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Napoleonic Scholarship

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J. David Markham
President

Wayne Hanley
Editor-in-Chief

Illustrations

Front Cover:
The first piece is a bronze replica of the Bastille, along with a small engraving by Raffet of that infamous prison, framed in a replica First Empire frame. Simple enough, but there is a fascinating story behind the piece. The wood base is about 7.5x5.5 inches and the bronze replica is about 4x3 inches with deep relief. The frame is about 14.25x19.5 inches. There is a faint inscription at the bottom, 'La Bastille 1789.'

When the Bastille was taken on 14 July of 1789, the Revolutionaries debated what should be done with it. But a self-styled patriot who was owner of one of the largest building firms in Paris named Pierre-François Palloy (1755-1835) seized the initiative and began to dismantle the building. Two days later he secured a formal contract to complete the job. As part of the deal, he had exclusive rights to make souvenirs from various parts of the building. He made replicas of the Bastille from some of the stones, and made countless toys, insignias, medals, swords, tools and small replicas of the Bastille out of wood, stone, iron, bronze, lead and other materials. This piece is one of the bronze replicas made and sold by Palloy in 1790 and is a direct relic of the French Revolution.

Back Cover:
The second item is every bit as historic and interesting as the Palloy piece. It is a rare pair of obelisks in 'porphyry' (quartzite) from Karelia (a part of Russia next to Finland, some portions of which are in dispute between the two countries). They measure 34 cm high, and the base is 45x45 mm.

When France decided to return Napoleon's remains to Paris from St Helena, they also decided to bury him in a large and magnificent tomb. To design and create the piece, they chose Louis Tullius Joachim Visconti (1791-1853), who was an Italian-born French architect and designer. He was also chosen to design various Parisian decorations for the return. Responsibility for the actual creation of the tomb, made of marble and quartzite, was given to the Antoine Seguin marble works, which included two important marble workshops in Paris. The Russian stone was chosen to emulate the porphyry used in late Roman imperial tombs.

Like Palloy before him, Seguin obtained the rights to use portions of the stones that would not be in the tomb, the debris generated from sawing the stones into their proper shape and size, as compensation for his work. The work lasted 20 years and during that time Seguin and his descendants created assorted high-quality souvenirs from this 'debris.' These two obelisks were made by Seguin from that material that was part of the quartzite used in the creation of Napoleon's tomb.

All pieces are from the David Markham Collection.

Article Illustrations: Images without captions or with (JDM) are from the David Markham Collection. The others were provided by the authors.

Napoleonic Scholarship

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL NAPOLEONIC SOCIETY

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Scholars from the following countries are Fellows of our Society:

Australia	Hungary	Palestine
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Belarus	Ireland	Portugal
Belgium	Israel	Poland
Bulgaria	Italy	Romania
Canada	Kazakhstan	Russia
Chile	Lebanon	Slovakia
Columbia	Luxembourg	South Africa
Cuba	Malta	Spain
Czech Republic	Mexico	Sweden
Egypt	Monaco	Switzerland
France	Mongolia	Syria
Georgia	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Germany	Pakistan	United States

International Napoleonic Society Aims and Goals

- The purpose of the International Napoleonic Society is to promote the study of the Napoleonic Era in accordance with proper academic standards. To this end, the goal of the International Napoleonic Society is to gather the leading minds in this field for the purpose of creating, reviewing, commenting upon, making awards to, and financially supporting Napoleonic Scholarship.

- The International Napoleonic Society will sponsor periodic International Napoleonic Congresses to give scholars and students the opportunity to meet and share the results of their research and studies. These Congresses will be held throughout the world. To date, Congresses have been held in Italy, Israel, Georgia, France, Poland, Canada, Malta, The Netherlands, Russia, Cuba, Belgium, Ireland and Austria and have attracted some of the world's foremost Napoleonic Scholars. We may also sponsor and support smaller meetings and/or joint meetings with other scholarly organizations.

- The International Napoleonic Society will encourage the publication of work of academic merit. To this end we will provide the opportunity for scholarly articles to be published in our journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship*, as well as on our website. We may also support the publication of works of academic merit, as well as the reprinting of important material no longer easily available.

- It is important that original documents, as well as material available only in languages not commonly read by western scholars, be made available to Napoleonic Scholars. We will therefore encourage and support the translation and/or publication of such materials, including in our journal and on our website.

- The INS may sponsor lectures, tours, the granting of scholarships, the production of exhibitions and other displays, and other academic and/or cultural activities as deemed appropriate.

Message from the President

Dear Fellows of the International Napoleonic Society,

It is with great pleasure that I send you the ninth issue of our academic journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship*. In it we feature a wide range of excellent articles from a variety of authors. All of the articles were peer reviewed and meet the high standards set by the INS.

In this email you will find a link that will take you to the PDF version of the journal. From there, you can either read it online or download it to your computer as a PDF file. Each listing in the table of contents is a link that when you click on it will take you directly to that article. (Please note that the listings in the table of contents included in this email are not links but are there simply for your information.)

As always, I want to thank our Editor-in-Chief, Wayne Hanley, and our Production Editor, Edna Markham, for their outstanding work in producing this journal. Thanks to their efforts, and the outstanding articles that were submitted, we can all be proud of this issue of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.

If you have difficulty downloading the PDF of the journal, please let me know and I will send you the file directly.

With my very best Napoleonic regards,

J. David Markham, President
Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques

Message from the Editor-in-Chief.

I am pleased to present the 2021-22, our second bi-annual edition of *Napoleonic Scholarship*, and I apologize for its delay in appearance (I was dealing with some non-life threatening, non-Covid-related health issues in Spring 2022 that took me out of my normal routine).

We begin with several articles based on papers first presented at the August 2021 Virtual Joint Napoleonic Congress, sponsored by the International Napoleonic Society and the Napoleonic Historical Society. That conference was held via Zoom on two successive weekends (13-15 and 21-22 August) and proved quite a success—with 37 papers being presented by scholars representing least 14 countries from four continents!

The first of these articles is part of Xavier Riaud's continuing exploration of the medical profession during the Napoleonic era. In "Napoléon Was Just a Man: His Diseases," he gives a resume of Napoleon's medical history, from his earliest records as a cadet at the École Militaire to his final days on St. Helena. Next Doina Harsanyi carries on her studies of Napoleonic Italy in "Criminal Justice and Legitimacy in Occupied Lands" by focusing on events in the city of Parma. Likewise Marian Hochel continues his explorations of the intersections of art and history with his article "Empire Style between Art and Propaganda? Reflections on the Napoleon's Imperial Representation on the 200th Anniversary of His Death." In an article that draws on historical study as well as art history and archeology, Matej Čapo explores the impact of the Napoleonic wars on Bratislava. Meanwhile, in his thoughtful essay Alasdair White provides insight on Napoleon's fateful exile to St. Helena and the origins of British exceptionalism in the early Nineteenth Century. In addition to these papers, Annaliese Wren explores the complicated history of the post-Napoleonic era as new political leader struggled to come to terms with the legacy of the imperial era while trying to establish new (peaceful) royal regimes in her "Visual Legacy of Napoléon during the Bourbon Restoration." Next, Alex Grab delves into the little explored medical history of Napoleonic era Italy as he shows the campaign to introduce small pox vaccinations there. The final three papers were all presented in recent INS Congress in Cork, Ireland. In the first paper Wayne Hanley continues his evaluation of Marshal Ney's career by examining the controversies surrounding his performance during the 1806-07 campaign in Poland: What really caused Ney to "disobey" the emperor's orders? In the second paper, Eugene Breydo explores the potential relationship between mathematical knowledge and his tactical and strategic planning. And in the final article, Alasdair White demonstrates the effects of distant (and not-so-distant) volcanoes on the course of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century European history.

We conclude this issue with three book reviews. These are a newer feature of the journal and one I hope to see more of in the future. If you come across a noteworthy new (or recent) book on a Napoleonic era topic, please consider writing a review and submitting it for consideration (typically 750-1250 words).

Wayne Hanley, Editor-in-Chief

List of Contributors

Xavier Riaud, a practicing dentist, holds a doctorate in the History of Sciences and Technology. He is a laureate and full member of the National Academy of Dental Surgery, a member of the National Academy of Surgery, the author of *Napoléon and his physicians* (2012), and a fellow of the International Napoleonic Society.

Doina Pasca Harsanyi received her Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2001 and is a professor at Central Michigan University. Her BA is from the University of Timisoara, Romania, in French Language and Literature. Her research interests include topics in French revolutionary and Napoleonic history, French-American relations, the movement of ideas across the Atlantic during the Enlightenment and the modern era, and the history of the nobility throughout the revolutionary era. Her current research project explores different aspects of Italy under Napoleonic occupation.

Marian Hochel is an associate professor at the Institute of Historical Sciences of Silesian University in Opava and a researcher of the National Heritage Institute in the Czech Republic. He is a member of the International Napoleonic Society. He received his Ph.D. in history at the Masaryk University in Brno (Czech Republic) and attended the Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines in Lyon (France). He specializes in the history of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era especially with a view to cultural history, historical memory, cultural heritage and iconography of art. His research in Napoleonic memorabilia commenced by two publications called *The 13th Chamber of Napoleon. The Image of Napoleon Bonaparte in the Collections of the National Heritage Institute* (2017) and *The Mirror of Power. Pillars of Napoleon Bonaparte's Power in Visual Arts* (2018). He is also editor of publications *Battlefield of the Three Emperors of Austerlitz* (2010 and 2011) and *Modern European of the First Half of the 19th Century* (2019).

Mgr. Matej Čapo earned a bachelor's, a master's and a doctoral degree in General history from the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia. In 2021, he successfully defended his PhD thesis titled "Pressburg and the Franco-Austrian War of 1809". In his research he deals with the Napoleonic Wars, especially in relation to the territory of today's Slovakia. He is a fellow of the International Napoleonic Society and a representative of The 1809 International Research Society for Slovakia.

Alasdair White is a management consultant, journalist and university lecturer, specializing in performance management, managing people and leadership. He is the author of a half dozen books on management and Napoleonic history (especially Waterloo) and is a Fellow of the International Napoleonic Society. A version of his paper was presented at the recent Virtual Joint Napoleonic Congress, sponsored by the International Napoleonic Society and the Napoleonic Historical Society in August 2021.

Annaliese Wren earned 1st class honours in her BA in history and art history at Oxford Brookes University before earning an Masters in Law at the University of Bristol.

Alex Grab is professor emeritus at the University of Maine and offers courses in early modern and modern European history. He is currently researching the Italian peninsula, with a special emphasis on northern Italy during the French Revolution and Napoleonic period. The author of several books including *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe* (2003), he is a fellow of the INS and a member of the editorial board of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.

Eugene Breydo is currently a software consultant and was formerly a member of the faculty of Harvard Medical School's Brigham and Women's hospital with a specialty in medical informatics. Holding a PhD in linguistics from the Russian Academy of Sciences, he is the author and co-author of numerous articles in the medical field. He presented a version of the present offering at the INS Congress in Cork.

Wayne Hanley is a professor of history at West Chester University (Pennsylvania) and holds a doctorate in modern European history from the University of Missouri-Columbia with a specialty in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Winner of the American Historical Association's 2000 Gutenberg-e Prize, he is author of *The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796-1799* and of numerous articles on historical and literary topics. He is also the editor of *Napoleonic Scholarship*.

Blizniakov Roman Alexandrovich and **Malishev Dimitrii Arkadievich** are candidates of historical sciences and assistant professors at Vernadski Crimea Federal University. They are also both fellows of the International Napoleonic Society.

Paul Chamberlain is the editor-in-chief of *The Napoleon Series* and is a long-time student of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, with a special interest in prisoners of war. He has published two books on the subject: *Hell Upon Water: Prisoners of War in Britain 1793-1815* and *The Napoleonic Prison of Norman Cross: The Lost Town of Huntingdonshire*, as well as written for magazines such as *First Empire*, *Age of Napoleon* and *Battlefields Review*.

International Napoleonic Society

Twentieth International Napoleonic Congress

NAPOLEON'S LONG DANCE WITH ENGLAND

Boulogne-Sur-Mer, France, 17-22 July 2023

In Association with the CENTRE D'ETUDES NAPOLÉONIENNES

The ***International Napoleonic Society*** will hold its twentieth International Napoleonic Congress in Boulogne-Sur-Mer, France, 17-22 July 2023. Boulogne-Sur-Mer is a lovely city with a very important connection to Napoleonic history.

The host hotel and meeting venue will be *La Matelote (*www.la-matelote.com*)* and the historic Pont-de-Briques, which served as Napoleon's headquarters in 1803-1805. With an excellent location on the coast *La Matelote Hotel* is also a famous gastronomic restaurant. More hotel and registration information will be forthcoming.

We anticipate that many papers will concentrate on the relationship between Revolutionary and Napoleonic France with England during this period. As always, other papers of interest and important new research will also be considered. Topics can include military, political, social and cultural aspects.

Monday we will have the Congress opening and some papers at the chateau Pont-de-Briques, in the room that served as Napoleon's dining room. A special ceremony will be held to commemorate Dr. Fernand Beaucour, INS Fellow and well-known specialist of the Napoleonic period who saved the chateau from destruction. Tuesday and Wednesday will meet at *La Matelote Hotel*. Thursday and/or Friday we will take historical tours by bus. Note that there will be charges for each of the tours. We will have a very

special Gala Dinner on Thursday evening at the *Hotel Clery (*www.clery.najeti.fr*)*, where Berthier stayed. On Friday and Saturday evenings there will be papers at the city annonciades library and on Saturday we will see some reenactors in Pont de Briques park.

The official languages will be English and French, but we encourage papers to be in English as there will not be translators available and our journal only publishes articles in English. Previous Congresses have been held in Austria, Canada, Cuba, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Georgia, Germany, Poland, France, Malta, The Netherlands and Russia. We encourage all people interested in this era to attend this Congress, whether or not they wish to give a paper.

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International Napoleonic Society
Twentieth International Napoleonic Congress
Napoleon's Long Dance with England
La Matelote Hotel

Boulogne-Sur-Mer, France, 17-22 July 2023
In Association with the *Centre D'Etudes Napoléoniennes*

Call for Papers

The city of Boulogne-Sur-Mer has a strong tie to Napoleonic history and is as well a very nice seaside location. We anticipate and encourage papers on the many aspects of the relationship between Revolutionary/Napoleonic France and England during this period, but, as always, we also will consider papers on other Napoleonic topics. Topics can include military, political, social and cultural aspects of the period. We anticipate having three days of papers and two days of tours.

Papers should be no more than 15 pages double-spaced, (about 5000 words), and presentations are limited to 20-25 minutes. To be considered for publication in our academic journal, *Napoleonic Scholarship,* papers must follow the Chicago Manual of Style.

Please complete the registration form and include a half-page summary of your paper and a résumé. *We encourage you to submit all information via email, with your paper attached as a WORD document.* Please give us a printed version of your paper at the Congress. If requested, you will be given an opportunity to make revisions to your paper prior to submission for publication. Selected papers will be published in our journal and/or on our website.

The official languages of the conference will be English and French, but we strongly encourage papers to be in English as there will not be translators available and our journal only publishes articles in English. Hotel registration and further information can be found in the other documents.

I must have all paper proposals no later than 1 June 2023, but I strongly encourage you to submit your proposals before then.

We urge you to check for further information and forms on our official website, www.napoleonicsociety.com. If you have not already done so, *please* send us your email address, as that is our preferred method of communication.

For further information, please contact:
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inspresident@icloud.com

Table of Contents

Napoléon Was Just a Man: His Diseases[1]

by Dr Xavier Riaud[2]

Napoleon with a dental abscess in Santa Helena[3] in 1816.

Everyone has heard the name "Napoleon" at least once in his life. He is elevated in our contemporary society as a fundamental and major pillar in our nation's history, an emblematic heritage in our everyday lives: The Emperor's coronation (1804), The Sun of Austerlitz (1805), the victor of the battle of Jena (1806), and that of Wagram (1809)--a myth, a legend, but also a dictator and a man who held the whole of Europe in his hand. His defeats, Aboukir (1798), Trafalgar (1805), Waterloo (1815), however, remind us of the fact that this man, as eminent as he was, was also a man with his weaknesses and his flaws.

There was no notable illness is mentioned in his childhood and no record of medical treatment at the royal École militaire de Paris.[4]

1785: Bonaparte was a second lieutenant in the Fère Bombardiers platoon garrisoned in Valence and Lyon. He had a fever of which little is known. A young lady from Geneva takes care of him.

1786: Back in Corsica, he was granted a leave of absence for several months on grounds of ill health. He left for the thermal spa town of Guagno, near Ajaccio. Returning to Auxonne he contracted malaria and was placed under the care of the surgeon-major of the Bienvelot regiment.

[1] *Paper presented at the Virtual International Napoleonic Congress, 2021/08/22.*

[2] DDS, PhD in History of Sciences and Technics, Laureate and member of the National Academy of Dental Surgery, Member of the National Academy of Surgery, Fellow of the INS. 145, route de Vannes, 44800 Saint Herblain, France, xavier.riaud@wanadoo.fr

[3] Robert Sire (Orléans, 2009).

[4] Maurice Boigey, « Les maux de Napoléon », in *Chronologie – Sainte-Hélène : la maladie de l'Empereur*, http://www.napoleonprisonnier.com, from his article published in *Almanach Napoléon*, 1930, 1-2.

1790: Bonaparte left Auxonne and was discharged with a new leave of convalescence. He went to the thermal spa town of Orezzua.

Spring 1791: Commissioned to Valence, he had a fever and suffered a serious relapse of malaria. He was cared for by the regimental surgeon, Parmentier.[5]

1793: Bonaparte catches scabies. He is cared for by Desgenettes.

1796: When he took command of the Italian Army, his health was frail. He was thin; he looks unwell; and he coughs continuously.

1797: Back from Italy in September, he handed in his resignation to the governing body. He claimed that he was in poor health and needed to rest. Feeling better, he accepted responsibility for the Egyptian army at the end of the year. Despite everything, he was described by a close friend as very thin with a yellow complexion, eyeballs sunken in their sockets with very frequent bouts of fever. Corvisart examined him and diagnosed inflammation of the lungs. On his return from Egypt, now as the First Consul, he still looked frail. He was very thin, which was obvious to anyone who saw him.[6]

1803: Bonaparte is in Brussels. He was very ill. The symptoms relate to the chest. He coughed up blood.

1804 to 1807: His general condition was satisfactory. Outward appearances betray no apparent concerns. Physically he appeared to be at his peak. He took hot baths several times a day for relaxation, especially when exhausted. His good health, he claims, is also dependent upon strenuous daily exercise[7].

On September 10th 1804, however, his servant Constant recounts in his memoirs: "The previous night the Emperor had an extreme anxiety attack or an epileptic fit, as if he were possessed." In 1805, Talleyrand said about Napoleon: "He wailed and dribbled, he had a kind of convulsion which ceased after a quarter of an hour…" An entry in a biography of 1838 mentions: "Throughout his youth, he had epileptic seizures. As a result, during his school days in Paris, he was made to eat whilst kneeling but one seizure he suffered was so severe it brought this punishment to an end." His seizures, if they existed, were rare and did not interfere with or affect his activities. It is important to mention that none of the physicians treating him reported a diagnosis of epilepsy or equivalent symptoms displayed by Napoleon.[8]

[5] Boigey, 1-2.
[6] Boigey, 1-2.
[7] Boigey, 1-2.

[8] Deutsches Epilepsiemuseum, « Malades épileptiques célèbres – Napoléon», in *http://www.epilepsiemuseum.de*, Kork, 2002, 1-2.

End of 1808: Intense and repeated attacks of gastric pain appear for the first time. Corvisart was convinced that the Emperor was eating his meals too quickly. Napoleon began to put on weight.

1809: At Schönbrunn Castle, a discharge on the back part of the neck appeared which concerned people around him so much so that the former doctor to Joseph II, Jean-Pierre Franck was consulted who diagnosed a severe case of Pityriasis Alba which was very serious. An emergency call was made to Corvisart who reassured everyone and applied a simple blistering agent treatment. Napoleon recovered in four days with no further occurrence. [OBJ]

From 1812 onwards: One of the two health reports from a doctor called Mestivier dated 5 September 1812, records that the doctor was called by the Emperor who told him that his legs had swollen and that he was barely able to urinate. During the night of 6/7 September, the same doctor observed that his renowned patient has "a continual dry cough with laboured and irregular breathing. The urine, which only appears drop by drop, is clouded with sediment. The lower legs and feet are extremely swollen. The pulse is strained, feverish and irregular." The doctor's prognosis is very worrying, and Yvan the surgeon is more precise:

> The Emperor is very receptive to atmospheric influence. If he is to feel well, his skin must play its role in maintaining good health. As soon as his muscles tighten because of his mood or his surroundings, discomfort of varying intensity will arise in the form of a cough and extreme ischuria. All these medical conditions hinder the healing process and function of the skin. During the days of the 5th and the 6th, he was troubled by the wind associated with the equinox, the fog, the rain and the military camp. His condition was serious enough to require a treatment which resulted in a medical potion being handed over at night a few kilometres away from the battlefield. His suffering was severe enough to cause a fever, and it was not until after a few days of rest in either Mozhaisk or Moscow that the cough and ischuria ceased.9

An important point is that the tone used by Yvan plays down the event which suggests that these symptoms occurred on a regular basis. In a second letter Yvan clarifies the situation to Ségur, who had requested further information:

> The Emperor had an incredibly nervous temperament. His mental health was affected, and the convulsions were equally divided between the stomach and the bladder. When the pain spread to his stomach, he'd experience sharp

[9] Jacques Macé, *Le général Gourgaud* (Paris: Nouveau Monde, Fondation Napoléon, 2006).

> coughs which drained his mental and physical strength to such a degree that his capabilities began to be affected. The convulsions usually included the bladder and he normally ended up in a distressing and degrading position. Travelling on horseback increased his suffering. This incident occurred during the battle of Mozhaisk. During the night of the 6th to the 7th, a request had to be made for a potion to be prepared by his pharmacist, who was a few kilometres away and loaded down with luggage.[10]

As a result of his health problems, the Emperor has a loss of voice which would have prevented him from speaking and dictating to the people around him. It was the eve of the Battle of Moskowa. All those involved in the battle of Borodino mention witnessing the anguish and frailness of the Emperor who never managed to establish his military genius in combat and restricted himself by sending his army to the onslaught of the Russian troops.

End of 1813: In Dresden, he suffered from hepatic colic for several days. During the Battle of Leipzig, he had extremely violent gastric and hepatic pains once more, which were almost intolerable. His health did not improve during the military campaign in France.[11]

From March to May 1815: Whilst permanently remaining in his office to reorganise his troops and government, suffering from stress and being considerably overworked, he was constantly troubled by new stomach complaints.[12]

16th-17th June 1815: On the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, he suffered once more from pain as experienced in Leipzig in 1813. He did not sleep that night.

June 18th 1815: On the morning of the battle, he was treated for haemorrhoids, which is very common amongst horse riders.[13]

1816: As a prisoner he gained a lot of weight, felt constant pain in his right side and saw his legs swell. Napoleon complained of rheumatism, but does not walk or do any exercise, which leads to criticism from those around him. Las Cases describes him as someone experiencing serious dental problems as he had a huge dental abscess which had been aggravating from 26 October 1816 to 9 November 1816. The Corsican had never experienced such discomfort since his arrival in Saint Helena.[14]

[10] Macé.

[11] Boigey, 1-2.

[12] Boigey, 1-2.

[13] Phil Mason, *Les hémorroïdes de Napoléon* (Paris: De l'Opportun, 2010).

[14] Emmanuel De Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* (Paris: Le Grand Livre du Mois, Vol. IV, 1999); Bastien Jacques & Jeandel Roland, *Napoléon à Sainte Hélène – Etude critique de ses pathologies et des causes de son décès* (Paris: Le Publieur, 2005); Albert Benhamou, *L'autre Sainte-*

1817: Napoleon showed symptoms of a scurvy condition which do not improve. In July, another tooth abscess appeared. According to Montholon, on 16 November 1817 O'Meara extracts one of his teeth following the appearance of a new abscess. It was the first.

1818: He no longer sleeps. He has a dull pain in his stomach and was troubled by a urinary bladder stone. He was conscious but approaching death imminently. According to Bertrand, other dental problems arise during the year.

1819: Napoleon fainted. The stomach pain was excruciating. The English doctor, Stokoe, diagnosed hepatitis. He prescribed an enema to his patient, followed by a venesection and finally purgation. The patient's health improved.[15]

August 1819: Bertrand notified Hudson Lowe that his prisoner was in great pain.

September 1819: General Bonaparte's state of health appeared to be improving because of the treatment recommended by Antommarchi, a new arrival on the island. The prisoner regains vitality, and his general state of health was better, but this does not last.[16]

March 1820: His liver and stomach pains become permanent. In October, he vomits. The resulting discharge is worrying.[17]

April 27th 1821: The Emperor, bedridden, continually vomits and is in great pain.

