government, and acquired, perhaps, more glory than is necessary to make a man happy, calumny shall strive in vain to impute to me perfidious intentions—my civil career shall, like those of my military, be comfortable to republican principles.’”²¹ In the Eighteenth Century, *glory* was defined as “exalted (and in moderate use, merited) praise, honour, or admiration accorded by common consent to a person or thing.”²² This definition reveals that *glory* required “common consent” of people to apply this word to someone. Napoleon’s use of *glory* in this speech reveals his understanding that he received his consent from the people to rule and would not stray from republican principles, which explains why Democratic-Republicans were initially drawn to his involvement in the French Revolution. Their initial investment in him reflected their desire, according to historian Julian Boyd, to “thwart” Federalists and their “monarchical designs.”²³ For many Democratic-Republicans, he became a symbol for the French Revolution because his propaganda, the deliberate information he wrote to convince the French people to

²¹ “Pacific Facts—and Traits,” *Norwich Courier* (Connecticut), 5 July 1797. See *America’s Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 20 October 2010.

²² Oxford English Dictionary, “Gory,” second edition, 1989. <http://dictionary.oed.com>

²³ Julian Boyd, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 25, xxxix.

follow his will, was reprinted in American newspapers like *The Norwich Courier*, and equally convinced Democratic-Republicans that their support of the French Republic would mean the survival of the American republic.

Napoleonic propaganda not only appeared in newsheets but in artwork as well. The creation of David's *Napoleon Crossing the Saint-Bernard* (figure 1), also known as *Napoleon Crossing the Saint-Bernard Alps* or *Napoleon Crossing the Alps*, begun in 1800 and finished in 1801, is an example of David's portrayal of Napoleon's military glory. The painting was intended to portray Napoleon crossing the Alps with his army in May 1800. It is uncertain whether Napoleon himself originally commissioned the equestrian portrait or if Charles IV of Spain's requested the work.²⁴ In a discussion between Napoleon and David on why Napoleon would not pose for the painting, Napoleon argues that, "No one knows if portraits of great me are likenesses. It suffices that their genius lives."²⁵ The definition of *genius* during the eighteenth century was an innate intellectual or creative power of an exceptional or exalted type and was often contrasted with the word "talent" so frequently among German and French scholars that during this time period, one could not be referenced without the

other.²⁶ Napoleon's quote reveals that he was more interested in his image as a military general rather than the art itself. Napoleon desired the art to reflect his military talent of winning battles in order to convince the French people that they should accept his rule.

The inscriptions on the rocks below Napoleon in the painting read: "Bonaparte, Hannibal, and Karolus Magnus Imp." The prophetic comparison to other military generals and emperors who have crossed the Alps, like Hannibal and Karolus Magnus, or Charlemagne, was fulfilled by Napoleon as well when he defeated the Austrians in the battles of Montebello and Marengo. The inscriptions could have been a literal indication of Charlemagne's title or perhaps a hint of Napoleon's ambition to become Emperor, which he was later crowned in 1804. Napoleon was so pleased with David's portrayal that he ordered a total of four copies of this piece, for allies and adherents. The replicas are currently located in Berlin, Vienna, and the family of the Prince of Napoleon. One is lost. The original lies in the Louvre museum in Paris.²⁷

Who would have seen these reproductions of David's *Napoleon Crossing the Alps*? It was custom for artists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to

²⁴ Warren Roberts, *Jacques Louis David, Revolutionary Artist: Art, Politics, and the French Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 143.

²⁵ Roberts, 143.

²⁶ Oxford English Dictionary, "Genius," (Oxford University Press, 2015). Accessed on 2 August 2015. <http://dictionary.oed.com>

²⁷ Anita Brookner, *Jacques-Louis David* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 148.

display their works at annual or biennial salons, which held paintings selected by a commission of artists established by Lucien Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and Minister of the Interior.²⁸ The French elite would have certainly been susceptible to seeing the paintings in this manner. Because the replicas were so well done, the viewers would have gained the same idealized effect. More importantly, how would Americans have seen these paintings? It is most probably that Americans would not have seen the originals but rather engravings of these portraits circulated among the French people in French publications and eventually either copied by American artists visiting France or these engravings were republished in America.²⁹ If

²⁸ Robert B. Holtman, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 164-65.

²⁹ According to Margaret K. Hofer and Roberta J.M. Olson's essay, "Two Symbols of French Taste and Power Come to America," American diplomats in Paris, such as Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, returned to the United States with trophies of French culture during the early American republic (213). This may have included reproductions of French paintings. Although Hofer and Olson explore the provenance of two pieces of furniture, one from King Louis XVI's reign, and one from Napoleon's reign, and how it ended up in America, this essay provides insight into how French decorative arts (and perhaps fine arts) arrived in America. They conclude that "it is ironic that these potent symbols of monarchy and empire were embraced by the young United States, a nation founded on republican ideals and democratic principles." See [Roberta Panzanelli](#), and [Monica Preti-Hamard, eds.](#), *La circulation des oeuvres d'art. The Circulation of Works of Art in the Revolutionary Era, 1789-1848* (Getty Research Institute, 2007), 224.

reproductions of David's paintings did not circulate in America during Napoleon's rise to power and reign, Americans would only have received news of his military victories through French and English newspaper articles and therefore use the language used to understand foreign events. Napoleon's military glory would have been left to the American imagination. Americans would have had to create their own ideal of what military *glory* meant to them. Either possibility reveals that Americans used pro-Napoleonic language as a model to imagine Napoleon's military glory and as a model to construct their own military aspirations.

While David's 1800 *Napoleon Crossing the Saint-Bernard* depicts Napoleon's military glory, David's 1805 depiction of Napoleon's imperial court in *Coronation of Napoleon and Josephine* (figure 2) reveals the transformation of the French government from a Consulate to Napoleon's neo-monarchical military Empire. David's portrayal of the coronation reveals the majesty of Napoleon's imperial court which harks back to the style of previous French monarchs like King Louis XIV. Although Napoleon gained his authority through merit and military leadership, David's painting depicts Napoleon's desire to hark back to monarchical culture. A day before Napoleon's coronation, Napoleon had decided to crown himself instead of letting

Pope Pius VII crown him.³⁰ These details can be subtly seen in the positioning of the Pope, his shoulders are hunched forward, providing a displeasing feeling to the viewer, perhaps to prove that Napoleon's rule was secular and that he did not receive his power through divine means. Although Napoleon ended up crowning himself at his own coronation, in the painting, it was decided based on previous coronation paintings, such as Pope Leo III's coronation of Charlemagne and Constantine's self-coronation, that he would be depicted crowning Josephine. Advisers told Napoleon that he would appear less histrionic if he crowned Josephine instead of himself in the painting.³¹

David's painting of Napoleon's coronation represents Napoleon's change in character when he assumed the role of Emperor of the French. By 1804, Napoleon Bonaparte was no longer concerned with French revolutionary principles of modesty and austerity but with royal costumes, festivities, and ceremonies.³² When Napoleon was suggested to have the coronation ceremony in the Champ de Mars, a place known for its festivals during the French Revolution, specifically the Festival of the Federation, which commemorated the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille that ignited the French Revolution, Napoleon turned down the idea, stating that

³⁰ Roberts, *David: Revolutionary Artist*, 156.

³¹ Roberts, *David: Revolutionary Artist*, 156-157.

³² Roberts, 151-52.

Times have changed: when the people ruled, everything had to be done in their presence; we must take care to let them know that they can no longer expect this kind of treatment. Today the people are represented by legal powers. In any event I cannot accept that the people of Paris, let alone of France, should be represented by the twenty or thirty thousand fish-wives, or others of their kind, who would invade the Champ de Mars; to me these are simply the ignoble and corrupt populace endemic to a great city. The real people of France are the regional representatives or the presidents of the electoral colleges: or indeed the army, in whose ranks serve soldiers from every part of France.³³

This statement reveals how Napoleon did not continue to hold the ideals of the French Republic as a priority for his rule. The fact that he did not want the ceremony to take place in a location that the French people held as a symbol for the French Revolution reveals his decision to break his connection with the principles of the French Revolution. His low opinion of the "fish-wives" of Paris exposes his change in character during this time period, believing these people to be "ignoble and corrupt." David's coronation painting and Napoleon's description carry the resemblance of a neo-monarchical military regime. Although he obtained his

³³ Brookner, 150-51.

power through merit, he mimics the cultural and political behavior of previous French monarchs. To maintain the façade of French Revolutionary ideals, however, Napoleon did not title himself a king, but rather an emperor. Although Americans did not have access to seeing David's coronation painting, they would have read about the coronation in their newspapers through reprinted French articles. Americans would have had to construct their own ideas and images of Napoleon's imperial court which is why analyzing the language used during this time period is vital to understanding how Americans perceived this imperial splendor and why they were drawn to Napoleon's neo-monarchical military standard. Democratic-Republicans embraced Napoleon during his neo-monarchical military regime which conflicts with their original classical republican ideologies of sacrificing individual needs for the greater good and ridding their nation of monarchies. They embraced his neo-monarchical military regime because they aspired to obtain the same imperial glory that he obtained for his empire.

American newspapers were accustomed to reprinting Napoleon's newsheets but they also began to write their own articles on Napoleon and develop their own use of words like *glory*. From May through November of 1796, Napoleon had defeated the Austrian army in two battles, the Battle of Arcola and the Battle of Lodi. The *Argus* described the battle of Lodi with pro-Napoleonic language: "This

battle, one of the most glorious of this brilliant campaign, offers innumerable instances of superior bravery, which will render it forever celebrated.³⁴ The definition of "brilliant," by the eighteenth century, was "brightly shining, glittering, sparkling, lustrous. Also of qualities, actions, and persons."³⁵ Americans saw Napoleon's military campaign as an exception to other European military performances and desired to follow his example. Americans became more intrigued when news of Napoleon's military successes against the First Coalition, an alliance of European monarchies to defeat Napoleonic France, reached American soil in 1797. New York's *The Herald* newspaper published a biographical sketch of Napoleon and regarded him in a heroic tone:

Born in the midst of a republican struggle in his native land, it was his good fortune to burst into manhood at the moment when the country of his choice shook off the chains with which she had been manacled for centuries. There was also something in manners and habits that announced him equal to the situation for which he seems to have been destined; instead of imitating the frivolity of the age, his mind was

³⁴ "Battle of Lodi. Attack and Capture of the Bridge," *Argus* (New York), 30 August 1796. See *America's Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 22 September 2010.

³⁵ *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, vol. 1, prep. by William Little (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), 802.

continually occupied by useful studies; and from the lives of Plutarch, a volume which he always carried in his pocket, he learned at an early age, to copy the manners, and emulate the actions of antiquity.³⁶

This sketch reveals Americans' favorable opinion of Napoleon's educational background and mature temperament, and distinguishes him from the "frivolity" of the French aristocracy. This article parallels his change from adolescence to manhood with France's change from monarchy to republic; French Revolutionary ideas were imbued in Napoleon's identity. Democratic-Republicans held classical antiquity as a model for ethical government conduct. The author's use of *destined* suggests the desire to see Napoleon in this classical manner as well. According to Oxford English Dictionary, *destiny* in the late-Eighteenth Century was defined as "the power or agency held to predetermine a particular person's life or lot."³⁷ The use of *destined* implies that Napoleon's rule was predetermined and, therefore, acceptable to Democratic-Republicans.

Democratic-Republicans believed that Napoleon's military glory could withstand the attacks against him which is why news

³⁶ "Biographical Sketches of French Generals. Napoleon Buonaparte," *The Herald* (New York), 30 August 1797. See *America's Historical Newspapers*. Accessed 22 September 2010, 1.

³⁷ Oxford English Dictionary, "Destiny," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Accessed on 19 April 2014 via <http://dictionary.oed.com>

of Napoleon's exile in 1814 generated many surprised reactions from Americans. Louisville, Kentucky's *The Western Courier's* article on Napoleon's exile reveals Democratic-Republican disappointment on hearing his defeat: "We did not believe they would consent to submit to British rule. We were strongly possessed of the idea, that Frenchmen gloried in the towering honors of France; and that in the hour of peril they would not desert the man who had been instrumental in raising them to the highest pinnacle of national glory. But we have been disappointed."³⁸ Democratic-Republicans assert blame on the French people for abandoning their leader who has obtained so much glory for them. On 31 March 1814, the government's Democratic-Republican point of view of Napoleon's exile was given by the unofficial Washington D.C. *National Intelligencer*:

We have seen a hope expressed in some of the factious prints which fills us with abhorrence—that the present Emperor of France might be dethroned and the race of Bourbons reelevated to the throne from which their incapacity had degraded them. Humanity shudders at the idea, and when these prints calmly talk of "legitimate sovereigns" and "bloodless revolutions," they betray

³⁸ "Reflections on the latest news from Europe," *The Western Courier* (Louisville, Kentucky), 11 July 1814), found in *America's Historical Newspapers*, accessed on 23 October 2010.

as much ignorance of the nature of man as they do of the feelings of the people of France. Monarchy in any shape is odious to all who love our free institutions, but if kings must exist, let them be kings by fortune and merit than by birth.³⁹

This article reveals that although Americans loathed monarchy, they were very much drawn to imperial power and the neo-monarchical culture, a democratic authoritarianism, of Napoleon's Empire.⁴⁰ Democratic-Republicans were drawn to Napoleon's ambitions for an expansive empire and the indulgent ceremonies that honored military triumphs.

Napoleon's military glory provided inspiration for Democratic-Republicans as they worked to achieve their own glory during the War of 1812. During the war, American military strategy lacked the professionalism and strategy that they

³⁹ "The News," *The Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, D.C.), 31 March 1814. See *America's Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 5 February 2014. The *National Intelligencer* was one of two newspapers (along with the *National Gazette*) that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson helped establish to carry the Democratic-Republican message. See *The Press in Times of Crisis*, ed. Lloyd Chiasson (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 32.

⁴⁰ Historian Steven Englund discusses the origin of Napoleon's power and how it differed from King Louis XVI. While the former monarch's power was described as "despotic, enlightened, or royal," the French people did not associate these terms with Napoleon's role as Head of State of the democratic republic; they believed his "power, both consular and imperial, pointed to something new; a form of democratic authoritarianism." See Steven Englund, *Napoleon: A Political Life* (New York: Scribner, 2004), 22.

admired in the French, however, Americans still desired to obtain the same kind of military standards for their army.⁴¹ Mordecai Myers, a major of the 13th infantry, commented on the famous Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, who won the Battle of Lake Erie, in his diary with envy as he desired to be a part of the glory of the battle:

At the time Commodore Perry made a requisition for a company of infantry to act as marines. When I heard of it, I went immediately to headquarters to offer my services; but I was just a few minutes too late to be accepted, and thus lost the opportunity of being present at Perry's victory on Lake Erie, when he so signally defeated a superior force and gained so much glory.⁴²

⁴¹ The American army had two recognizable weaknesses during this war: they were lacking well trained officers and basic strategy. As a result of American military professionals following Napoleon's battles during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, they recognized the necessity for training professional officer-specialists with the creation of military schools and a literature on warfare to guide officers in their studies. Post-war Republicans sought to improve the Military Academy, which was near extinction in 1815, and West Point by appointing military personnel who followed the French example. In July 1817, American President James Monroe ordered Captain Sylvanus Thayer, who had studied French military schools and fortifications, to become superintendent of the Military Academy. Under Thayer's supervision did the Military Academy begin to transplant French professional standards to the banks of the Hudson River. See Millett et. al., *For the Common Defense*, 118-19.

⁴² Mordecai Myers, *Reminiscences, 1780 to 1814, including incidents in the war of 1812-14; letters*

This diary entry suggests that American soldiers wanted to be a part of the everlasting fame that encompassed glory. Commodore Perry's fame as a great naval commander spread quickly throughout the U.S. during the war. Like Napoleon, Commodore Perry inspired soldiers, like Major Myers, to follow him into battle and potentially die for him. Even volunteers from Northumberland joined the war cause as a way to obtain glory. Philadelphia's *Weekly Aurora* published brigadier letters which stated: "We learn that at Derrstown, eight miles from this place, they were joined by a company of infantry from Catawiss and the Milton. Washington, and Danville rifle companies—composed of a brave hardy set of men, who burn with a desire to extend the glory of the American name—They have our best wishes."⁴³ This account reveals that the volunteers wanted glory to maintain America's reputation and prestige.

Although there were many military defeats during the War of 1812, American soldiers maintained a desire to obtain military glory for their country. Great Britain's control of the seas threatened this very glory. Upon hearing of the impressments of American soldiers near New York, *the Enquirer* responded with a

pertaining to his early life written by Major Myers, 13th infantry, U.S. army (The Crane Company, 1900), 37.

⁴³ "War Operations from the National Intelligencer," *The Weekly Aurora* (Philadelphia), 29 September 1812. See *America's Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 9 November 2010.

positive outlook of America's progress in the war: "Taking into view also the superior genius and talents which now direct and control the operations of the war department, together with the improved state of organization and discipline of the army, we look forward with a lively and firm hope to more prosperous and successful days, and to the dissipation of those dark & threatened clouds which have so long obscured our military glory."⁴⁴ As in the earlier description of Napoleon, *genius* and *talent* were similarly applied to the American war department. The article affirms that military glory had become a part of the American mindset of war.

Military dinner celebrations were another example of Napoleon's impact on American society. Comparable to Napoleon's post-military victory celebrations, Americans also imitated these dinner parties in order to commemorate their naval and army officers and to display their military glory. Newspapers commented on the lavish decorations and preparations for these military dinners; one such dinner celebration honoring Captain Hull of the frigate *Constitution* outlines the work behind these parties: "The decorations of the Hall which were conducted by Col. Henry Sargent, were in the highest degree, brilliant and appropriate. Indeed all the

⁴⁴ "March 27, Impressed American Seamen," *The Enquirer* (Richmond), 6 April 1813. See *America's Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 9 November 2010.

arrangements of the day were splendid and elegant, and such as do great credit to the committee by whom they were superintended.”⁴⁵ The author of this article refers to the decorations as “brilliant” and equally “appropriate” for the occasion. Another article mentions a dinner in honor of General Harrison in 1813 which had “five tables, containing sixty covers each, and furnished most plentifully with excellent dishes, were provided for the company. Ornamental representations of castles, pyramids, &c. displaying the American flag were arranged on the tables and appropriate distances and produced a most brilliant and pleasing effect.”⁴⁶ *Brilliant* is also used in this article to signify the luminous effect that these dinners had on the guests. The “excellent dishes” and “ornamental representations” contributed to the image of the military and “prove that a republic could properly honor its heroes.”⁴⁷ The portrayal of these resplendent military dinners in American newspapers boosted the morale of Americans and promoted the notion of American military success to the world. The extravagance of these

American military dinners simultaneously honored brave soldiers and officers while projecting their own military glory and splendor to the European powers.

Many historians have analyzed American opinion of Napoleon during the early republic and War of 1812, offering different arguments for why Americans held the French Emperor in such exaltation. However, a close examination of pro-Napoleonic language in Democratic-Republican newspapers reveals a contradiction in Democratic-Republican ideologies and a desire for Democratic-Republicans to gain military glory during the War of 1812. By using words like *glory* and *brilliance* to describe Napoleon’s victories, Democratic-Republicans expressed their longing to become a forceful military power. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the Nineteenth Century, Democratic-Republican emulation of Napoleon exposes the contradiction of Americans who concurrently tried to break away from the Old World to form their own national standards, and yet mimic the military actions, behavior, celebrations, and language of Napoleon’s neo-monarchical military regime. This contradiction reveals that democracy and imperial visions are more closely related than Americans are willing to acknowledge. Perhaps Americans need to reevaluate the origins of their democracy and credit Napoleon’s Empire during this era for their government’s existence.

⁴⁵ “Boston, Friday Afternoon, September 11, 1812,” *The Yankee* (Boston), 11 September 1812. See *America’s Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 9 November 2010.

⁴⁶ “From the Advocate. Dinner in Honour of General Harrison,” *The Columbian* (New York), 3 December 1813. See *America’s Historical Newspapers*. Accessed on 20 November 2010.

⁴⁷ Dan Hicks, “Broadships on Land and Sea: A Cultural Reading of the Naval Engagements in the War of 1812” in Paul A. Gilje and William Pencak eds., *Pirates, Jack Tar, and Memory: New Directions in American Maritime History* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1970), 186.

I recognize that the pro-Napoleonic language that I explore in American texts could be strengthened with further investigation on the way in which Americans saw Napoleon's military glory visually depicted. Because it is difficult to determine when and how Americans saw visual representations of Napoleon's military glory, such as in David's paintings, it is unclear how Napoleon's visual propaganda influenced American concepts and notions of military glory. If it was the case that visual depictions of Napoleon did not arrive in America until the late-Nineteenth Century, this would mean that visual concepts of Napoleon's military glory during the early republic and War of 1812 would have been left to the American imagination and solely based on the descriptions coming back to America during this time period. This would hold the language used during this time period as an important factor in influencing Democratic-Republicans to adopt Napoleon's neo-monarchical military culture and establish their own imperial agenda. They used Napoleon as a model for their military aspirations and believed that by emulating this charismatic, courageous man, they would eventually march on the path to military glory.



Figure 1. Jacques Louis David. *Napoleon Crossing the Saint-Bernard*. Malmaison version. 1801. Oil on canvas. National Museum of the Chateau, Malmaison, France.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Jacques Louis David. *Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard*. Malmaison version. 1801. Oil on canvas. National Museum of the Chateau, Malmaison, France. Accessed via <http://www.histoire-image.org/pleincadre/index.php?i=437>



Figure 2. Jacques Louis David. *Coronation of Emperor Napoleon I and Coronation of the Empress Josephine in Notre-Dame de Paris, December 2, 1804*. 1807. Oil on canvas. Louvre Museum.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Jacques Louis David. *Coronation of Emperor Napoleon I and Coronation of the Empress Josephine in Notre-Dame de Paris, December 2, 1804*. 1807. Oil on canvas. Louvre Museum. Accessed on 30 March 2014 via The Yorck Project ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Category:PD-Art_\(Yorck_Project\)&from=J#/media/File:Jacques-Louis_David_006.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Category:PD-Art_(Yorck_Project)&from=J#/media/File:Jacques-Louis_David_006.jpg)).

The Plunder State: Napoleon's Exploitation of the Kingdom of Westphalia

by Sam A. Mustafa

On 20 October 1806 French infantry passed through Halberstadt in pursuit of the retreating Prussians. The French stayed long enough to plunder the town thoroughly. Virtually every building was ransacked, their contents dragged out into the streets to be sorted and hauled away. Private possessions from homes were piled up in the churches. When Marshal Ney arrived, the town's officials sent a deputation to him to beg for an end to the plunder. He responded by giving them a bill for 100,000 francs, explained as the cost of supplying his men.¹ Six weeks later orders from Napoleon arrived, setting Halberstadt's "war contribution" at 520,000 francs (roughly 170 francs per family, more than a typical middle-class family's monthly income).² The French, it seemed, were here to stay.

The Kingdom of Westphalia (1807-13) was supposed to showcase the superior, modern, secular ideas of the French Revolution. It was, in twenty-first-century parlance, "nation building" on a grand scale, enforced by French armies and a

¹ Georg Arndt, *Chronik von Halberstadt von 1801-1850* (Halberstadt: Schimmelburg, 1908), 22-24.

² Had a "poverty line" existed in northern Germany at that time, it would have been set around 150 francs per year. For an example, see: *Die Herrschaft Schmalkalden im Königreich Westfalen* (Braunschweig: Otto, 1853), 26-27.

new French-speaking administration, and allegedly overseen by Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon's youngest sibling. Westphalia was not Napoleon's only geo-political creation, but it was unique in several ways. Unlike the Kingdoms of Holland and Naples, or the Duchy of Warsaw, it was not the obvious successor state of an older polity. Unlike the Kingdom of Italy, Westphalia was not an evolution from a pre-existing republican entity. Unlike all of Napoleon's other German satellites, Westphalia was created from whole cloth, with no ties to any German dynasty. Napoleon's official statements in reference to the promulgation of the constitution made clear that Westphalia was intended as a radical break from the Old Regime. Religious minorities were to be liberated by the new secular state, men of talent and humble origin would no longer face traditional class or guild-based prejudices and limitations, and the rule of law and rational administration would replace centuries of idiosyncratic custom and aristocratic privileges. It was to be quite literally the dawn of a new era.

Recent German historiography has tended to describe Westphalia as the most important Napoleonic *Modellstaat*. But what was the model? Westphalia imported French administrative systems and terms, but they were applied quite differently

than in France itself. And of course, the experience of Westphalians in their French proxy state was dominated by an extraordinary level of confiscation of their wealth, far in excess of what the French themselves suffered. Thus, if we set aside the theoretical intent of Westphalia's creation and consider instead the *actual* practice of administration and French hegemony, it would be more accurate to describe the Kingdom of Westphalia as a *Plunderstaat*.

In his famous *Bulletin* of 4 November 1807, acknowledging the dissolution of Hessen-Kassel, Hannover, and Braunschweig and the creation of Westphalia, Napoleon predicted that "the inhabitants of Hessen-Kassel will be happier than before ..." and he promised that they would enjoy the same enlightened government that the French enjoyed. Even if we give the French emperor the benefit of the doubt (that he really believed he would improve the lives of average people), we cannot escape the fact that Napoleon was no constitutionalist in France, and certainly would not be in Germany.³ For all its

³ In his seminal 1973 work *Napoleonische Herrschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik im Königreich Westfalen* (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Rupprecht),

trappings of legislative process, the French imperial system allowed Napoleon to rule by decree and to do more or less anything he wished, notwithstanding even his own laws. That was the system the French transplanted to Westphalia.

Even in the unlikely event that a Napoleonic *Bulletin* was entirely sincere, its stated intentions were mooted by the realities of Westphalia's role in the French imperial system. Westphalia was a satellite state with very little actual sovereignty. Its military was at the disposal of the French emperor. It could not conduct its own foreign policy, trade policy, censorship, nor even police its subjects without French supervision. French citizens were immune to Westphalian law, even when employed by the Westphalian state. And most significantly, it was to provide resources and funds for the Napoleonic war effort. This paper will explore that last point: how did the French extract wealth and resources from Westphalia in the period 1807-1813?

Helmut Berding did in fact give Napoleon the benefit of that doubt.

With regard to the lands that would comprise Westphalia (primarily in Prussia, Hannover, Braunschweig, and Hessen-Kassel), we can divide the extraction of wealth into three unequal phases. The first begins with the war in Autumn 1806 and is characterized by extensive plundering and ad-hoc demands by local French commanders for tribute, or their acceptance of bribes and protection money from local officials. Official demands (i.e. emanating from Napoleon or his designated agents) were also made on the occupied territories in the form of wartime taxes and "contributions," ostensibly for the costs of the occupation, but often simply as tribute for France. After the Peace of Tilsit in the Summer of 1807 a second phase began, in which French officials acting on Napoleon's orders laid the groundwork for the future Westphalian state by carrying out meticulous surveys of the region, cataloguing property and wealth, and confiscating much of it as donatives for French civil and military officials. The final phase comprises the life of Westphalia, roughly 1808 through most of 1813, during which the allegedly sovereign

state was nonetheless still taxed by or for the French in a number of ways. These included special payments for French forces stationed in Westphalia, the raising of special forced bond issues to pay debts owed to France, and special war taxes, which locals came to know as *Franzosensteuer* because it was used to pay tribute to Paris.

Plunder

Jerome Bonaparte inherited a realm that had been substantially plundered. Even the official guides and "handbooks" published by, or authorized by the state to acquaint people with the lands and peoples of the new realm had to concede this fact. When describing Braunschweig, for example, Johann Samuel Ersch's *Handbuch über das*



Königreich Westphalen mentioned that Westphalia's second-largest city had until very recently been a wealthy place with impressive homes, art collections, and museums, unfortunately lost "during the recent war."⁴ In Paderborn, the French had managed to find an astonishing

⁴ Johann Samuel Ersch, *Handbuch über das Königreich Westphalen* (Halle: Hemmerde & Schwetsche, 1808), 82.

number of forbidden "English goods" to confiscate, while simultaneously presenting the town of 5,400 people with a bill for 225,000 francs in "war contributions."⁵ These sorts of scenes had been repeated in every region of the country. When King Jerome arrived in his new capital of Kassel, he found that Napoleon had employed a French officer named Rewel to systematically strip the city of its valuables, including furniture, upholstery, statuary, and the better paintings from wealthy homes in the region.⁶

Throughout 1807, some sort of French martial law and occupation could be seen in most of the lands that became Westphalia. French commanders on the scene were therefore charged with the extraction of wealth from these regions. When it became clear that Westphalia would be created, these men were under some pressure to complete a final round of collections before the Westphalians took control of their land. General Lagrange, for example, military commander in Kassel and "*Gouverneur-Général de la Hesse*," filled his days with paperwork trying to push this process forward in the face of the inevitable complaints and resistance. Between May and December 1807 Lagrange dealt with over 300 petitions from local people asking to be

relieved from some or all of the "contributions." A former court secretary in Kassel, for instance, wanted to know if he could substitute supplies instead of money, since he was unemployed. A young valet wrote a lengthy appeal, describing how his father had abandoned him years ago, and ever since he had to support "my poor family." Aristocrats used their wax seals on letters such as these, which probably did not impress Lagrange.⁷ The occupied territories were scoured for money and valuables before being handed over to the new Westphalian state.

The Domains

On 9 February 1808 Jerome Bonaparte signed the *Domänenvertrag* with France, making official what had already been underway for five months: the transfer of nearly 40% of Westphalia's hereditary and corporate domains to Napoleon, to be given as rewards to French officials. To accelerate the process Napoleon had named Jean-Baptiste Jollivet (himself a recipient of one of these domains) as "liquidator-general."⁸ Jollivet, a former French prefect in the Rhineland, had been chosen by Napoleon to be Westphalia's first treasury minister during the transitional period of 1807. Whereas one might expect a treasury minister to exercise stewardship over his government's wealth, in this case he was in fact sent to oversee the extraction of that wealth and

⁵ Alfred Heggen, *Das Hochstift Paderborn im Königreich Westfalen 1807 bis 1813* (Paderborn: Volksbank Paderborn, 1984), 11 and 22.

⁶ Mariane Heinz and Sabine Thümmeler, *König Jerome: was er zurückliess, was er mitnahm* (Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2010), 69.

⁷ Hessian State Archive, Marburg: Best. 75, Nr. 2657.

⁸ The treaty is preserved in the Prussian State Archive, Berlin-Dahlem, I. HA Rep., Nr. 157.

its transfer to France. The second article of the Westphalian constitution, promulgated by Napoleon, stipulated: "We reserve for Ourselves half of the allodial domains of the princes, to be given by Us, as promised, to those officers of our army who have given us the greatest service in the present wars." Thus Westphalia's creation was inseparable from the idea of property confiscation.

A "domain" was usually a family's private property: buildings and land. This was sometimes aristocratic property, but not always. Many domains were owned by bourgeois, such as a mill on the outskirts of a town, for example, or a small farm along a road. In a few cases domains included lucrative enterprises such as mines or productive forests. Some domains were religious properties, as the Old Regime German churches engaged in a wide variety of economic activities. In the cases of larger domains, any number of tenants might occupy the land, having rented some portion of it for generations. A number of servants or other employees also lived on domains, or depended upon them for income.

During the Autumn and Winter of 1807, French surveyors began to inspect every meter of Westphalia, cataloging the property for potential confiscation. It is not clear exactly how many men were involved in this operation, but the scope of their efforts was substantial enough to have been organized into several regional intendancies. The French had done this

before; by the time they came to Westphalia they had developed pre-printed forms for the process that needed only to be filled-in with the pertinent information. Each row of the form stated the name of the property, how and when it was acquired by its current owners, its size, location, and other information regarding its value, productivity, land under cultivation, and any outstanding liens.⁹

Most of these reports were in Napoleon's and Jerome's hands by the end of December 1807. Disputes immediately surfaced regarding the net values and portions that would go to France. The head of the French assessors (*Inspecteur de l'Enregistrement* G.R. Ginoux) valued all the domains around 30 million francs and asserted that France would take 11 million francs' worth of them. But Jacques-Claude Beugnot, acting finance minister and Jollivet's replacement,¹⁰ claimed that the domains had been overvalued, in fact totaled only 26 million, and that the French were poised to take nearly half of their total value.¹¹ Jerome appealed to his brother but predictably received nothing but a rebuke, as Napoleon told him that the totals were not important to Westphalia; what mattered were the values to the French: "These lands belong to my generals who conquered your kingdom. It's a commitment I made to

⁹ Hessian State Archive, Marburg Best. 75, Nr. 2561.

¹⁰ The treasury and finance portfolios were unified in late 1807.

¹¹ Berding, 33-36.


them and nothing will change my plans."¹² The French surveyors then sorted the domains into categories (first class, second class, and so on) based upon their value. This made it easier for Napoleon to allocate the prizes more equitably among his beneficiaries. The domains were reorganized into *Ampliations*, each compiled in a large booklet addressed to the recipient. Inside was another pre-printed form on which it was only necessary to fill-in the blanks for dates, value, the names of the gifts, and the recipients, and of course, the signature of the dispossessed former owners, who were forced to turn over this title.¹³

Most of the beneficiaries were French officers or civil officials, and they received rewards based upon their ranks and status. The biggest winner by far was Marshal Berthier, who received the large domain of Giebichenstein near Halle, plus several smaller estates, with a total value of 180,000 francs. Other Marshals received

domains valued from 100-120,000 francs, making them wealthier than all but a handful of the richest Westphalians. Many other high-ranking officers and civil officials received domains in the 20-80,000 franc range. Most generals of division and brigade received domains valued from 5,000 to 20,000. There were exceptions to the system: Napoleon's sister Pauline, for example, was one of the wealthiest landowners in Westphalia, receiving over 170,000 francs' worth of property.

Most of the recipients took ownership of their properties in 1808-09, although some had to wait longer. General Marmont, for example, received some of the properties he was promised in 1809, but did not collect them all until August 1811. By that point he was the owner of 77 separate

domains in Westphalia, including orchards, a mine, a mill, forests, and various fields and farms. Many of these were quite small, and each certificate of *Ampliation* shows the signature of an



¹² Napoleon to Jerome, 17 December, 1807.

¹³ Hessian State Archive, Marburg Best. 75, Nr. 2592 and 2897.

owner, usually a middle-class local family, who was dispossessed.¹⁴


When it was finished, Westphalia was the most-confiscated state in Napoleon's Europe. Of the approximately 4,000 estates Napoleon seized in central Europe, 943 were in Westphalia. They were, on average, the more valuable properties, amounting to 23 percent of the total land area, but worth 31 percent of the total land value in that country.¹⁵ Contemporaries estimated that the domains reduced Westphalia's overall tax revenues by about one-third, and of course dispossessed more than a third of Westphalia's rural employers and entrepreneurs.