April 29th 1821: He is delirious.

Night of 4/5 May 1821: Coma.

May 5th 1821. Died at 5:49 p.m. He was 51 years old.[18]

Hélène, la captivité, la mort et les médecins autour de Napoléon (Albert Benhamou Publishing, 2010).

[15] Edith Stokoe, *With Napoleon at St. Helena: Being the memoirs of Dr. John Stokoe, naval surgeon* (Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2008).

[16] F. Antommarchi, *Mémoires du Docteur F. Antommarchi ou les derniers momens de Napoléon* (Paris: Librairie Barrois L'Aîné, 1825).

[17] Boigey, 1-2.

[18] Edith Stokoe, *With Napoleon at St. Helena: Being the memoirs of Dr. John Stokoe, naval surgeon* (Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2008).

Criminal Justice and Legitimacy in Occupied Lands

by Doina Pasca Harsanyi, Ph.D.

On 3 August 1807 Antonio Luzardi, *maire* of the village of Morfasso who was also in charge of the local customs office, wrote an anguished letter to the captain of gendarmerie: he had just heard that a surgeon named Bonaccorsi was arrested because the gendarmes received a letter of denunciation signed Luzardi–his name. Indeed, an incriminatory letter to the gendarmes in Lugagnano, dated Morfasso 31 July 1807 and signed Luzardi stated that the surgeon had come into the mayor's office that day, accompanied by three notorious criminals, and ordered drinks. The mayor obligingly served him. Yet, at the simple question *come va – how are you - Doctor* Bonaccorsi hurled abuse at the mayor, accused him of spying on behalf of the French, and stormed out of the room without paying. Claiming to fear for his life, the signatory of the letter demanded the immediate arrest of the surgeon and vowed to pursue the matter beyond the justice of peace in Lugagnano to the district tribunal in Borgo San Donino and maybe even to the Criminal Court in Parma. Acting on this statement, the gendarmes arrested Bonaccorsi the same day. It all looked like professional, efficient police work, the kind the French took great pride in. Except that it had nothing to do with Luzardi who desperately wanted to extricate himself from the entire happening. Luzardi wrote to the gendarme captain in Lugagnano that somebody had the effrontery to forge his signature, because he barely knew Bonaccorsi who had not set foot in his village since December 1806. To further prove his innocence, Luzardi submitted a sample of his own hand (the letter itself being written by the local priest, because the mayor was not accustomed to writing long letters). He urged his superiors to liberate without delay the unjustly accused doctor, who enjoyed a stellar reputation in the region. It could have stopped here, with Doctor Bonaccorsi walking out of jail a free man, savoring the sweet taste of avenged innocence.[1] The case gained much wider relevance, however, because various office holders, from low-level local administrators to the Governor of the States of Parma *Maréchal* Pérignon and even the Minister of Justice in Paris saw in this episode a failure of leadership, a malfunction of some sort. The way the discussion went after that illustrates the strategies imperial subjects in occupied territories employed to work around the great power of French state institutions.

Following up on the news, the *subdélégué* Locard, chief manager of the arrondissement Borgo San Donino, wrote an outraged letter to Eugene Nardon the

[1] Il maire di Morfasso al Signor Galinga Maresciallo della Gendarmeria stazionata a Lugagnano, s.d. (3 Agosto nel testo) Archives Nationales Paris, F/1e/87.

Administrator Prefect of Parma.[2] Recounting the events in detail, Locard put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the gendarmes who, in his telling, abused their authority. Locard pointed out that the law obliged gendarmes to submit the letter first to the justice of peace who alone had the legal power to order an arrest should the evidence warrant it. Instead, the gendarmes jumped to conclusions and arrested an upstanding citizen as if he was a common thief and scandalized the entire community while doing so. In conclusion, Locard wrote – and this is the most interesting part of his message: "If one day some calamity occurs (meaning a popular uprising) because of aggravations so often visited, with complete impunity, upon citizens of these communes, I want to prove that I have never concealed the truth."[3]

The truth Locard alluded to went much further than shedding light on an incident in a remote village. It had to do with simmering resentment against the French gendarmes' indifference to local sensibilities and with ambivalence towards the so-called brigands, a term that covered robbers, deserters, draft dodgers, and assorted recalcitrant subjects. In a word, the truth concerned the legitimacy of French rule in the area.[4] It was a sensitive matter in the Piacentino where a violent uprising had been put down barely a year before this doctor's controversial arrest.[5] The arrondissement's supervisor Locard had been nominated in the wake of this uprising. He was a loyal public servant who believed in the progressive potential of French rule. But he also believed that any excessive use of force, any perceived iniquity could stir old resentments and set the country aflame again. He wrote to his superiors that the gendarmes were the face of French power; as such, it was their duty to behave in an exemplary manner; by

[2] The States of Parma were divided in three *arrondissements* (Parma, Piacenza, Borgo San Donino) each headed by a *subdélégué* who reported to the Administrator Prefect who in turn reported to the Governor. This system changed in 1808 when the States of Parma became a full-fledged department of the empire. For details see C. Ghisalberti, *Le amministrazioni locali nel periodo napoleonico, in AA.VV. Dagli stati preunitari d'antico regime all'unificazione,* a cura di Nicola Raponi (Bologna, 1981), 431–54.

[3] Locard to Administrateur-Préfet Nardon, Borgo San Donino, 14 August 1807. ANP, F/1e/87. *Si un jour il arrive quelque Malheur par suite des vexations qu'on fait si fréquemment et si impunément éprouver aux habitants de cette partie de l'arrondissement confié à mes soins, je dois pouvoir prouver que je n'ai jamais celé la vérité.*

[4] There is a rich literature on the ambivalent relations between the outlaws the French called *briganti* and residents in the Italian countryside. For quick reference see Grab, 'State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy,' *European History Quarterly*, 25 (1995), 39 – 70. Many fascinating case-studies in Enzo Ciconte, *Banditi e Briganti. Rivolta continua dal cinquecento all'ottocento* (Soveria Mannelli, 2011), 63–121. A sympathetic account is given in Carlo Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisalpina al Regno* (Torino, 1991), 624–26. For a pan-European examination see *Popular Resistance in the French wars. Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates*. Ed. C. J. Esdaile (Houndmills, 2005)

[5] The Piacentino revolt started in the fall of 1805 and ended officially in May 1806 with the execution of the main leader. The most comprehensive survey of the revolt remains Vincenzo Paltrinieri*, I Moti Contro Napoleone Negli Stati di Parma e Piacenza (1805-1806)* (Bologna, 1927). Excellent case studies are in *Folle Controrivoluzionarie. Le insorgenze popolare nell'Italia giacobina e napoleonica.* A cura di Anna Maria Rao (Roma, 1999).

offending peaceful citizens, they put social peace at risk–this was his warning and his truth.

Once informed, Administrator Prefect Nardon showed little surprise given that he received letters of complaint almost daily. He took no action but forwarded Locard's report to the senior authority in the States of Parma, Governor Maréchal Pérignon, who decided in favor of the gendarmes. If they erred, Pérignon declared, it was in good faith, because there was another truth that the local official omitted: Bonaccorsi, the man placed under arrest had provided medical care to a notorious runaway bandit named Tomarrone. It was not the first time the good doctor mixed with such characters – there was something about him that raised the justified suspicions of the gendarmes. It was true, Pérignon admitted, that the denunciation itself was fake, but it was not fair to accuse the gendarmes of abuse of power. Instead, he reproached *subdélégué* Locard for disparaging reliable public servants and for not supporting French law and order. Worst of all, Pérignon was displeased by Locard's suggestion that the gendarmes' behavior could provoke another insurrection. Wrong, Pérignon replied: "The trust we put in our policies and the power of the Empire assure me of the perfect submission of the people in these states."[6] That was, indeed, the gist of the matter: was Pérignon's Olympian self-assurance justified or was the humble local official Locard correct in fretting over impending social turmoil?

Maréchal Pérignon (from the J. David Markham collection).

Stung by the disapproval, Locard composed a second letter where he went into excruciating detail trying to exonerate himself of any suspicion of bias. He based his entire plea on one of the most cherished French principles of government: the fundamental right of every citizen to personal freedom and equal treatment under

[6] Maréchal Pérignon to Administrator Prefect Nardon, Parma, 4 September 1807. ANP, F/1e/87. *La confiance dans nos moyens et la puissance de l'Empire m'assurent de la soumission parfaite du peuple de ces états.*

the law, as opposed to the old regime's system of privileges. The doctor's 'sacred rights' were violated, Locard declared, even if the gendarmes acted in good faith. Now, he admitted that the surgeon had indeed assisted men on the run from the law. But was this so wrong, after all? Bonaccorsi was practicing medicine; how could he, in good conscience, refuse to help the sick and the wounded, no matter who they were? At this point, Locard launched a complicated defense, meant to show that domestic tranquility depended entirely on his abilities to adapt the French system to local ways of thinking and doing things. His superiors had to understand that cooperation came at a price, for which he gave another example, where an entire village chased out of their community two brothers who collaborated with French gendarmes in the arrest of the bandit Tomarrone, the very one cared for by the doctor. For now, he felt too exhausted to continue: "my strength does not equal my zeal" he sighed. Equally exasperated was Maréchal Pérignon who noted on the margin of an official letter that he was tired of local 'passions and prejudices' and believed it was high time that people in that part of the world grasped the truth of the advantages of the French administration.

Maréchal Pérignon (from the J. David Markham collection).

All sides insisted on conveying the truth. Historians cannot give verdicts on truth. All we can do, is analyze documentary sources and empirical evidence to convey the realities of a certain period and better understand what truth meant to different historical actors at different times. What *subdélegué* Locard, speaking for local public opinion, and Maréchal Pérignon, speaking for the imperial leadership, called truth, each from their own angle, opens a window into the reality of this corner of Italy – and by extension of most occupied lands – under Napoleonic rule. Reality was made of opacity, ambiguities, calculations, mutual suspicions, all mixed with collaboration instances and day-to-day negotiations. It is remarkable that a lowly bureaucrat like Locard was able to grasp so cleverly the nature of French power, that is, the aspiration of imperial administrators to show that their rule was legitimate and rooted in rational legal

principles – not an arbitrary system like the old regime was. This was at once the strength and the weakness of any executive team. The credibility of French rule stood on two pillars: good laws on one hand; impartial, reliable justice on the other hand. Ideally, French leadership amounted to a balancing act where citizens appreciated the benefits of new ways of managing daily life while fearing– but not hating, not abhorring – French law and order methods, such as the gendarmerie. Community leaders could always use the aspirational side of French notions of law and order to turn the tables and put their powerful French masters on the defensive. Locard had the audacity to point repeatedly to fractures in the grand edifice of the imperial administration because he knew that his bosses cared and very much wanted the population to value the fruits of progressive French governance – to love even French dominion. [7]

The episode in Morfasso offers a glimpse on how grand imperial theories worked on the ground, at the micro-level of village life. Following the letter of the law and relying on clear evidence, the gendarmes proceeded to arrest a person who associated with criminals. Local leaders called for flexible law enforcement and argued that, for the common good, helping persons in trouble with the law must qualify as charity, not criminal activity. Senior French bureaucrats did their best to uphold the ideal of good will between grateful citizens and a caring government free of prejudices and emotional impulses. Each branch acted on its own version of truth, which complicated the daily lives of people compelled to navigate between different social and legal codes.

Finally, it is telling that the entire discussion revolved on attitudes and feelings, which rendered each fact debatable and hard to pin down. It is also telling that in the heat of the debate the trigger of this incident – the forged letter sent to the gendarmes in Lugagnano – was forgotten. Nobody cared to find out who had falsified mayor Luzardi's signature and why; forgotten also was the accusation that the mayor was spying for the French, a revealing detail pointing to deep-seated animosities. All involved understood that what truly mattered were the larger issues illuminated by these small events, not the events themselves. The final word was left to Prefect Nardon, who took the matter philosophically. In a report to Minister of Justice *Grand Juge* Régnier he articulated the Sisyphic task of enforcing the law in foreign territories. "The news that I have the honor of sending you, Monseigneur, are meant to show that the Administration needs support and funds, and that despite my efforts, my deference to authorities, and my discretion, my career path is strewn

[7] Senior imperial officials often used the word 'love' to describe the ideal relationship between the administration and local citizens. Nardon too declared at the beginning of his tenure that he wished 'to win the hearts' of the people he was ruling. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Piacenza 10 February 1806. ANP F/1e/86/

with thorns."[8] Pity the loyal Napoleonic bureaucrat – it was not an easy job!

Napoleon crowned as the King of Italy (from the J. David Markham collection).

[8] Nardon to Minister of Justice Régnier, Parma 14 September 1807. AN F/1e/87. *Les communications que j'ai l'honneur de vous faire, Monseigneur, tendent à vous prouver que l'administration a besoin d'appui et de ressort, et que malgré mes soins, mes égards, ma déférence et ma réserve, ma carrière et en tout parsemée d'épines.*

Pierluigi Feliciati concluded that:'…gli effetti dell'amministrazione Nardon furono decisamente negative per il consenso locale al dominio francese.' Pierluigi Feliciati, 'Arrivano in Francesi! Gli stati parmensi dal 1796 a 1814' in *L'Ossessione della memoria. Parma settecentesca nei disegni del conte Alessando Sanseverini* (Parma, 1997), 31. Numerous complaints from all over Parma - Piacenza and a general atmosphere of passive resistance certainly validate this judgment. It must be said, however, that it was not for lack of trying. Nardon wrote almost daily reports with details on his various (mostly unsuccessful) initiatives for earning public trust.

Empire Style between Art and Propaganda? Reflections on the Napoleon's Imperial Representation on the 200th Anniversary of His Death

by Marian Hochel

The interpretations of historians and art historians differed methodologically and terminologically in the question of Napoleon's representation via art both in space and in time. The usual "black-and-white" view of Napoleon's imperial style degraded this artistic style, especially by the tendencious Marxist historiography, to a mere means of political propaganda by the Napoleonic regime. Such a concept completely denied the nature of the specific art that developed in France as one of the consequences of Napoleon's cultural policy. Art? Propaganda? How do these two instances relate to each other in the case of Napoleon's art representation? To what extent can art serve as a tool of propaganda? This question is complicated to the same extent by the divergence of experts. The aim of this study is to evaluate the significance of the Empire style and return it to its artistic license which was denied to him mainly in the countries of the Eastern Bloc bound by the ideologies of Marxism and Communism. The bicentennial of Napoleon's death, commemorated by memory institutions through the concept of sites of memory and cultural heritage in the interests of interdisciplinary and international cooperation, contributes to the construction of a pillar that could support the legitimacy of this license.

As already mentioned, this year marks the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's death. Uttered in 1806, Napoleon's idea resonates as if from the grave – it says that "there are only two forces in the world: the saber and the spirit. The saber is always defeated by the spirit in the longer perspective."[1] It can be stated already at the beginning of this study that Napoleon's beliefs were not far from the truth. It is the modern spirit, the original power of thought that permeates the art production that reflects the official aesthetics of Napoleon's reign. Aesthetics which influenced the creative process in other European countries beyond the borders of the French Empire. The artifacts which were commissioned by Napoleon's regime continue to be a mirror of it, a representative of period iconography, and at the same time they served as a catalyst for historical memory. Through them, Napoleon's epoch remains immortal – in museums and galleries it often becomes the center of attention and a magnet for visitors. This is also evidenced by the museological concept of sites of memory of

[1] Jean Tulard, Napoléon ou le mythe du saveur (Paris, 2008) (1987), 277; Lucian Regenbogen, *Napoléon a dit. Aphorismes, citations et opinions* (Préface de Jean Tulard) (Paris, 2002), 58.

Napoleonic history, within which the preserved Napoleonic collections have been successfully presented lately – directly *in situ* in the former residences of the Bonaparte family. These are documented in exhibition catalogs or representative publications. In this regard, we can selectively mention books whose authors or editors are current or former employees of these institutions, specialists in the field – Jérémie Benoît,[2] Christopher Beyeler,[3] Bernard Chevallier,[4] Frédéric Lacaille,[5] Emmanuel Starcky[6] and others. Careful analysis and valuable knowledge about Napoleon's cultural policy, his relationship to art and the formation of the Empire style in France have been published in recent years by Jean-Claude Bonnet,[7] Odile Nouvel-Kammerer,[8] Jean-Michel Leniaud,[9] Pierre Branda[10] or in this year's re-edition of Annie Jourdan's excellent essay.[11] The list of relevant authors is far from complete.

The Czech art historian Marie Mžyková, author of the exhibition titled *Napoleon and His Time* organized in 1995 on the occasion of the 190th anniversary of the Battle of Austerlitz at Austerlitz Chateau, mentioned in the selection exhibition catalog that

> Napoleon as a great strategist fought for his goals with weapons against which there was no protection: They were art and science. French aesthetics of the Empire period, crossing borders even into the houses of the greatest enemies. A new captivating culture, amplified by the example of ancient Egyptian monuments, discovered and studied during Napoleon's Egyptian

[2] Jérémie Benoit, *Napoléon et Versailles*, Paris 2005; Jérémie Benoît, *Le Grand Trianon. Un palais privé à l'ombre de Versailles de Louis XIV à Napoléon et de Louis-Philippe au général de Gaulle*, (Lathuile, Haute-Savoie, 2009).

[3] Christophe Beyeler, Napoléon. *L'art en majesté. Les collections du musée Napoléon Ier au château de Fontainebleau* (Paris, 2017); Christophe Beyeler, *Le musée Napoléon Ier, une ambition européene enchâssée dans un palais impérial*, in: Fontainebleau. La vraie demeure des rois, la maison des siècles (Paris, 2015), 505–77.

[4] Bernard Chevallier (ed.), Style Empire, (Valmont Éditeur and J. P. de Monza, 2000); Chevallier, Bernard: *Napoléon, les lieux du pouvoir* (Artlys, 2004); Bernard Chevallier (ed.), *Musée national des châteaux de Malmaison et Bois-Préau*, Paris 2006; Chevallier, Bernard: *Décors d'Empire* (Éditions de Monza, 2008).

[5] Frédéric Lacaille(ed.), *Napoléon à Versailles* (Versailles, 2021).

[6] Emmanuel Starcky, *Le Palais impérial de Compiègne* (Paris, 2008); Emmanuel Starcky, *Compiègne royal et impérial. Le palais de Compiègne et son domaine* (Paris, 2011); Starcky, Emmanuel and Andrzej Rottermund (eds.), *Napoléon Ier ou la légende des arts, 1800–1815* (Paris, 2015).

[7] Jean-Claude Bonnet (ed.), *L'Empire des Muses: Napoléon, les Arts et les Lettres* (Paris, 2004).

[8] Odile Nouvel-Kammerer (ed.), *L'Aigle et le papillon. Symboles des pouvoirs sous Napoléon 1800–1815. Catalogue, Les Arts decoratifs* (Paris, American Federation of Arts, 2007).

[9] Jean-Michel Leniaud, *Napoléon et les arts* (Paris, 2012)

[10] Pierre Branda and Xavier Mauduit, *L'Art au service du pouvoir. Napoléon Ier – Napoléon III* (Paris, 2018).

[11] Annie Jourdan, *Napoléon. Héros, imperator, mécène* (Paris, 2021) (1998).

campaign and used to form the new imperial style.12

This definition of the aesthetics of the Empire period as an expression of Napoleon's cultural policy without pejorative significance in the mid-1990s meant to some extent a breakthrough in Czech and Slovak art historiography. Marie Mžyková's interpretation, dispelling previous myths, was published five years after the Velvet Revolution which swept away the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. There were few specialized publications on this topic which were not scientifically obsolete or ideologically tendentious, in the then Czechoslovakia in Central Europe which was part of the Eastern Bloc. I myself have been confronted by various interpretations of historians and art historians which differed methodologically and terminologically in many ways.

The acute lack of publications on this topic from the point of view of Czech and Slovak historiography and the usual "black and white" view of Napoleon's imperial style degraded this artistic style, especially by the tendency of Marxist historiography, to a mere means of political propaganda of Napoleon's regime; a "style pervaded by war spirit,"[13] "characterized by the formal use and soulless imitation of mainly Roman architectural motifs,"[14] leading "to an effort to break away from reality, to create one's own closed world of art in which the role of the artist was unhistorically absolutized."[15] Such gross simplifications completely deny the true nature and character of the specific art that developed in France as one of the consequences of Napoleon's cultural policy.

Let us recall that the Empire style (*Le Style Empire*) as a new representative style was regulated not only by the authority of the French ruler and state intervention, but this specific style was a product of contemporary aesthetic theories and art criticism in official scientific and academic institutions, shaped in the studios of renowned artists as a mirror of period morals, value systems and the taste of the then French society. As a distinct stylistic period, the Empire is defined by Napoleon's monarchical government in France, it absorbs Napoleonic symbolism in its decorative vocabulary as a new representative symbolism of the state, a socially integrating one. In this form, it subsequently penetrates throughout Europe, establishing itself in the Czech lands between about 1810 and 1840 as a new fashion wave, to which is first subjected the royal court and then the local

[12] Marie Mžyková, *Napoleon a jeho doba. Výběrový katalog výstavy ke 190. výročí bitvy u Slavkova*, Historické muzeum ve Slavkově u Brna – Zámek Orlík nad Vltavou (Brno, 1995), 1.

[13] Ivan Kuhn, *Barok, klasicismus, empír* (Bratislava, 1955), 25.

[14] Ivan a kol Kuhn, *Klasicistická architektúra na Slovensku. Príspevok k jej dejinám* (Bratislava, 1955), 11.

[15] Josef Hanzal, *Od baroka k romantismu* (Praha, 1987), 86.

nobility.[16] It thus becomes part of the aesthetics of the living space of aristocratic society and wealthy classes in the Habsburg monarchy, albeit in a relatively modified form. It is because it already represents other clients and authorities as their own style.[17]

The Empire style, combining aesthetic impact with functionality and Napoleon's ostentatious representation, pervaded all artistic disciplines of visual culture.[18] The glorification of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), of his state and war successes, the glorification of the French nation and the revival of the spirit of patriotism, as well as stories from ancient mythology with a symbolic moral reference to the Napoleonic period, determined the direction in which the aesthetic concepts and aspirations of artists supported by the state and creating on the orders of the Napoleonic regime were to go.[19] What role did Napoleonic propaganda play in this process? Not only did it create a paternalistic image of Napoleon with the connotations of a protector and a savior, a guardian of national pride with a messianic mission, the embodiment of modern French Hercules, the way the essence of this revolutionary symbol was analyzed by the American historian Lynn Hunt (2007).[20] Moreover, propaganda was also an active political weapon and a pillar of political power, redistributed between the relevant state institutions and administrative bodies. In this way, the image of Napoleon was formulated, which offered this special *vision*. The image of the new French ruler

[16] Cultural history is not defined by exact milestones; Milan Togner tried to apply this periodization to the example of the development of arts and crafts in the Czech lands, see *Historický nábytek* (Praha, 1993), 73.

[17] On the question of the Empire style in the Czech lands, see only selectively Jiří Kuthan and Ivan Muchka, *Aristokratická sídla období klasicismu* (Praha, 1999); Ludmila Kybalová *Dějiny odívání: Od empíru k druhému rokoku, Praha 2004; Roman a kol Prahl Umění náhrobku v českých zemích let 1780–1830* (Praha, 2004); Jiří Rak and Vít Vlnas (eds.), *Habsburské století 1791–1914. Česká společnost ve vztahu k dynastii a monarchii* (Praha, 2004); Pavel Zatloukal, *Příběhy z dlouhého století. Architektura z let 1750–1918 na Moravě a ve Slezsku* (Olomouc, 2002); etc.

[18] For the Empire style in general, see Emile Bourgeois, *Le Style Empire, ses origines et ses caractères*, (Paris, 1930); Pierre Francastel, *Le Style Empire (du Directoire à la Restauration)* (Paris, 1939); Sibylle Harksen, *Empire* (Leipzig, 1989); Christophe Huchet de Quénetain, *Les styles Consulat & Empire* (Paris, 2005); Chevallier, Bernard: *Décors d'Empire*, Paris 2008; Guillaume JANNEAU, *L'Empire* (Paris, 1965); Jean-Pierre: Samoyault, *Mobilier français. Consulat et Empire* (Paris, 2009).