The new French owners were largely absentee landlords. Few of them are known even to have visited their new properties. They were, however, off-limits to Westphalian tax collectors and immune to Westphalian law. The French General Lauriston, for example, who received two domains valued at 15,000 francs, spent the entire six years of Westphalia's existence in a conflict over the revenues from the property. Lauriston never visited his

domains, but claimed that he was not receiving their full value in revenues and that the Westphalians were treating his land as taxable. He made no effort to complain to Westphalian authorities. Indeed, when a Westphalian judge reviewed the case in 1810, Lauriston asserted that the judge had no authority to do so. Rather, the general complained to the French intendants and to Napoleon personally. Finally in May 1813 Lauriston resigned himself to the drudgery of having to deal with the local authorities.¹⁶ Five months later, Westphalia ceased to exist.

In many cases, local people who lived and worked on the domains continued to do so, which inevitably raised a number of legal questions.

For example, the French General Lorencez received a domain that included a mill. Lorencez might not have been taxable, but the miller was, much to his chagrin.¹⁷ A similar problem arose on the estate of Beberbeck, the property of the French General Reynaud. There, a wily forester named Forcht claimed that the owner of the estate (the absentee general) was



¹⁴ Hessian State Archive, Marburg Best. 75, Nr. 2601.

¹⁵ Berding, 148.

¹⁶ Lower Saxon State Archive, Wolfenbüttel: 2 W Nr. 26.

¹⁷ Hessian State Archive, Marburg Best. 75, Nr. 2898.

supposed to collect the taxes of his employees and hand them over to the state. Since the Frenchman had never bothered to do so, the forester did not have to pay. Forcht hired a lawyer who—in a delicious irony—billed him for the new Westphalian taxes for all legal documents and proceedings, but who managed to keep the case held up in courts through 1813, by which time Westphalia collapsed and Forcht apparently got away with it (making him one of the few people for whom the creation of Westphalia had actually meant a *reduction* in taxes).¹⁸

Forced Bonds

Five weeks before he ordered his brother to sign the *Domänenvertrag*, Napoleon had delivered a separate bill to his new puppet state, the "Extraordinary Contributions" due to France as of 1 January, 1808. It was a lengthy account, divided by the various regions of Westphalia, and broken into two categories: "Argent" and "Fournitures," meaning that some of what

the French demanded was in the form of physical property. The numbers were staggering. The district of Magdeburg alone, for example, was billed over 24 million francs. The total came to just under 50 million, of which 24.8 million had already been paid, leaving a balance due of more than 25 million.¹⁹



This invoice was presented to a state whose entire annual tax revenues were roughly 34 million francs, and which had already been assigned all of the debts of its predecessor states, as well as being denied the revenues of more than a third of its domains. Westphalia began its existence with a 20 percent deficit and a debt nearly four times its national revenues. In short, there was no way for Westphalia to pay Napoleon without

extraordinary measures above and beyond the normal means of taxation. The method they chose was a forced bond issue (*Zwangsanleihe*).

By 1808 the continental bond markets had largely been exhausted by the ravenous

¹⁸ Hessian State Archive, Marburg Best. 75, Nr. 2900.

¹⁹ Prussian State Archive, Berlin-Dahlem, I. HA Rep., Nr. 157.

demands of French state finance. There was little chance of smaller states floating bonds in the traditional places like Amsterdam or Hamburg, since those mercantile cities were in deep depression due to the Continental System and the British blockade. Having been created with a 20 percent structural deficit, Westphalia's credit was so shaky in any event that it could not borrow at much less than 9 percent (and creditors surely knew that the real off-budget deficits were much higher). The state limped along with special private loans in 1808, but the first full-time finance minister, Ludwig Hans von Bülow, despaired at a "year of disorder" caused by a stream of additional expenses added by the French. He recommended a forced bond issue of 20 million francs.²⁰

States often lean heavily on their citizens to purchase bonds during wartime. Westphalia's situation was different because it was ostensibly at peace, and because the purchase of the bonds was compulsory. By forcing the citizens to buy, the state could artificially reduce the interest paid. Because citizens were given nearly a year to purchase the bonds,²¹ the state was able to incentivize early purchases with a higher rate (6%) which dropped as the citizen delayed, until the

²⁰ L.F.V.H von Bülow, *Rapport au Roi sur l'administration des finances de l'an 1808*. (Cassel: l'imprimerie royale, 1809), 3 and 126.

²¹ The word *citizen* is used here anachronistically, since Westphalia's constitution acknowledged no "citizens," only "subjects."

recalcitrant last-minute purchasers received only 4 percent.²²

Jerome's 19 October 1808 decree for the "Supplementary Bond" (*Ergänzungsanleihe*) began with a proclamation that the extraordinary situation of the kingdom required a special expansion of revenues, "without increasing the burden upon Our subjects ... " (a formulation he would use in the decrees for the subsequent forced bonds in 1810 and 1812). Amusingly, obtaining a copy of the official proclamation of this euphemized tax, cost 15 centimes.²³ One can imagine that many people chose not to pay for the announcement, only to learn about it via rumor or angry gossip.

The number of bond coupons each person had to purchase varied by that taxpayer's property class, and was thus linked to the property tax. Each prefect received a set of pre-printed forms that were to be distributed to all communities where the mayors would ensure that each purchaser's name, location, property, and bond purchases could be recorded. A typical purchase for a working-class head of household was 200 francs, roughly two months' income.²⁴ Citizens knew that although the forced bonds were interest-bearing, they were of course taxes because they were compulsory. However, because

²² Lower Saxon State Archive, Hannover, Hann. 74, Wöltingerode, Nr. 35.

²³ Lower Saxon State Archive, Wolfenbüttel, 4 W, Nr. 268.

²⁴ City Archive of Braunschweig, C.IV 3:15 Vol. I-II Zwangsanleihen 1808.

they were interest-bearing, everyone had to pay an additional 3 percent taxes on the interest! Since Westphalia never repaid more than a fraction of its bonds, most citizens were simply taxed and taxed again, for the payment of the French treasury.

There was never any doubt in anyone's mind that the reason for all of this wealth extraction was the funding of Napoleon's war machine. On an 1808 tour of the fortress of Magdeburg, Jerome saw a population struggling to pay for the large and unwanted French garrison. When he pleaded with his older brother for financial relief, Jerome received this blunt reminder of the purpose of Westphalia: "The immense expenses that are required to rebuild my fleets and to supply my armies do not allow me to agree to your request. The province of Magdeburg is the richest ... it must pay me just as the other provinces have."²⁵ Westphalia essentially had to pay for two armies at Westphalian expense: its own, plus the French and French-allied troops Napoleon stationed there. All of the latter was off-budget and, therefore, entirely a deficit expense. For example, during the first nine months of 1811, maintenance of French forces cost Westphalia over 6.1 million francs. That year, for reasons that are unclear, Napoleon also billed Westphalia for the cost of the garrison of far-away Danzig. The cost of that fortress came to another

2.4 million.²⁶ The total, 8.5 million, was almost exactly the same as the cost of Westphalia's own war ministry in that same nine-month period. In other words, for every franc a Westphalian paid for the army, he paid another franc to Napoleon's army.

Forced Bonds (Again) and War Taxes

As early as 1808 Finance Minister Bülow had predicted that a second forced bond issue would be necessary by 1810. He did not know at the time that in March 1810 Napoleon would expand Westphalia by adding much of French-occupied Hannover. These regions had already experienced the stresses of French martial rule for years, including forced bonds and war taxes. Napoleon assigned the Hannoverian debt to Westphalia (and took another 11.5 million francs' worth of domains from those lands prior to adding them to Jerome's realm). Then in December 1810 he changed his mind about the land and took much of it back (to annex to France.) Thus in 1810 Westphalia added over 17 million francs of new debt, but without expanding its population or tax base.²⁷ From that point the state was essentially bankrupt, sustained by an elaborate shell-game of

²⁵ Quoted in Lamar, 55-56.

²⁶ Prussian State Archive, Berlin-Dahlem, I HA. Rep., Nr. 215.

²⁷ For an interesting examination of the effects of this period in rural Hannoverian lands, see: Stephen von Welck, *Franzosenzeit im Hannoverschen Wendland, 1803-1813*. Hannover: Hahn, 2008.

amortization and transfer payments that lasted until the breakdown in mid-1813.

The 1808 bond had essentially been successful: It raised the projected 20 million francs to transfer to France. Its success probably gave Westphalian officials a false optimism about using this tool in the future, but of course the economy was in decline, the population's taxes were increasing, and civil disobedience in several regions had been increasing since 1809. The 1810 forced bond was not as successful. Jerome issued the declaration on 1 December 1810, to raise 10 million francs because Westphalia owed France additional "overdue debts and war contributions" as well as the liquidation of the recent "treaty obligations" (i.e., the redrawing of the borders to include parts of Hannover). Again, interest rates were set with incentives from 6% down to 4%. Subsequent proclamations reminded people that this obligation was non-negotiable; even religious institutions and soldiers in the army were required to buy the bonds.²⁸ The very poor were exempted entirely; a legal redundancy since the punishment for failure to pay was the confiscation of property, which would have been moot for people without property in the first place.

Writing a year after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Heidelberg law professor Carl Zachariä calculated that

²⁸ Lower Saxon State Archive, Wolfenbüttel, 4 W, Nr. 268.

Westphalia's second forced bond brought in a little more than 7.1 million francs, falling well short of its goal.²⁹ The government, however, had no other tools remaining. Napoleon's demands only increased as he prepared for war against Russia, and by the time that conflict began in 1812 Westphalia was again desperately scrounging for money for the French war effort. A third forced bond was declared in June 1812. This decision came only three months after a special French contribution was assessed to pay for the coming campaign, represented by an extra 5 percent personal tax, with additional taxes on institutions. That March anti-tax revolts began to appear throughout Westphalia, usually small and easily controlled by the gendarmes. One in the Paderborn district (Altenhagen and Haxthausen) resulted in ten people being arrested. In July there was another revolt in Kleinenburg, culminating in an assault upon the Rathaus.³⁰

The final forced bond introduced some new considerations, such as pegging a person's commitment to the amount paid in the last bond, as well as a surcharge for state employees (the state by then being by far Westphalia's largest employer).³¹ Since the poor had not bought bonds the last time and had no property to assess, this time

²⁹ Carl Salomo Zachariä, *Ueber die Verpflichtung zur Aufrechthaltung der Handlungen der Regierung des Königreichs Westphalen* (Heidelberg: Engelmann, 1816), 20.

³⁰ Heggen, 30.

³¹ Lower Saxon State Archive, Wolfenbüttel, 4 W, Nr. 268.

there was also a flat rate of contribution assigned to each town, and each mayor was required to make sure that the town "bought" the bonds, with that expense then being spread across the community. These refinements were for naught. The 1812 bond brought in a bit more than half of its goal. And as Westphalia's army vanished in Russia that year and had to be rebuilt for service in Napoleon's 1813 campaign, the state's financial exigencies only increased. Westphalia did not survive to see the end of 1813, but it did manage in its last ten months to levy two more special "war taxes" (*Kriegssteuer*) "for the maintenance of those [French] troops currently marching through [Westphalia]."³² By that point the state was nearing collapse, and salaries were becoming irregular. Nonetheless families were still assessed for both money and goods to provision Napoleon's armies.

Conclusions

On 6 August, 1808, a year after Westphalia's creation, the Prefect of the Oker department sent a long report to the Minister of the Interior regarding "*l'esprit publique*" in his department. He conceded that many people in these lands (most formerly belonging to Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel) frankly did not understand that Westphalia existed as a sovereign state. They thought of the government as French, believed that they were ruled by

³² Royal Decree of 20 March 1813. In City Archive of Braunschweig, C.IV 3:10 Vol. I-III *Kriegssteuer*.

Napoleon, or by "a French king." The omnipresence of French troops or officials, the transfer of wealth and property to Frenchmen, and the control of the media for French purposes, all reinforced this view.³³ It is worth noting that this report was written three months *after* King Jerome had concluded a lengthy and elaborate tour of this region, replete with rituals and symbolism for the new regime.

Carl Zachariä estimated in 1816 that Westphalians had the highest per-capita tax burden of any Napoleonic satellite state.³⁴ The historian Elisabeth Fehrenbach calculated that by 1809—before most of the forced bonds and war taxes—the overall tax burden an individual farmer in Westphalia had already risen above 60 percent.³⁵ Nonetheless, the kingdom was bankrupt, both nationally and locally in every department, primarily due to Napoleon's demands. Friedrich Ludwig von Berlepsch, prefect of Westphalia's Werra department, criticized Westphalia's finances as a "parasitical plunder system" set up cynically by the French and doomed to fail.³⁶ The promise that Napoleon held out

³³ Henneberg to Siméon, 6 August 1808. In Prussian State Archive, Berlin-Dahlem, I. HA. Rep. Nr. 1338.

³⁴ Zachariä, 15.

³⁵ Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Traditionale Gesellschaft und revolutionäres Recht. Die Einführung des Code Napoleon in den Rheinbundstaaten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 101.


³⁶ Friedrich Ludwig von Berlepsch, *Ueber Grundsteuer in Teutschland und vollständiger Abriß der westphälischen Finanz-Geschichte und der*

to liberate Westphalians from their Old Regime feudal obligations was irrelevant; he in fact simply transferred the overbearing relationship to the state (and increased the burdens). A Westphalian peasant was no longer directly obligated to his feudal lord, but his taxes were higher and he was even more comprehensively obligated to the state, which exercised new powers and rights over his labor and life, including the right to conscript him and send him to die in far-away Spain or Russia.

Georgians in the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815)

by Nika Khoperia

The Napoleonic Wars represent one of the most interesting periods in military history (or in the words of British historian John Rose, “for twelve momentous years the history of Napoleon became the history of mankind”).¹ Whatever the causes of the Napoleonic Wars, they left in their wake both a very different Europe and a very different world. The Napoleonic Wars witnessed unparalleled mobilization of human and material resources in Europe as the armies of Emperor Napoleon and his opponents clashed in half a dozen major conflicts. Besides the Frenchmen, many nationalities (English, Austrians, Germans, Swedes, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and Poles) fought for and against Napoleon, but there were also Georgians, the scions of the Caucasuses. They participated in the Napoleonic Wars both as the allies and foes of Napoleon. This paper is a short review of the lives of some Georgian



Peter Bagration

participants and the roles they had played in the Napoleonic wars.

Georgians in French service

By the end of the Eighteenth Century, Georgia had been divided between the Ottoman and Persian spheres of influence.

At the same times the advancing powers of Russia and France revived Georgian hopes of foreign support in their continuous fight for independence and self-preservation.² The first Georgians encountered General Napoleon Bonaparte during the famous Egyptian Expedition that France launched in 1798. While in

Egypt, Napoleon fought against the Mamelukes, many of whom were Georgian-born elite slave-warriors.³ When

² Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Franco-Georgian Diplomatic Relationship, Part I: Bonaparte and Georgia Meet in Egypt*, http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_georgia1.html.

³ A prominent Mameluke statesman and military commander, Murad Bey was born to a Georgian peasant family near Tbilisi and was kidnapped at an early age. Alexander Mikaberidze, "Murad Bey" in *The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, Vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 663.

¹ J. H. Rose, *The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789-1815* (Cambridge: University Press, 1907), 148; and Charles J. Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815* (New York: Viking, 2008), 1 (Kindle Edition).

Napoleon returned to France in 1799, he took several Mamelukes with him and later formed a squadron of Mamelukes who served in Imperial guard and fought in many campaigns of the First Empire. The squadrons included Greeks, Armenians, Arabians, Copts, and Georgians—the most famous of whom was Roustam Raza. Born in an Armenian family in Tbilisi in 1782, he would go on to write an interesting memoirs about his life on Imperial court.⁴


Among the other Georgian Mamelukes were Musaha Giorgi, Daud Gurji, Gurji Roustam, Hasan, Giorgi Cherkesi, Hannania,⁵ but the most distinguished was Jean Chahin, who was born in Tbilisi in 1776.⁶ Kidnapped in childhood, as it was common that time, Chahin ended up in Egypt where he was trained as a Mameluke. In 1798, with the French invasion in Egypt, he abandoned his comrades and joined the

French army, quickly advancing through the ranks. When the French army left Egypt in 1801, Chahin followed them to France and embarked on an illustrious career as an officer in the newly formed Mameluke Squadron of the Imperial Guard. He took part in half a dozen campaigns and distinguished himself in numerous occasions, including Austerlitz in 1805 and Madrid in 1808. Chahin was the *aide-de-camp* of General Charles, comte Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and there was speculation that he also participated in the campaign of 1815 in Belgium and in the battle of Waterloo, where Lefebvre-Desnouettes (who commanded the Guard Light Cavalry Division) was wounded.⁷

⁴ Alexander Mikaberidze and Nika Khoperia, eds. *Napoleon's mamluqi: rustam razas memuarebi* (Tbilisi: Artanuji, 2012); Jonathan North ed., *Napoleon's Mameluke: The Memoirs of Roustam Raza* (New York: Enigma Books, 2015); and Jill Hamilton, *Marengo: The Myth of Napoleon's Horse* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), 31.

⁵ Garde Impériale. Chasseurs à Cheval-Mameluks. Registre de Matricule, Service Historique de la Défense, Archives du Ministère de la Guerre, Château de Vincennes, 2 Yb 79; Alexander Mikaberidze, "ambavi erti mamluqisa: jan shahinis ekhovreba da mogvatseoba," *Saistorio krebuli*, vol. 3 (Tbilisi: Mkhedari, 2013), 5-6; and Ronald Pawly, *Napoleon's Mamelukes* (Oxford: Osprey, 2006), 38.