[19] For the Empire style as an art in the service of Napoleon's imperial regime, see in more detail: Pierre Branda and Xavier Mauduit (eds.): *L'art au service du pouvoir. Napoléon Ier – Napoléon III, catalogue de l'exposition*, Paris 2018; Sylvain Cordier (ed.), *Napoléon. La maison de l'Empereur* (Montréal, 2018); Bernard Chevallier and Karine Huguenaud (eds.), *Napoleone. Fasto imperiale. I tesori della Fondation Napoléon* (Paris 2008); Jean-Michel Leniaud, *Napoléon et les arts* (Citadelles & Mazenod, 2012); Odile Nouvel-Kammerer (ed.), *L'Aigle et le papillon. Symboles des pouvoirs sous Napoléon 1800–1815. Catalogue* (Paris: Les Arts décoratifs, 2007); Emmanuel Starcky and Andrzej Rottermund (eds.), *Napoléon Ier ou la légende des arts, 1800–1815* (Paris, 2015).

[20] Lynn Hunt, *Francouzská revoluce. Politika, kultura, třída*, Brno 2007, 107-39 (from the English original *Politics, Culture and Classe in the French Revolution*, The Regents of the University of California, 1984).

was projected into both public and private spaces, reminiscent of his ubiquity, mirrored his self-confidence, and had a purely representative function, emphasizing the legitimacy of sovereign power and the tradition from which it was derived. The art of Empire was to eventually fulfill this noble mission, which Napoleon sought over time, militarily and politically – to represent this imaginarily restored Empire of the West. The Empire style was a perfect synthesis of Greek, Roman and Egyptian art, adapted to the needs of new functionality and the aesthetic canon of the period by Napoleon's "court" of artists and advisers in the field of culture, bringing together talented masters of combinatorics, personification and metaphor.

The grand exhibition, installed on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's death under the simple title *Napoléon* in the Grande Halle de la Villette in Paris,[21] provides many impulses to reconsider his legacy in various aspects of his government. One of them is Napoleon's cultural policy and the new aesthetics representing his regime. Both at the exhibition and in the impressive accompanying catalog, Isabelle Tamisier-Vétois (2021), head curator (*conservateur en chef du Patrimoine*) of the National Museum at Malmaison and Bois-Préau Chateaus, took on the task of redefining the Empire style. She focused her analysis on the specifics of the Empire style in interior design, especially Napoleon's imperial residences, which are now owned by the state as an extremely valuable and important part of the French cultural heritage presented to the public. The emperor also tried to enter in the historical memory by furnishing his residences, in which he left his testimonies about his government, time and visions. His representative style was characterized by opposites – it could be majestic or simple, dark and light, straight and curved, monumental but comfortable, modern, but just as inspired by the past.[22] The emperor's apartments mirrored this duality – they reflected luxury, elegance, but also simplicity and functionality, which expanded throughout Europe and were an expression of the modernity of the new century. The decor and their furnishings were adorned with new symbols of power – bees, an eagle, Napoleon's monogram, a laurel wreath of victors, and they participated in the propaganda of the new regime under the supervision of the emperor's uncompromising and ubiquitous eye.[23]

[21] *Napoléon*, Grande Halle de la Villette – Réunion des musées nationaux – Grand Palais, May 28 - December 19, 2021; official web presentation of the exhibition project, see: https://expo-napoleon.fr/ [18. 8. 2021].

[22] Isabelle Tamisier-Vétois, *Les arts décoratifs sous l'Empire*. In: Bernard Chevallier and Arthur Chevallier (eds.), Napoléon (Paris, 2021), 184.

[23] Tamisier-Vétois, 182. Also, a recently published outstanding book under the direction of Thierry Sarmant deals with the issues of Napoleon's cultural policy in the field of interior

So far, I have reflected on the essence of Napoleon's artistic representation when it comes to the goals of the Empire style. We may now ask how art and propaganda are related in the case of Napoleon's representation. To what extent can art serve as a tool of propaganda? This question is complicated the same extent that different interpretations of historians and art historians diverge. The legitimization of sovereign power in Napoleon's iconography by means of propaganda was not new – as demonstrated by a team of authors led by Allan Ellenius in the book titled *Iconographie, propagande et légitimation*, published in 2001 as part of the international research program "Origins of the Modern State in Europe" (*Les origines de l'État moderne en Europe*), the rhetoric of such paintings was evident in contemporary imagination long before Napoleon; in the modern state it has become a new and fundamental necessity of power that needs to be (re)presented.[24]

Jean Tulard, a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris and honorary president of the Napoleon Institute (*Institut Napoléon*), stated in his publication "Napoleon or the Myth of the Savior" (*Napoléon ou le mythe du saveur*, 2008) that "we cannot deny that Napoleon used the art of his time for his personal propaganda."[25] In his book, he drew attention to the publication of the American historian Robert B. Holtman, a professor at Louisiana State University, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (1950), which accentuated "Napoleon's recognition that every ruler must use propaganda as a necessary tool of politics and statesmanship. (…) Most activities of any ruler, Napoleon or another, might be called propagandistic to the extent that through them he hopes to build up a public opinion favorable to himself."[26] Holtman defined propaganda as "a conscious effort to affect the attitudes of large numbers of people toward definite doctrines by direct manipulation of social suggestion," adding that "propaganda presents only one side of an issue and discourages its subjects from seeking the reasons for their attitude and behaviour."[27] He described Napoleon as "the first modern propagandist" because he contributed to the improvement of propaganda in two respects: "He was the first sovereign to talk to to his subjects [ie. those who were the center of his propaganda interest] directly and frequently, partly through medium such as the bulletins and orders of the day, which he was the first to exploit; and in his utilization of the machinery of government, he took a pioneering step toward systematic official propaganda activity of the type we know today."[28] Holtman characterized Napoleon's "use of art" as follows:

design and the formation of a new imperial style: Thierry Sarmant (ed.), *Palais disparus de Napoléon: Tuileries – Saint-Cloud – Meudon* (Paris, 2021).

[24] Allan Ellenius (ed.), *Iconographie, propagande et légitimation* (Paris, 2001).

[25] Tulard, 300.

[26] Robert Holtman, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), *Preface*, xi.

[27] Holtman, xi.

[28] Holtman, 246.

"Although he definitely crippled them in many respects, it is only fair to note that there were times – as in the case of the theater and of architecture – when his interest was occasionally something more than that of the mere propagandist."[29] Napoleon, however, never spoke of engaging in "propaganda"; the term began to be used openly only in connection with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. As Holtman proved, the absence of this concept does not mean that Napoleon did not participate in propaganda, or this term had not been used long before.[30]

On the other side are historians, respectively art historians who avoid the use of the term "propaganda" in connection with the art of Napoleonic France. One of the reasons may be the surviving negative connotation of this concept which was fully manifested especially in the crisis moments of the 20th century in the case of totalitarian regimes. Let us give an example of the connotation of the term "propaganda" from the 1930s:

> Moral dictatorship is a new tool of warfare: absolute control of public opinion and the morality of one's own population and constant pressure on public opinion and the morality of the population in the hostile and neutral state have imprinted new content on the concept of 'propaganda'. Propaganda has become a recognized tool not only for war but also for politics. Post-war dictatorships made propaganda a monopoly of the state, or the only party controlling the state, an instrument of absolute control of the thinking, wanting and feeling of the population. With the need to defend against this propaganda, the contemporary world is aware of propaganda as a social phenomenon that must be dealt with theoretically and practically. (…) Contemptuous perceptions of propaganda have spread from military circles to broad sections of the population, in which post-war disillusionment has led to the rejection and condemnation of methods - often indiscriminate - of war propaganda. (…) It is the primacy of dictatorial states to elevate propaganda to a separate branch of public administration (the Ministry of Propaganda in Germany and Italy), which exercises a leading

[29] Holtman, 168.

[30] The origin of the word "propaganda" dates back to the end of the 16th century, when a congregation was founded in 1597 by Pope Clement VIII (1536–1605) under the name *Sacra Congregatio de propaganda fide*, which was reorganized in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV (1554–1623) so that it would be *"the heart of the defense and conquest of the Catholic Church throughout all the earthly districts."* Shortly afterwards, in 1643, "propaganda" was also established in England for the spread of the Christian religion in New England. The expression "propaganda" was then expanded to any society, systematic effort or movement seeking to negotiate the validity and spreading of any teaching or activity. For more details, see: Oskar Butter, *Propaganda*, Zvláštní otisk ze „Sociologické revue", Sociologický seminář Masarykovy university v Brně (1937), 5.

> influence over the management of the state and all its policies.[31]

Annie Jourdan (1998) from the University of Amsterdam cautiously operates with the terms self-presentation (*presentation in soi*), representation (*de la représentation mentale à la représentation figurée*), reminiscence (*commémoration*) and self-celebration (*autocélébration*), while she explains the "connections" of Napoleon's authority with the world of art as follows:

> Power, as we know, tries to represent and be represented. The thought image, laboriously created by the main actor and his followers, is tirelessly captured on canvas, in marble or bronze. This is especially valuable for Napoleon. More than the Sun King, the French Emperor did not stop creating his image, or rather images, during his reign. In order for [these] images to legitimize [his] power, to be its support, and to enter and persist in history. From self-presentation which aims to gain a name, a personality symbol, to a representation that confirms and strengthens fame; from the mental representation to the physical representation, and to history which perpetuates the image thus created, and which promotes it into the pantheon of humanity, all occupied Napoleon from his first successes until his final defeat. This is evident in both art politics and historiographic projects of the Consulate and the Empire. Because Napoleon did not want only to be surrounded by canvases, monuments, statues or medals dedicated to his government, but also longed for writing and rewriting history. (…) The great novelty of the century is indeed the exploration of local color and historical fidelity. Fine arts are perceived as inseparable from history. Like historiography, it creates history. A history that began in the recent past and is taking place now, with a view to future generations. The interest in the visual arts is that they can give [it] a wide space."[32]

Elaine Williamson (2001), director of the French Studies section of the British Institute in Paris, also offered an original view, according to which "celebrating the glory of the Emperor and the nation is not in itself propaganda."[33] Art historian Marie Mžyková (1995), on the other hand, mentioned that "the art used by Napoleon to build a cult was also inspired by his energy and actions. The cult of power, the dynamism, the captivating canter of the cavalry on which the outcome of the battle depended – this new charge struck art,

[31] Butter, 4.

[32] Jourdan, 9–12.

[33] *„Célébrer la gloire de l'Emperuer et celle de la nation (…) n'est pas en soi de la propagande."* Elaine Williamson, *Denon et la propagande*, in: Francis Claudon and Bernard Bailly (eds.): Vivant Denon. Colloque de Chalon-sur-Saône du 22 Mars 1997, Université pour Tous de Bourgogne (Chalon-sur-Saône, 1998), 54.

provoked the imagination, set the path for romanticism."[34] However, the French historian Jean Chatelain (1973) went even further. He introduced Dominique-Vivant Denon (1747–1825), Napoleon's chief adviser in the art and referred to the cult of the French Emperor.[35]

As Denon's biographers Jean Chatelain (1973) and Pierre Lelièvre (1942, 1993)[36] indicated to varying degrees, but also, for example, a large exhibition project at the Louvre Museum in 1999 under the direction of Pierre Rosenberg and Marie-Anne Dupuy[37] or a subsequent colloquium held the same year in the Louvre under the direction of Daniella Gallo,[38] it was Dominique-Vivant Denon who in a way served as "Napoleon's eye" while acting as general director of museums.

As I pointed out in my earlier publications, as part of designing Napoleon's imperial style (*Le Style Empire*), Denon formed an image of Napoleon Bonaparte, the First Consul and later" Emperor of the French, with the intentions of an official artistic representation, as well as a new artistic style required by political circumstances, based on the principles of Napoleonic propaganda and Napoleon's personal cult. After the victorious campaign of 1805 and the Battle of Austerlitz Denon initiated the birth of the myth of Napoleon's restored Empire of the West.[39] This is proved not only by his work and private correspondence,[40] but also by the selected works of art he designed, the cultural policy projects he influenced and the government procurements he managed administratively during the period of his tenure in the service of the Napoleonic regime in 1802–1815.

Both most likely fatalists, it was Denon who helped light up Bonaparte's star. For Denon, art was a means of expression; representation, propaganda and the cult of personality were form, but the real driving force – as for many other artists – was the soul. This soul found its expression in the astral (or solar) archetype of the star – it was reflected both in the Napoleonic symbolism, enriching the decorative

[34] Mžyková, 1.

[35] Jean Chatelain, *Dominique Vivant Denon et le Louvre de Napoléon* (Paris, 1973), 114.

[36] Pierre Lelièvre, *Vivant Denon, directeur des Beaux-Arts de Napoléon. Essai sur la politique artistique du Premier Empire. Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris,* (Angers, 1942); and Pierre Lelièvre, *Vivant Denon, Homme des Lumieres,"Ministre des Arts" de Napoléon* (Paris, 1993).

[37] Marie-Anne Dupuy (ed.), *Dominique-Vivant Denon. L'oeil de Napoléon. Paris, musée du Louvre, 20 octobre 1999 – 17 janvier 2000* (Paris, 1999).

[38] Daniela Gallo (ed.), *Le vies de Dominique-Vivant Denon. Actes du colloque organisé au musée du Louvre par le Service culturel du 8 au 11 décembre 1999*, I–II (Paris, 2001).

[39] Marian Hochel, "Dominique-Vivant Denon (1747–1825): Napoleon's Chief Arts Adviser," *Napoleonic Scholarship. The Journal of The International Napoleonic Society*, 11 (2011), 26–35; Marian Hochel, *Vivant Denon a kouzlo empíru: Napoleonova hvězda, která oživuje duši,* (Praha: Opava, 2020).

[40] Marie-Anne Dupuy, Isabelle Le Manse de Chermont and Elaine Williamson (eds.), *Vivant-Denon, Directeur des Musées sous le Consulat et l'Empire. Correspondance (1802–1815)* (Paris, 1999); Fausta Garavini (ed.), *Vivant Denon. Lettres a Bettine* (Actes Sud, 1999).

vocabulary of the Empire style, and in period iconography. Bonaparte saw in it "his lucky star". Denon himself, enchanted by this star, began to amplify and transpose to all the radiance of the Napoleon's star so that it remained permanently anchored in the minds of the present and subsequent generations. The allure of the Empire style still confirms its originality and artistic license in spite of its qualities having sometimes been unjustly denied. The reflections summarized in this article prove that art in France during the period of Napoleon's reign did not lead to the lack of creative freedom or a mental dictatorship of the glorified French sovereign. The Empire style was a mirror of the visions of Napoleon I, Denon, and several artists who were willing to participate in the imperial presentation.

An excellent example of these visions which did not come from the sovereign, but from the creator-artist himself, is the statue of "Napoleon as Mars the Peacemaker" (*Napoleone in veste di Marte Pacificatore*) by the master of Italian classicist sculpture Antonio (1757–1822). It is an iconographic program that the artist applied in several variations during Napoleon's reign. They were all united by the same vision, the distinctive visual rhetoric that elevated Napoleon to the status of the Olympic gods. The artist conceived him in the triumphant nudity of the god of war, captured standing with a slightly stepped leg **(Fig. 1)**. In his left hand he holds a pole in the form of a scepter surmounted by an imperial eagle, in his right-hand Victory in a flowing drapery, dominating the globe **(Fig. 2)**. On his left shoulder, he has a richly gathered cloak *à l'antique* draped over, while his sword is set aside and hung on a tree trunk. Mars offers the world peace born of victory - this is how it is depicted in a bronze cast made for the city of Milan according to an earlier marble model between 1809 and 1811 by order of Eugène de Beauharnais (1781–1824), Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy. It was not until 1859 that this statue was erected in the courtyard of the local *palazzo di Brera*. It is a perfect proof of Napoleon's imperial presentation, combining ancient tradition with Napoleonic symbolism, applied in the decoration of the pedestal in the form of Napoleon's monogram and imperial eagles, connected by a garland etwined from oak and laurel twigs **(Fig. 3)**.[41] This aesthetic which finds the ideals of beauty in idealization *à l'antique*, completely corresponded to Denon's taste, although it went beyond Napoleon's, who had no understanding for allegories and preferred more realism in matters of his own (re)presentation.

The period in which Denon influenced public opinion in France in the service and in favor of Napoleon could be described as the end of one epoch and the beginning of a

[41] For more details on this statue, see Gérard Hubert, and Guy Ledoux-Lebard, *Napoléon. Portraits contemporains, bustes et statues,* (Paris, 1999), 136-39; reproduction of the original plaster model of the statue from 1806, see Mario Guderzo, (ed.): *Antonio Canova. Sculture, dipinti e incisioni dal Museo e dalla Gipsoteca di Possagno presentati ad Assisi* (Terra Ferma, 2013), 57.

new one. The new state power showed off the vision of a better society, happiness, glory and prosperity of the nation. The image of the ruler, a symbol of integration and revival, was placed by Denon at the forefront of the attention of (not only) the French audience in order to conquer public opinion and constantly strengthen the foundations on which his authority was built. This controlled glorification of Napoleon's personality through a new representative style was an attempt to systematically confirm the legitimacy of his government. Modern historiography, dealing with Denon's activities and the cultural policy of Napoleon's government, has reached certain conclusions in some cases, while offering a number of important facts based on a study of the relevant archival sources. In other cases, however, it has only identified questions that remain a challenge for further systematic research. However, cultural overlaps in time and space, as well as the phenomenon of art in the service of the political regime, require a modern and interdisciplinary approach in terms of their structuralism. Only then can the pitfalls of vague or limited interpretations be avoided.



Antonio Canova, Napoleon as Mars the Peacemaker, between 1809–1811, Palazzo di Brera, Milan (photo by Marian Hochel).



Antonio Canova, Napoleon as Mars the Peacemaker (detail with Victory), between 1809–1811, Palazzo di Brera, Milan (photo by Marian Hochel).

Antonio Canova, Napoleon as Mars the Peacemaker (detail of pedestal), between 1809–1811, Palazzo di Brera, Milan (photo by Marian Hochel).

The Napoleonic Wars in the Historical Memory of Bratislava: Historical Objects and Works of Art

by Matej Čapo, PhD.

The Napoleonic Wars, which influenced life in Europe for years, did not avoid the territory of present-day Slovakia. It was affected in 1805 and 1809, during the wars of the Third and Fifth Coalition. The decisive role was played by Pressburg (today's Bratislava).[1]

Although the inhabitants of Pressburg did not experience the rampage of war in 1805, the city was occupied twice by troops of the III Corps of the *Grande Armée*. It happened for the first time before the Battle of Austerlitz and Pressburg was occupied for the second time as a result of armistice concluded after Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. Napoleon designated Pressburg as a place for peace negotiations shortly afterwards. The city went down in the history of diplomacy due to the Treaty of Pressburg signed on 27 December 1805, in the Primate's Palace.[2] Even though it was a historically significant event, Pressburg did not commemorate it for many years. Eugen (Jenő) Engyeli, a member of Pressburg's municipal council, decided to change that. In 1905, on the occasion of the approaching 100th anniversary of the signing of the Peace of Pressburg, he proposed to the general assembly of the municipal council to place a commemorative plaque in the city to commemorate this event.[3] On 26 December 1905, the commemorative plaque of red marble, two meters high and one and a half meters wide, was unveiled on the building of the Primate's Palace. It was created by the stonemasonry Rumpelmayer and bore text in Hungarian. Its author was the Pressburg's historian Theodor (Tivadar) Ortvay and in translation it reads as follows:

> In this house, after the Battle of Austerlitz, on 26 December 1805,[4] the Peace of Pressburg was concluded. Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, and Tyrol were separated from the empire of Francis I, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor of the French, Napoleon, raised to power. The peace document was signed by Talleyrand on behalf of the French Emperor and by Liechtenstein on behalf of the Austrian Emperor. To commemorate this great event of

[1] I will use the name Pressburg to refer to the city until 1919, when it officially acquired the name Bratislava.

[2] Martin Hrubala, "Podpísanie Bratislavského mieru 27. decembra 1805." *Vojenská história* 10 (2006): 33-34.

[3] "General-Versammlung des Munizipal-Ausschusses der königl. Freistadt Pozsony." *Westungarischer Grenzbote* 34 (7 March 1905), 4.

[4] The text of the Treaty of Pressburg was dated 26 December 1805, however, the treaty was only signed during the early hours of 27 December 1805. For more details see: Hrubala, "Podpísanie," 33-34.

> world history, citizens of Pressburg inserted the commemorative plaque into the wall of this house on the occasion of its 100th anniversary.[5]

Two more plaques made of the same material were added to the wall after the establishment of Czechoslovakia. They contain Slovak and German translations of the original text.[6] The original plaque with the Hungarian inscription was removed after the end of World War II.[7]

Several historical sights in Bratislava are associated with the events of the Franco-Austrian War of 1809, which had a much greater impact on the city compared to the events of 1805. At the beginning of June 1809, the fortified Pressburg's bridgehead became one of the secondary battlefields of the military conflict and Pressburg faced French attempts to take control over the city for almost a month and a half. Pressburg managed to defend itself, however, based on the armistice, the city had to open its gates and endure the consequences of the enemy occupation for more than four months.[8]

The battles for the Pressburg's bridgehead became an inspiration for visual art as evidenced by several graphic arts from the collections of the Bratislava City Gallery. The first one, made around 1810 by an anonymous Austrian engraver, depicts the attack of *Grande Armée* troops on the Pressburg's bridgehead on 3 June 1809.[9] The authors of the second art work are German artists Hanns Veit Schnorr von Carolsfeld and Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld. They portrayed the events of 4 June 1809, from the perspective of defenders of the Pressburg's bridgehead, namely the heroic act of the soldier Joseph Pallasch (also referred to as Palasch) from the Infantry Regiment Beaulieu Nr. 58.[10]

[5] "A pozsonyi béke emlékezete." *Nyugatmagyarországi Hiradó* 18 (7 December 1905), 3; "Die Jahrhundertfeier des Preßburger Friedens." *Preßburger Zeitung* 142 (24 December 1905), 2.

[6] Teofil Macejka, "Z dejín bratislavskej radnice." *Slovák* 25 (26 September 1943), 8.

[7] Ivan Houdek, "Francúzi v Bratislave v rokoch 1805-1809," in *Slavín: historická ročenka Západoslovenského kraja III*, ed. Ladislav Hubenák (Bratislava: Západoslovenská pobočka Slovenskej historickej spoločnosti pri SAV a Krajská skupina spolupracovníkov ÚD KSS pri ZsKV KSS, 1969), 162.

[8] For more details see: Matej Čapo, "The Occupation of Bratislava in 1809." *Napoleonic Scholarship: The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society* 9 (December 2018): 191-208, accessed 6 August 2021; available from http://www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/frameSetAccueil_Eng.htm.

[9] The Bratislava City Gallery (hereafter BCG), unknown author, "Útok francúzskeho vojska na rakúske mostové priekopy pri Bratislave 3. júna 1809," created around 1810, chalcography, inv. No. C 9283, accessed 6 August 2021; available from https://www.webumenia.sk/dielo/SVK:GMB.C_9283. Under the reverse engraving is the inscription "Angriff der Franzosen auf die Oesterreichische Brückenschanze bey Presburg am 3. Juny 1809" ("Attack of the French on the Austrian bridge fortifications at Pressburg on 3 June 1809").

[10] BCG, Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld and Hans Veit Friedrich Schnorr von Carolsfeld, "Boje pred Bratislavou v roku 1809," 1810-1830, aquatint and etching, inv. No. C 8260, accessed 6 August 2021; available from https://www.webumenia.sk/dielo/SVK:GMB.C_8260. Under the graphics is the inscription "Edelmuth des Gemeinen Jos. Pallasch vom 58ten Infanterieregiment Beaulieu im Brückenkopfe bei Presburg am 4ten Juni 1809" ("Heroism of the

We also learn about his brave deed from the history of the regiment. During the battle, the company, in which the Pallasch served, had been withdrawn behind fortifications for men to rest. The officers sat down in a circle when suddenly a grenade landed among them. Pallasch was standing nearby and ignoring the danger, he threw himself at the captain Köller and tried to protect him with his own body. The grenade exploded at that moment. Its shrapnel wounded two officers and several soldiers. Pallasch himself was injured but he was glad that he had saved his commander. He was awarded with a silver medal and three ducats in 1810 for this act.[11]

Another historical object related to the events of 1809 that took place in Pressburg is connected with the Emperor Francis I himself, who was an eyewitness to the firing of the city on the night between 26 and 27 June. Already at the end of June, Francis I provided 10,000 guilders to those inhabitants who had suffered damage.[12] The cite gave him 4,000 guilders in November 1809 to cover the state expenses. The emperor greatly appreciated this gesture considering that the inhabitants of Pressburg had suffered a great deal during the war.[13] Francis I decided to repay the city for the loyalty the inhabitants had shown him during the siege by donating a bust depicting himself. However, he did not manage to carry out this intention himself. This deed was executed by his successor, Emperor Ferdinand V. The bust was made of Carrara marble in the Classicist style by the sculptor Josef Klieber. Although it was created in 1830, it was not handed over to the city until ten years later. The bust was solemnly unveiled on 31 May 1841, in the Council Chamber of the Pressburg's Town Hall in front of many, at that time still living, witnesses of the events of 1809. Guarded by members of the burgher militia, it was opened to the public during the following three days, between 2 and 6 p.m.[14] The bust of Francis I was originally displayed in a niche in the wall opposite the windows of the Town Hall's Council Chamber. After the separation of the Bratislava City Gallery from the Bratislava City Museum in 1959, the bust was detached from the pedestal and became part of the collection of the Bratislava City Gallery. The pedestal with the inscription in gilded letters was kept as a collection object in the Bratislava City Museum. However, it was unworthily stored under the staircase of the Old Town Hall (former Town Hall). After the overhaul of the Primate's Palace, the bust with its original

solder Jos. Pallasch from the Infantry Regiment Beaulieu Nr. 58 at the bridgehead near Pressburg on June 4, 1809").