⁶ Relevé nominatif des militaires compris dans les Troisième et Quatrième Classes, Service Historique de la Défense, Archives du Ministère de la Guerre, Château de Vincennes, Xab 36; and Mikaberidze, "mamluqisa," 93-94.




Roman Bagration

⁷ Philip J Haythornthwaite, *Napoleon's Commanders (1) c. 1792-1809* (Oxford: Osprey Military 2001), 48; Dossier d'officier Chahin, Service Historique de la Défense, Archives du Ministère de la Guerre, Château de Vincennes, XI37 d; and Mikaberidze, "mamluqisa," 101.

After the fall of the First French Empire, Chahin continued to serve for France until his death in 1838.⁸

Georgians in Russian service

In 1801, having violated an earlier agreement with Georgia, Russian Czar Paul I annexed the Eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti to the Russian Empire. Later, the Russians gradually extended their authority to the Western Georgian Kingdom of Imereti and the Principalities of Guria and of Mingrelia. As a result, many Georgians found themselves under the Russian authority and entered the Russian military service. Among these, Peter Bagration (a member of Georgian Royal dynasty) is the most well-known Georgian officer of the Napoleonic wars. He took part in every campaign Russia had fought against France from 1798 to 1812 and was mortally wounded on the



Leo Iashvili

⁸ Mikaberidze, "mamluqisa," 89-103; Pawly, 17; and Mikaberidze and Khoperia, 5-6.



Vladimir Iashvili

fields of Borodino. Peter's brother Roman Bagration also served as an officer and distinguished himself in the battle of Bautzen (1813).⁹

Other Georgians, however, also served with distinction. Leo Iashvili (Yashvil) enjoyed a successful military career and fought almost in every campaign against the French empire, commanding Russian artillery (although his brother Vladimir—also a general—played an active role in the conspiracy against Russian Emperor Paul I). Leo Iashvili participated in the 1805 Campaign, distinguishing himself in battles at Wischau and Austerlitz. In

⁹ Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815* (New York: Savas Beatie, 2005), 18; Irakli Antelava, "Generali Roman Bagrationi", *istoriuli memkvidreoba*, N1 (2011), 31-33; and *Slovar ruskikh generalov, uchastnikov boevikh deistvii protiv armii Napoleona Bonaparta v 1812-1815 gg.* Vol. VII (Rossiiskii arkhiv, Saint Petersburg, Moscow: Studia "TRITE", N. Mixalkova, 1996), 303-04.


1806-1807 he served in Poland and took part in the battles at Pultusk, Eylau, Friedland. In 1812, Iashvili commanded an artillery brigade in Count Wittgenstein's corps and distinguished himself in several battles, for which he was promoted to a Lieutenant General. In 1813-14 he participated in most of the major battles in Germany and France. After the war he was promoted to the General of artillery.¹⁰ Another Georgian-born general Anton Shalikashvili distinguished himself in the campaigns against the French republic and against the empire between 1799-1814. He participated in Russian campaign in Switzerland in 179 and was wounded in the battle of Austerlitz in 1805. He later fought in the battles of Heilsberg and Friedland where he commanded Royal Uhlan regiment, and he participated in the campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814, fighting in the battles of Borodino and at Leipzig. Semen

Gangeblov (Gangeblishvili) served with distinction in the 1812 and 1813 campaigns against Napoleon and suffered

¹⁰ Ilia Antelava, *Gruzini v Otchestvennoi voine 1812 goda* (Tbilisi: Merani, 1983), 51-52; Mikaberidze, *Officer Corps*, 159-60; and "Levan Iashvili-general-leitenanti," *Istoriuli memkvidreoba*, 1 (2012), 30.

a serious injury at Bautzen which caused him to leave the army. Pavel Lashkarev, a son of well-known diplomat Sergey Lashkarev, started his military service in 1781. In 1799 he served in Rismky-Korsakov's corps in Switzerland and was wounded at Zurich. Lashkarev later distinguished himself during the 1805 campaign; and in 1812 he served under Prince Peter Bagration at Smolensk and was seriously wounded at Borodino.¹¹

Three members of Javakhishvili (Zhevakhov) family also in the Russian army of Napoleonic era, but only two of them were active participants of



Anton Shalikashvili

Napoleonic wars. Ivan Javakhishvili began his career fighting against the Turks and Poles before distinguishing himself during the 1807 campaign in Poland. In 1812 he fought at Janov, Kobryn and Pinsk. In 1813 he distinguished himself at the battle of Dresden and was promoted to Major General. The second officer from

Javakhishvili noble family was Spiridon Javakhishvili who served under Peter Bagration at Krems, Schöngrabern and Austerlitz in 1805. He distinguished himself in the campaign of 1807 and

¹¹ *Slovar ruskikh generalov*, Vol. VII, 351.

earned promotion to a colonel. In the 1812 campaign he fought in several battles, including Berezina. In the 1813 campaign he distinguished himself at Leipzig. He also participated in the 1814 campaign. After the war, he suddenly died in 1815.¹²

There were two brothers Panchulidze (Panchulidzev) in Russian army officer corps. They were the sons of Georgian noble David Panchulidze who immigrated to Russia in 1738. Ivan Panchulidze start his military service in Life guard Preobrazhensk regiment in 1774. He participated in several campaigns against the Ottoman Empire and Persia. During 1805 Ivan Panchulidze distinguished himself in several battles (including Schöngrabern) and was wounded at Austerlitz. Panchulidze become a Major General in 1807. In 1812 Ivan fought at Smolensk, Borodino, Tarutino, Maloyaroslavets, Vyazma and Krasnyi. In 1813 he distinguished himself at Lutzen, Bautzen, Reichenbach, Katzbach and become a Lieutenant General. The following year, he fought at Mainz, Rheims and Paris. His brother Semen Panchulidze start his military service in 1785. He fought against Ottomans and in Poland. After that Semen served under Rimsky-Korsakov in Switzerland in 1799. During the 1805 campaign he distinguished himself in several battles. Semen participated the campaign of 1806-07 and fought at Eylau and Friedland. He was promoted to a Major General in 1807.

¹² Antelava, 79; and Mikaberidze, *Officer Corps*, 465.

Over the course of the 1812 campaign, Semen fought in the battles at Smolensk, Borodino, Tarutino, Maloyaroslavets. In 1813, Panchulidze served at Bautzen, Dresden, Leipzig. The following year he took part in the battles at Brienne, Craonne, Laon, Le Fere Champenoise, but retired in 1815 because of poor health.¹³

Another famous Georgian who participated in the Napoleonic Wars was Alexander Chavchavadze, a notable Georgian poet, a public benefactor and a military figure, who became “the father of Georgian Romanticism.” He was a member of the noble family elevated to the princely rank in the Seventeenth Century. Alexander's father Garsevan Chavchavadze served as an ambassador of Heraclius II, the king of Kartli and Kakheti to the Russian Tsar. During the War of the Sixth Coalition (1813-14), he



Ivan Zhevakhov

¹³ Antelava, 65-66; Mikaberidze, *Officer Corps*, 293; and *Slovar ruskikh generalov*, Vol. VII, 507-08.

served as an aide-de-camp to the Russian commander Barclay de Tolly and was wounded in his leg at the Battle of Paris on 31 March 1814. As an officer in the Russian expeditionary forces, he stayed in Paris for two years, and the restored Bourbon dynasty awarded him with a *légion d'honneur* for his service. Open to new ideas and early French Romanticism in particular, he was impressed by Lamartine and Victor Hugo, as well as Racine and Corneille, whose writings entered Georgian literature through Chavchavadze.¹⁴

Georgians thus participated almost in every campaign of the Napoleonic wars—both for and against him. Napoleon's Mamelukes became vivid figures of Western Europe in the first half of the Nineteenth Century not only as warriors who served in the Imperial Guard and fought for the Emperor, but because their eastern style had an influence over the French society. Almost every Georgian officer who served in artillery, infantry and cavalry of the Russian army, distinguished himself in the Napoleonic wars and contributed his mite in the success of the Coalition forces against Napoleon.

¹⁴ *Russkii biograficheskii slovar* 22 (Saint-Petersburg: tip I.N. Skorokhodova, 1905), 5-6.

Clausewitz and Jomini: Two Different Interpreters of Napoleonic Warfare

by Eugene Chalvardjian

After Napoleon's downfall and the restoration of the balance of power in Europe, military theorists—or strategists as they were called since—learned valuable lessons from the French Emperor's campaigns.¹ They drew teachings ranging from the guerilla type warfare (carried out by Spanish or Russian partisans against invading French troops) to the general Napoleonic strategy. Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini were the two most astute theorists of this new wave of strategists. Their doctrines and theories of war and strategy, directly and indirectly, influenced several generations of soldiers and military strategists and are still valid to this day.

Their thinking which was inspired from Napoleonic strategy was not, however, born in a theoretical vacuum. Bonaparte had read the works of classical and modern military authors and had greatly admired some of them. Clausewitz had grasped many of Machiavelli's, Montesquieu's and Kant's ideas in addition to those of military theorists of his own time (whom he soundly criticized by the way). As for Jomini, he drew upon the writings of eighteenth-century French and German

theorists. He also studied Napoleonic Wars and to a lesser extent those of Frederic II, where the dictum "divided we march, united we strike" was widely applied. Since this rule had been invented well before Jomini's time, he renamed it as "the theory of operating lines," and his entire war doctrine was based on it. This theory offered a flexible concept of the art of maneuvering on the battlefield and, thus, had for a long time a profound impact on the military circles. It led French strategists to think that Napoleon had devised a highly effective model of conducting a war—a panacea! In short, Jomini synthesized the intellectual legacy of the eighteenth-century military school of the Enlightenment with the characteristics of Napoleonic warfare.²

Thus, the nineteenth-century strategic thinking (or at least the one that was concerned with continental wars) was partly resting on the previous century's body of strategic knowledge. This kind of phenomenon is not surprising *per se*, since the eighteenth century abounded with a variety of military thinking. Both Clausewitz and Jomini were inspired by the works of the military theorist, Henry

¹ Eugene Chalvardjian, *Impact de l'art de la guerre napoléonien dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle* (Paris: Publibook, 2014), 165-73. All translations are the author's.

² Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 5.

Lloyd. Having taken part in many military campaigns in several countries, Lloyd, a British general, had, within four decades, acquired an almost unique experience of war. This real-life experience constituted the core of his historical writings which were complemented by his theoretical works. Before Clausewitz, Lloyd had laid the foundation of a war philosophy and before Jomini, the doctrine of an operational strategy.


According to the British theorist, the science of war is divided into two parts: the first is of a mechanical nature and can be taught, while the other does not bear any name and can neither be defined nor taught. Lloyd's entire concept of strategy embraced the dichotomy between these two faces of war: a doctrine of war based on operational strategy on the one hand and on the other, on a "philosophy of war." This dual approach reflected the differences between the two great strategists of the nineteenth century: Jomini, the spokesman for an operational strategy based on a number of principles including that of the lines of operations and Clausewitz, the philosopher and dialectician of war who sought to understand its essence.

Any possible link between Lloyd's military thinking and Clausewitz's (or Jomini's) conception of Napoleonic strategy could be

explained by the fact that Napoleon himself was very interested in the works of the English general and particularly in his concept of the lines of operations. And since Lloyd and Jomini alike attributed a great deal of importance to that concept, they both stressed the logistical and communication aspects of a military campaign. Like the British theorist, Jomini tried hard to define a war typology and its corresponding strategies. And like Lloyd, Clausewitz outlined the importance of points and centers of gravity around which was looming every strategy. The works of the Prussian strategist, especially his *On War*, reveal signs of the British general's thoughts. Let's now take a closer look at these two interpreters of Napoleon.

Clausewitz's Theories

Born in 1780, Carl von Clausewitz took part in some of the Napoleonic wars. During the Jena campaign, he was *aide-de-camp* to Prince August of Prussia. In 1812, the year of the Russian campaign, he left the Prussian army to serve with the czar's forces until 1814 and in 1818, he directed the *École Militaire Prussien*. His monumental work *On War (Vom Krieg)* is considered to the present day to be a universal reference in the field of strategy. It was, first and foremost, a set of sparse writings which were published only after



his death in 1831. It took a while for the work to gain some reputation. By 1860, it had become a classic and had had a profound impact on the military thoughts of the future victor of the Prussian campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, Helmuth von Moltke, which further enhanced the importance of the book.³

In his writings, Clausewitz tries to capture the very nature of war. He seeks to find its guiding regulative idea, its philosophical foundation. His work must be understood in connection with the transformation of the art of war which was brought about by Napoleon, following the French Revolution of 1789. Eighteenth-century warfare, shaped by the character of the absolutist state and cabinet politics, had been uncertain and dominated by sieges, maneuvers and finances. By contrast, the mass armies which had been introduced by the Revolution and been infused with patriotism had enabled Napoleon to achieve decisive results against the whole of Europe.⁴ The reorganization of the army's divisionary system into *corps d'armée*, the requisitions in foreign lands (to ensure the flow of troops' supplies) and the introduction of skirmishers' tactics (to disrupt enemy forces before a massive attack) are only a few of the many new or improved methods to which Clausewitz was exposed during the Napoleonic campaigns and of which he made extensive use in his masterpiece *Vom Kriege*. His

³ Martin van Creveld, *La transformation de la guerre* (Paris: Éditions du Rocher, 1998), 56.

⁴ Gat, 124.

interpretation of the Napoleonic strategy of annihilation suggests that the Emperor's objective, in utter defiance to classical rules, was to destroy his opponents' armies—as illustrated by the use of a new and improved artillery—swiftly and unconditionally in as many lightning swift attacks as possible. In stating his theories, Clausewitz was not seeking to impose solutions he would have picked up in his military campaigns. Instead, he provided the reader with extremely powerful conceptual and dialectic tools in order to help him grasp all the complexity of war and handle uncertainty. That's why after two centuries his work still remains pertinent.

Clausewitz's emphasis on the centrality of politics in war represents his greatest contribution to the theory of military art. He insists that under any circumstance, war must be regarded as a political instrument and not as an independent entity.⁵ He also states that since war is characterized by the use of armed forces, a strategic action during its course always implicitly involves the thought of a combat. Having thus determined the aim of a combat as being the partial or total annihilation of the enemy, he then promptly seeks to discover the principles rule of a war plan and its execution. He figures that focusing as much as possible

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *De la Guerre*, (Paris: G. Lebovici, 1989), 854-61; and Maschke, Gunther, "La guerre, instrument ou expression de la politique" http://www.stratisc.org/strat_7879_MASCHKE22.html. Accessed on 26 December 2006.

on the target and acting as plainly and as quickly as possible are the two most important principles to follow. These two principles combined bear a strong resemblance to Napoleon's maxim: "In warfare just like in mechanics, time is the single most important element between weight and power."⁶

Among the numerous objectives of war, such as the acquisition of enemy military resources and the winning of public opinion, he nonetheless figures that the defeat and destruction of the enemy army should be—according to Napoleon's strategy of annihilation—the main goal to be pursued.⁷ Inspired again by Napoleonic campaigns, Clausewitz next lays down the principles that should be followed in order to achieve that goal:

- a) Use exhaustively the forces from all available resources;
- b) concentrate all forces on wherever the decisive attacks would take place;
- c) not waste any time (speed severely hinders many of the enemy's plans of action and wins public opinion. The use of surprise is a particularly efficient

- way of achieving victory); and
- d) keep up with battlefield successes (only the relentless pursuit of a defeated enemy can bring victory).⁸



Clausewitz's next theory states that defense is a stronger form of warfare than offense. In advancing this argument, he directly contradicts Bonaparte's assertion of the superiority of offense. He is certainly in agreement with the

Emperor when he claims that in order to attack, one has to be stronger than the enemy either right at the outset or by being capable of wearing him down. Thus he is referring to some of the Napoleonic campaigns like Castiglione, Rivoli, Marengo, and Austerlitz. But while presenting his defense-offense concept, he argues that defense is a stronger form of fighting than attacking because it requires less force and since it generally seeks to hold ground, it depends on the fact that it normally operates in its own territory, thereby enjoying the advantages of terrain as certain geographical features, such as mountains and rivers, tend to constrict the enemy's lines of attack. And as the purpose of defense is to hold ground and that of offense to is gain ground and since it is easier to preserve than to acquire

⁶ John Frederick Charles Fuller, *La conduite de la guerre, (1789 - 1961)*, (Paris: Payot, 1963), 61.

⁷ Clausewitz, 262-66.

⁸ Gat, 124; and Fuller, 62.



territory, he concludes that it is easier to defend than to attack. He adds that a comprehensive and well-conducted defense wears down the assailant, alters the balance of power between attacker and defender and opens the way to the offense. Clausewitz figures that the moment of transition from defense to offense should be as much as possible postponed in order to prolong the wearing down period of the opponent.⁹ Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz did not seek to lay out a new way of conducting a war. He wanted to gather in a single body all the known principles of military art in order to reduce each one of them to its most elementary form.

Jomini's Theories

Born in 1779 in Payerne (Switzerland), Antoine-Henri Jomini began to serve France in 1803. Two years later, this

⁹ Émile Wanty, *L'art de la guerre* (Verviers: Gérard et Cie, 1968), 386 ; Fuller, 63-64 ; and Clausewitz, 475-79.

young commander of battalion, member of Marshal Ney's staff was publishing *Le Traité des grandes opérations militaires* in Paris. This treatise of Grand Tactics in warfare contained a collection of the most important maxims of military art. It constituted the compendium of Jominian theories. His work was so rigorously analytic and so precisely critical of Napoleonic campaigns that it amazed even Napoleon himself who had read it after Austerlitz (1805). It was immensely popular during the first half of the nineteenth century and was considered to be an almost universal authority in the military. During the preparatory phase of the Italian campaign of 1859, Napoleon III readily consulted Jomini, then 80 years old, about some of its strategic aspects. The aging veteran provided the new Emperor with a 25-line long summary of the operational project inspired directly from the uncle's campaigns, but the application of which required different

military aptitudes than those of the nephew.