[11] Joseph Sikora, *Geschichte des kais. königl. österreichischen 58ten Linien-Infanterie-Regiments vom Jahre 1757 bis 6. August 1846* (Lemberg: Peter Piller, 1847), 89 and 100.

[12] Slovak Republic, Bratislava city archives [hereafter BCA], fund Magistrát mesta Bratislavy [hereafter MMB] No. 5, Protocollum magistratuale [hereafter PM] 1809, sign. 2a 75, fol. 190b-191a, No. 1512, 30 June 1809.

[13] *Wiener Zeitung* 107 (6 December 1809), 3397; Slovak Republic, BCA, fund MMB No. 5, PM 1809, sign. 2a 75, fol. 361b, No. 2305, 22 November 1809.

[14] "Ungarn." *Preßburger Zeitung* 77 (4 June 1841), 182.

pedestal, which inscription was reconstructed, was placed in a niche on the first landing of the Primate's Palace's representative staircase leading to the Hall of Mirrors.[15] It is still there today.

An intriguing and currently forgotten reminder of the siege of Pressburg is connected with the commander of the Pressburg's bridgehead, Major General Vinzenz Friedrich Bianchi. According to an article published in the *Preßburger Zeitung* newspaper in 1893, the city decided to express its gratitude to Bianchi, who had been promoted to Lieutenant Field Marshal, by presenting him with a commemorative cup. Since no records were preserved about it in Pressburg, the city asked the then owner to send a photograph of the cup. The article mentions that the owner was the son of Lieutenant Field Marshal Bianchi, Baron Leopold Bianchi, living in the castle of Rubbia. Based on the information provided to me by Baron Federico Bianchi, a direct descendant of Lieutenant Field Marshal Bianchi, it was the nephew of Lieutenant Field Marshal Bianchi, Leonhard, who bought the castle around 1880. The above-mentioned article points out that the requested photograph was sent to the city but was not published. The article further states that the cup was made of cut crystal glass, which shows that the city could not afford to have the cup made of precious metals. The firing of Pressburg was depicted on the cup. An unknown artist captured the city with towers of its churches, Pressburg castle, and a row of houses on the embankment, with shells falling in wide arcs from the opposite bank of the Danube. Below this portrayal was an unspecified inscription paying tribute.[16] According to Baron Federico Bianchi, the cup most likely ended up in the ruins of the Rubbia Castle, which was destroyed by artillery bombardment during World War I. Interestingly, a similar glass cup with a portrayal of the siege of Pressburg was donated by Ignatz von Vegh to the Hungarian National Museum in Pest in 1813. It was made in 1811 by the Pressburg's glassmaker Joseph Riegele and cost 30 ducats.[17] Richard Bright, who visited the Hungarian National Museum in Pest in 1814, also mentioned this exhibit in his travelogue.[18] The further fate of this cup is unknown. Based on the information provided to me by the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest, the cup is currently not among the collections of this museum.

It is a little-known fact that a part of the former Pressburg street Mühlauergasse in the direction of the winter harbor bore the

[15] Štefan Holčík, "Podstavec busty cisára bol pod schodiskom," accessed 6 August 2021; available from https://www.bratislavskenoviny.sk/historia/5610-podstavec-busty-cisara-bol-pod-schodiskom.

[16] "Der Bianchi-Becher." *Preßburger Zeitung* 130 (19 December 1893), 2.

[17] "Neue Nachrichten über den gegenwärtigen Zustand des ungrischen National-Museums zu Pest." *Vaterländische Blätter für österreichischen Kaiserstaat* 6 (15 December 1813), 597.

[18] Richard Bright, *Travels from Vienna through Lower Hungary. With Some Remarks on the State of Vienna during the Congress in the Year 1814* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1818), 216.

German name Bianchi-Gasse, in Hungarian Bianchi Frigyes-utca since 1904 in Bianchi's honor.[19] After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, the street was renamed to Chalupkova Street after the Slovak poet Samo Chalupka and it still bears this name today. Another reminder of the military events of 1809 in Pressburg is a small tin keg in the collections of the Bratislava City Museum, which is part of the exposition of the Museum of Viticulture in the Apponyi Palace. The keg, measuring 20×20×30 centimeters, is decorated with engraved German texts on the front and back. A removable statue of Bacchus, the god of wine, 32 centimeters high is placed on the keg. It is made of carved polychromed and gilded wood. On his head and around his waist is a gilded laurel wreath symbolizing victory. On the keg, an unknown chronicler briefly recorded the most important events that took place in and around Pressburg between June and November 1809. As there is also a reference to the fire that destroyed Pressburg castle and many houses below the castle in 1811, it can be concluded that the keg was made that year at the earliest.[20]

Another historical object connected with the military events of 1809 is the Chapel of the Holy Cross in Starý háj (then Alte Au) in Petržalka. Its history is linked to the great flood that affected Pressburg and its surroundings in January 1809. The water also brought with it a wooden cross, which got caught among the trees in Alte Au. Local citizens put up and re-consecrated the cross on this spot. The original cross was replaced by a new one in 1844, which was replaced by a stone cross a quarter of a century later. The Feast of the Holy Cross was held here regularly, with more and more people attending each year.[21] This gave rise to an idea to build a chapel on this site. It was built on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the events of 1809 to commemorate the victims of the flood, the war, and the epidemic.[22]

The events that took place in 1809 in Pressburg and its surroundings also became a subject for modern art. This is evidenced by a bronze statue made by the academic sculptor Juraj Meliš placed in July 1997 on the Main Square in Bratislava in front of the building of the French Embassy. It is often referred to as a "statue of a Napoleonic soldier", however, it is more reminiscent of the Emperor Napoleon himself. The siege of Pressburg also became an inspiration for a large graffiti painting

[19] "Straßenbenennungen." *Preßburger Zeitung* 141 (24 January 1904), 3.

[20] Zuzana Francová, "Unikátna pamiatka na vojnové udalosti z roku 1809 v Prešporku," accessed 6 August 2021; available from https://bratislavskerozky.sk/unikatna-pamiatka-na-vojnove-udalosti-z-roku-1809-v-presporku/.

[21] See "Die Kreuzeinweihungs-Erinnerungsfeier." *Preßburger Zeitung* 125 (25 June 1888), 2.

[22] Jozef Horváth, *Rozpomienka na povstanie oslavy sv. Kríža v Starom lesíku v Bratislave* (Bratislava: Karol Angermayer, 1925), 16; Matej Čapo, "Aký príbeh ukrýva Kaplnka sv. Kríža v Starom háji?." *Petržalské noviny* 25 (5 July 2019), 11.

entitled "Napoleon conquers Bratislava (1809)". It was made in 2012 by the painter Michal Turkovič and is placed on the wall of the transformation station on Gessayova Street in Petržalka.

Remains of military fortifications on the territory of present-day Petržalka

The relics of the system of defensive fortifications remind us to this day the battles for the Pressburg's bridgehead, which took place in 1809 on the territory of today's Petržalka. Only part of the original fortification system has been preserved. Some of the fortifications, which were located near the Danube, were destroyed by lateral erosion of the watercourse and were washed away by the river. Others have succumbed to urban development or road construction. The preserved remains of military fortifications include the rampart bordering Janko Kráľ City Park, redoubt in Pečniansky les, and redoubt near the Vienna Road.

The rampart surrounding Janko Kráľ City Park has been preserved fully on the eastern side for about 400 meters; on the southern side, it has been preserved only in some places. A large part of the rampart was destroyed during the construction of the Aupark shopping center and the adjacent parking area. Its remains are visible only as an elevation about one meter high.[23] It is currently commemorated by two memorial plaques, on which it is referred to as the so-called Anti-Napoleonic wall.[24] However, several sources I have collected show that the military fortification was destroyed in 1809 during the occupation of Pressburg. Napoleon himself wanted the rampart to be removed. On 20 July 1809, shortly after beginning of the occupation of the city, Napoleon addressed a letter to Marshal Louis Alexandre Berthier, in which he stated: "Order General Bertrand to send two officers of engineers and a squad of sappers to General Reynier at Pressburg; he will use them in destroying all the Austrian works on the right bank."[25] On 28 June he sent him another letter. He requested General Reynier to inform him whether "the bridgehead built by the enemy on the right bank was completely destroyed."[26] We also learn about the removal of the rampart from the *Preßburger Zeitung* newspaper which states that the extensive fortification built by Austrian troops on the opposite bank of the Danube between the village Engerau (the area of today's Petržalka) and Pressburg are completely demolished.[27]

[23] Romana Lompartová, "Terénne relikty vojenských aktivít napoleonského ťaženia v roku 1809" (Bachelor's thesis, Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2017), 36.

[24] See also Viera Obuchová, *Príbehy z dejín Bratislavy* (Bratislava: Albert Marenčin Vydavateľstvo PT, 2013), 165-69.

[25] Bonaparte to Louis Alexandre Berthier, 20 July 1809, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Unpublished correspondence of Napoleon I. Preserved in the War archives. Volume III, 1809, 1810* (New York: Duffield & Company, 1913), No. 3334, 132.

[26] Bonaparte to Louis Alexandre Berthier, 28 July 1809, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Dernières lettres inédites de Napoléon Ier* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1903), No. 928, I, 427.

[27] *Preßburger Zeitung* 45 (28 July 1809), 583.

Interestingly, the British newspaper *The London Chronicle* published a similar report, which had a rather local significance.[28] Another contemporary source shows that the cost of destroying the fortifications was 914 guilders.[29] Works of Stefan Rakovszky[30] and Oľga Wagnerová[31] also mention its destruction. According to Ivan Houdek,[32] the entire bridgehead of Pressburg was razed to the ground by the French so that no trace of it remains.

According to other sources, the rampart that surrounds Janko Kráľ City Park does not date back to 1809, but it was built at the beginning of October 1848 to defend Pressburg, which was then in the power of the Hungarian supporters of the revolution, against the Croatian army led by Ban Josip Jelačić. For this reason, the construction of a new fortification started on the site of the rampart from 1809. Cannons were deployed on the rampart and the anti-flood embankments were reinforced. On 7 October 1848 Ban Jelačić announced to the Pressburg magistrate his intention to enter Pressburg.[33] Despite the fact that he even threatened to bomb the city, he did not endanger it in the end and moved on to Vienna. The courage shown by the inhabitants of Pressburg at that time was compared by the contemporary press to the bravery with which their predecessors had defended the city in 1809.[34]

According to the plans from the first half of the 19th century mapping the area on which Janko Kráľ City Park is currently located, the fortification that was located here was probably not destroyed without a trace in 1809. Even though the ditch was probably buried, the line of the rampart, although disturbed in places, has been preserved to some extent, as evidenced by its delineation by cartographers. The rampart line could have served as a basis for the construction of a new fortification in 1848, the remains of which can still be found here today. As far as the redoubt in Pečniansky les is concerned, archaeological research was carried out on this site in the years 2015-2016. Based on the material findings, namely coins, bullets from firearms, a button from an Austrian uniform, or a French buckle, it can be concluded that the building of the fortification is directly connected to the

[28] It states: "All the redoubts which the Austrians had thrown up on the right bank of the Danube, between Engeneau [correctly should be "Engerau" – author's note] *and Presburg, have been rased*." *The London Chronicle* 106 (1 August 1809), 210.

[29] András Krisch, "Francia megszállás Magyarország szabad királyi városaiban 1809" (PhD diss., Pécsi Tudományegyetem, 2009), 238.

[30] Stefan Rakovszky, *Geschichtliches über Presburg* ([s.l.]: [s.n.], around 1900), 47.

[31] Oľga Wagnerová, "Bratislava a ťaženie 1809," in *Zbierka Europa. Výstavba miest–národné hospodárstvo. Československá republika. Bratislava* (Berlin: Vydavateľstvo Dari, 1928), 23.

[32] Houdek, "Francúzi," 169.

[33] Emil Kumlik, *Pozsony und der Freiheitskampf 1848/49* (Pozsony-Budapest: Karl Stampfel's Kommissionsverlag, 1905), 21.

[34] "Locales." *Preßburger Zeitung* 84 (10 October 1848), 564.

siege of Pressburg in 1809.[35] The redoubt located on the Vienna Road was a part of a line of six redoubts enclosing the village of Engerau from the south side and is the only one of them that has been preserved to the present day. Compared to the rampart enclosing Janko Kráľ City Park and the redoubt in Pečnianský les, this redoubt is in the worst condition.[36]

Napoleon's stone and Napoleon's poplar

During the occupation of Pressburg in 1809, the city was visited by the Emperor Napoleon himself on 31 August. According to several contemporary sources, he stayed here only briefly. He inspected the Pressburg Castle and the camp of the occupying Saxon troops. According to tradition, he was supposed to rest for a while at the foot of the hill called Eselberg (now Somársky vrch), which offered a good view of the wide surrounding area. The name Eselberg derives from the fact that donkeys used to graze here. They used to carry drinking water in leather bags from nearby springs to the Pressburg Castle.[37] A stone prism was set on the side top of Eselberg, bordered by today's Riznerova, Radvanská, and Medzierka Streets, which was originally called Haubnerberg, sometime after 1809. It became known as the Napoleon's stone. According to tradition, the regular four-sided stone prism with a slightly pyramidal shape topped with a small iron tip was supposed to commemorate Napoleon's presence on Haubnerberg, which became known as Napoleon's Hill. On all the sidewalls of the sandstone prism in shades of yellow, the initials "N. Q." were carved, which in Latin were supposed to mean "Napoleon quiescebat," translated as "Napoleon rested".

According to the Pressburg archivist Johann Batka, a cadastral map from 1850 is probably the oldest document mentioning this stone, on which it was marked as Haubner-Berg-Pyramide.[38] In this context, the opinion presented by the historian Emil Kumlik can be mentioned that the stone was placed on this site for the purpose of cadastral surveying.[39] According to another opinion, it was supposed to be a memorial stone of an evangelical priest of Slovak origin, Paul Rázga, who was a supporter of the reform movement of the Hungarian liberal middle nobility led by Lajos Kossuth. After the outbreak of the revolution in Hungary in March 1848, he agitated in its favor, which he continued to

[35] For more details see Jozef Kováč, "Valové opevnenie z obdobia napoleonských vojen na lokalite Pečniansky les v bratislavskej Petržalke," in *Fortifikačné systémy na území Bratislavy (od praveku po 2. svetovú vojnu). Zborník príspevkov zo symposia* (Bratislava: Mestský ústav ochrany pamiatok, 2019), 276-84.

[36] Lompartová, "Terénne relikty," 38-39.

[37] Ivan Houdek, "Napoleon v Bratislave v roku 1809," in *Bratislava: zborník múzea mesta Bratislavy*, ed. František Kalesný (Martin: Osveta, 1970), 393-94; Svetozár Krno, "Napoleon v Bratislave." *Krásy Slovenska* 68 (1991): 11; Ján Houdek, "Napoleonovo neslávne víťazstvo." *Historická revue* 12 (2001, No. 8): 18.

[38] Johann Batka, "Kaiser Napoleon I. in Preßburg." *Preßburger Zeitung* 146 (31 August 1909), 3.

[39] Emil Kumlik, "Franciák Pozsonyban." *Hiradó* 32 (31 August 1919), 3.

do after the occupation of Pressburg by the imperial army in December of that year. Rázga was imprisoned and sentenced to death by hanging for his involvement in the revolution. He was executed on 18 June 1849, on Somárský vrch.[40] Whatever the truth may be, the stone can no longer be found on its spot. The news of its disappearance was reported by the *Večerník* newspaper in 1958 and the public was invited to search for this historical sight.[41] However, it did not bring the desired success and the further fate of the stone remained shrouded in mystery.

The character of Napoleon's Hill itself changed in the following period. On its site, a large multifunctional house Bonaparte was built. Nevertheless, there is still a vivid reminder of the events of 1809. According to the legend, three oak trees were planted here to commemorate Napoleon's visit. Nowadays, only one of them can still be found at the foot of Napoleon's Hill. An old, widespread tree with a trunk circumference of about 2.5 meters undoubtedly deserves more attention, given the history to which it is linked. According to tradition, Napoleon was supposed to stop for a while on the right bank of the Danube on the territory of today's Petržalka after he departed from Pressburg and observe the city from under the crown of a large poplar. The tree, which used to stand on today's Tyršovo nábrežie near the port of the former Propeler ship, later became known as the Napoleon's poplar.

The tree must have been rather old already in 1809, which is evidenced by the fact that in the 1920s, the trunk had a diameter of about 2.5 meters. The circumference of the trunk must have been approximately 7.8 meters.[42] According to the *Preßburger Zeitung* newspaper from 1927, the health state of the poplar, which had been damaged by numerous storms, was poor. According to Klima, the head city gardener, the lifetime of the decaying tree could have been extended by sealing it. However, there was a lack of financial resources.[43] A sum of CSK 7,000 was needed, and which was eventually obtained in 1928. The Monuments Board made a contribution of CSK 1,000.[44] The trunk of the poplar tree was reinforced from the outside with an iron hoop.[45] Czechoslovak politician, journalist, and writer Bohuslav (Bohuš) Chňoupek recorded an interesting memory of the Napoleon's poplar in his book, but he mistakenly described it as an oak tree:

[40] Viera Obuchová and Štefan Holčík, *Cintorín pri Kozej bráne* (Bratislava: Albert Marenčin Vydavateľstvo PT, 2006), 52.

[41] "Hľadáme Napoleonov kameň." *Večerník* 3 (1 November 1958), 4.

[42] "Napoleonov topoľ." *Slovenský denník* 11 (15 August 1928), 4.

[43] "Vom Auparke." *Preßburger Zeitung* 164 (30 May 1927), 2.

[44] "Napoleonov strom v Bratislave bude plombovaný." *Slovenský denník* 11 (14 December 1928), 3; "Neue Parkanlagen in Preßburg." *Preßburger Zeitung* 165 (14 December 1928), 3.

[45] Jaroslav Gustafík, *Spomienky Staropetržalčana. 1. vydanie* (Bratislava: MÚ MČ Bratislava-Petržalka, 2000), 174.

> We spent our childhood playing under the tree, teasing each other in its shadow and placing bets on how many of us, eight or ten, could embrace it. That's why I knew every wrinkle in its old bark, every screw in the iron hoop that tightened it, even the cement patches that filled its decaying inside. [...] It is not known whether he [Napoleon – author's note] made any remarks under the oak during his memorable visit. Over the years, a legend spread around this period, according to which he not only delivered a speech at this very place, but also promoted officers, and people would go as far as to assume that he also had breakfast in the grass. Every citizen was familiar with the Napoleon's oak. The tree was so famous that lovers met by it, mothers brought their children there and teachers their pupils. Even Hitler looked at Bratislava from beneath the branches of the Napoleon's oak in the corresponding pose with binoculars in front of his eyes, as evidenced by the photographs taken at that time, when he visited the occupied right bank after the Munich Agreement. Our French professor was also familiar with the history of this tree. [...] I recall with deep emotion how passionately he demonstrated his pedagogical talent under the crown of this unique botanical specimen....[46]

A report was published in the press in 1935 that the Napoleon's poplar had been uprooted by the wind.[47] Despite efforts to save it, the tree gradually rotted away. As can be seen from a unique photograph from the private collection of Anton Šmotlák Jr., only the torso of the tree stood on its original location in July 1955. In 1958, in the "Critical Camera" section of the *Večerník* newspaper, a question appeared as to how long the Petržalka's bank would have to tolerate the concrete filling and the iron hoop of the former Napoleon's poplar.[48] Shortly afterwards, another report was published in the newspaper of the same name in the "Echoes" section that the matter had been rectified when on 17 June 1958, the concrete filling and the iron hoop were finally removed as part of the action "Z."[49] In this context, it may be noted that it is possible to find incorrect information in the literature that the removal took place in the 1960s or even 1970s. As a matter of interest, the torso of one more memorial tree associated with the year 1809 can still be found in Janko Kráľ' City Park. It is an old yew tree (Taxus baccata L.) and only its dry trunk has been preserved to this day. The trunk with a circumference of approximately 2.4 meters stands not far from the statue of the poet

[46] Bohuš Chňoupek, *Lámanie pečatí* (Bratislava: Smena, 1984), 10-11.

[47] "7 dní." *Slovenský denník* 18 (13 January 1935), 6.

[48] "Kritická kamera." *Večerník* 3 (26 May 1958), 2.

[49] "Ozveny." *Večerník* 3 (25 June 1958), 2.

Janko Kraľ situated in the center of the park. It is believed that the top of this tree was shot down during the battles for the Pressburg's bridgehead.[50]

Cannonballs in the building walls

The military events of the Franco-Austrian War in 1809 are still commemorated in Bratislava by cannonballs of various calibers. They were embedded in the walls of several buildings and were called "wall nipples" by the inhabitants in the past.[51] Some of them still exist today, others were removed during the reconstruction of buildings over the past years or disappeared during the demolition of buildings.

Probably the most famous of the preserved cannonballs is located in the front wall of the first floor of the Old Town Hall on the Main Square No. 1. The second cannonball has been embedded in the wall of the Apponyi Palace at Radničná Street No. 1. Two cannonballs are located in the courtyard of the Franciscan Monastery on the Franciscan Square No. 1. The fifth cannonball has been built into the supporting pillar of the house on the Franciscan Square No. 9. The sixth cannonball is located in the wall of the townhouse on Zámočnícká Street No. 3. Other four cannonballs are located on Michalská Street. The first one is located in the courtyard of the Jesenák's Palace on Michalská Street No. 3, the second one in the front wall of the townhouse on Michalská Street No. 5, the third one in the wall of the townhouse on Michalská Street No. 6 and the fourth one in the gate area of the townhouse on Michalská Street No. 12. Another cannonball has been planted in the facade of the rental townhouse on Sedlárska Street No. 1. The twelfth cannonball is located above the entrance to the residential building on Beblavého Street No. 12. The thirteenth cannonball is located in the wall of the Monastery of the Merciful Brothers on the SNP (Slovak National Uprising) Square No. 10. The fourteenth cannonball is inconspicuously hidden under the plaster on the left side of the portal at the exit from the baroque Esterházy Palace on Panská Street No. 13.

The second group is represented by cannonballs, which were placed in the walls of some buildings that are still standing today. Based on the preserved sources, I have managed to document 9 such cannonballs, which were removed e.g., during the reconstruction of buildings and their fate is unknown. A separate category is represented by cannonballs, which were placed on buildings that no longer exist today. Their fate is equally unknown. In this case, I was able to document 10 cannonballs (12 based on other sources). As can be seen from the above, there were at least 33 (or 35) cannonballs in the walls of the buildings commemorating the military events of 1809. The total number of

[50] Štefan Borovský and Pavel Šimkovic, "Petržalský park." *Ochranca prírody a pamiatok* 4 (1964, No. 12): 5.

[51] Vlado Plicka, "Keď napoleonské vojská bombardovaly Bratislavu." *Slovák* 26 (26 March 1944), 9.

cannonballs was probably higher due to reconstructions, building renovations, and demolitions.

Historical sources prove that remains of munition from the Franco-Austrian War of 1809 could have been found in Pressburg and its surroundings even many years after the end of the war. In October 1895, excavation work was carried out in the courtyard of house No. 57 on Schloßgrundgasse for the purpose of building a sewerage system. During the work, workers found a large piece of a bomb that had exploded on the site during the bombardment of the city in 1809. The innkeeper Josef Csurka, who had the sewage system built, gave this fragment to the City Museum in Pressburg.[52]

Graves of French soldiers

The fights for the Pressburg's bridgehead in 1809 resulted in many casualties and wounded on both sides. The wounded from the Austrian side were treated in Pressburg. In contrast, wounded members of the *Grande Armée* were transported to the main camp in Kittsee. The fallen soldiers of the Austrian army were apparently buried in the old military cemetery in Pressburg, which was located on today's Miletičova Street.[53] The state of the enemy army, whose losses might have amounted to about 1,500 men,[54] was probably more complicated in this matter. The diary of an anonymous Franciscan priest reveals that at first, the fallen soldiers of the *Grande Armée* were transported to the surrounding villages and many also found their graves in the waters of the Danube.[55] Several French soldiers were also buried at the places where they died.