Jomini had been credited with sorting out the principles and methods which enabled Napoleon and Frederic II to maneuver exceptionally well in order to win battles, but he did it as a highly methodical analyst who labels and categorizes all his observations in a colorless rigid style. He did indeed expose the Napoleonic war with far greater precision than Clausewitz, but he dissected it like a cadaver, whereas his Prussian counterpart had managed to capture it on the spot. That explains the difference in fortune granted to the two interpreters by posterity. Today, Jomini's writings read like manuals because of their didactic tone, whereas those of Clausewitz are much more those of a philosopher.

In *Le Traité des grandes opérations militaires*, Jomini's intentions are clearly didactic: He tries to impose upon the reader the concept of "modern war" by comparing Napoleonic warfare with that of Frederic II. He also severely criticizes the Austrian generals of the Eighteenth Century for being greatly mistaken about adopting the "cordon-like" formation (which tries to cover every part of a theatre of war) in their defense system. Jomini's main teaching concerns the advantages that a concentration of forces on a central position would offer. In order to avoid the weaknesses of the Austrian system (of cordon), an army should be kept concentrated on a single line of operations and manoeuver on interior

lines. An army whose lines are interior and closer to one another than those of the enemy can overpower him by throwing successively the bulk of its forces on a few decisive points.¹⁰

Jomini unveils remarkably well the major characteristics of Napoleonic warfare. He insists, first and foremost, on the need for an army to "live off the countryside." To that effect, he harshly criticizes the eighteenth-century supply system by pointing out that the troops depended for their provisions on long endless convoys behind them. As far back as during the ancient times and the Middle Ages, when the great commanders invaded foreign lands, their armies lived off the resources of the conquered countries. During Caesar's (and the Huns') invasion of the Gaul and the Arab conquest of Spain, the troops were marching without any store behind them. Jomini notes that Frederic's troops could have comfortably lived in a rich and fertile country with a population of 5 to 6 million. He concludes that in contrast to ancient times, this particular aspect of warfare in the eighteenth century had somehow regressed. He then advocates swiftness in an army's movements because it greatly increases its strength by directing successively the mass of its forces on to every point of its line of attack. He also favors the offensive because it enables an army's troops to take

¹⁰ Antone-Henri Jomini, *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*, vol. I (Paris: Anselin et Pochard, 1818), 292-94.

the initiative as illustrated by the march of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in 1805. This advantage dispenses the troops of marching *en masse* as long as the enemy has not been engaged yet. Thus, dispersion precedes concentration.¹¹

In his *Traité*, the Swiss theorist stresses that the ultimate goal of the operation is the destruction of the enemy army and, according to him, Napoleon's superiority stems from this will to destroy the opponent. He figures that during the eighteenth-century Seven Years War, no one was quite aware of it. Austrian generals were the champions of pusillanimity: Instead of searching for strategic places they could use as battlegrounds for their troops, they were occupied with endless theoretical calculations. Jomini criticizes Frederick II for not behaving like Napoleon. In his work, he always favors Napoleon over the Prussian king because the latter did not know how to take advantage of his victories: He often acted passively and was too hesitant to engage the enemy. The Swiss theorist deems that Frederick's reputation was largely overrated by Napoleon. One should no longer dwell on besieging fortresses: One should instead engage in battles as vigorously as possible.

Following the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, Jomini decided to collect all of his theoretical considerations in a writing that

¹¹ Web Site: Bruno Colson, "Lire Jomini" http://www.stratisc.org/strat_049_colsonjomi.html. Accessed on 15 September 2010.

would be used as an introduction to his *Traité*.¹² In 1836, he was appointed private tutor to the imperial prince, the future czar Alexander II. He revised his text, enriched it and turned it into *Le Précis de l'art de la guerre*. The teachings of Napoleon, however, were somehow lost in a whole set of considerations which might lead the reader to think that the author was regressing towards a more cautious concept of strategy where the aim was the occupation of territories rather than the destruction of the enemy's main army in a major Napoleonic battle. The strategy is dealt with a set of definitions and procedures designed in terms of spaces. Whereas Jomini openly addresses Napoleon's system in his earlier works, he seems to have moved to a more territorial concept of strategy later. Some of the principles in the *Précis* state that the objective is indeed the destruction of the enemy army, but that is only the Napoleonic way of battle and should not be used all the time.

In his *Précis*, Jomini examines the pros and the cons far more than in the *Traité*—to the point of being ambiguous. His principles, definitions, and rules seem to turn war into a science. He had already declared in one of his previous works, *Les Guerres de la Révolution*, that the science of war was made up of three general considerations: the first was the art of embracing the lines of operations in the

¹² This 1830 work was entitled *Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre et de leurs rapports avec la politique de l'État*.

most favorable way, the second was the art of moving the troops as quickly as possible on the decisive points of the lines of operations and the third was the art of utilizing one's main forces on the most important point of a battlefield.¹³ Yet he stresses that war, far from being an exact science is a terrible and passionate drama, certainly ruled by three or four general principles, but whose outcome depends on several moral and physical considerations.¹⁴ His concern for poise and middle ground led him at times to criticize the scientific excesses of the Prussian theorist Heinrich von Bülow and the school of geometry and at times to refute Clausewitz for his denial of the value of any prescription for the conduct of war.¹⁵

Jomini, along with Clausewitz, remains in the end the great interpreter of the transformations of warfare by Napoleon. Unlike his Prussian rival, Jomini did not interpret in depth the interdependence of strategy and politics. Basically his work is

¹³ Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Les Guerres de la Révolution* (Paris: Hachette littératures, 1998), 406-07.

¹⁴ Jomini, *Les Guerres*, 408-15.

¹⁵ Jomini, *Les Guerres*, 408-15.

about extracting war theory from the context of Napoleonic campaigns. Moreover, the broad-stroke outlines of Jomini's strategic principles are drawn solely from Napoleon's military "masterpieces": the Italian campaign of 1796-97, and those of Marengo, of Austerlitz, and of Jena. The Napoleon who wanted to extend his empire to the whole of Europe, who raised mass armies, who marched on Moscow, fascinated and at the same time worried the highly sensitive Jomini. The Jominian concept of military operations consisted of the formal presentation of Napoleonic warfare only at its peak. This explains its successes as well as its limits.¹⁶

In order to turn warfare into a science,

he reduced it to strategy, which was for him a set of techniques, analyses and plans resembling prescriptions for the conduct of war. He resumed and systematized his views on the frontlines, on the bases and lines of operations and he was always advocating the offensive in battle. And in spite of the finesse of his political

¹⁶ Jomini, *Précis*, 17-18.



observations, Jomini gave the impression that he was separating the phenomenon of war from its political and social context. He was fully aware of the limiting scope of his work. He admitted that he had treated only the military aspects and that other factors, no less important, could not be ignored for the conduct of a major war, but that they are the science of empire ruling rather than those of a general.¹⁷ He emphasized the rules of decision-making and operational outcome and in the end left us with a picture of war resembling a gigantic chessboard.

Agreement over the Importance of “Terrain” in Warfare

When comparing Clausewitz with Jomini in their interpretation of the Napoleonic system, it is important to point out how their viewpoints converge when it comes to one of the most positive aspects of warfare, the terrain. In tactics, where firepower is dominant since it rules all movements, the terrain is of primary importance: It provides observation posts for firing as well as covers for protection from enemy fire. Thus, it could be noted that armament progress (like improved firepower during the Napoleonic wars) had a tendency to shield combat from the constraints of terrain. In strategy, the terrain is not any less important. Indeed, in strategy, maneuvering is about forming, spreading out and moving masses of men and material in preparation for battle; therefore, it could not be conceived or

conducted without taking into account the facilities that a terrain offers for troop movements and concentration. Strategy and geography are, therefore, as linked as tactics and topography. Yet the use of terrain was often misinterpreted in early-Nineteenth Century. For some, like Bülow, the terrain was of no practical use—except for the selection of bases of operation that would be favorable for the conduct of war. Others, however, like Archduke Charles of Austria, one of the fiercest opponents of Napoleon I, had an entirely different view of the importance of terrain. In his military writings on strategy, the Prince pointed out that the conduct of military operations on a war scene should be based on the possession (by conquest or defense) of strategic points, taking primarily into account geographical and topographical factors. These strategic points would represent the “keys of the country.”

When tackling that particular aspect of warfare, Jomini takes a more moderate stand between these extreme viewpoints. His writings abound with reflections on the constituents of a theatre of war—the base of operations being only one of them. Furthermore, he distinguishes the geographical and topographical elements of a war zone which are considered by the belligerents to be permanent sources of power (such as fortified systems and political centers) from those which are relatively unimportant.

As for Clausewitz, he is also cautious not to value disproportionately the value of

¹⁷ Jomini, *Précis*, 15.

terrain in strategy or to disregard entirely its importance. For the Prussian theorist, the natural objective of war is to overthrow the enemy. In order to succeed, his main elements of resistance—his armed forces, his territory, his will to fight—must be overcome. A strong strategy involves the targeting of the first of these three elements: The destruction of the enemy army followed by its relentless pursuit, which means the systematic search for a battle. In that respect, Napoleonic strategy was an improved model on that of eighteenth-century warfare. But it is equally certain that territory and armed forces constitute interdependent elements of power for any belligerent nation. Consequently, operations against enemy armed forces and operations aiming at conquering territories were closely interrelated and the results would mutually influence each other. Therefore, even a strategy aiming solely at an annihilation battle could include territorial and geographical objectives deemed profitable or even imperative.

Sometimes, during a war, the enemy's loss of part of his territory—such as his capital—would hurt him more badly than the loss of a battle. Certainly, the disposal of more powerful means of combat than the opponent was a must to overcome him. Otherwise, the goal of an offensive war would be limited to the conquest of a fraction of enemy territory, in which case topographical and geographical considerations would sometimes be

preponderant.¹⁸ In short, both Jomini's and Clausewitz's view of the value of terrain is clearly relativistic: Terrain is important only insofar as the conquest or defense of territory necessitates its destruction or preservation as dictated by strategy. That was precisely Napoleon's viewpoint and it was confirmed by every war after 1815, including the Great War of 1914-18.

¹⁸ Général Duffour, "L'élément terrain en stratégie"
http://www.strarisc.org/strat_058_Duffour.html.
July 1931. Assessed on 18 September 2010.

Schooling and Privilege: Schoolgirls at the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur during the Napoleonic Empire

by Maureen MacLeod

In October 1807, the first students entered the *Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur* at Écouen, the first secular educational institution for girls in France. The idea of creating a secular female educational institution emerged two years earlier in 1805, after the Battle of Austerlitz. During this important battle that left 2,000 French dead and 7,000 wounded, France defeated the Austrian and Russian armies, forcing their leaders to sign peace treaties with Napoleon.¹ On 7 December 1805, Napoleon decreed that the state would provide education for the sons and daughters of French soldiers, officers, and generals killed in this battle.² A second decree—on 15 December 1805 (24 Frimaire, an XIV) and known as the Schönbrunn decree—created a governing body to oversee the creation of three education institutions, each of which would accommodate approximately one hundred students, for the daughters of Legion of Honor members.³ While the decrees for multiple schools seem to indicate that the project was off to a quick start, nearly two years passed before the

doors opened and the first students were formally admitted.

As noted in numerous works on the Legion of Honor schools, such as Rebecca Rogers's *Les demoiselles de la Légion d'honneur* and Pierre Codechèvre's *Napoléon et ses maisons de la Légion d'honneur*, Écouen, the first Legion of Honor school for girls, initially began as an elite institution for the daughters of military personnel or state workers rather than for the orphaned girls whose fathers had died in battle as had been originally envisioned. Écouen, and subsequently Saint-Denis, were known for many years as the elite institutions for educating girls, and many parents fought to secure a place for their daughters—especially during the Napoleonic period—where they could mingle with appropriate society. The contradiction between the envisioned mission of the Legion Honor schools and their actual practice is perplexing. Therefore, my work asks questions about these initial years, examining the education the girls received—which was outside the norm of the future bourgeois woman—and how they used this education in a world that was dramatically altered with the fall of Napoleon and the return of the Bourbons. This article specifically examines the discrepancy

¹ Owen Connelly, *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1987), 90.

² Thierry Lentz, *The Publication of Napoleon's General Correspondence by the Fondation Napoléon: An Historic Adventure*, vol. 5 (Paris: Fayard, 2008).

³ Codechèvre, *Napoléon et ses Maisons de la Légion d'Honneur* (1972), 11–12.

between the goals of the initial decree to the actual execution of the school in 1807.

In the two years between the Schönbrunn decree and the opening of the Maison Impériale de la Legion d'honneur d'Écouen, significant discussions took place concerning the school's location, the directress's appointment (who would eventually be Madame Henreiette Genet Campan), the students who would be admitted, and the institution's goals.

Napoleon placed Bernard Germain Etienne de La Ville, comte de Lacépède and Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, in charge of the day-to-day work of establishing and managing the schools.⁴ Although there was a great debate over the school's potential location, everyone concerned agreed that placing it within the city of Paris would not allow school leaders to instill appropriate values in the students. Paris's urban setting was chaotic, dirty, and would introduce the students to life's negative aspects.


⁴ Bernard Germain Etienne de La Ville, comte de Lacépède was Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, 1803-1814 and March to July 1815. He remained loyal to Napoleon Bonaparte after the latter's abdication in 1814, and returned for the Hundred Days. After Napoleon was finally removed from power to Saint-Helena, Lacépède retired from his position, but ultimately was made a peer of France by the Bourbon Restoration in 1819.

Therefore, placing the school just outside the city would be a better choice for the safety and security of the girls' moral character. The desire to remain outside of Paris shows how the perception of Enlightenment women—the salonnieres who were believed to dictate politics and society in the *ancien régime*—still existed, and how Napoleon's administration feared that the women of Parisian salons would continue to corrupt young girls.

Therefore in October 1807, the first students arrived at the Chateau d'Écouen, a safe 22.2 kilometers outside of the center of Paris, another Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur would open in 1809, at Saint-Denis, a mere 11.6 kilometers from the center of Paris.

Establishing Rules and Regulations

Napoleon Bonaparte is known for his very hands-on style of ruling—he read hundreds of police reports daily, was active in crafting legislation, attended important state functions, and headed the largest army in Europe—and only allowed himself approximately fifteen minutes for meals. Napoleon was personally very active in establishing the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur, but he also had a busy schedule of state



responsibilities and had to appoint a deputy to see his plans through: Grand Chancellor. Consequently, archival documents that record Napoleon's personal objectives for the school are in short supply, because after its inception, Napoleon, occupied with other endeavors, gave Lacépède much of the control over establishing the schools, believing that his brief but concise direction were sufficient. One of the surviving letters to Grand Chancellor—known as the Finkelstein letter—was in response to an earlier query in which Lacépède had asked Napoleon, “what should the girls at Écouen learn?” Napoleon responded specifically to this question, outlining a curriculum for the future students.

What should the girls who are students at Écouen learn? They should begin with religion, with the utmost stringency.... Religion is an important affair within the public institution of girls....The weakness of the female mind is in the movement of ideas, their destiny in the social order, the necessity of constant and perpetual resignation and a kind of charity that is indulgent and easy, all this can only be achieved by Religion.⁵

In Napoleon's perspective, devotion to religion was not important, but the rigidity, order, and structure that

⁵ Napoleon to Lacépède, 15 May 1807, Finkelstein letter, Archives de la Musée de la Légion d'Honneur, France [hereafter AMLH].

accompanied it were. Napoleon's turbulent history with the Catholic Church illustrates that he was not fond of organized religion; however, he understood its importance for order and made it a pillar of his school.

Napoleon also maintained that the girls should be educated in numbers, writing, and the French language. Basic mathematics was important because women should be able to calculate the value of goods simply and concisely, which would help them run an efficient, economical household. Napoleon thought that the girls should learn some geography and history, but that they “be careful not to teach them any Latin, or any other foreign language.” Yet he did feel it necessary to teach them some botany and other natural history, probably based on Rousseau's educational ideas, so that they would not be ignorant and superstitious.⁶

Napoleon discussed the idea of teaching the girls a little cooking and nursing so they could care for their families when they were sick, and he permitted dancing in the curriculum, but only as a form of exercise. Napoleon's character shines through his very specific details about the curriculum in this initial discussion about how to get the program started. “Three quarters of the day,” he wrote, “should be devoted to [manual labor or handiwork]: they should know how to make stockings, shirts, and embroidery, every kind of

⁶ Napoleon to Lacépède, 15 May 1807, letter, AMLH.

women's work." Napoleon's ideal pupil would emerge from Écouen with the ability to manage a small household, and with the skills to direct her servants, mend clothes, and provide overall care for her family.⁷

Admitting the "Privileged" Few

As noted above, when Napoleon first conceived the idea for the Maisons d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur after the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, he intended to create a school for the daughters of those killed in battle, or those who were impoverished and had no means of educating their daughters. Napoleon hoped that offering the girls a basic education would give them the opportunity to make good marriages and become simple wives and mothers, an advantage that they would not otherwise have had after their fathers' deaths. Without some education, they would most likely have ended up living in poverty. The French public positively embraced the idea of the schools. As Lacépède wrote Napoleon with great enthusiasm regarding the establishment of the schools, "public opinion seems very favorable to what you are doing" and "the parents of the girls admitted and many members of the Legion inquire with much interest."⁸ However, shortly after the public announcement of the Maison

d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur's creation, members from all ranks and aspects of society, whether they were financially in need or not, began to ask for their daughters to attend the school. While examining a register of scholarship students from 1807-1845, I collected employment or status information for the male relatives that sponsored the education of 117 students admitted between 1807 and 1813. One can see in *Table 1* and *Figure 1* that these were daughters of the higher ranks of military and civil society.

Families sent letters of application to the Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor (Lacépède), who was supposed to give preference to the daughters of Legion of Honor members' widows according to Article Two of the decree establishing the Legion of Honor Schools. However, many of the girls who attended the school were neither poor, nor orphaned. Archival records provide evidence of some widows with numerous daughters who did receive some preferential treatment. For example, the Vaugrigneuse family, whose father died while his two oldest daughters were attending Écouen (for free), still had four other daughters to educate. All of them were admitted as *gratuite* or non-paying students.⁹

As evidenced from the tables, charts, and archival documents the students admitted

⁷ Napoleon to Lacépède, 15 May 1807, letter, AMLH.

⁸ Lacépède à Napoleon, 4 mai 1807, letter, Archives Nationales, France [hereafter ANF], AFIV Carton 1038, Dossier 5.

⁹ Dossiers de la famille Vaugrigneuse, Archives de la Maison d'Éducation de la Légion d'Honneur à Saint-Denis, France [hereafter ASD].

under Napoleon were not average. They already lived lives of privilege, which continued with their admittance into the *Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur*. We do not see the daughters of sergeants, corporals, or privates, who composed the majority of the population of the *grand armée*. Eventually in 1811, the goal of Napoleon's initial Schönbrunn decree of 1805 would be fulfilled with the opening of the *Maisons d'orphelines de la Légion d'honneur*.

A variety of letters came in from parents, grandparents, and other relatives requesting admittance of their daughters into the *Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur*. The men who fell into different categories of Legion of Honor members—a designation bestowed by special decree on a man who had served either in the military or within the civil service—wrote to, or in some cases visited, the Grand Chancellor petitioning for their daughter(s) to receive a free or low-cost education at what would become the best female educational institution in France.

Some of the letters were simple and direct. On 1 July 1807, Jean Baptiste Estève, Baron of the Empire and a Major General in the Army, wrote,

If he [Napoleon] pleases, my daughter is one of the number of young ladies who possess the qualities required to enjoy the benefits accorded by His Majesty the Emperor and King, to be admitted to the pension of Ecoeu. This child is

five years and three months, and she carries the name Zéphérine.¹⁰

Zéphérine was admitted as a free student to Écoeu on 17 May 1808, with the delay between her father's letter and her admittance largely due to her young age.

Many of the parents who applied on behalf of their daughters argued that they were in the unfortunate circumstance of having numerous daughters for whom they could not provide good educations. Such was the case for Baron Jean François Merlet, prefect of the Vendée and commander in the Legion of Honor, who wrote to the Grand Chancellor seeking a place for his daughter, Caroline Merlet. He claimed that he had too many children and too many expenses to educate her properly:

His majesty has ordered the establishment of two houses of education for the daughters of the Legion of Honor; I have the honor of addressing myself to your excellence that I wish to request the admission to one of the houses, Caroline Merlet, my youngest daughter, aged ten years. A child who is very pleasant and has a happy disposition and I have every reason to hope that one day she would be a justifiable choice and be taken care of with a free education.

¹⁰ J. B. Estève to the Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, 1 July 1807, letter, ASD, Doissier Madeleine Zéphrine Estève.

I am father to four living children, my fortune is not considerable, much of it suffered the ravages of the revolution and civil war; five and a half years I have held an honorable and difficult position; the few that are notable profit fully and I am reduced to [taint] my captains, I have hope the kindness of your excellence, that she will be a worthy cause to His Majesty, that through you I will obtain that favor I solicit.¹¹

Less than a month later, Caroline Merlet entered Écouen on 19 April 1808, as an *élève gratuite* or free student. Her father did not pay any pension for her education; her lessons, room, board, and trousseau were provided by the state until her departure from the school on 9 May 1813.¹²

The Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, was responsible for compiling a list of the nominees for the school, and often ran into cases for which the Emperor had made promises to parents regarding the admittance of their daughter to the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur without informing him. In numerous letters to Napoleon, he complained about the lack of communication and explicit instructions, and he also noted that he had not been able to gain a private audience

¹¹ Request for admission by Monsieur Merlet to Napoleon, 28 March 1806, letter, ASD, Dossier Caroline Merlet.

¹² Dossier Caroline Merlet, ASD.

with the Emperor in nearly three years.¹³ For example, in this excerpt from one of his letters to Napoleon, Grand Chancellor wrote about visitors he had received:

Madame Chacqué, widow of M. Chacqué, lieutenant colonel of the Swiss regiment de Reidon, killed in Spain, on the battlefield, she was quick to come to the palais de la Légion, to let me know that your Majesty met her at a review in Madrid and because of your goodness was touched by her unfortunate position and that you deigned to grant her a pension, a place for her son, age eight in a lycée and two places at Écouen for her two daughters, the oldest Théodora Chacqué, age fourteen years and the second Antoinette Chacqué age eleven years.

I have the honor to beg your Imperial and Royal Majesty to kindly give me the relative orders for Mesdemoiselles Théodora and Antoinette Chacqué.¹⁴

The archival records do not mention M. Chacqué as a Legion of Honor member, nor did I find any confirmation that his daughters, Théodora or Antoinette, were ever admitted to the school. However, his widow did make the trip from Madrid in

¹³ Lacépède à Napoleon, 18 September 1808, letter, ANF, AFIV Carton 1038, Dossier 5.

¹⁴ Lacépède à Napoleon, 18 September 1808, letter, ANF, AFIV Carton 1039, Dossier 5.

an attempt to see that the promise the Emperor made to her was fulfilled.

After gathering and researching the background of each nominee's parents, Grand Chancellor sent a nomination list to the Emperor Napoleon for his approval. Nomination letters often arrived from an entire regiment, and Grand Chancellor then created a list for a specific regiment or group of legionnaires. He usually included his notes on the parents' financial situation to buttress their argument for their daughter's admittance as you can see in *Table 2*.

For the years when Écouen was the only Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur, it is unclear how much it cost for a student to attend. Upon their arrival, the girls were listed as *pensionnaire* (full payment), *demi-pensionnaire* (half-payment) or *gratuite* (free) students. The majority were admitted as *gratuite*. The dossiers of numerous girls show that a *demi-pensionnaire* paid 400 francs, and therefore a *pensionnaire* would have submitted an annual payment of 800 francs. However, after the founding of the second Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur at Saint-Denis on 25 March 1809, the first official statute regarding payment was listed as 1,000 francs for a *pensionnaire* and 500 francs for a *demi-pensionnaire*.¹⁵

¹⁵ Rebecca Rogers, *Les demoiselles de la Légion d'honneur: les maisons d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Plon, 1992), 37.

Upon admittance, the school provided each girl with a trousseau worth approximately 400 francs (*Table 3*). While the trousseau was furnished by the school, it was at the expense of the parent or guardian and no one was exempt whether they were paying or non-paying. The sum of the trousseau was nearly half of the tuition of a *pensionnaire*, making the cost of their education increase by nearly 50%. Families were expected to furnish other clothing, but the school provided the basics. However, many of the girls were from elite or wealthy families, and many times they had more fashionable clothes than the other girls. Yet, when one girl received a pair of red shoes from her father as a gift, she was forbidden to wear them on the school's property because they did not adhere to the dress code, which required all of the girls to wear white dresses, stockings, and black shoes.

Upon leaving the school, according to the first draft of the *Règlement général* in 1806, the students would receive a dowry or a pension of 2,000 francs. However, if the student did not marry upon leaving school, the pension would be held for her until she reached her majority, which at this time was the age of twenty-five. In later drafts of the *reglements*, such as one in 1807, the statute is still listed as article forty-two, stating "When a student leaves the Maison Impériale Napoléon she will receive a dowry of the value ... or a pension of..." Neither of the values was given and was left blank until the *Règlement général* of 1809. In the decree of

29 March 1809, in addition to the cost of the trousseau, parents of paying and non-paying students were required to pay into an annual pension that would receive 5 percent interest, which was to be awarded to the student in the form of a dowry after their completion of school and upon their marriage. For those who did not marry, once they reached their majority, they could request their pension from the Grand Chancellor. The only way to be exempt from contributing to the annual pension was to have a Paris resident commit to taking on the student after she finished her studies. Students who fell into this category did not have to contribute to the pension, and did not receive a pension at the end of their education.

Transfers from St-Germain-en-Laye

Another divergent shift to those admitted to the school was after Madame Campan became directress of the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur. She had her own school in St. Germain-en-Laye which she opened in 1794 and educated the most elite of French and American society with Napoleon's sister and his step-daughter, Hortense, as well as James Monroe's daughter Eliza, all receiving an education at her school. It was under the pressure of his step-daughter/sister-in-law Hortense that he appointed Madame Campan directress of the first school at Écouen.

After her appointment as directress of the first Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur at Écouen, Madame Campan

closed her debt-ridden school in Saint-Germain-en-Laye since she was no longer there to run it. Consequently, the elite parents of her female students no longer had access to a suitable institution of learning in which to educate their daughters. The convent schools that reemerged in the latter period of the First Empire from 1807 onward, as well as other smaller boarding schools, were undesirable alternatives. Thus, many fathers of daughters who had attended Madame Campan's Institut d'éducation sought to gain admission for them at the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur at Écouen. As noted earlier, one had to be a daughter, sister, granddaughter, or niece of a Legion of Honor member to gain admission, and in the initial admission process, most were daughters of legionnaires. However, special permission was requested on numerous occasions by the parents and their daughters for Madame Campan's former students to be admitted to Écouen. Not only were many of them not daughters of Legion of Honor members, most were older than the majority of students admitted, being between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, which was rather old to be admitted to the school.¹⁶

Who were some of these young women that were so desperate to get into Écouen? Annette de Mackau, daughter of the Baron Armand-Louis de Mackau, who had been

¹⁶ Rogers, *Les demoiselles de la Légion d'honneur*, 65-68.

able to maintain his title from the ancien régime, had attended Madame Campan's Institut d'éducation for more than ten years, and Madame Campan thought of her as a daughter. The Baron de Mackau was not a Legion of Honor member, and therefore Annette was not eligible to attend Écouen. However, her letter of request stated otherwise, and at the age of eighteen, she spent many months during 1808 at Écouen, attending classes and Mass. Eventually Madame Campan found her a place with the Grand Duchess of Baden (the former Stéphanie Louise Adrienne de Beauharnais, who was related by marriage to the Emperor) that eventually led to her marriage.¹⁷

Alix d'Audiffredy, born Elizabeth Françoise Audiffredy in Martinique and second cousin to the Empress Joséphine, had also been one of Madame Campan's former students. Born in 1798, Alix was one of the younger students at the school and looked upon Campan as a mother figure. She wrote the Empress Joséphine, begging her help in being admitted to Écouen, despite her father not being a Legion of Honor member,

I would not be very happy to leave Madame Campan; I beg Your Majesty to let me enter the school of

¹⁷ Saint-Alphonse, Annette de Mackau Watier *Correspondance d'Annette de Mackau, Comtesse de Saint-Alphonse, Dame Du Palais de L'impératrice Joséphine, 1790-1870*. Ministère des Affaires Culturelles. Direction des Archives de France. Archives Nationales. Inventaires et Documents (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N, 1967), 22-41.

Écouen. I hope that they will always speak well of "la petite Alix" to Your Majesty and I will be worthy of your kindness. I beg Your Majesty to write to M. Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor to put my name on the list, because it is urgent."¹⁸

Madame Campan wrote an accompanying letter on Alix's behalf, asking the Empress for her help. Campan stated that Alix's family fortune had been depleted and that the young girl was worthy of admittance to Écouen.¹⁹ The letter-writing campaign was successful, and Alix d'Audiffredy was admitted as a non-paying student of Écouen.²⁰

Nancy MacDonald, the daughter of Jacques Joseph Alexandre MacDonald, a general in Napoleon's army, was also admitted into Écouen from Campan's Institut d'éducation in 1809. General MacDonald was named a Marshal of France the same year, and he was a Legion of Honor member who, under the Bourbon Restoration, would become the Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor. Nancy wrote to her father about her frustration at Madame Campan leaving the Institut at Saint-Germain for Écouen. She and others wanted to go with Madame Campan, but it was the bureaucracy of government that

¹⁸ Letter of Alix D'Audiffredy, 30 October 1807, letter, ANF, AFIV Carton 1038, Dossier 5, piece 7.

¹⁹ Madame Campan to Empress Joséphine, 30 October 1807, letter, ANF, AFIV Carton 1038, Dossier 5, piece 6.

²⁰ Rogers, *Les demoiselles de la Légion d'honneur*, 66.

was causing the delay in her admission. She speaks of those still at Saint-Germain: “All the students who are older want to go to Écouen, those who remain have parents who are members of the Legion of Honor.”²¹ Nancy was seventeen upon her entry to Écouen on 19 April 1809, and stayed approximately one year until her marriage on 1 November 1810 to the future Duke of Massa.²²

When Madame Campan asked to move to Écouen to ready the school for its students she also asked if she could bring some of her current students with her:

At this moment, with me in my Saint-Germain house, are young girls of the following names, who have already been admitted as students of the Maison imperial d’Écouen: Mlle Adine Ballardier, who I have cared for for three years;—Mlle Vincent;—Mlles Blanquet du Chayla: Mme du Chayla, is about to give birth and it would be inappropriate to place them with her mother at this time;—Mlle Gérard, daughter of a Major; —Mlle

²¹ Nancy MacDonald to her father, 1 November 1807, letter, ANF, 279 AP 11.

²² The future Duke of Massa was the son of Claude Ambroise Régner, a grand judge in Napoleonic courts, who in 1809 was made the hereditary Duke of Massa. With his death in 1814, his son, Nicolas François Sylvestre Régner became the Duke of Massa and his wife, Nancy MacDonald, the Duchesse of Massa. Nicholas served the state as a government official in positions such as auditor and prefect, he was able to maintain his title, and was made a peer of France under the Bourbon Restoration in 1816. See Louis Bergeron, *France under Napoleon* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 124.

Heurteloup, who is modeling samples of the first uniforms for me.²³

Each of these girls was allowed to accompany Madame Campan to Écouen. The girls that came over from her Institut de Saint-Germain-en-Laye enjoyed extra privileges because many of them were older than the average incoming student. The older girls would go into Paris to attend parties or balls, and Madame Campan would also bring the older girls with her when she made visits to Malmaison, where Empress Joséphine maintained her residence. This privilege were not given to the younger students nor was the average student allowed to accompany Madame Campan into Paris, only her former students from her Institut de Saint-Germain-en-Laye were permitted these privileges thus creating another divide between the students at Écouen.²⁴

Conclusion

When Napoleon developed the idea of schools for the orphan daughters of those killed during the Battle of Austerlitz, he had not intended to create a school that would cater to the daughters of elite society. However, as Napoleon’s

²³ Bonneville de Marsangy, L. *Mme Campan à Écouen; étude Historique et Biographique D’après Des Lettres Inédites et Les Documents Conservés Aux Archives Nationales et à La Grande-Chancellerie de La Légion D’honneur*. Paris, 1879, 122.

²⁴ Sophie Durand, *Mes souvenirs sur Napoléon, sa famille et sa cour* (Paris, 1820), 164-65; and Nancy MacDonald to her Father, 21 July 1810, letter, ANF, 279 AP 14.

commitments domestically and internationally increased as well as his concern with his legacy he delegated decisions about the schools to his Grand Chancellor and the first directress of the school, Jeanne-Louise-Henriette Genet Campan, who would alter the goals and objectives of the school. The Maison

d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur developed in a very regimented manner, which outlined the curriculum, clothing, and food the girls would eat. But ultimately, it would not create the domesticated women devoted to Napoleon that he had envisioned.

<i>Position of Male Relative</i>	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Lieutenant General	5	4.3%
Major General	15	12.8%
Brigadier General	6	5.1%
Colonel	20	17.1%
Lieutenant Colonel	1	0.9%
Major	8	6.8%
Staff Captain	2	1.7%
Captain	34	29%
First Lieutenant	3	2.6%
Commandant of a school	2	1.7%
Drum Major	1	0.9%
Baron of the Empire	2	1.7%
Government Controllers	2	1.7%
State Official	4	3.4%
Commissioned Doctor	2	1.7%
Member of the Tribunat	2	1.7%
Prefect	2	1.7%
Two-star Admiral	3	2.5%
Comte of the Empire	1	0.9%
Member of the Institut de France	2	1.7%

¹ Registre répertorient les élèves gratuites par ordre alphabétique, 1807-1845, AMLH, Carton G²¹.

Figure 1. Percentage of Students Attending the Maison, Broken Down by their father's Occupation/Position.