Based on preserved sources it can be stated that there were several anonymous graves of French soldiers in the territory of today's Petržalka,[56] but only one of them can be

[52] "Ein Fund." *Preßburger Zeitung* 132 (16 October 1895), 3.

[53] Alojz Vyčislík, *Vojenské pamiatky Bratislavy* (Bratislava: Obzor, 1974), 99.

[54] Dušan Špirko and Miroslav Lupták, "Obrana bratislavského predmostia vo francúzsko-rakúskej vojne v roku 1809." *Vojenská história* 6 (2002, No. 1): 23.

[55] Florenc Hutár, "Napoleon oblieha Bratislavu." *Františkánsky obzor* 4 (1938, No. 3-4): 127.

[56] This is evidenced by several cases. Skeletal remains belonging to a French soldier who died in 1809 were found as part of construction works near today's Janko Kráľ City Park in 1925 ("Ein Skelettfund in Engerau." *Preßburger Zeitung* 162 (20 February 1925), 3; "Csontvázat találtak Ligetfalun." *Hiradó* 38 (21 February 1925), 3). In November 1927, skeletal remains of five more *Grande Armée* soldiers who had died in 1809 were found at a depth of 80 centimeters on the site of the former Karl Marx Street. Their memory was subsequently commemorated by a wooden cross. The grave was later removed as part of landscaping ("Kostry napoleonských vojakov v Bratislave." *Slovenský denník* 10 (18 November 1927), 4; "Skelettfund." *Preßburger Zeitung* 164 (18 November 1927), 4; "Csontvázlelet Ligetfalun." *Hiradó* 40 (18 November 1927), 3; "Kostry v Bratislave z doby francúzskej vojny." *Slovák* 9 (19 November 1927), 4; Jaroslav Gustafík, *Spomienky Staropetržalčana. 2. vydanie* (Bratislava: Albert Marenčin Vydavateľstvo PT, 2017), 14; Karl Rudolf, *Engerau 1225 – 1946. Zur Erinnerung an einen vergangenen Ort* (Freistadt: Ing. Plöchl, 1988), 36). The remains of a French soldier who died in 1809 were discovered during construction works on the site of the former Hurbanova Street in 1931 ("Ein Franzosengrab in Engerau freigelegt." *Neues Preßburger Tagblatt* 2 (21 March

considered a historical sight. Historical writings independently mention a grave of a French soldier[57] and a grave of five French soldiers,[58] about which there was almost no information known. In fact, it was the very same place and the two graves were linked. The original grave of the French soldier was located in the vicinity of the present-day site of Pri Seči,[59] which was part of the island Stadt Grund during the period under study. According to tradition, the inhabitants found the body of a French soldier on this spot while removing the fortifications after the end of the fighting for the Pressburg's bridgehead. His identity could not be determined. However, from the notes he had with him, it was possible to deduce that he was from the Nancy area. The soldier was buried with dignity on this spot and the grave was marked by a wooden cross with a French inscription: "Ici gît un guerrier de la Grande Armée française, 1809" ("Here lies a soldier of the French Grande Armée, 1809").[60] The grave was restored in the 1880s. Senior Lieutenant Johann Göpfert was responsible for this. He planted a new wooden cross with a commemorative iron plaque with a German inscription: "Hier ruht ein französischer Krieger aus dem Jahre 1809" ("Here rests a French soldier from 1809"). According to the contemporary press, the memorial site was always well-tended, decorated with flowers, and lit with candle flames on the All Souls' Day.[61]

After the declaration of Czechoslovakia, diplomatic negotiations in Paris resulted in Petržalka also becoming a part of the newly established republic. Czechoslovak troops under the command of French Lieutenant Colonel Jean Pierre Brau occupied the territory of Petržalka in the early hours of 14 August 1919, according to a plan drawn up by the French commander of the Western Army Group in Bratislava, General Eugène Mittelhauser.[62] The changes also affected the grave of the French soldier, which was, due to close Czechoslovak-French relations, brought to the attention of the French Military Mission, in whose environment there was a strong Napoleonic cult. Given the absence of mutual Czechoslovak-French contacts in the past, the period of the Napoleonic Wars proved to be an important turning point. The grave of the French soldier, which cross was inscribed with a new Slovak inscription "Francúzsky vojak, 1809" ("French

1931), 4). The remains of French soldiers were also found in Petržalka in July 1935 ("Kostry napoleonských vojakov." *Slovenský denník* 18 (27 July 1935), 3).

[57] Ješek Hoffmann and Klement Ptačovský, *Bratislava s okolím a Malé Karpaty* (Praha: Dr. K. Dvořák, 1922), 20; Houdek, "Napoleon," 393; Pavel Dvořák, *Štvrtá kniha o Bratislave* (Budmerice: Rak Budmerice, 2011), 173-75.

[58] Vyčislík, *Vojenské pamiatky*, 100; Chňoupek, *Lámanie*, 12; Obuchová, *Príbehy*, 168.

[59] The name of this location is said to be connected with the fierce battles that took place here in 1809 between the defenders of Pressburg and the *Grande Armée* troops. Gustafík, *Spomienky. 2. vydanie*, 13-14.

[60] Kumlik, "Franciák," 3.

[61] "Das 'Franzosengrab'." *Westungarischer Grenzbote* 14, (4 November 1885), 4.

[62] "Bratislavské predmostie sme obsadili!." *Slovenský denník* 2 (15 August 1919), 1.

soldier, 1809"), played a significant role in this respect.

Two skulls, skeletal remains as well as remnants of uniforms and weapons were found on 14 April 1922, on the right bank of the Danube, near the Windisch arm of the river, during works associated with the blasting of trees.[63] They were found to belong to four soldiers of the *Grande Armée* who died in 1809. The provincial military commander in Bratislava, General Claude Spiré, proposed that the remains should be placed in a grave from 1809 and the city agreed to that. The ceremony was scheduled for 18 May 1922, when representatives of Paris were to visit Bratislava. In the morning hours of that day, the members of the delegation, consisting of César Caire, the President of the Paris City Council, Louis Delsol, the Vice-President of the Paris City Council, Léon Riotor and Jules Raffignon, members of the Paris City Council, and René Weiss, the Secretary of the Paris City Council, were welcomed to the city by Martin Mičura, the Minister plenipotentiary for the Administration of Slovakia, Matej Metod Bella, the Mayor of Bratislava, and General Spiré, together with other military and civilian officials.[64] After the tour of the city, the members of the delegation were transported to the opposite shore of the Danube to attend the military ceremony. General Spiré, in the presence of Bella, the Mayor of Bratislava, Josef Lederer and August Krendel, representatives of Bratislava, Ovidius Faust, the curator of the City Museum in Bratislava, officers of the French Military Mission, officers of the Czechoslovak Army, and representatives of Paris, deposited the common coffin[65] with the remains of the four French soldiers in the open grave from 1809 at 11 a.m. A cross, common to both graves, was placed on this site, bearing French and Slovak inscriptions: "Ici reposent cinq soldats français tombés en 1809" / "Tu odpočívajú piati francúzski vojaci padlí r. 1809" ("Here rest five French soldiers who died in 1809"). The grave was consecrated by a military priest and volleys were fired in honor of the fallen soldiers.

General Spiré recalled in his speech the fierce battles that took place in 1809 in front of Pressburg and the glory of the *Grande Armée*. He then emphasized the bravery and heroism of five unknown French soldiers. He called for their memory to be honored, as well as the memory of other French soldiers who died during the Napoleonic Wars and are buried in unknown places.[66] The President of the Paris City Council, Caire, laid a bouquet of flowers on the grave on behalf of Paris. He

[63] "Beerdigung der französischen Soldaten." *Preßburger Tagblatt* 27 (19 May 1922), 1.

[64] "Zástupci mesta Paríža v Bratislave." *Slovenský denník* 5 (19 May 1922), 2. For further details: "Páris város delegációjának látogatása." *Hiradó* 35 (19 May 1922), 3-4.

[65] "Pařížští hosté v Bratislavě." *Moravská orlice* 60 (20 May 1922), 2. For further details: "Zástupci města Paříže v Bratislavě." *Lidové noviny* 30 (19 May 1922), 4.

[66] *Les représentants de Paris en Tchécoslovaquie. À Prague, Tábor et Bratislava* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1923), 64.

praised the Czechoslovak-French alliance and paid tribute to the memory of the French soldiers.

In connection with the grave of five French soldiers, valuable documents have been preserved in the form of letters from French officials, which are deposited in the *Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes* in France. Only two days after the funeral, Captain Joseph Pendariès sent a letter from Prague to General Spiré expressing the enthusiasm of the members of the Paris delegation for the military ceremony.[67] On 12 June 1922, General Spiré sent a letter to the commander of the French Military Mission in Prague, who at that time was General Mittelhauser. Enclosed was a copy of the protocol for the burial of the remains of the French soldiers. General Spiré also attached a design proposal of a monument to be placed there and a 1:10,000 scale map sketch on which the grave was marked. The cost was estimated at CSK 3,500 and military manpower was to be used as well. General Spiré also inquired about the possibility of providing a subsidy for the construction of the monument.[68]

The French ambassador in Prague, Fernand Couget, addressed a letter to the *Souvenir français* company in Paris, which took care of military graves abroad. He presented General Spiré's plan to erect the monument to five French soldiers in Petržalka, the design of which he enclosed together with an estimate of the cost of CSK 3,500, which amounted to approximately 750 francs.[69] In a short time, he sent a letter to General Mittelhauser informing him that the sum of CSK 3,500 could be provided from the funds of the *Service d'Information*.[70]

The cross on the grave of five French soldiers in Petržalka was soon replaced by a monument consisting of a low pedestal on which stood a higher rectangular cube.[71] A white marble plaque was placed on the front, on which an inscription in French and Slovak was carved in golden letters: "Ici reposent les ossements de cinq soldats français tombés glorieusement en ces lieux dans les combats de juin 1809" / "Tu odpočívajú telesné pozostatky piatich francúzskych vojakov padlých slávne v tomto kraji v júnových bojoch r. 1809" ("Here rest the remains of five French soldiers who fell gloriously in this region in the battles of June 1809"). According to Gustafík, the monument stood about 200 meters from Starý most (the Old Bridge) in

[67] Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter CADN), fund Prague, Services culturels, Supplément, 1886 – 1954, Box 34, sign. 548PO/1/34, fol. 3.

[68] CADN, fund Prague, Services culturels, Supplément, 1886 – 1954, Box 11, sign. 548PO/1/11, fol. 1-3.

[69] CADN, fund Prague, Services culturels, Supplément, 1886 – 1954, Box 11, sign. 548PO/1/11, fol. 4-5.

[70] CADN, fund Prague, Services culturels, Supplément, 1886 – 1954, Box 11, sign. 548PO/1/11, fol. 7.

[71] Viera Obuchová, "Evidenčný list pamätihodnosti mesta Bratislavy BA–VI.–A.3," accessed 6 August 2021; available from http://muop.bratislava.sk/assets/File.ashx?id_org=600176&id_dokumenty=4021.

the direction of the former Lido swimming pool.[72]

In the following period, the grave received considerable attention from Czechoslovak and French officials. French Marshal Ferdinand Foch visited Bratislava in May 1923. He also visited Petržalka and, on behalf of France, laid a large wreath to honor the memory of five French soldiers.[73] Two years later, French General Henri Gouraud arrived in Bratislava and visited the grave of five French soldiers.[74] The French consul Charles-Albert-Henri-Édouard Tamburini visited the grave in November 1928 and honored the memory of the fallen soldiers with a bouquet of flowers.[75]

The grave of five French soldiers became known to the inhabitants of Bratislava and became a frequently visited place.[76] The commemoration of the memory of the fallen French soldiers persisted in the 1930s, which was of great importance for the development of the Napoleonic tradition in Czechoslovakia. On 1 November 1932, the French consul Tamburini laid a wreath on the grave of five French soldiers.[77] Léon Noël, the French ambassador in Prague, arrived in Slovakia in June 1933. As part of his trip, he also visited Bratislava and laid a wreath on the grave of five French soldiers in Petržalka.[78] A wreath-laying ceremony was also held at this site on 2 November 1933. Besides the French consul Tamburini, it was attended by Štefan Janšák, the chairman of the organization *Alliance Française*, Léon Chollet, the French language lecturer at Comenius University in Bratislava, and the editor Édouard Dulac.[79] A wreath was laid on the grave by the French consul Henri Billecocq on 1 November 1934.[80] The memory of the fallen French soldiers was also honored the following year.[81] A commemoration was also held at the grave in June 1936. Representatives of the *Alliance française* also participated.[82] Probably the last commemoration of the fallen French soldiers took place in 1937 in connection

[72] Gustafík, *Spomienky. 2. vydanie*, 14.

[73] "Francia po boku Československa. Maršal Foch v Bratislave." *Slovenský denník* 6 (19 May 1923), 3; "Svetový víťaz opustil Bratislavu." *Slovák* 5 (20 May 1923), 2; "Odjezd maršála Focha z republiky." *Venkov* 18 (18 May 1923), 6.

[74] "Jednoruký hrdina v Bratislave. Návšteva generála Gourauda u nás." *Slovenský denník* 8 (27 August 1925), 2.

[75] "Francúzsky konzul v Bratislave." *Slovenský denník* 11 (4 November 1928), 4; "Der französische Konsul in Preßburg." *Preßburger Zeitung* 165 (4 November 1928), 3.

[76] "Noví Bratislavčania." *Slovenský denník* 11 (8 August 1928), 3.

[77] "Uctenie pamiatky mrtvých vojakov." *Slovenský denník* 15 (3 November 1932), 3; "Francúzsky konzul v Bratislave." *Slovák* 14 (3 November 1932), 5.

[78] "Francouzský vyslanec na západním Slovensku." *Národní listy* 73 (7 June 1933), 3; "Francouzský vyslanec v Praze Leon Noël." *Lidové noviny* 41 (7 June 1933), 5.

[79] "Vojenské oslavy u hrobov padlých vojakov." *Slovenský denník* 16 (3 November 1933), 2.

[80] "Francúzsky konzul v Bratislave." *Slovenský denník* 17 (4 November 1934), 4.

[81] "Uctenie pamiatky Napoleonových vojakov v Petržalke." *Slovenský denník* 18 (3 November 1935), 3.

[82] "Alliance française de Bratislava." *Slovák* 18 (7 June 1936), 5; "Mestská rada." *Zprávy mesta Bratislavy* 13 (8 June 1936), 394.

with the visit of the French ambassador Victor de Lacroix.[83] Interestingly, on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the siege of Pressburg, a celebration was about to be prepared in Bratislava, but in the end, it did not take place due to the development of political events.[84]

Based on the Munich Agreement, Petržalka was annexed by the German Reich in October 1938. Less than a year later, World War II broke out and the grave of five French soldiers ceased to receive attention. Since the Hungarian-Slovak armed conflict in March 1939, direct war events had avoided the Slovak territory. The situation changed in June 1944, when Bratislava itself felt the hardships of the war. The bombing of the Apollo refinery and other strategic targets by the US Air Force on 16 June 1944, also hit Petržalka. It proved to be fatal for the grave of five French soldiers which, according to Gustafík, took a direct hit. As this memorial has not been restored in any form, the exact location of the grave has gradually been forgotten.

Revived history of the battles at Pressburg

The military events of 1809 have been commemorated in Bratislava for years through "historical reenactment". This phenomenon is very popular with the public. The most frequently reenacted are military events and within them individual fights and battles. The idea is to recreate various historical periods and events in costumes or uniforms, with weapons and other daily essentials of military life appropriate to the time.[85] During the past decade, reenactments have emerged as a vital trend in popular as well as scholarly forms of historical representation. It has begun to make its way into historiography as a new concept in the understanding of the past.[86]

The era of the Napoleonic Wars is undoubtedly one of the most widely reenacted historical periods. Various societies and associations from several countries are involved in reenactments of specific fights and battles. *Slovenská spoločnosť vojenskej histórie a strelcov z historických zbraní* (Slovak Society of Military History and Historical Firearms Shooters) joined them in 1993.[87] It decided to renew the tradition of the Infantry Regiment Nr. 2 of the Austrian Army, whose recruiting districts were the Pressburg, Neutra (Nitra), and Trentschin (Trenčín) counties, and thus the men consisted mainly of Slovaks. Its titular owner became the Russian Tsar Alexander I. in 1814. Between 1992 and 2001, the

[83] "Pražský francúzsky vyslanec de Lacroix." *Slovenský denník* 20 (6 June 1937), 4; "Francouzský vyslanec de Lacroix." *Lidové noviny* 45 (2 June 1937), 3.

[84] Jan Špatný, "Tradice bitvy u Slavkova," in Ivan Šedivý, Pavel Bělina, Jan Vilím and Jan Vlk, eds., *Napoleonské války a české země* (Praha: Lidové noviny, 2001), 251.

[85] Miroslav Lupták, "História oživená v uniformách." *História – Revue o dejinách spoločnosti* 1 (2001, No. 2): 30.

[86] Iain McCalman and Paul A. Pickering, eds., *Historical reenactment. From Realism to the Affective Turn* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), ii.

[87] Lupták "História," 30.

regiment named *Alexander, cár ruský* (Alexander, Tsar of Russia) participated in about 80 events at home and abroad. Among the most popular were reenactments of important battles such as Battle of Arcole, Battle of Rivoli, Battle of Austerlitz, Battle of Wagram, Battle of Znaim, Battle of Kulm, or Battle of Waterloo.

In 1994, *Slovenská spoločnosť vojenskej histórie a strelcov z historických zbraní* organized the first year of reenactments of the 1809 battles, which became known as the "Siege of Bratislava". The reenactments took place at the authentic sites of the 1809 battles, in today's Janko Kráľ City Park in Petržalka. Other seasons took place in 1995, 1996, and 1999. The fifth year of the "Siege of Bratislava" took place in 2007. In the following period, the event named "We Have Defended Ourselves" was held regularly until 2019. Paradoxically, at the time of the 210th anniversary of the military events at Pressburg in 2019, the reenactment did not take place due to lack of funds and its further fate is questionable.[88] However, it is certain that the event, which included historical units from several countries, has gained in popularity over the years. The phenomenon of "living history" was also associated with reenactments, which were not limited to combat demonstrations. The public had the opportunity to see the everyday military life during the Napoleonic Wars recreated as faithfully as possible from many aspects, such as the preparation of food, military training, the changing of the guard, the meetings of military commanders, the preparation of ammunition, the care of rifles, cannons, and horses, and the entertainment of the soldiers.[89]

The commemorative plaque of the Peace of Pressburg in the gate area of the Primate's Palace (Photo: Matej Čapo).

[88] "Pripomíname si ostreľovanie Prešporka Napoleónom," accessed 6 August 2021; available from http://www.petrzalcan.sk/pripominame-si-ostrelovanie-presporka-napoleonom.

[89] Lupták, "História," 31.



Unknown author, "The attack of the French army on the Austrian bridge ditches near Pressburg on June 3, 1809" (The Bratislava City Gallery, Old Masters Drawings and Prints, inv. No. C 9283).

Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld and Hans Veit Friedrich Schnorr von Carolsfeld, "Battles in front of Pressburg in 1809" (The Bratislava City Gallery, Old Masters Drawings and Prints, inv. No. C 8260).

Unknown author, "The French Army at Pressburg" (The Bratislava City Gallery, Old Masters Drawings and Prints, inv. No. C 9279).

Bust of Emperor Franz I. by Josef Klieber (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The tin keg with a statue of Bacchus, the god of wine (Available from: https://bratislavskerozky.sk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/E-00386-Bakchus-na-sude-Dia-Mi%C5%A1urov%C3%A1-scaled.jpg).

The Chapel of the Holy Cross in Starý háj (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The "statue of a Napoleonic soldier" on the Main Square in Bratislava (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The large graffiti painting on Gessayova Street in Petržalka (Available from: https://www.petrzalka.sk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2-02-01.jpg).

The Napoleon's stone (Photograph from the collection of the Bratislava City Museum).

The last of three oaks at the foot of Napoleon's Hill (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The Napoleon's poplar on a postcard from 1907 (Postcard from the private collection of Matej Čapo).

The contemporary view of the place where the Napoleon's poplar was located (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The concrete filling of the Napoleon's poplar with an iron hoop in 1955 (Photo from the private collection of Anton Šmotlák Jr.).



The torso of the trunk of the memorial yew tree in Janko Kráľ City Park (Photo: Matej Čapo).



The cannonball on the Main Square No. 1 (Photo: Matej Čapo).

The burial of the remains of French soldiers in Petržalka, 18 May 1922. (Les représentants de Paris en Tchécoslovaquie. À Prague, Tábor et Bratislava (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1923), 65).

The side view of the grave dedicated to five French soldiers. (Photo from the collection of Bibliothèque de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris).

The view of the monument for five French soldiers. (Photo from the collection of Bibliothèque de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris).

Why St Helena? … Why Not the Yardarm *"pour ecourager les autres?"* The Napoleonic Era and the Rise of British Exceptionalism

by Alasdair White PhD FHEA FINS

Abstract

This paper examines the background and environmental conditions that underpinned the decision to imprison Napoleon on the south Atlantic island of St Helena, a very expensive option, rather than to simply do what all the crowned heads of Europe, particularly Prussia, wanted, which was to execute the man who had plunged the entirety of Europe into nearly twenty years of costly war. The paper looks at the socio-political conditions in England in 1815 that contributed to the English government choosing to bear the costs of garrisoning an unimportant island in the south Atlantic, involving soldiers and a number of naval vessels and their crews for however many years it took, together with acting as the unwilling hosts to a household of officers, their wives and servants with all the associated costs of feeding them and their guards on an island that ocean currents and weather patterns made extremely difficult to provision. Additionally, examination will also be made of the cultural aspects of the decision and will seek to answer the question: was the decision to use St Helena entirely rational or was it the result of British Exceptionalism?

The Fall of Napoleon after Waterloo

Having been decisively beaten at Waterloo on 18 June 1815, Napoleon simply abandoned his army and fled to Paris to face, what by all accounts was a frosty reception from the population of the city. Some 'romantic' historians try to make the case that Napoleon wanted to fight to the bitter end so as to achieve a soldier's death in battle, but it is clear from subsequent events that the French were tired of his constant wars, the impoverishment of the people, and the loss of one and half generations of young men (3 million, according to Lafayette in addressing the Chamber of Deputies on 21 June 1815). The Chamber demanded that Napoleon abdicate so that a new government could be formed under Joseph Fouché, Napoleon's Minister of Police. According to J. David Markham among others, the hand of Fouché is to be seen in the downfall of Napoleon and he was certainly a leading figure in the events in Paris, although what threats were used against Napoleon to force him to abdicate are not entirely clear; but, on 22 June 1815, the day after the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, Napoleon did abdicate and was placed under armed

"protection," effectively as a prisoner in Malmaison.[1]

According to Markham (2008), Napoleon's abdication was the start of secret negotiations, primarily with the British. The Prussians were demanding that Napoleon be executed and according to Von Müffling's letters (1815), both Blücher and Gneisenau were planning on taking things into their own hands: if Napoleon was not handed over, they would destroy Paris; peace negotiations with the Prussians were unlikely. To complicate matters, the Duke of Wellington, a very influential voice as the man who had defeated the French, had made it known that he was against the execution of Napoleon. In the end Gneisenau wrote to Von Müffling (as cited in Hamilton-Williams 1994) on 29 June saying:

> When the Duke of Wellington declares himself against the execution of Bonaparte, he thinks and acts in the matter as a Briton. Great Briton [sic] is under weightier obligation to no mortal man than to this villain: for by the occurrences whereof he is the author, of her greatness, prosperity, and wealth, have attained their present elevation. The English are masters of the seas, and have no longer to fear any rivalry in this dominion or the commerce of the world …

Fouche (from the J. David Markham collection).

In the meantime, Fouché had been busy and, according to McLynn (1997), concocted a scheme whereby Napoleon would be escorted under armed guard to Rochefort on the Atlantic coast with the promise that he would be allocated two French frigates and safe passage to escape to America.[2] But, at the same time, it seems that Fouché had sent strict orders to Rochefort and the naval officers concerned that under no circumstances where they to undertake any such activity. The very real threat of capture by the Prussians finally made Napoleon agree and he was escorted under military guard

[1] See J. David Markham, *The Road to St Helena: Napoleon after Waterloo* (Pen & Sword Military, 2008); Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1936); Frank McLynn, *Napoleon: A Biography* (Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1997); and David Hamilton-Williams, *The Fall of Napoleon* (Arms and Armour Press, 1994).

[2] From personal communications between Paul Chamberlain and the author in June 2021.

from Malmaison to Rochefort (Markham 2008).[3] He was not, however, on his own: he was accompanied by Bertand, plus his wife and children, de Gourgaud, de Savary, de Monthalon, Las Cases, de Lallemand, de Marchand, General Becker and Colonel Planat.