Table 2. List of Applicants for the Maison d'éducation de la Légion d'honneur with Information to Assist in Determining Admission. ²					
<i>Surname and First name of the Girls</i>	<i>Age of Girl as of 10 March 1807 (Years/Months)</i>	<i>Surname of the Father</i>	<i>Father's Rank in the Legion of Honor</i>	<i>Civil or military occupation of the Father</i>	<i>Observations</i>
Oulié (Victoire)	13 “	Oulié	Commandant	Colonel	
Boisard (Caroline)	7 6	Boisard	Officer		This superior officer has three daughters. He strongly desires the admission of one of the three. His services and activities, the placement of his father and family, members of the Legion of Honor, who have many titles of government benevolence.
Charlot (Anne Philippine)	13	Charlot	Légionnaire	Chef d'Escadron	This officer has a reduced salary and three children.
Clément (Victoire Céleste)	9	Clément	“	“	This officer has five children
Jobey (Adelaide Anne)	11	Jobey	Légionnaire	Lieutenant	M. Jobey has little fortune and has four daughters and three sons.
De Caire (Anne Marie Joseph)	10 3	De Caire	Légionnaire	Sous-Inspecteur aux Rennes	Employed for three years in the Grand Army

² Lapécède to Napoleon, 10 March 1807, letter, ANF, AFIV Carton 1038, Dossier 5,.

<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Item</i>
12	Shirts
6	Nightcaps
6	Headbands
4	Heavy Petticoats
12	Kerchiefs
4	Nightgowns
8	Colored Stockings
4	White Stockings
6	Pair of Gloves
6	Neck Scarves
2	Hats
2	Dresses
2	Aprons

³ ANF, AFIV Carton 1038, dossier 5.

Dr. James Verling: Napoleon's Would-Be Irish Doctor on St Helena

by J. David Markham

Napoleon's final exile on St. Helena has long been a topic of great interest among both Napoleonic scholars and those with a more general interest in the life of one of history's most fascinating people. Often described as something of a soap opera, this period was marked by clash of egos, pettiness on the part of any number of participants, and controversy regarding Napoleon's ultimate cause of death. Most of the memoirs and letters of the people who played various roles at St. Helena have been published (and usually translated into English). One major exception is the journal of Dr. James Verling who was appointed physician to Napoleon and his companions at Longwood. This paper is based on the research for my book, *Napoleon and Dr. Verling on St Helena*, which includes the complete journal as well as appropriate letters from the Lowe Collection in the British Library (most of which have likewise never been published).¹ This paper will deal with one

of the more interesting stories to come out of those documents. When the British took it upon themselves to move Napoleon into his remote exile on St. Helena, they realized that the entire world would be watching and judging of their treatment of their illustrious prisoner. One obvious concern was Napoleon's health. Enforced isolation is perhaps by definition an unhealthy state of affairs, and to that was added concerns regarding the climate of St. Helena and of the quality of medical care available.

The British were determined to provide Napoleon a doctor with whom he would have a reasonable level of comfort, but whom they also could expect to be sensitive to their needs for information regarding the health status of Napoleon and, frankly, to inform them of any escape plans or other interesting activities at Longwood.



Dr. James Verling

extant. This paper and the book used the copy in the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, where it is listed as M.S.S. Curzon C 1, and also the original journal in Paris. They are collectively hereafter referred to as *Verling Journal*. Punctuation and spelling have been preserved as found in the copies.

¹ The original copy of the journal was presented to Napoleon III and is at the *Archives Nationales* in Paris. There are evidently four transcript copies

Moreover, they expected Napoleon's doctor to be "politically correct," which is to say unwilling to blame the climate of St. Helena (and thus, by inference, the British) for any of Napoleon's real or imagined health difficulties. Napoleon, on the other hand, naturally wanted a doctor in whom he could place complete confidence and expect reasonable confidentiality. When he began to have his well known difficulties with Sir Hudson Lowe, he refused to accept anyone who could be seen as a puppet of his British jailer.

These conflicting expectations and requirements naturally led to problems. Initially, however, both sides were anxious to find a solution that would keep all sides happy. Before departing for St. Helena, the British asked Napoleon to choose a French doctor, and he selected Foureau de Beauregard. This French doctor had anticipated joining the Emperor on his planned passage to America, but had no interest in a self-imposed exile to the remote island of St. Helena. With no other doctor available prior to the speedy departure of Napoleon and his entourage, the British turned to one of their own for the task. That person

was Barry Edward O'Meara, surgeon of the *Bellerophon*. He agreed to accept the position, but insisted that he remain a British officer. It was unclear what ability Napoleon had to pay him, and he was not interested in giving up his military career for an uncertain position with a prisoner of war, no matter how famous. This insistence on remaining a British officer, subject to British regulations, would prove problematic.

The natural conflict between the needs and desires of Napoleon on the one hand, and Sir Hudson Lowe on the other, eventually led to O'Meara's downfall. Looking back on his appointment, O'Meara commented on the difficulty of the assignment:

I never sought the situation; it was in some degree assigned me; and most assuredly I should have shrunk from the acceptance of it, had I contemplated the possibility of being even remotely called on to compromise the principles either of an officer or a gentleman. Before, however, I had been long scorched upon the rock of St. Helena, I was taught to appreciate the embarrassments of my situation. I



Barry O'Meara

saw soon that I must either become accessory to vexations for which there was no necessity, or incur suspicions of no very comfortable nature.²

These words foreshadowed the very similar words of Dr. Verling, still years away from his appointment as Napoleon's physician.



Sir Hudson Lowe

When Napoleon, O'Meara, and the other members of his entourage sailed for St. Helena aboard the *Northumberland*, they were joined by a company of the Royal Artillery. The surgeon of this company was a young Irish doctor named James Roche Verling. Unlike many of the

² *Napoleon in Exile; or, A Voice from St. Helena. The Opinions and Reflections of Napoleon on the Most Important Events in His Life and Government, in His Own Words.* 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Philadelphia: James Crissy, 1822), I: vii.

medical people in the British military, Dr. Verling actually had graduated as a Doctor of Medicine at Edinburgh University.³ His service in the Peninsular War earned him some honors, and he was appointed to the fairly high rank of Assistant Surgeon. Verling's initial three years on St. Helena were uneventful; however, the relative serenity of his assignment came to an abrupt end when, on 25 July 1818, Sir Hudson Lowe appointed him to be the physician-in-residence for Napoleon and his party at Longwood with the following letter:

Dr. Verling Plantation House

Royal Artillery 25th July 1818

Sir,

Mr. O'Meara, Surgeon of the Royal Navy, who was in attendance on General Bonaparte, having been removed from that situation in consequence of orders from His Majesty's Government, I have to request you will immediately proceed to Longwood, to afford your medical assistance, to General Bonaparte,

³ For a useful, if brief, discussion of Verling's career, see Arnold Chaplin, *Thomas Shortt (Principal Medical Officer in St. Helena) With Biographies of Some Other Medical Men Associated with the Case of Napoleon from 1815-1821* (London, 1914). For information on Verling and the other people involved, as well as a good explanation of the major documentary sources available, see Arnold Chaplin, M.D. *A St. Helena Who's Who, or, A Directory of the Island During the Captivity of Napoleon.* Second edition, revised and enlarged. (New York and London: E. P. Dutton, 1919).

and the foreign persons under detention with him; there to be stationed until I may receive the instructions of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

I am etc

/s/ H. Lowe⁴

Lowe's motivation in appointing Verling was probably reasonable and straightforward. There is reason to believe that Verling and Napoleon had interacted on the long voyage to St. Helena, as Verling was able to speak both French and Italian. Surgeon Walter Henry, who was Assistant Surgeon to the 66th Regiment at Deadwood, thought very highly of him, saying "Dr. Verling is an esteemed friend of mine; and I know that he was well qualified in every respect for the duty on which he was employed; being a clever and well educated man, of gentlemanly and prepossessing manners, and long military experience."⁵ Frank Richardson, no

⁴ Hudson Lowe to James Verling, letter, 25 July 1818 (British Museum [hereafter BM] 20, 149; 1). Some of the papers in the Lowe collection are originals. Most of those sent to others are, naturally, not available in the original. However, Lowe had exact copies made of all his correspondence prior to its being sent. Thus, we have a virtually complete record of everything that he sent or received. Many of these copies were made by Major Gideon Gorrequer, who served as Lowe's aide-de-camp and Acting Military Secretary. Lowe also had detailed minutes made of all important meetings and conversations, especially those with the residents at Longwood.

⁵ *Surgeon Henry's Trifles: Events of a Military Life*. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Pat Hayward. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), 166-67. Henry was a surgeon in the

apologist for Lowe or the British, calls the selection of Verling "an excellent choice, and one more indication that Lowe really did try to accommodate Napoleon and the French."⁶

Even Napoleon's own supporters urged him to accept Verling. His valet, Louis Marchand, reports in his memoirs that

... the grand marshal and Count de Montholon urged the Emperor not to remain any longer without a doctor, and suggested the one who had replaced Dr. O'Meara, Dr. Verling ... but the Emperor flatly refused. This refusal was not aimed at the doctor, but at the governor, who with this doctor would have had a man of his



Dr. John Stokoe
Peninsular Campaign and served on St. Helena from 1817-1821.

⁶ Richardson, Major General Frank, M. D. *Napoleon's Death: An Inquest*. Forward by James A. Ross. (London: William Kimber, 1974), 132-33.

own choosing. The Emperor considered Dr. Verling a perfectly honest man, he had spoken with him several times on the *Northumberland*, either at the table when he was invited there, or during his strolls on deck.⁷

Napoleon's mameluke Ali says essentially the same thing:

It is true that he could command the services of Doctor Verling, of whom I have written, but the Emperor had never admitted him to his private apartments. It was enough that the doctor had been stationed at Longwood by the governor for the Emperor to refuse to receive him or to see him. Yet Dr. Verling was a serious man, who seemed very capable. The care which he had taken of the Grand Marshal's family and some other people at Longwood, among them Marchand, whom he had cured of a very serious illness, had gained him the confidence of all of us, and I have no doubt that if the Emperor had found himself seriously ill he would not have hesitated to call in the doctor, whom he knew

⁷ *In Napoleon's Shadow. Being the First English Language Edition of the complete Memoirs of Louis-Joseph Marchand, Valet and Friend of The Emperor 1811-1821.* Produced by Proctor Jones. Original notes of Jean Bourguignon and Henry Lachouque. Preface by Jean Tulard. (San Francisco: Proctor Jones Publishing Company, 1998), 532.

perfectly well, having seen him on board the *Northumberland*.⁸

Napoleon, however, would have none of it. Frederic Masson described Verling as Lowe's "man,"⁹ and Dr. John Stokoe, a British doctor who would have his own difficulties with Sir Hudson Lowe, called Verling "one of his [Lowe's] puppets."¹⁰ Napoleon, naturally enough, would accept no one seen as fitting those descriptions. He wanted someone who would serve as *l'homme de l'Empereur*, and would accept no one else. Lowe understood that and expressed the same to Verling on the 17 August 1818:

17th. Was informed by Sir H. Lowe, whom I saw in Town, that General Montholon having mentioned to him in conversation, the two points which had been the obstacles to mutual accommodation, and had stated that he believed the only reason why Napoleon did not see me, was that Sir H. Lowe had send me, and not from any personal objection to me.¹¹

⁸ Louis Etienne St. Denis, *Napoleon from the Tuileries to St. Helena: Personal Recollections of the Emperor's Second Mameluke and Valet Louis Etienne St. Denis, Known as Ali* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1922), 216-17.

⁹ *Napoleon at St. Helena 1815-1821.* Translated by Louis B. Frewer. (Oxford: Pen in Hand, 1949), 239.

¹⁰ *With Napoleon at St. Helena: Being the Memoirs of Dr. John Stokoe, Naval Surgeon. Translated from the French of Paul Frémeaux by Edith S. Stokoe.* (London: John Lane, 1902), 82.

¹¹ *Verling Journal*, 18 August 1818.

Count Bertrand expressed the same sentiments directly to Verling:

He assured me more than once, that Napoleon's objections to me were not personal, that Napoleon had often said so, but that he had declared when I first came to Longwood, that he would never see me since I had been selected by Sir H. Lowe, and through my conduct during my residence at Longwood had not given rise to any personal objection, yet the repugnance to receive me as the choice of Sir H. Lowe, was as strong as ever, and indeed, added he, "the sudden manner in which you were sent here the evening of

Mr. O'Meara's removal was the most unlikely to insure your reception." I interrupted Count Bertrand by saying I was sent thus suddenly that Longwood might not be a moment without a medical attendant; that I was not much disappointed for the failure of the recommendation, he had bestowed on me, when I reflected on the extreme delicacy of the situation and how difficult it must be

for a British subject to discharge the function.¹²

Lord Bathurst, Lowe's superior in London, himself made it clear to Lowe that Napoleon was to have a doctor of his choosing, although the conditions were somewhat unclear:



Lord Bathurst

... you will not fail to acquaint him [Napoleon] at the same time that, should he have reason to be dissatisfied with Dr. Baxter's medical attendance, or should prefer that of any other professional man on the island, you are perfectly prepared to acquiesce in his wish on the subject, and to permit the

attendance of any medical practitioner selected by him, provided that he conform strictly to the regulations in force.

I have only to add that you cannot better fulfill the wishes of his Majesty's Government than by giving effect to any measure which you may consider calculated to prevent any just ground of dissatisfaction on the part of General

¹² *Verling Journal*, 17 January 1819.

Buonaparte on account of any real or supposed inadequacy of medical attendance.¹³

Since the British desperately wanted Napoleon to have good medical care, so as to protect themselves against accusations of medical mal-treatment; and since Napoleon would only accept a doctor who was willing to serve in much the same capacity as any doctor to his or her patient, a reasonable person might well ask why Sir Hudson Lowe would not work more toward accommodating Napoleon on this issue. This is especially true when one considers that the British were quite willing to provide Napoleon a French doctor of his selection, whose loyalties would quite logically be to his Emperor rather than to his long-time enemy. While such logic never carried the day in the policy discussions of Napoleon's British jailers, it did manifest itself in Napoleon's efforts to replace Dr. O'Meara with a British doctor of similar persuasion regarding their relationship.

Napoleon made two efforts to obtain the services of a British doctor under acceptable conditions. Having lost the services of O'Meara, he approached Dr. John Stokoe, who was serving as the surgeon of the *Conqueror* and whom

¹³ Lord Bathurst to Hudson Lowe, letter, 16 May 1818, in William Forsyth, *History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena; From the Letters and Journals of the late Lieut.-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe, and Official Documents Not before Made Public*, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1853), III: 399-400 (No. 131).

O'Meara had introduced to Napoleon. On 16 January, Napoleon fell ill, and Bertrand and Montholon requested Dr. Stokoe to attend the Emperor. Bertrand's letter to Stokoe was urgent:

Longwood, 1 A.M.

Sir,

The Emperor has just had a sudden and violent attack. You are the only medical man at present in this country in whom he has shown any confidence. I beg you not to lose a moment in hastening to Longwood. On your arrival ask for me. I hope that you will arrive in the course of the night.¹⁴

Stokoe was ordered to report to Dr. Verling, who was to accompany him to see Napoleon; however, since Napoleon would not allow Verling to see him, Stokoe saw the Emperor on his own. Shortly thereafter, Bertrand presented a list of eight conditions under which Napoleon would accept Stokoe as his personal physician. These articles provided for Stokoe to make appropriate medical reports and to report on any activities that called upon him to exercise his patriotic duty (such as escape plans), but to otherwise serve as Napoleon's doctor without interference from the British.¹⁵ Stokoe "saw nothing in the articles incompatible with the honour of a British officer and a gentleman," attended to

¹⁴ Stokoe, 84.

¹⁵ Stokoe, 87-89.

Napoleon, and forwarded the list of conditions to Admiral Plampin, his immediate superior.¹⁶

While these conditions were initially met with some degree of possible acceptance, Stokoe ultimately paid a heavy price. Verling was consulted by Lowe's aide-de-camp Major Gideon Gorrequer, letters flew back and forth, and Stokoe was ultimately not only denied the opportunity to serve as Napoleon's doctor, but court-martialed and drummed out of the service for his efforts. He had foreseen these possibilities and had tried to avoid such entanglements, but all to no avail. Verling, who was no fool, could see the distinct possibility of the same thing happening to him.

It was clear that Napoleon wanted his own doctor. It was also clear that Verling had established a good relationship with the Bertrands and Montholons. On 19 January 1819, Bertrand had a meeting with Verling which some contend was an effort to remove him from Longwood, but which can also be seen as the first step in a campaign to convince Verling to accept conditions similar to those offered Stokoe.¹⁷ Verling relates the incident as follows:

He then professed to feel sentiments of good will towards me, and expatiated upon the praise I was entitled to from everybody at the

present moment. He then produced a letter from Sir H. Lowe, stating that he had received orders from Earl Bathurst to remove O'Meara and to replace him by Mr. Baxter, but in case of Napoleon disliking Mr. Baxter's attendance, that he should have the choice of any medical man on the Island, but that he had sent one in the meantime, that even a momentary want should not be felt. "Napoleon, declined at that time making any choice, invited as he was, and declared he never would see you, whom if you had not been sent here, we should all have pointed out, from our knowledge of you aboard ship. Our influence has been repeatedly used to induce him to see you, and in vain, even when he thought he was going to die. The Governor now recedes from Lord Bathurst's letter, Napoleon has made a choice, obstacles are thrown in the way, he is about to refuse him. The correspondence is becoming warm (the Governor is a man who never feels a blow until he is knocked down). He perseveres in wishing to force you upon him, and I warn you that motives will soon be attributed to him for this line of conduct in which your name will unavoidably be implicated, and in a manner in which it ought not to appear, I therefore advise you to retire immediately from the situation."

¹⁶ Stokoe, 91.

¹⁷ Forsyth, 109.

I replied to Count Bertrand, that as a military medical man, I was here in obedience to orders and that my conscience would enable me to disperse any false imputations.¹⁸

Sometime later, Madame Bertrand tried to convince Verling to become Napoleon's doctor, which he dutifully reported to Lowe:

I informed Sir. H. Lowe, that Madame Bertrand had expressed to me her anxiety that I should become the Physician to the Emperor, and had even asked me if I would accept the propositions offered to Stokoe, and on my declining entering on the subject, had said that if I did not choose to discuss these points with her, I ought to cultivate the good will of her husband, whose character I did not properly appreciate. I affected to laugh, and told her that I had no hopes from what had passed, that the Emperor would never see me, and that I looked upon myself as a mere *locum tenens* (placeholder), till the arrival of a French Surgeon. To this she replied, that I had been misled, as the Emperor had never made a formal demand for a French Surgeon, but that her husband, in the discussions about the removal of O'Meara had suggested to the Governor the propriety of not removing him until replaced from Europe, and if the situation should

¹⁸ *Verling Journal*, 19 January 1819.

not be accepted by an Englishman that "*un medecin quelconque*" [any sort of doctor] would do, but that Napoleon would prefer a French or Italian one.¹⁹

On 1 April 1819, Montholon had a meeting with Verling and made a specific proposal to Verling. In a memorandum to Lowe, Verling described it as follows:

Longwood 6 April 1819

Sir-

I have the honor to enclose for your information a Memorandum of a proposal made to me by the Count de Montholon.

This proposal I thought it my duty to communicate verbally to you as soon as possible after it was made and I there explained my wish to be removed from Longwood....

I hope therefore your Excellency may be pleased to adopt some measures, by which medical assistance may be afforded to the Family at Longwood, and which may enable me to return to my Military duty.

I have the honor to be your most obedient most humble servant

J. Verling

¹⁹ *Verling Journal*, 25 February 1819.

Memorandum of a proposal made to me by the Count de Montholon on the 1st of April 1819.

Having had a reason to visit at Count Montholon's he took an opportunity when we were alone of introducing the subject of Napoleon choosing a Surgeon. He said, I must be aware that he had long endeavored to fix Napoleon's choice on me, and how flattering it would be to me should I now be chosen notwithstanding that I was the person selected by the Governor, as this must be attributed to the favorable impressions made by my conduct during the 8 months I had been at Longwood.

He informed me that four positions which the Governor might perhaps accept, had this morning been made, and if accepted Napoleon would instantly choose a Surgeon, but that he could not think of having near him *l'homme du Gouverneur*; by this, he meant he said any person whose views of promotion and of self interest might prompt him to act under the Governor's influences.

If on the contrary, I was willing to become *l'homme de l'Empereur* to attach myself, *comme le sien propre* [like his own], he Count Montholon was authorised to make a proposal to me, which he advised me to accept, as I should at once obtain a degree of his confidence by avowing the motions of making my fortune, a

motive much more intelligible to him than any vague declaration of admiration of the Man.

He said that Napoleon was willing to give me an allowance of 12000, Francs p. annum, to be paid monthly and he (Count Montholon) had represented to him the danger I might incur "*de perdre mon état*" [loss of my position] pointing out the examples of Mr. O'Meara and Mr. Stokoe, he would at once advance a sum to my practice in Giles upon the house of Baring, the interest of which should equal to my present pay from the British Government.

He asked the amount of my pay and I told him nearly 1£ per day on this Island. He told me Napoleon would not require from me any thing which should compromise me with Government or with any tribunal, or even in public opinion—that Mr. O'Meara had never been required to do any thing of this nature—I should be able when I saw him to judge of the state of his liver which he himself thought was much diseased; that in my Bulletins my report might lean rather to an augmentation than a diminution of the malady. That I might draw the line rather above than below, as he was still in hopes that "*la force des choses*" [the strength of things] might summon him from St Helena.

He (Ct. Montholon), however, was much more in dread of apoplexy attacking Napoleon, to which they all thought, he had a strong tendency, but advised me to be guarded upon this subject as it was one on which he would not converse and from which he wished to avert his thoughts.

To this proposal I replied that I considered it totally incompatible with my duty to enter into a private agreement with Napoleon Bonaparte.²⁰

Montholon, incidentally, does not mention this offer to Verling in his memoirs. He does, however, discuss in some detail a letter of 1 April 1819, deploring the loss of Dr. Stokoe and setting forth conditions similar to those related by Verling under which Napoleon might select a medical officer from the island as his physician.²¹

The next day, Lowe wrote a long letter to Lord Bathurst describing the offer made to Verling, and closed it with these words:

Dr. Verling after informing me of what was said when they were shewn to him, mentioned Count Montholon was not aware of the communication that had passed being made known to me, and proposed to quit

Longwood; but as I was in daily expectation of information respecting the arrival of a French Medical Attendant by the *William Pitt*, *Indiaman*, which had been reported on her way hither by a Transport with part of the 20th Regiment, and as the arrival of that Regiment might present to me some fresh choice of a medical officer to station at Longwood, I desired Dr. Verling would remain at his post until the *Pitt* arrived, when if no French Surgeon came, I would immediately appoint another English Medical Officer to relieve him.²²

So it seemed that Verling was not yet out of the woods! Indeed, in September, Madame Bertrand made one last pitch to convince Verling to take a position as Napoleon's personal physician.

12th. I rode out with Madame Bertrand, she told me they were to have dined with Napoleon but that he found himself too unwell to receive them and had sent to say so.

²⁰ James Verling to Hudson Lowe, letter, 6 April 1819, BM MSS 20, 214; 117-19.

²¹ Charles Jean Tristan [marquis de Montholon], *History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena*, 4 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1846), III, 76-79.

²² Hudson Lowe to Lord Bathurst, letter, 7 April 1819, BM MSS 20,126.

She reproached me on my refusal, as she termed it, justly to become his Surgeon, told me he had said, it was evident he was no longer anything, since people refused to come to him; she acknowledged that he did not like the coming of the foreign Surgeon and would prefer an English one, that he was astonished, if two were coming, that they should have sent people, whose persons and even names were entirely unknown to him. She said that he still had great hopes, some turn of affairs might remove him from St. Helena and again reproached me for not wishing to be in daily communication with so great a man.²³

Verling had resisted all efforts to make him *l'homme de l'Empereur*, but Sir Hudson Lowe, never known for his trust in his fellow man, suspected that Verling was getting a bit too close to the residents of Longwood. For example, after the offer of 1 April 1819 to Verling, Lowe told Verling and Bathurst that he [Verling] had done

²³ *Verling Journal*, 12 September 1819.

the right thing, but his aide-de-campy, Major Gorrequer, presented quite a different picture. In his encoded diary, he relates this conversation of 4 April, which follows here in part:



Count Montholon

Old Mach [Lowe] mentioned to me ... that Magnesia Terzo [Verling] had done things as bad as either 1st or 2nd Naval ones. that he had agreed to the propositions offered by Veritas [Montholon]... Afterwards Mach said “I do not consider him fit for such a situation. He is not trustworthy, particularly after all that he had said to him, and all his cautions.” There

were several things in him he did not like. “I assure you Mr. Verling is not the person I expected to find. He has been talked over.”²⁴

Apologists for Sir Hudson Lowe such as William Forsyth would have one believe

²⁴ *St. Helena During Napoleon's Exile: Gorrequer's Diary*. With Introduction, Biographies, Notes and Explanations, and Index of Pseudonyms by James Kemble. (London: Heinemann, 1969), 124-25. Gorrequer's diary was written using code names for the people on St. Helena, and Kemble was able to “break the code” and present a fascinating account of life during the exile.

that all was well between Verling and Lowe. In fact, a reading of Verling's journal and other evidence shows quite the contrary. Gorrequer, for example, makes these entries for 6 April 1819 and 8 September 1819 respectively:

The hostility he began displaying about Great Gun Magnesia [Dr. Verling], and his angry remarks at his not having reported to him sufficiently of his palavers with the satellites of Neighbor [Napoleon].²⁵

Mach [Lowe] said Magnesia Great Gun [Dr. Verling] had played a double part. The rancour he showed against him. His jealousy. He said that any other [doctor] should be chosen in his place—and the vingtième [20th] Magnesia [Dr. Arnott] in particular.²⁶

Lowe wrote Lord Bathurst with the “shocking” news that Verling, who was Irish, may have had certain Irish connections! Fortunately for Verling, Bathurst was a supporter of Catholic emancipation and was not interested in such trivial matters.²⁷ Indeed, Lord Bathurst's aide Henry Coulburn sent a rather pointed response, a portion of which reads:

²⁵ *Gorrequer's Diary*, 126.

²⁶ *Gorrequer's Diary*, 140-41.

²⁷ Norwood Young, *Napoleon in Exile at St. Helena (1815-1821)*. 2 vols. (Philadelphia: John C. Winston, 1915), II: 155.

Lord Bathurst has also desired me to take this opportunity of replying to one of your private letters in which you communicate certain information respecting Mr. Verling's opinion and connections in Ireland which you had derived from him and which you had thought it right to make known to Lord Bathurst. I am to assure you that the whole of Mr. Verling's conduct appears to have been so discreet and proper on occasions even of no little difficulty that Lord Bathurst cannot avoid expressing his entire approbation of it, and in case Mr. Verling should have been aware of your having communicated to Lord Bathurst the circumstances contained in your private letter ... Lord Bathurst is desirous that you should assure him that they can make no impression on his Lordship's mind & that whatever may be his connections in Ireland and the religious faith either of himself or them Lord Bathurst cannot permit any circumstance of that nature to invalidate the confidence to which his uniform discretion and propriety of conduct, up to the date of your last communication so justly entitle him.²⁸

Verling never did attend Napoleon, although he did see him at a distance from time to time. Indeed, Verling was

²⁸ Henry Coulburn to Hudson Lowe, letter, 8 April 1819, BM MSS 20,126; 82-84.

constantly being asked for reports by Lowe and his staff. Verling did attend the Montholons and Bertrands, but even this placed him in an uncomfortable position. Eventually, his long standing request to be given a leave of absence to return home was granted. This was made possible by the arrival of Dr. François Antommarchi, the long-expected Corsican doctor sent by Napoleon's mother. Napoleon's refusal to see Verling was evidently unknown to Antommarchi, and their first meeting was, therefore, an uncomfortable embarrassment to both parties.²⁹



Dr. Francesco Antommarchi

²⁹ Francesco Antommarchi, *The Last Days of the Emperor Napoleon*, 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1825), II: 58. The first meeting between Verling and Antommarchi was so embarrassing to Verling that he withdrew after Lowe explained the situation to Antommarchi.

Verling fell into a situation from which there was no escape save departure from Longwood and, preferably, St. Helena. Napoleon was certainly not going to accept the services of a British doctor unless that doctor would agree to conditions that Sir Hudson Lowe was never going to accept. Any effort by Verling to get on the good side of Napoleon and his companions would be very suspicious to Lowe. Verling himself understood this and said so in his diary:

Upon the time of this conversation [with Sir Hudson Lowe], which I have not fully detailed I have to remark that it has left upon my mind the impression that the situation of Physician to Bonaparte is one which cannot be held by a British subject, without the certainty of sacrificing his peace of mind for the time he holds it, and with more prospects of ultimate injury than benefit.³⁰

Verling, then, was truly the doctor who might have been. And the role he played leads to interesting “what if” considerations. He was clearly one of the best qualified doctors available to Napoleon—certainly superior to Antommarchi. If Napoleon had been willing to accept him, or if Hudson Lowe had accepted the conditions laid out, the quality of Napoleon's health care would have been considerably improved. If one believes that Napoleon died of stomach cancer, then perhaps the best that could

³⁰ *Verling Journal*, 25 February 1819.

have been hoped for was greater comfort. But if one believes that Napoleon died of other causes (including poisoning), then the quality of health care could have made a difference. A removal from the island for health reasons, or the recognition of symptoms of arsenic: either was more likely with Verling in attendance, and

either would have potentially made a considerable difference to Napoleon's fate. Dr. James Verling was the right person at the right time, but circumstances prevented him from achieving his own potential destiny.

Mordechai Gichon (1922 – 2016)



Mordechai Gichon, a Professor Emeritus of Classical Archaeology at Tel-Aviv University, was one of Israel's premier scholars. He was born in Berlin in 1922, to a household that endorsed both the values of traditional Judaism and classical education, and immigrated with his family to Palestine in 1934, settling in Tel Aviv. At the age of 18, he joined the Jewish underground movement, only to enlist in the British army not long afterwards.

During the Second World War, Gichon served in various units, finally as an infantryman in a field intelligence section of the 1st Battalion, the Jewish Brigade, seeing action in the Italian Front, fighting in the last important battle of this campaign, the crossing of the Senio River near Ravenna. Upon the end of the fighting he was heavily involved in a variety of activities, from the hunting

down of Nazis, to the organization of refugees and establishment of Zionist activity centers in post-war Europe. During the Israeli War of Independence Gichon served as the intelligence officer of the IDF Etzioni Brigade in the battles for Jerusalem. Subsequently, as a lieutenant-colonel, he established and headed the first research/analysis branch within the IDF Intelligence Corps, becoming a fundamental figure of the fledgling Israeli Army.

As an archaeologist of world renown, he had conducted archaeological excavations at Ein-Bokek and elsewhere in Israel. Additionally, Professor Gichon was a researcher of military history and a leading authority both on the Roman Limes Route in the Negev and Napoleon's 1799 campaign in Palestine. He was a founder member of the Israeli Society for Napoleonic Research, serving as its first chairman, and later its president. He was also a founder member of the Israeli Society for Military History, serving as its chairman for many years. He was also a member of a large number of historical research associations and institutions both in Israel and abroad Professor Gichon participated in numerous academic congresses, including many of the ICHM (International Commission of Military History).

Professor Gichon published numerous papers and books on the archaeology and military history of the Holy Land. He edited the military history volume of the Carta History of the Land of Israel Atlas, wrote the entry "Napoleon in the Land of Israel" and participated in the writing of the book *The Wars of the Bible*. His last book, the result of a long and painstaking research of the Bar Kochba revolt, was published only a few weeks ago.

Mordechai Gichon was among the first great Napoleonic scholars to join the International Napoleonic Society upon its founding. Under his inspirational leadership the second

international congress of the INS, held in Israel in 1999 became a great success. He was awarded the Legion of Merit, the INS' highest award for academic accomplishment.

Mordechai Gichon was married to his long life-partner Chava, who sadly passed away in 2015. Mordechai and Chava are survived by their three children and by the large number of people who will forever cherish their memory and legacy.

---Allon Klebanoff



President Markham, Mordechai Gichon and General Franceschi in 2007.

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13. Please note the correct format for the Correspondence of Napoleon and Wellington as well as the archival citations.

A. Published Materials

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3. URL
4. Date of access

For an article available in more than one format (print, online, etc.), cite whichever version you used (although the printed version is preferable).

SAMPLES

Books:

¹Donald D. Horward, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 80.

²Horward, *Twin Sieges*, 180-85 and 249-317.

Multi-volume Books:

¹Ramsay W. Phipps, *The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), I, 141.

²Phipps, *Armies*, I, 141.

Multi-Volume Works in Series:

¹Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, vol. 2 of A History of East Central Europe*, gen. eds., Peter F. Sugar and Donald Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 146.

²Sugar, *Southeastern Europe*, 146.

Articles:

¹Donald D. Horward, "Wellington's Peninsular Strategy, Portugal, and the Lines of Torres Vedras." *Portuguese Studies Review* II (1992-93): 46-59.

²Horward, "Wellington's Peninsular Strategy," 44.

Articles in Books:

¹Giles Gunn, "Interdisciplinary Studies," in *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, ed. Joseph Gibaldi (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1992), 239-61.

²Giles, "Interdisciplinary Studies," 239-61.

Napoleon's Correspondence:

¹Bonaparte to Executive Directory, 8 June 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Plon, 1858-1869), No. 587, I, 461-63.

²Napoleon to Clarke, 19 September 1810, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 16923, XXI, 127.

Wellington's Dispatches:

¹Wellington to Liverpool, 28 March 1810, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington* (London: J. Murray 1838), V, 604-06.

²Wellington to Liverpool, 28 March 1810, *Wellington's Dispatches*, V, 604-06.

B. Archival Sources

Public Records Office:

¹Hookham Frere to Lord Hawkesbury, 1 April 1802, Great Britain, Public Record Office, London, MSS (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office [hereafter FO], Portugal, 63/39.

²Fitzgerald to Lord Hawkesbury, 25 September 1804, PRO, FO, 63/40.

British Library:

¹Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, British Library, London [hereafter BL], Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

²Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, BL, Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

Archives de la guerre:

¹Augereau to Dugommier, 28 germinal an II (17 April 1794), France, Archives de la guerre, Service historique de Défense Château de Vincennes, MSS, [hereafter SHD], Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Registre de correspondance du général Augereau, Carton B4 140.

²Augereau to Schérer, 26 prairial an III (14 June 1795), SHD, Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Carton B4 142.

Archives Nationales:

¹France, Archives Nationales, AF IV, MSS, Carton 1311, dossier 1807, "Tableau des domaines dont Sa Majesté a disposé par décret du 30 juin 1807," Ordre No 4.

²Dom João to Bonaparte, 23 May 1803, Archives Nationales, AF IV, Carton 1689, dossier 2.

Archives Étrangères:

¹Lannes to Talleyrand, 14 November 1801, France, Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, [hereafter Affaires Étrangères], Correspondance politique: Portugal, MSS, vol. 122.

²Souza to Talleyrand, 1 September 1802, *Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance politique: Portugal*, vol. 123.

Wellington Papers:

¹Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810, *Wellington Papers*, University of Southampton, [hereafter WP], No. 11304.

²Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810, WP, No. 11304.

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