Napoleon left Rochefort on 12 July for *Île-d'Aix* located in the *pertuis d'Antioche* to the south of La Rochelle, in a desperate attempt to stay clear of his pursuers and to be closer to the shipping he believed could save him. But once there, he decided against attempting to run the blockade and found himself with just two options: surrender to the advancing Prussians and be executed without trial or surrender to the English who he believed would allow him to "retire gracefully to a country estate." Napoleon procrastinated, and when the naval officers refused to attempt to run the blockade, he finally decided to surrender to the British. He wrote to the Prince Regent of England on 13 July 1815:

> Royal Highness, the target of the factions which divide my country and the enmity of the greatest powers of Europe, I have finished my political career, and I come like Themistocles, to sit on the hearth of the British people. I put myself under the protection of his laws,

Napoleon's last residence on the Île-d'Aix (photo courtesy of J. David Markham).

[3] As quoted in Napoleon and St Helena, 1815-1816 by Roger Morriss – www.napoleon.org (accessed 24 June 2021). The article comes from Chapter Four of Morriss' 1997 book.

Plaque commemorating Napoleon's departure from continental Europe on July 8th, 1815 (photo courtesy of J. David Markham).

> which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.[4]

This letter of surrender having been accepted by Captain Frederick Maitland RN, on 15 July 1815, Napoleon and his court stepped onto *HMS Bellerophon* and formally surrendered. The *Bellerophon* departed for England almost immediately, arriving in Plymouth on 26 July, and on 28 July, the allies in Paris gave Britain *carte blanche* to deal with Napoleon as they saw fit. This left the British government faced with a number of choices of what to do with him.

The Choices

The first choice that was available to the British was to simply hand Napoleon to the Prussians and/or the Russians, either of whom would simply have executed him as an outlaw (he had been declared as such by the Congress of Vienna in March 1815), or as the man responsible for so much suffering and economic disturbance across Europe for the last twenty years. Although this option will certainly have been

[4] *Recueil de pièces authentiques sur le captif de Ste.-Hélène : de mémoires et documens écrits ou dictés par l'empereur Napoléon. Suivis de lettres de MM. le grand-maréchal comte Bertrand, le comte Las Cases, le général baron Gourgaud, le général comte Montholon, les docteurs Warden, O'Meara …*, A. Corréard, 1821, p. 15

discussed and was promoted vigorously by the Prussians, it was never seriously considered as the *carte blanche* from the allies, including the Prussians and Russians, effectively barred that course of action.

For similar reasons, the second choice, that of handing Napoleon to the French Royalists and the new regime, was also a non-starter. Additionally, the new French regime would have been at serious risk from Napoleonic loyalists, and their hold and control of the country was by no means certain.

The third choice was to imprison him in England, but this seems to have been quickly dismissed. Paul Chamberlain, an expert on French prisoners of war in the Napoleonic period, estimates that in 1811 there were perhaps around 43,500 French prisoners-of-war in various prisons, such as Dartmoor and Norman's Cross, and in prison hulks in various ports; and more than 2,500 French officers were on parole in local communities (such as Odiham in Hampshire). In 1815, some 7,500 still remained for whom the presence of Napoleon within England could have provided a focus for them to make a break for it.[5] Additionally, there was increasing social and economic unrest amongst the English population and considerable sympathy for the ideals of the French Revolution, especially among the growing numbers of those of the Whiggish persuasion. Many in politics – particularly those of the Tory frame of mind – seemed to think that such sympathisers would have flocked to a Napoleonic standard. According to Adam Zamoyski (2014), the potential for a French-style revolution in England, and possibly throughout Britain, was considered to be a very real one. As a result, the idea of having Napoleon on British soil would have been anathema to the ruling elite, as well as being a very real security risk: in fact, a *casus revolutio*.[6]

The fourth choice, and perhaps the most elegant, was the simple expedient of hanging Napoleon from the nearest yardarm: a judicial execution under military law and administered by the Royal Navy. In the thinking of the time, it would've been an appropriately military end to a military warlord and act as a deterrent to others of the same mind; indeed, in the words of Voltaire "*pour encourager les autres*." Interestingly, it does not seem to have been seriously considered, almost certainly due to the opposition of the Duke of Wellington who considered such a course to be profoundly un-British and against everything Britain stood for.

The fifth choice was to ship him off to somewhere where he could be contained with little chance of escape, and where he could simply be forgotten. On 21 July 1815, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Lord Liverpool, wrote to Lord Castlereagh, his Foreign Secretary, then still in Paris, to tell

[5] From personal communications between Paul Chamberlain and the author in June 2021.

[6] Zamoyski, 22-120.

him that he, Liverpool, had "spoken to Lord Melville, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and John Barrow, the permanent secretary, and the latter 'recommend St Helena as the place in the world best calculated for the confinement of such a person'" (Roberts, 2001).[7] It was thus a civil servant and not Wellington or some politician who made the final choice. So, less than 15 days from his surrender, a decision was made: Napoleon would be held in permanent exile as a prisoner under guard on the island of St Helena in the middle of the South Atlantic Ocean.

Napoleon was almost immediately transferred to *HMS Northumberland*, a 74-gun battleship of the line, together with various members of his 'household' who had volunteered to go into permanent guarded exile with him. The southward voyage took ten weeks and on 15 October 1815 Napoleon was put ashore on St Helena.

So why St Helena?

> "Nothing can possibly be less prepossessing, nay more horribly forbidding, than the first appearance of this isolated and apparently burnt-up, barren rock, which promises neither refreshment or pleasure." (Admiral Sir George Cockburn, October 1815)[8]

St Helena is an island on the mid-Atlantic ridge in the South Atlantic Ocean. It is 16 x 8 km covering 122 km^2 and situated 2,000 km from the southwest African coast, the nearest landmass, opposite what is now Angola, and around 3,000 kms from the South American coast. The prevailing winds blow west by northwest from Africa and the ocean currents are northerly up the African coast. This makes the island extremely difficult to reach from the northern hemisphere as the winds and currents mean that sailing ships had first to cross to the Caribbean, then sail down the South American coast before turning east in the southern forties and then north again off South Africa (hence the ten-week journey for Napoleon). In effect, this meant that almost no southbound shipping visited the island. On the other hand, St Helena is almost directly on the route of every northbound ocean merchantman from India and the East, and in 1815 around 1,000 ships a year were stopping at the island for provisions and repairs. Such was the importance of its position on the northbound trade route that St Helena was under the control of the British East India Company, which maintained a military presence there of 820 to 1,000 infantry and perhaps 200 artillerymen, with well-maintained and equipped defences, and a fully operational naval station.

The arrival of Napoleon, as an exiled prisoner under guard, necessitated around

[7] Roberts, 197.

[8] As quoted in Napoleon and St Helena, 1815-1816 by Roger Morriss – www.napoleon.org (accessed 24 June 2021). The article comes from Chapter Four of Morriss' 1997 book., page 131.

2,000 additional soldiers of the line, drawn from the 2nd battalion of the 53rd (Shropshire) and the amalgamated 1st and 2nd battalions of the 66th (Berkshire) regiments. To guard the island itself, in addition to the *Northumberland*, a frigate together with six brigs and sloops, were added to the muster at the naval station. This increase in the population from around 2,000 in September 1815 to around 6,000 in October involved a huge logistics operation to keep everyone fed and watered, and to bring in the large quantities of building materials need. Although this was going to be hugely expensive to the British Crown on an ongoing basis, the practicalities were already in place through the British East India Company.

Miniature on ivory of Napoleon on St. Helena (from the J. David Markham collection).

In summary, therefore, the geographical location of St Helena meant that it was extremely difficult to reach by sailing ship from the northern hemisphere whilst it can be easily provisioned from southern Africa. Thus, any rescue attempt launched from Europe or the United States of America faced a near three-month voyage to get there, a very active naval blockade, extremely difficult landing conditions, and a garrison of around 4,000 soldiers … all guarding one man.

But that man and his court of faithful retainers lived a life of quiet seclusion at Longwood House, a country estate in the centre of the island that served as the summer residence of the British East India Company Governor of St Helena. It was exactly as Napoleon had hoped when he wrote to the Prince Regent, just not in the geographical location he wanted.

So why did the British Government choose this very expensive solution rather than the simpler one of 'hanging him from the yardarm'? The reason has much to do with the growing sense of British Exceptionalism and imperial power.

The Napoleonic Era and the Rise of British Exceptionalism

Exceptionalism is the perception or belief that a species, country, society, institution, movement, individual or time period is 'exceptional'. The term carries the implication, whether or not specified, that the referent is superior in some way to others and this transfers into behaviours that project superiority, even arrogance.

Exceptionalism arises as a result of national cultural myths replacing a more rational and realistic assessment of the facts and is driven by a deliberate application of culturally specific confirmation bias within the available public relations and political media, usually in a highly jingoistic manner. This then is backed up by political and other public figures shifting the general focus towards a nationalist interpretation of events showing the nation in the best light possible, and often belittling other nations accordingly or treating them as 'hate' objects. In modern terminology, this is propaganda, and, just as in any neuro-linguistic programming, its effectiveness depends on the frequent and extensive repetition of the new national myth until the population comes to suspend its rational judgement in favour of the 'new reality', resulting in the feeling that 'after all, if it is said so frequently in the best media and by the most respected public figures, it must be true'.

The key to the successful creation of exceptionalism is to base the new myth on real events interpreted though the distorting lens of jingoistic nationalism, events that can be interpreted as showing the superiority of the exceptional nation. And in 1815 Britain had much to feel superior about. (Prados de la Escosura, 2004)

From the second half of the 1500s, under Queen Elizabeth I, England had pursued an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy but was unable and unwilling to engage in effective military campaigns. That notwithstanding, English traders, often operating with letters of marque (which are licences to fit out an armed vessel and use it in the capture of 'enemy' merchant shipping, committing acts which would otherwise have constituted piracy), were actively challenging the dominant trading and military power, Spain. But the defeat of the English by the Spanish in 1589, the year after the Spanish Armada, caused the Elizabethans to shift their focus towards a trade-based foreign policy. After the chartering of the joint-stock Muscovy Company in 1555, which traded with Russia, and the Levant Company in 1592, which traded with the Ottoman Empire, it was in 1600 that Elizabeth's trade policy really started to deliver with the chartering of the East India Company, which was granted a monopoly concession for the whole of India. This was the start of an aggressive and highly successful militarily-backed trade and colonisation policy that made England the world's most successful and richest trading nation by the end of the 1700s and which gave it a virtual hegemony over marine trade – a point acknowledged by Gneisenau in his letter to Von Müffling on 29 June 1815 mentioned above.

In terms of exceptionalism: we the English are a great world-wide trading nation, better than anyone else, especially the Spanish whose Armada we defeated.

At a time when Protestantism was challenging the catholic hegemony in the areas of faith and civil control, and the

Eighty Years War between the Dutch and Spain was coming to an end with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), new thinking about human and civil rights were about to lead to the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the subsequent regicide of King Charles I in 1649. The English Civil War is usually portrayed as being about religious differences and the issues of religious freedom, but this is to profoundly misunderstand the fundamentals in play.

According to Grappenhaus (1989), the fundamental issues were about the responsibilities of governance and how it was to be paid for. The King was responsible for foreign affairs and defence, but Parliament held the sole authority to raise taxes. Charles was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy and needed funds to pay for it, but Parliament disagreed with the King's strategy and objectives and refused to allow the raising of taxes. After ruling without Parliament for a while, Charles found himself unable to raise the revenue for his costly foreign wars, and like most enfeebled dictators, turned on his perceived internal enemies and the Civil War erupted. For Charles, it ended on 30 January 1649 when he was beheaded in Whitehall, London.[9]

In terms of exceptionalism: we the English people have opposed a dictator who thought he ruled by divine right.

The regicide of the king established a key principle for the Age of Enlightenment (1685-1815) – that monarchs ruled for the people at the will and pleasure of the people (through Parliament), and that the monarch's power was constrained by the boundaries set for it by Parliament. In addition, it established that no one was above the law. The restoration of Charles II in 1660, embedded this *de facto* situation into law and from then on, England has been, in all but the letter of the law, a constitutional monarchy – the first in Europe, indeed the first anywhere in the world. Critically, this is one of the founding principles of the Enlightenment and which led to both the American Revolution (1775-1787) and the French Revolution (1789-1795), and which were summed up by Thomas Paine in *The Rights of Man*.

In terms of exceptionalism: we British are the foundation of the entire Age of Enlightenment and the originators of the great Enlightenment thinking in politics and economics.

Throughout all this, the English, and subsequently the British, were consolidating their power as colonialists, as traders, and as the marine hegemon with more or less total control of the seas. The British had entered their *imperium* and the British Empire had become a reality (the term was the preferred usage after 1763). And between 1700 and 1800 it is thought that around 40% of world trade passed through British hands.

[9] Grappenhaus, 217-89.

These very real and major developments since the mid 1500s had established in the minds of the British (particularly the English) that they were indeed 'special': that it was on British ingenuity, valour, energy, and developing industrial prowess that the huge wealth of Britain was based; and it was on British developments in civil society and the instruments of governance that the Enlightenment was founded, and indeed, were it not British writers and thinkers who had converted those ideas into usable concepts now adopted around Europe and in the United states; and was it not true to say that the 'sun never set on the British Empire'? As the world's most powerful nation, had not other nations called to Britain to oppose Napoleon and his marauding armies, using their wealth, their Navy and their armies to finally defeat the Great Disturber at Waterloo? Was it not also true that Britain had exported all that was best about Britain to its Empire, to become the model on which the world was now based? Sportsmanship, playing by the rules, the concept of *noblesse oblige*, enlightened self-interest, doing what is right, standing up for the underdog, bringing Christianity to the heathen, showing generosity to the defeated (providing, of course, that they paid tribute) – these made the British exceptional in their own thinking and legends in their own minds. Truly, they thought of themselves as exceptional. After all, had they not single-handedly defeated the Corsican Ogre and made Europe safe again for civilised man?

Even Wellington got in on the act by observing that it was unacceptable to execute Napoleon as to do so would be against all that Britain stood for.

More than anything else, this sense of superiority and British Exceptionalism and pride in their achievements as individuals and as a nation, meant that when the defeated and undoubtedly dejected Napoleon surrendered to the Royal Navy and threw himself on their mercy, the officers and men of the *Bellerophon* would treat him with respect, wine and dine him, and rescue him from those who would prefer to see him dead. It also meant that when faced with the decision of what to do with Napoleon, the British government would not execute him like the common criminal that many thought him to be (how unsporting, we never kick a man when he's down). *Noblesse oblige* kicked in, tempered with a strong sense of reality, and so calls for 'death to the tyrant' were ignored. No, they would allow Napoleon to do exactly what he himself had suggested in his letter to the Prince Regent: to retire to a country estate and live peacefully. That would satisfy the Whigs and *vox populi* and avoid inflaming the lower classes, but to satisfy the Tories in the government and to maintain the support of the property-owing classes, it would be necessary that that 'country estate' be somewhere from which he would never escape.

So, St Helena it was, courtesy of British Exceptionalism, and never mind the cost.

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Visual Legacy of Napoléon during the Bourbon Restoration

by Annaliese Wren

Napoléon Bonaparte (1769-1821) rose to power during a coup d'ètat in 1799, before crowning himself Emperor of France in 1804.[1] He embarked on a programme of propaganda, focusing specifically on visual imagery as a form of consolidating control. The production of imagery which glorified his reign as Emperor resulted in paintings by artists as Jacques-Louis David and Antoine-Jean Gros, as well as a multitude of public sculptures and monuments, which have been comprehensively studied. To this day, Napoléon has long been regarded as France's supreme heroic military leader.[2]

This article will not examine these images, but the visual representations of Napoléon which were produced immediately after his downfall. Following France's defeat at Waterloo (1814) the Allies determined the next ruler of France. The reinstatement of Bourbon rule was deemed the safest route, which saw Louis XVIII anointed King of France. The period can be categorised as an unpopular regime, evidenced through the warm welcome Napoléon I received upon his return to Paris in 1815. Visual representations of Napoléon post 1815 range widely, from depictions of a young military general to an old man bearing the weight of his own actions: a man who both made and broke himself. It is difficult to determine the exact inspiration behind such artworks, an issue clouded by patronage, propaganda and censorship. One could argue that visual representations of Napoléon were shaped by the regimes which created them. This is true for artworks created under the guise of Napoléon I, who ultimately set the precedence for self-visual depictions which would emerge even years after his death. By analysing artworks created during the Bourbon regime, one gains a greater understanding of the sentiment of the general populace. This provides an invaluable source of a continued devotion to Napoléon and the victories the French army achieved under his reign. For historians, these sources further the scope of knowledge regarding the opinions of the different classes in France at the time. As the majority of peasants were illiterate, only visual depictions, or second-hand accounts, can be used to decipher where their loyalties lay. The prints and concealed Napoleonic memorabilia discussed later in this article paints a better picture of the working class's attitude at the time. However, these artworks are merely the productions of a few men, and thus cannot of course speak for the entirety of the masses.

The legend of Napoléon was partly formed by propaganda 1804 to 1814, but primarily

[1] Octave Aubry, *Napoleon* (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1964), 17.

[2] Charles Esdaile, *Napoleon, France And Waterloo* (London: Pen & Sword Books, 2016), 156.

in response to the downfall of France following its humiliating defeat at Waterloo.[3] The revival of the Napoleonic image post-1815 can be analysed as an attempt to reinstate French national identity. As such, visual representations of Napoléon depicted not only the emperor, but the legacy of military grandeur in a time of defeat. Some sixty battles won by Napoléon's Grande Armée led to a sentiment of French Imperial pride.[4] Post-1815, a large proportion of the French population, having served in the army, held an image of Napoléon as supreme commander. His exile to Saint Helena by the Allies and position as a fallen emperor was perhaps seen as a representation of France herself during the period.[5] Napoléon's legacy was strengthened through a dissatisfaction by the French populace with the Restoration's reign; Napoleonic depictions were perhaps received as a romanticised representation of Imperial France.

Barbara Day-Hickman made a crucial contribution to this topic with her publication *Napoleonic Art: Nationalism and the Spirit of Rebellion in France*. Day-Hickman highlights the widely available prints accessible to the illiterate. Other historians, such as Robert Goldstein, have similarly discussed the 'threat to social order' such prints created.[6] Michael Marrinan's work focuses specifically on the visual representations in the July Monarchy, however, he does aim to analyse it within the context of the preceding regimes. He stated that Napoleonic representations were a constant struggle to control, as the French public clung to the Napoleonic legacy. This article focuses on the artistic medium of painting, print and sculpture.

The primary thesis is to examine visual representations of Napoléon in France after his downfall, with a specific focus on the political influences within Napoleonic depictions. Changing artistic movements throughout Nineteenth Century France had a certain influence on Napoleonic representations, however this article will not focus upon this aspect. The benefit of this research is to further an understanding of Napoléon's legacy post 1814, particularly amongst the Nineteenth Century French peasantry.

The April 1814 Treaty of Fontainebleau marked the first abdication of Napoléon as Emperor of France.[7] The Allies implementation of Louis XVIII as king led to the Bourbon Restoration being regarded with suspicion in France; a monarch backed by the English and its Allies also held links

[3] Carmel McCallum-Barry, "Myth under Construction," *Classics Ireland* 7 (2000): 102.

[4] M. Dziewanowski, "Napoleon: Legend and Propaganda," *Military Affairs* 9, no. 1 (1945): 90.

[5] McCallum-Barry, 103.

[6] Robert Goldstein, *Censorship Of Political Caricature In Nineteenth-Century France*, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 1.

[7] J. Headley, *Napoleon And The Marshals Of The Empire* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1858), 284.

to the *ancien régime.* [8] This reflected what the revolution sought to remove. 1 March 1815 marked the start of the Hundred Days campaign, in which Napoléon temporarily gained power.[9] It not only led to Napoléon's exile to Saint Helena, but Louis XVIII returned to a weakened position of power. The Hundred Days highlighted the number of Bonapartist supporters in France, and the threat which Napoléon posed to the new regime. Artistic production played a prominent role in legitimising the Bourbons, whilst also removing the Napoleonic legacy.[10] Louis XVIII's perception of the threat of Napoleonic imagery led to government repression of such artworks.

Much like the proceeding regimes, the Restoration used public sculptures as propaganda. David O'Brien, an American art historian, has written that this period placed an equal amount of emphasis on removing artefacts created during the Revolutionary period, as it did to restore the earlier statuary which was destroyed.[11] The Vendôme Column, situated in Place Vendôme Paris, provides an example of how art played an important role in the changeover of regimes, as well as how visual imagery of Napoléon was received during this period. Erected by Napoléon in 1810, the column commemorated his military victory of 1805.[12] It was modelled after Trajan's Column in Rome.[13] This links the perception of the might of the French Empire to that of the Roman Empire, reinforced by Chaudet's sculpture of Napoléon in Roman dress atop the column. Alongside commemorating the victories of the Grand Armée, it served as a reminder of Napoléon's position as the hero of France. The removal of Chaudet's statue in 1814 signified and foreshadowed the reception to which visual representations of Napoléon would be received in years to follow.

Spurred on by the events of the Hundred Days and the fear of Napoléon's return to Paris, King Louis XVIII symbolically melted Chaudet's Napoléon 'to supply the material for the horse of François-Fédéric Lemot's' statue of King Henri IV on Pont Neuf.[14] The effigy to Napoléon was replaced with the white Bourbon flag. The art historian Albert Boime claimed that Lemot 'offered to supply an equivalent amount of bronze' in order 'to preserve Chaudet's statue as a national monument.'[15] The government's refusal to comply indicates that this represented Napoléon's removal from power and

[8] Pamela Pilbeam, *The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814-48*, Seminar Studies in History. (Harlow, England: Longman, 2000), 1.

[9] Esdaile, *Napoleon, France And Waterloo*, 152.

[10] Albert Boime, *Art In The Age Of Counterrevolution, 1815-1848*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 16.

[11] David O'Brien, "Censorship of Visual Culture in France, 1815-1852," *Yale French Studies,* no. 1222 (2012): 37.

[12] Albert Boime, *Hollow Icons: The Politics Of Sculpture In Nineteenth-Century France*, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987), 8.

[13] David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 320.

[14] Boime, *Counterrevolution,* 18.

[15] Boime, *Counterrevolution,* 19.

signified the belief he would never return to France. Kimberly Jones, curator of Nineteenth Century French paintings at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, has argued that Henri IV played a vital role in the reestablishment of the Bourbon throne.[16] It was believed that representations of the former King would remind the French public of Louis XVIII's link to the *ancien régime*.[17] The original statute of King Henri IV was destroyed during the Revolution, despite being the king popularly regarded in France as a hero. By restoring the artwork, Louis XVIII was drawing on prominent representations within the French monarchy in order to unite the different political factions which existed in Restoration France. It can also be seen as an attempt to revise a French historical figure. The statue of Henri IV on Pont Neuf attempted to legitimise the Bourbons through the removal of Napoleonic sculpture. As such, no official sculptures of Napoléon were commissioned or created during the Restoration.

The historian Sheryl Kroen has written that in 1815 'supporters of Napoléon in a small town near Dieppe… seized the occasion of 15th August to go to their local church and worship before an altar where a statue representing the Saint of Napoléon had been destroyed.'[18] This provides evidence of both the removal and destruction of a visual representation of Napoléon, alongside the defiance of the populace to continue adoring him. The statue's location upon the altar demonstrates how he was perceived as a deity by the French population. The invention of Saint Napoléon in 1806 was an act of state, which 'makes it possible to draw conclusions concerning his popularity and broad appeal.'[19] This demonstrates the Bourbon regime's desire to eradicate sculptures which portrayed Napoléon favourably to dissuade such blatant worshiping. Kroen's research enlightens the reader that in early Restoration France, despite government efforts, the populace viewed Napoléon as a hero.

When analysing painted representations of Napoléon, one can deem the removal of previously commissioned works from public viewing as prominent as those which were completed during this period. The Restoration removed major canvases by Jacques-Louis David, Antoine-Jean Gros, François Gérard and others, from the Louvre and Luxembourg museums.[20] Gros' *Bonaparte Visiting the Victims of the Plague at Jaffa* was removed from the Louvre, perhaps because it depicts Napoléon heroically visiting his troops despite the risk to himself.[21] The 1802 copy of David's *Napoleon Crossing the Alps* was removed

[16] Jones, "Henri IV and the Decorative Arts of the Bourbon Restoration," 4.

[17] Jones, 3.

[18] Sheryl Kroen, *Politics And Theatre: The Crisis Of Legitimacy In Restoration France*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 165.

[19] Vincent Petit "Napoleon, A Saint For The Nation," *Napoleonica. La Revue* 2 (2005): 139.

[20] O'Brien, "Censorship of Visual Culture in France, 1815—1852," 43.

[21] "Napoleon Bonaparte Visiting The Plague-Stricken In Jaffa," *Louvre*, Accessed January 3

under the Restoration from Les Invalides. An artwork which celebrated Napoléon as the mastermind behind France's military victories may have been threatening to the Bourbon regime who were unable to provide the same successes. This was reinforced by the Salon of 1822, which rejected Horace Vernet's *The Barriere de Clichy* and *The Battle of Jemmapes* on the grounds of being too political, as they contained 'symbols from the revolutionary era.'[22] The latter 'celebrates Napoleonic resistance to the allied forces' in 1814.[23] When Vernet chose to exhibit these works privately in his studio, alongside other paintings, the government did not object. This may perhaps be attributed to the type of people attracted to Vernet's exhibition; a wealthier audience was not seen as a threat. The works did not include visual representations of Napoléon but did show allegorical depictions displaying the glory of the army he once commanded.

Figure 1: Pierre-Narciss Guerin, Portrait of Henri de La Rochejaquelein, c. 1916. Oil on canvas, 216 x 142 cm (Musée d'art et d'historie de Cholet, France).

The Restoration witnessed a shift from state-sponsored portraits and history paintings depicting Napoleonic and Imperial propaganda. This trend ceased as the new regime chose to focus on consolidating Bourbon rule. O'Brien has argued that the Restoration 'commissioned an unprecedented number of canvases of events from the French nation's past,' alongside revitalising religious painting.[24] Representations of Napoléon were quashed to transfer the portrayal of military glory from Napoléon onto new subjects. This is particularly evident in Pierre-Narcisse Guerin's *Portrait of Henri de La Rochejaquelein* created in c.1816 (Figure 1),

2020 https://www.louvre.fr/en/oeuvre-notices/napoleon-bonaparte-visiting-plague-stricken-jaffa.

[22] Daniel Harkett and Katie Hornstein, *Horace Vernet and the Thresholds of Nineteenth-century Visual Culture*, (Dartmouth: Dartmouth College Press, 2017), 7.

[23] Harkett and Hornstein, 38.

[24] David O'Brien, *After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon Bonaparte*, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 194.

Figure 2: Horace Vernet, L'Apothéose de Napoléon, dated 1821. Oil on canvas, 54 x 80.5 cm (The Wallace Collection, Hertford House, London).

which depicts the youngest general of the Royalist insurrection during the Revolution as leader of the revolt in Vendée.[25] It can be seen as a deliberate alternative to representations of Revolutionary, and Napoleonic, conquests, promoting the image of an anti-republican military hero. Behind the young general Guerin positioned the white Bourbon flag, which can be interpreted as a response to the inclusion of the tricolour in the previous regime's numerous paintings. He takes a heroic and victorious stance, representing a portrayal of strength by the Bourbons. The sling on his arm suggests that, despite injury, Rochejaquelein was willing to continue fighting for his beloved France. The sling may also be a reference to the stance and positioning of the arms in Jacques-Louis David's *Napoléon Crossing the Alps* (1801). Guerin's work may be set to rival David's heroic depiction of a Napoleonic victory in order to solidify the Bourbon regime.

Horace Vernet's oil painting *L'Apothéose de Napoléon* (Figure 2) presented an allegorical representation of the emperor's tomb. Napoléon's grave on Saint-Helena was,

[25] O'Brien, *After the Revolution*, 201.

according to reports, positioned by a stream, yet Vernet chose to place it next to the sea for dramatic grandeur.[26] Smashed against the rocks in the foreground is a shipwreck inscribed with the names of Napoléon's most prominent battles. This symbolically created a visual representation that the death of the former emperor marked the end of France's military victories. To the left of the grave Vernet has illustrated two of Napoléon's generals who were present on St Helena at the time of his death consoling one another over the death of their emperor and friend. To the right of the tomb lies a group of Napoléon's dead marshals amongst the clouds. It can be led to represent the men who gave their lives to serve Napoléon, who created a French Empire based on military might which was now deemed to be quashed by the Restoration. Figure 2 was exhibited by Vernet within his Paris studio in 1822, having been amongst the artworks rejected from the Salon on the same year.[27] One may attribute the apparent leniency towards depictions of Napoléon aimed towards a Bourgeoise audience as a mere appeasement of an artistic appetite. It could perhaps be also attributed to a fear of peasant revolt if such artworks were available to the masses. Artworks have long possessed the ability to elicit particular emotions. Exposing the lower classes to emotive artworks which glorified the former Emperor were perceived as having the power to spark a rebellion.

Vernet's *Napoléon Sur Son Lit de Mort, 5 Mai 1821* contrasts to other images of Napoléon created during the Restoration which preserved him in time as a young general on a victory charge. This displays a human element to the former emperor. The laurel wreath around his head is similar to that displayed by the Roman Emperor Caesar. It symbolised Napoléon as an imperial leader of strength in a scene which depicted weakness. Vernet has captured a romanticism in his death, reminding the viewer of Napoléon's ability to guide France from being a nation of revolt to one of Imperial glory. It does not openly celebrate the First Empire's victories, yet the death portrait is subtle enough through the use of a religious cross and lack of military memorabilia to deny the authorities a claim of sedition. Vernet's personal fortune afforded him the ability to pursue private projects despite government hostility, placing him in a unique position compared to the majority of French painters who relied on patronage.[28] This perhaps explains the few painted Napoleonic representations from 1815 to 1830.

[26] "Horace Vernet (1789 - 1863): Napoleon's Tomb," *Wallacecollection.Org*, Accessed January 2 2020 https://wallacelive.wallacecollection.org/eMP/eMuseumPlus?service=direct/1/ResultListView/result.t1.collection_list.$TspTitleImageLink.link&sp=10&sp=Scollection&sp=SfieldValue&sp=0&sp=0&sp=2&sp=SdetailList&sp=0&sp=Sdetail&sp=0&sp=F&sp=T&sp=19.

[27] *Catalogue Of Pictures: Volume 2*, (London: Trustees of the Wallace Collection, 1986), 251.

[28] O'Brien, "Censorship of Visual Culture in France, 1815-1852," 44.

Antoine Montfort's *Adieux de Napoléon à la Garde impériale dans la cour du Cheval-Blanc de château de Fontainebleau* (Figure 3) follows a similar representation to that of Vernet. Completed in 1825, it shows the figure of Napoléon in military uniform central to the canvas. Charles Esdaile has written that this work shows 'the Imperial Guard weeping as it bids farewell to Napoleon.'[29] It depicts the historical tale that after Napoléon's farewell speech at Fontainebleau, he leant forwards to kiss the standard. The inclusion of the banned tricolour is unusual, and perhaps represents a lapse in censorship by the Bourbons, or merely an inclusion for historical accuracy.[30] The weeping guards surrounding Napoléon represent both the sorrow caused by the defeat and humiliation at Waterloo, alongside the exile of Napoléon. It shows him not in Imperial finery but preserved as a military man who captured the loyalty of the Grand Armée.

Figure 3: Antoine Montfort, Adieux de Napoléon à la Garde impériale dans la cour du Cheval-Blanc de château de Fontainebleau, dated 1825. Oil on canvas, 98 x 130 cm (Château de Versailles, Paris).

[29] Esdaile, *Napoleon, France And Waterloo*, 129.

[30] Beatrice Farwell, *French Popular Lithographic Imagery 1815-1870*, Vol.8, Contemporary Events and Caricature, (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1988), 5.

O'Brien has argued that prints were the most regulated and restricted artistic media during the Bourbon Restoration.[31] This was partly due to the ease with which they could be produced. The invention of lithography in 1797 ensured a large number of prints could be reproduced at low cost, and thus distributed to a broad audience.[32] The historian Robert Goldstein wrote that these images 'were seen as more threatening than words' because they could be understood by the poor and illiterate.[33] A press law in response to the assassination of the King's nephew, March 1820, declared 'that no printed, engraved or lithographed design may be published or sold without advance authorisation of the government.'[34] Sheryl Kroen, History lecturer at the University of Florida, wrote that the Restoration struggled to control the trafficking of prints, the three prints presented below managed to evade or trick censorship.[35]

Producing a series of 59 Napoleonic-based illustrations during the Restoration, the Pellerin firm in Epinal were amongst the largest printers of Napoleonic imagery during the Restoration.[36] A reproduction rate of 5,000 copies per print, with each print being distributed by book dealers and peddlers, ensured that these prints were able to reach and influence a geographically vast audience. [37] As each print cost a sou or less, Pellerin was consistently harassed by Bourbon authorities who deemed their prints to be aimed at peasants, and as such a threat. This presents a sharp contrast to the Bourbon's reception to Vernet's private exhibitions, reiterating the idea surrounding the fear of such images sparking a peasant revolt. *Bataille de Waterloo* is a wood engraving by Francis Georgin, published by Pellerin in 1820 and printed on heavy verge (now held in a private collection).[38] It depicts a battle scene, in which Napoléon features centre stage, the image of a strong military leader leading the charge of his troops into battle, fearlessly cutting down France's enemies. One can gauge the government's response to this print by the fact that it led to accusations that Pellerin was marketing seditious posters alongside police involvement. The Battle of Waterloo was a national humiliation. However, Georgin created an idealised version of events in order to portray Napoléon in favourable public light: a patriotic act, fighting as an equal alongside his men. Behind Napoléon Georgin engraved three tricolour flags, a symbol of defiance against the Bourbon

[31] O'Brien, "Censorship of Visual Culture in France, 1815-1852," 37.

[32] Beatrice Farwell, Robert Henning, and Santa Barbara Museum of Art. *The Charged Image: French Lithographic Caricature, 1816-1848*, (Santa Barbara, CA: Santa Barbara Museum of Art, 1989), 10.

[33] Robert Goldstein, *The War for the Public Mind: Political Censorship in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 128.

[34] Robert Goldstein, *Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 91.

[35] Kroen, *Politics And Theatre,* 189.

[36] Barbara Day-Hickman, *Napoleonic Art* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999), 13.

[37] Day-Hickman, 13.

[38] Day-Hickman, 19.

monarch. The inclusion of colour within this artwork demonstrates the two things, the skill of artists during this period alongside the need to highlight the use of the tricolour. This print represents how Restoration artworks depicting Napoléon served as remembrance of the Napoleonic legend, and not the reality, whilst also directly defying Bourbon leadership.

Jean-Louis-André-Théodore Géricault's *March in the Desert* (Figure 4) is a lithograph print, from a series of sixteen, published in *Vie Politique et militaire de Napoléon* in Paris in 1822.[39] This book, written by the French play write Antoine-Vincent Arnault, described Napoléon's military and political career. Donald Horward wrote that 'in the decade following the collapse of the Empire a number of biographies of Napoleon were published.'[40] Arnault's book was an elite publication and may not have served such an imminent threat to the illiterate masses.

Figure 4: Jean-Louis-André-Théodore Géricault, March in the Desert, dated 1822. Lithograph, 30.6 x 39.9 cm (British Museum, London).

[39] O'Brien, *After the Revolution*, 210.

[40] Donald Horward, "Napoleon in Review: A Bibliographical Essay," *Military Affairs* 43, no. 3 (1979): 144.

Central to the print is young General Bonaparte, directing his troops into battle. The pyramids in the background allude to the Egypt campaign of 1798 to 1801, often referred to as 'the battle of the pyramids,' reminding the viewer of France's Imperial strength and conquests.[41] The print adheres to the accepted compositional layout of a Napoleonic battle painting (general in the centre, troops to the side).[42] Beatrice Farewell wrote that 'images of Napoléon the man follow a pattern: they show the general not the emperor at the pinnacle of command.'[43] Perhaps this provides an explanation for its evasion of censorship laws, Bonaparte did not crown himself Emperor until 1804, therefore, this print merely represented a French general directing soldiers into battle. It was also published after his death in 1822, which eliminated the threat of his resurgence to the French throne. This Napoleonic representation may have gained support and popularity particularly amongst the *demi-solde* due to its military nature, referring to France's former victories. The *demi-*solde made up a considerable proportion of the French populace during the Bourbon Monarchy. The term refers to former soldiers of the Grande Armée who rose through the ranks under Napoléon's military leadership which placed skill above position within society. In contrast, the Bourbons chose to downsize the army, placing many soldiers on half-pay, and restoring the bourgeois to prominent military positions.[44] This led to anger and frustration, and in turn a movement which sought to glorify the army under Napoléon. Géricault has incorporated military victory with a pictorial representation of Napoléon, and in doing so solidified the public's memory of his former glory.

[41] "Marche Dans Le Désert (Desert March)". *The British Museum*. Accessed January 2. https://research.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1456441&page=1&partId=1&searchText=gericault.

[42] O'Brien, *After the Revolution,* 210.

[43] Beatrice Farwell, French Popular Lithographic Imagery 1815-1870. Vol.9, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), 16. Marche Dans Le Désert *The British Museum*.

[44] Guérard, Albert Léon, *Reflections On The Napoleonic Legend*, (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1924), 116.

Pierre-Jean de Béranger's lithograph *Memories of the People* (Figure 5) demonstrates a different portrayal of Napoléon. The central focal point is not Bonaparte himself, but an old woman with her arm outstretched, pointing towards a bust of Napoléon placed atop a mantelpiece. Her extended family surround the table and are portrayed as both eagerly listening to her tale and gazing at the bust with fascination. Underneath the photo reads (translated from French) 'He spoke to



Figure 5: Pierre-Jean de Béranger, Memories of the People, dated 1828. Lithograph engraving (Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires, Paris).

Figure 6: Anonymous, Bonapartist Suspenders, c.1815-1820. (Museum of the National Archives, Paris).

you grandmother! He spoke to you!' If the recipient of this print was illiterate, the attempted message would still have been evident to the majority of the French population during the Restoration. Day-Hickman has written that this lithograph is an 'illustration for song rendition of the 'Memories of the People.''[45] The song describes the woman's imagined encounter with Napoléon, in which he stayed in her cottage and spoke to her before returning to Paris to face France's enemies.[46] It represents hope of a Napoleonic successor returning to power. This portrayal was a common theme in prints from 1827 to 1830, an 'expression of defiance against the Bourbon government' during a time of economic uncertainty.[47] Although not a representation of Napoléon in the flesh, it demonstrated peasant's devotion to the former Emperor and also frustration with Bourbon rule. The bust of Napoléon depicts the well-known shape of his military hat, not a crown, which alludes to his role within France's military glory. Day-Hickman has also stated that this artwork 'celebrated Napoléon's fictional return.'[48] One could suggest that Béranger was attempting to appeal to patriotic citizens who looked upon Napoléon as a symbol of national glory, in order to reinstate France as an imperial military power. In analysing these three works, one needs to determine whether their primary aim was to pay homage to Napoléon, or to serve as anti-Bourbon propaganda through highlighting France's former Imperial victories which Napoléon orchestrated.

[45] Day-Hickman, 30.
[46] Day-Hickman, 30
[47] Day-Hickman, 32.
[48] Day-Hickman, 31.

Other emblems and sculptures presented themselves outside official domain, Kroen has written that these appeared in many forms.[49] Day-Hickman has discussed a class divide when it comes to Napoleonic memorabilia during the Restoration. Wealthier classes had the luxury of 'bronze statues, clocks and expensive engravings of Napoléon to display privately in their homes.'[50] These representations of the former emperor were not deemed such a threat by authorities. It is hard to determine if these pieces reflected public opinion of Napoléon, or merely trends in decoration. In rural locations, 'suspenders, pipes and wood-block images' of Napoléon could be acquired from peddlers.[51] Figure 6 evidences this trend Bonapartist paraphernalia, showing a photograph of suspenders containing Napoléon's side profile. Underneath the image reads the word 'immortality,' suggesting that this representation of Bonaparte was also an act of defiance against the Restoration.[52] Napoléon is dressed in armour, crowned with a laurel wreath, mimicking that worn by Julius Caesar to demonstrate his status as a powerful leader. Underneath one can view the beginning of a scene of Napoléon astride his horse with his familiar general's hat, presumably charging into battle; a portrayal of bravery. This representation, although placed on an item which spends the majority of time concealed, may also be revealed if necessary. It demonstrates that Napoléon was portrayed as both Emperor as well as military leader. A proportion of the French public united in their common accusation of commemorative Napoleonic objects, distanced from public view.

To conclude, the Restoration chose to eradicate visual representations of Napoléon (whether authorities chose to carry this out is another matter), instead of commissioning artworks which depicted Napoleonic failures. Prints provided a cheap means of mass-producing Bonapartist propaganda across France in comparison to exhibitions held in Paris, and as such were deemed a greater threat to the stability of the Bourbon regime. The removal and destruction of Chaudet's sculpture of Napoléon from atop the Vendôme Column reflects Louis XVIII's attitude to monuments celebrating the former emperor. Although revolutionary symbols and Napoleonic allegories were supressed, Vernet's paintings both presented portrayals which glorified his death, whilst also emphasising his role in Imperial victories. Publicly the Bourbons embarked on a propaganda campaign to restore the destruction of artworks enacted by the Revolution, while seeking to replace anything which paid homage to Napoléon. Alongside this, peddlers distributed different representations, which evidence the Bonapartist legend was still depicted in artworks from 1815 to 1830. It is unknown what other artworks may have been

[49] Kroen, *Politics And Theatre*, 191.
[50] Day-Hickman, 18.
[51] Day-Hickman, 18.
[52] *Bonapartist Suspenders*, c.1815-1820. (Museum of the National Archives, Paris).

created had censorship or patronage did not play a role.

France in the Nineteenth Century was a nation rife in political turmoil, with ample bloodshed and revolutions to determine its ruler. As such, it is not a surprise that Louis XVIII chose to consolidate his reign through the incorporation of visual imagery which solidified the link of their family to France's ruling dynasties. One can first witness this within the reign of Napoléon I itself, and his systematic use of art as a tool of propaganda. The Restoration removed these depictions in favour of that which supported Bourbon rule (an example being the removal of Chaudet's statue to create King Henri IV on Pont Neuf). Artists such as Vernet with a personal fortune may not have been greatly influenced by patrons, and indeed censorship itself, but others who relied on commissions would perhaps have adapted their artworks.[53] This, however, may not have had such an impact on prints which were not commissioned, such as those by Pellerin. One cannot accumulate an understanding of how the French populace received images of Napoleon and his legacy solely through prints primarily targeting the lower classes. The certain biases within the artworks discussed throughout this article create an almost impossible task of drawing a solid conclusion, and one which becomes only a workable theory.

It would not be imprudent to allude that events during the Restoration directly influenced certain artworks, however. The death of Napoléon in 1821 can be linked to the production of artworks that depicted this moment, forever cementing it within French popular memory. Napoléon III would rely on this in subsequent years. Béranger's song *Les Souvenirs du Peuple* influenced prints under the Bourbon Restoration, and later the July Monarchy, demonstrating the popularity of this ballad and leading one to assume that there was a large market for such representations of Napoléon. There is no definitive visual representation of Napoléon, it adapts and changes face over time. With a multitude of factors influencing these works, one merely concludes that the image of Napoléon I became an idealised symbol of the 1789 Revolution in Restoration France which ultimately transitioned to one which represented France's former Imperial glory. It was censored and shaped to serve the agendas of the many regimes of Nineteenth Century France, whilst an icon of a legendary 'man of the people' for French peasantry.

[53] Harkett and Hornstein, 7.

Smallpox Vaccination in Napoleonic Italy (1800-1814)

by Alex Grab

Smallpox vaccination constituted the most important medical innovation during the transition from the 18th into the 19th century and an important reason for the decline in child mortality. This article studies vaccination policy, its implementation, and consequences during the Napoleonic rule over the northern Italian state of Republic and Kingdom of Italy.[1] It explores vaccination laws and regulations, their enforcement by administrators and physicians, the clergy's role in enforcing the policy, the public reaction, the difficulties the government confronted, and how it tried to solve those problems. The study tries to prove that the Napoleonic state created an effective vaccination apparatus that immunized tens of thousands of people annually. The article sheds light on health care policies, a topic that is largely neglected in Napoleonic scholarship. Moreover, it enhances our understanding of the build-up and functioning of the Napoleonic central state and the means it used to enforce the law. Using a major health policy, this study will demonstrate how the Napoleonic state became increasingly powerful, effective, and intrusive in people's life, forcing them to recognize its existence and obey its orders. While the Napoleonic rule created the strong central machinery, the key to success of vaccination was the commitment and hard work of hundreds, if not thousands, of municipal officials, physicians, and clergymen. In sum, state and local officials combined forces to advance a highly important health policy.

I

Smallpox was a terrible disease.[2] During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it killed hundreds of thousands of Europeans annually, leaving many survivors disfigured and sometimes blind. Children were especially vulnerable. In May 1796, the English physician Edward Jenner discovered a cure when he performed the first successful vaccination by injecting cowpox virus into James Phipps, an eight-year-old boy. Jenner had learned from local dairy maids that people who had contracted the harmless cowpox were immune to smallpox. In 1798, after testing his discovery on more people, Jenner published his findings in a booklet, *An*

[1] This article uses documents in Italian state archives in Bergamo, Bologna, Mantua, Novara, and Verona: Archivio di Stato di Bergamo (henceforward, ASBe); Archivio di Stato di Bologna (ASBo); Archivio di Stato di Mantova (ASMa); Archivio di Stato di Novara (ASNo); Archvio di Stato di Verona (ASVe).

[2] On the history of smallpox, see Ian Glynn & Jenifer Glynn, *The Life and Death of Smallpox* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004); Donald Hopkins, *The Greatest Killer Smallpox in History* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983).

Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of variolae vaccinae, a Disease Discovered in some of the Western Counties of England, Particularly in Gloucestershire, and Known by the Name of Cowpox. In it he concluded that "Cowpox protects the human constitution from the infection of smallpox."

Jenner's book was quickly translated into several languages, and physicians began performing vaccination throughout Europe.

Jenner's discovery drew much attention in Napoleonic France, where the authorities laid the foundations of national vaccination.[3] As a French historian pointed out "For the first time in our history, the state confirmed its determination to direct a set of health operations by means of coherent and skillful measures."[4] Napoleon encouraged the population to get immunized, although he never proclaimed it mandatory. In May 1811, the Emperor ordered Henri-Marie Husson, one of the chief French physicians, to vaccinate his son shortly after his birth. In 1800, the government organized the *Comité central de vaccine,* consisting of medical and administrative personnel, to combat smallpox nationwide. It opened a vaccination hospital in Paris. Provincial *comités* were established and physicians began immunization under the supervision of Department *officiers de santé*, who ordered hospices, charity institutions, and *lycées* to vaccinate all individuals. The clergy assisted too, presenting vaccination as "a precious gift of God." In 1804 Napoleon introduced vaccination for army recruits. In 1809, the government published the first vaccination decree, allocating a vaccination budget. The diffusion of Jenner's vaccination procedure in France had positive effects on infant and child mortality.[5] In the last five years of the Empire, one out of two newborns was vaccinated in half the departments, and the number of smallpox cases dropped to about one-quarter of the pre-revolutionary number.[6]

In the Italian peninsula public officials and physicians began applying Jenner's method in 1800. This coincided with the Napoleonic geopolitical transformation of the peninsula and the launching of comprehensive reform policy. Smallpox vaccination was the most important public health program the Napoleonic authorities established. In 1800, Luigi Careno, a

[3] On vaccination in Napoleonic France, see Hervé Bazin, The Eradication of Smallpox. Edward Jenner and the First and Only Eradication of a Human Infectious Disease (San Diego & London, Academic, 2000), 94-103; Yves Marie Bercé, Le chaudron et la lancette. Croyance populaires et médecine préventif (1798-1830) (Paris, Presses de la Renaissance, 1984) 15-43; Jean Francois Lemaire, La médecine napoléonienne, (Paris, Nouveau Monde Editions/Fondation Napoléon, 2003), 64-66.

[4] Darmon, La longue traque de la Variole. Les pionniers de la médecine preventive (Paris, Librairie Académique Perrin, 1986), 207.

[5] Louis Bergeron, *France under Napoleon* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1981), 112.

[6] Lemaire, *Le médecine,* 66.

physician from Pavia, translated Jenner's book into Italian. In 1800, Michele Buniva, the top health official in Piedmont, introduced the Jennerian method into that region and worked tirelessly to disseminate vaccination there under Napoleon. Napoleon's sister Elisa, the enlightened ruler of Lucca-Piombino, was the first European ruler to introduce obligatory vaccination.[7] In 1808 the Tuscan governing *Giunta* created a central Vaccination Committee in Florence, increasing their number to 18,834 in 1810 and 21,255 in 1811.[8] In Naples, King Joseph Bonaparte instituted a Central Committee of Vaccination and published vaccination rules in May 1807.[9] Under his successor, Joachim Murat, vaccination commissions operated in each province.

II

Following his victory over the Austrians at Marengo (June 1800) and the restoration of the French rule in northern Italy, Napoleon established the Second Cisalpine Republic (1800-01). In January 1802, he altered it into the Republic of Italy with him as its president. In 1805 following his crowning as the French emperor, Napoleon transformed the Italian Republic into the Kingdom of Italy with him as its king. The Italian Kingdom lasted until the collapse of the Napoleonic rule in April 1814. It consisted of Lombardy, Veneto, Modena, Novara, parts of the Papal State including the cities of Bologna, Ferrara, and the region of the Marche, and Alto Adige (South Tyrol).

Vaccinations began during the Second Cisalpine Republic (1800-1) in northern Italy. Luigi Sacco, the chief Italian vaccination official stressed in 1801 "vaccination will contribute to the increase of the population, which is the source of force and riches of nations." Sacco performed hundreds of vaccinations and issued a 28-article immunization program. On 9 May 1804, the Vice-President of the Republic of Italy Melzi issued a thirteen-article decree that created the foundations of the vaccination policy for the duration of Napoleonic rule.[10] The decree created a centralized and uniform structure, designed "to prevent the fatal effects of smallpox by rendering vaccination general and common (to all)." It set up a General Director of Vaccination to supervise vaccinations throughout the state. Prominent physicians, called *delegati,* oversaw the vaccination activity of physicians in the country. They reported on progress and difficulties to the Director, who dispatched the information to the government. Municipal officials were responsible for vaccination in their towns (*comuni*), and,

[7] Bercé, *Le chaudron*, 65-66.

[8] Yves Marie Bercé, "L'introduction de la vaccination antivariolique en Toscane, 1801-1815," in Ivano Tognarini (ed.), *La Toscana nell'età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica* (Naples, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1985), 596-611.

[9] Piero Pierri, "Le vaccinazioni antivariolose nel Regno delle Due Sicilie" in "*Archvio storico per le provincie napoleotane,*" CVI (1988), 409-10.

[10] Bollettino delle leggi della Repubblica italiana (henceforward, Bdl) (1804), 573-75.

with the help of priests, had to report all outbreaks of smallpox and quarantine the infected. Violators of quarantine were punished with up to forty days in jail. Significantly, the poor received free vaccination. The edict established no obligatory vaccination but spelled out that children without vaccination were not admitted to elementary school, while poor families with unvaccinated members were blocked from getting welfare. The Interior Minister was the highest authority in enforcing the rules.

Soon, the government expanded the public health rules and administration. On 13 November 1804 it formed a central health care body, *Magistrato centrale di sanità* in the Interior Ministry to run public health policies throughout the state.[11] The *Magistrato* was designed to process information it received from departments' prefects and advise the Interior Minister. One of its main duties was to prevent the spread of epidemics from other states. People who endangered public health could be sentenced to long prison terms and even the death penalty. On 5 September 1806, the Kingdom proclaimed its most advanced and organic health organization in a detailed edict that increased the health bureaucracy, tightened its rules, and strengthened state control over the medical and pharmaceutical professions.[12] Medical police (*polizia medica*), with branches at the three universities at Pavia, Bologna, and Padua, consisting of medical faculty, physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists, supervised the activities of the medical professions and granted them licenses. Citizens who reported on contagious diseases received monetary rewards.

III

As in France, the Kingdom's Interior Minister was the highest authority in charge of enforcing the health policy. Interior Ministers Ludovico di Breme (1806-9) and Luigi Vaccari (1809-1814) were experienced officials who exerted great efforts in executing the vaccination rules. Every year they sent numerous letters and instructions to prefects, urging them to implement the rules efficiently and to supervise local officials. They repeatedly reminded prefects of the regulations and stressed the benefits of vaccination. They received reports from prefects on outbreaks of smallpox, difficulties they faced, and measures to overcome them. For example, in May 1806, Di Breme sent a letter to prefect Antonio Cossoni (Mincio) stating:

> "Among the beneficial objects that concern the Viceroy, vaccination occupies a distinct place, and he wishes that this precious discovery would extend to every part of the Kingdom, hence he ordered me to use

[11] *Bdl* (1804), 951-53 and 954-56.

[12] *Bdl* (1806), 923-41; Carlo Zaghi, *L'Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisalpina al Regno* (Turin, UTET, 1986), 436-37.

> the most efficient means to that effect."[13]

The Interior Minister then ordered Cossoni to watch health officials and cooperate with the Director of Vaccination when he visited his department. In August 1811, Vaccari exhorted prefect Michele Vismara (Mincio) to inoculate not only babies but also unvaccinated adults, whose number remained "considerable."[14] The *Magistrato centrale di sanità* assisted the Interior Minister, prodding prefects to pursue vaccination effectively and send back information about their efforts.[15]

Luigi Sacco (1769-1836), the General Director of Vaccination (*Direttore generale della vaccinazione*), contributed more than any other administrator to the successful execution of Jenner's method in Italy.[16] A physician himself and a strong advocate of the Enlightenment, Sacco performed his first vaccination on five children in the autumn 1800, and soon became the chief vaccination official in the Second Cisalpine Republic. He had discovered an indigenous cowpox virus in Lombard herds and sent some of the matter to Jenner. In 1802 he was appointed as the vaccination director in the Republic of Italy, a position he held until 1809. Sacco was an exemplary state administrator, totally devoted to his profession and to guaranteeing the accessibility of vaccination to all citizens. On 17 March 1810, Melzi wrote Viceroy Eugène "The introduction and propagation of vaccination are exclusively due to him."[17] Sacco corresponded with prefects and physicians, issued circulars, and supplied departments with vaccine. Most importantly, he visited departments numerous times to vaccinate, teach, and help organize an effective immunization system. For example, in late October 1804, he vaccinated 240 citizens at Imola (Reno), and in June 1806 he traveled to Mantua and Verona to do the same.[18] A letter he sent to Reno in October 1804 illustrates his efforts:

> I came here to make sure that everything is implemented correctly. The government exerted much effort to achieve good results. The civilian and ecclesiastical authorities need to combine efforts... Make sure that priests embrace the vaccination and enforce the decree of 9 May.[19]

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[13] ASMa. *PdMS*, *b*. 988, 10 May 1806.

[14] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 988, 22 August 1811

[15] ASNo, *PdA*, *b*. 1893, Letter to prefect of Agogna, 24 May 1806.

[16] Luigi Belloni, "La medicina a Milano dal Settecento al 1915," in *Storia di Milano*, XVI (Milan, Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri, 1960), 960-70; id. "Luigi Sacco e la diffusione del vaccino in Italia," in *Annales cisalpine d'histoire sociale*," 4 (1973), 39-48.

[17] Melzi to Eugène, letters 17 March 1810 & 16 April 1813, in *I carteggi di Francesco Melzi d'Eril Duca di Lodi. Il Regno d'Italia*, ed. Carlo Zaghi, (Milan, Museo del Risogimento, 1965), 128 AND 394.

[18] ASBo, *PdRS*, 1804, Tit: 25 Rub*:* 5-10, Cancelliere of Imola, 1 November 1804.

[19] ASBo, *PdRS*, 1804, Tit: 25 Rub*:* 5-10, Cancelliere of Imola, October 1804.

He also traveled to assist physicians outside the Kingdom, including in Florence (1805), Lucca, and Genoa (1807). Sacco also vaccinated three children of the Kingdom's Viceroy Eugène.

Sacco wrote two books on vaccination. In his first work, *Osservazioni pratiche sull'uso del vajuolo vaccino* (*Practical Observations of the use of smallpox vaccination*) published in 1801, Sacco presented the history of smallpox and explained how to practice the Jennerian method by describing three hundred vaccinations he had performed. In 1809, Sacco produced a second book, *Il Trattato di vaccinazione,* (*The treatment of vaccination*) which presented numerous observations and suggestions on the implementation of vaccination. His goal, he stressed was "to render the practice of vaccination as common as possible and propose secure norms to those who will perform it" and to silence slanderers who spread "fairy tales that harm humanity." Ambitiously, he stated: "I hope that the government of the *Regno* serves as a model to other nations in conducting the practice of vaccine at a level that nobody else has reached." He estimated that one and a half million vaccinations were performed under his watch. His unrelenting efforts, expertise, and efficiency gained Sacco a great reputation throughout Europe. He continued to serve as a major health official until 1832.

In the departments prefects and *Commissioni dipartimentali di sanità* supervised vaccination. By the time the Kingdom was established (1805), most prefects were experienced, devoted to their career, and loyal to the Napoleonic regime.[20] Prefects presided over departmental health *Commissione* and served as the liaison between the Interior Minister and municipalities. Their primary goals were to enforce vaccinations and prevent outbreaks of smallpox. They routinely dispatched instructions to municipalities and physicians and received information about vaccination results, difficulties *comuni* faced, and eruptions of smallpox. They dispatched this information to the Interior Minister. Prefects constantly praised the benefits of vaccination and dismissed skeptics. Somenzari (Reno) insisted that "'Theory and practice (of vaccination) match so decisively that any doubt would offend reason and nature," while Cornalia (Serio) labeled it "one of the most beneficial (discoveries) for human beings."[21] Prefects were assisted by departmental *Commissioni di sanità*, who received lists of vaccinees from local authorities and passed them to the government. They also processed

[20] Livio Antonielli, I prefetti dell'Italia napoleonica Repubblica e Regno d'Italia (Bologna, il Mulino,1983), 229-536.

[21] ASBo, *PdRS*, 1804, Tit: 25, Rub: 5-10, *b.* 20 October 1804; ASBe, *PdSS*, *b.* 1240, 23 March 1813.

information about outbreaks of smallpox and vaccination.

IV

The key to successful vaccination was the cooperation and daily activity of municipal officials, physicians, and priests, who implemented the policy locally. In 1809, Di Breme declared: "The communal administrations need to supervise and assure that the benefits of vaccination are not lost,"[22] while Cornalia (Mincio) stated that without the zeal of municipal functionaries, "smallpox would reappear and through it deformity, disease, and death."[23]

Prefects and departmental *Commissioni* initiated the implementation of vaccination by dispatching orders to municipalities. On 28 September 1807, the *Commissione* of Lario ordered the communes to prepare for the upcoming vaccination, provide assistance to vaccinators, order priests to inform their flocks, and assure that lists of vaccinees would be completed properly.[24] While immunization could be performed at any time of the year, the authorities preferred the mild spring and autumn since the summer heat damaged the vaccine and physicians had difficulties reaching remote communities in the winter. Immunization took place in hospitals, priests' homes, and in town halls. However, cowpox matter was not easily available everywhere. Prefects sometimes sent matter to each other. Most municipalities resorted to the arm-to-arm method (*braccio a braccio*), transferring matter from one person to another.[25] In 1809, the Interior Minister instructed:

> "Vaccination will be executed from arm to arm, a method that is safe and will prevent the spread of bad vaccine...; I propose that this healthy operation is done from town to town starting with the department's capital."[26]

Usually, towns sent a child to a major city to get vaccinated and then used the vaccine they removed from that child. In 1807, the mayor of Maccaretolo (Reno) sent a "healthy and robust child" to Cento to be vaccinated, and then used the vaccine to immunize 34 children.[27]

Municipal authorities established several vaccination dates during the year. For example, Volta (Mincio) had four vaccination days between 22 April and 19 May 1811 and vaccinated 76 people, while Bozzolo (Mincio) had 16 days between 14 March and 9 November to vaccinate 56 more.[28] Shortly before vaccination day, town officials announced time and place of

[22] ASNo., *PdA*, *b*. 1895, 9 March 1809.
[23] ASBe, *PdSS*, *b*. 1240, 23 March 1813.
[24] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1894.
[25] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b*. 1807, Tit: 25 Rub: 1-11, a dateless decree by Mosca; ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 988, prefect of Mincio, 16 July 1807.
[26] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 988, 2 May 1809.
[27] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b*. 1807, Tit: 25 Rub: 1-11, Mayor to prefect, 23 November 1807.
[28] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 991.

immunization and names of physicians. On 2 June 1806, Filippini Savio, the *podestà* of Mantua, announced that vaccination would take place on Saturday, 7 June, at the houses of local priests.[29] He ordered priests to announce it from the pulpit two days before the vaccination date, and on that date to ring their church's bell to signal to parishioners to come to their house. Newborns had to be vaccinated within six months after birth, although many parents waited longer. Once vaccinations were completed, mayors reported the results to prefects. The *delegati* dispatched lists of vaccinees, with name of each vaccinee, age, father's name, name of parish, and outcome to the departmental *commissione* who sent them to the *Magistrato centrale*.

By far most of the vaccinees were infants up to three years old. Still, some adults were vaccinated as well. Italian archives contain numerous reports by local officials about successful vaccinations in various communities. In November 1804 the mayor of Castel S. Pietro (Reno) stated,

> "I stimulated the physicians and surgeons to promote vaccination…I am pleased to say that in less than one month 130 people were vaccinated. The local physician assigned one day a week to vaccinate people free of charge… I hope that this will extend considerably the progress of such a useful discovery."[30]

On 6 November 1807 Giuseppe Aloisi of Castel Fiuminese (Reno) reported good outcome and wrote to prefect Mosca,

> "government's orders were completed. Aside from publishing an *avviso,* I have written to the priests four times urging them to tell their parishioners to obey government's orders… I personally visited many homes to convince inhabitants to observe the rules."[31]

In 1813 the *podestà* of Varallo (Agogna) reported a "delightful outcome" due to the hard work of physicians, surgeons, and priests.[32]

Many physicians and surgeons demonstrated expertise and commitment and contributed significantly to the progress of vaccination. In June 1804, Giorgio Facconi reported that in two and a half months he had vaccinated 300 people in twelve towns in the departments of Mincio, Mella, and Alto Po.[33] In 1808, Paldi vaccinated 671 at Robbio (Agogna) while Brogoli vaccinated 505 at Cannobio.[34] Communities with no medical personnel hired physicians to perform vaccinations and paid them travel expenses and a fixed honorarium per vaccinee.

[29] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 989.

[30] ASBo, *PdRS, b*. 1804, Tit: 25 Rub: 5-10, 23 November 1804.

[31] ASBo, *PdRS, b*. 1807, Tit: 25 Rub: 1-11.

[32] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1896, 16 April 1813.

[33] ASMa. *PdMS*, *b*. 988.

[34] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1895, a table dated 14 December 1808.

Many priests also played an important role in executing the vaccination. The government also ordered clergymen to preach obedience to military conscription law.[35] Priests were expected to combat ignorance, and prejudices and convince their flocks to cooperate. Officials exhorted clergy to persuade their parishioners to obey the law, particularly to immunize their children. On 16 June 1804, Giovanni Bovara, the Minister of Religion, ordered the bishops to instruct priests to support vaccination, stating that "the government justly requests their cooperation to remove the obstacles that vulgar prejudices pose to its beneficial propagation."[36] Shortly thereafter, Bovara wrote to the bishops of Reno and Rubicone that "The voice of the priests can suitably persuade the insecure and reluctant parishioners to get vaccination whose fortunate effect many people already feel throughout the Republic."[37] Departmental officials also stressed the Church's role. An *avviso* in Serio (1804) ordered priests to try and persuade parents to vaccinate their children.[38] Municipal administrators ordered priests to announce the time and place of upcoming vaccinations and explain the benefits of vaccination. The higher clergy cooperated with the government. The apostolic *provicario* of Reno, Preposto della Volpe, declared, "It is my religious duty to stimulate all the priests in this diocese to animate among the lower classes a firm persuasion of such a healthy remedy."[39] Most priests complied with those orders and provided the necessary assistance. Officials praised their help in promoting vaccination. The *cancelliere* of Castel Pietro (Reno) stated, "Priests use all their influence to persuade the idiots (to be vaccinated)."[40] Ecclesiastical support is not surprising since clerics were aware of the devastating effects of smallpox on their flocks and recognized the vaccine's value.

V

Despite the obvious benefits of vaccination, its implementation met with difficulties and opposition that slowed down the program and sometime even impeded it in various towns. In 1810 prefect Smancini (Adige) complained that, while many people in his department got vaccinated, "quite a few communities remained unvaccinated. Instructions were not fulfilled everywhere."[41] Officials expressed

[35] Alexander Grab, "Army State and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)" in *The Journal of Modern History*, 67, (1995), 49.

[36] *Foglio Officiale della Repubblica italiana*, (1804), 81-82. In Napoleonic France, see Dramon, *La longue*, 205-06; In the Rhineland the Catholic hierarchy played the same role. Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 147.

[37] ASBo, *PdRS*, 1804, *b.* Tit: 25 Rub: 5-10, 1804, 19 November 1804.

[38] ASBe, *PdSS, b.* 1240, Prefect of Serio, 23 July 1804.

[39] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b.* 1804, Tit. 25 Rub: 5-10, 27 October 1804.

[40] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b.* 1804, Tit: 25 Rub: 5-10, 2 November 1804.

[41] ASVe, *CmV*, *b.* 285, 17 September, 1810.

disappointment with parents' reluctance to have their children immunized. In October 1807, the *podestà* of Novara expressed frustration, stating "I feel huge displeasure with the parents who don't take advantage of this great benefit."[42]

Ignorance and fear by many parents constituted the most common hindrances. Surgeon Fernando Launa reported that "considerable aversion" in Vogogna (Agogna) left many unvaccinated: "People don't understand and are not properly informed about the importance of vaccination."[43] The *podestá* of Goito (Mincio) stated, "People are very prejudiced."[44] While ignorance and fear certainly existed, it is very possible that some local officials exaggerated its prevalence to hide their ineffectiveness.

Poverty and a shortage of medical personnel in impoverished communities particularly in mountainous areas, hindered vaccination as well. Often, they had to hire outsiders to perform vaccination and pay them, an expense they could barely afford. At times they could not find anybody to carry out immunization. In late 1808 prefect Cossoni (Mincio) commented, "the lack of vaccine and physicians are the reasons why vaccination was not performed in certain communities."[45] The Interior Minister asked prefects to assist poor villages, yet funds were not always available. In sum, while the law stated that vaccination would be accessible to all citizens, poverty of some towns impeded that goal.

Lack of vaccine constituted another obstacle. In September 1807, the *Commissione* of Reno reported that children arrived in Bologna for the arm-to-arm procedure, but no material was available, and they returned home unvaccinated.[46] In 1809, the Interior Minister pointed out that "lack of vaccine" constituted a problem in Agogna and Mincio.[47] The authorities also reported that physicians had to postpone vaccination of sick children. Smancini reported that in three towns in the department of Adige children were too ill to be vaccinated in 1810.[48]

Public disorder also disrupted vaccination. Uprisings in several departments in 1809[49] prevented its execution in various places. In December 1809, the vice-prefect of Cento (Reno) reported that vaccination did not take place in several towns due to brigand attacks.[50] The *podestà* of Mantua claimed that many families left that city during the

[42] ASNo, *PdA*, *b*. 1894, 28 October 1807.
[43] ASNo, *PdA*, *b*. 1895, 18 February 1811.
[44] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 989, 30 December 1810.
[45] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 989, 31 December 1808.
[46] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b*. 1807, Tit: 25 Rub: 1-11, 17 September 1807.
[47] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1895, 2 May 1809; ASMan, *PdM*, *b*. 991, 2 May 1809.
[48] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1895, 9 March 1811.
[49] On the 1809 uprising, see Alexander Grab, "State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy," in *European History Quarterly*, 25, 1, (January 1995), 39-70.
[50] ASBo, *PdRS*, *b*. 1809, Tit: 25 Rub: 1-7, 31 December 1809.

Franco-Austrian War (1809), thus making vaccination scarce.[51] Bad weather also played a role in preventing vaccination efforts. Flooded roads hindered physicians from reaching towns. Not surprisingly, lack of adequate efforts by some administrators and physicians hindered vaccination too. In February 1809, the Minister of Interior wrote that physicians and surgeons in Bergamo failed to perform vaccination with "zeal" and ordered to dismiss "those who refused to execute vaccination and fomented sinister opinions."[52] Inexperience and ignorance of the Jennerian method caused delays during the early years of the Republic. As for physicians, facing reluctant parents who refused to immunize their children, travel fatigue, and most importantly, lack of adequate monetary compensation, explain their lack of commitment.

Aside from confronting vaccination problems, municipalities also had to deal with outbreaks of smallpox. Prefects sent very strict instructions to municipalities regarding the treatment of such cases. They had to quarantine the house of the infected person, restrict him to one room, and allow only one person and an appointed physician to approach the ill person. Twenty days after the desiccation of the smallpox pustules, the physician was authorized to lift the quarantine if he judged the patient healthy. When freed, the latter needed to be carefully washed and clothing had to be cleansed or burnt. Mayors sent physicians to inoculate contagious neighborhoods. In early 1806 and again in October 1810, Mantua experienced a number of smallpox cases, the latter originating from sick soldiers in a military hospital.[53] In July 1810, the *podestà* of Bologna, Tavecchi, reported about fifteen members of poor families, mostly children, who had contracted the disease and asked for permission to place them in the former convent of Lazzaretto until they recovered.[54] He sent vaccinators to the contagious areas, ordered the cleaning of the houses of the diseased, and stressed that "The utmost vigilance be maintained so that no abuse is introduced and the entire operation is taking place according to health discipline." The Interior Minister approved his request.

State and departmental officials invested considerable effort to improve vaccination and overcome obstacles. They tried to convince local officials to do their utmost by stressing the benefits of vaccination and the general support it received from enlightened governments. Sacco's diligent activity and his recurrent visits to various departments to vaccinate people himself and organize vaccination programs played a major role in such efforts. The Interior

[51] ASMa, *PdMS*, *b*. 989, 2 February 1810, & 28 December 1809.

[52] ASBe, *PdSS*, *b*. 1240, 24 February 1809.

[53] ASMa, *PdMS, b*. 988, *Commissione di sanità*,, 20 March 1806; *Podestà* Gelmetti, 24 December 1810.

[54] ASBo, *PdRS, b*. 1810, *Tit:* 25 *Rub:* 1-7, 14 July 1810.

Ministers constantly urged prefects to ensure that mayors apply the rules faithfully. The authorities also used threats, warning parents that unvaccinated children would not be able to attend public schools and that they would not get welfare benefits. In 1811, Agogna's prefect ordered municipalities to give a monetary award of five lire to the first vaccinee in each town.[55] The *podestà* of Novara, Gautieri, warned teachers that they would be fined, and their schools would be closed if they admitted unvaccinated children.[56]

VI

How successful were the authorities in overcoming the obstacles and in implementing an effective vaccination policy in the Italian Republic-Kingdom? Difficulties persisted despite the government's efforts to overcome them. Prejudices diminished but did not vanish, while scarcity of vaccine in distant communities continued. Generally, cities and major towns, where medical personnel were larger, fared better than the countryside. Not all local administrators showed the same degree of effort, good will, and hard work hence vaccination results were uneven throughout the Kingdom of Italy. Departments did not always show persistent progress. In Agogna the number of vaccinations rose to 26.540 in 1811, and then plummeted to 6801 in 1812.[57]

And yet, statements by public officials, reports by municipal administrators and physicians, numerous rosters of vaccinees, and statistical evidence demonstrate that as time progressed the Napoleonic government ran an increasingly effective vaccination system. In 1806 Melchiorre Gioia, the well-known Lombard economist and head of the Kingdom's Office of Statistics stated: "vaccination is promoted efficiently by the government and is welcomed by fathers and expands almost daily, (thereby) diminishing mortality...."[58] In 1811 the Interior Minister wrote that the viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais, was very pleased with the 1810 vaccination.[59]

Nowhere throughout the Italian peninsula had vaccinators achieved better results than in the Republic and Kingdom of Italy. In his Treatise on Vaccination he published in 1809, Sacco proudly estimated that by that year the authorities had performed 1,500,000 vaccinations, thereby saving the lives of 150,000 (10%) people.[60] Melzi repeated the same data in March and April 1810 in two letters to Eugène.[61] Available statistical data clearly establishes that the authorities improved the performance of

[55] ASNo. *b.* 1896, 9 March 1811.

[56] ASNo. *PdA*, *b.* 1895, an undated *avviso*.

[57] ASNo. *PdA*, *b.* 1896, 31 March 1813.

[58] Renato Zangheri, "La popolazione italiana in età napoleonica" in *Bollettino del museo del Risorgimento*, VIII (1963), 46.

[59] ASNo. *PdA*, *b.* 1896, 21 August 1811.

[60] Giorgio Cosmacini, Soigner et réformer. Médecine et santé en Italie de la grande peste à la première guerre mondiale (Paris, Payot,1982), 283.

[61] Zaghi, *I carteggi*, 128, 394.

vaccination and annually immunized thousands of people in each department.

Prefect Smancini reported that in 1810 Adige had 11,346 births and 16,900 vaccinations, stating that "results have never been so good."[62] Moreover, no case of smallpox erupted in Adige in that year. In the department of Reno, by the end of 1810, 13,224 out of 14,684 inhabitants (90%) at Imola and 2527 out of 2,987 (84%) at Vergato were immunized.[63] In 1812, the last Napoleonic year for which general statistics exist the number of vaccinations amounted to 194,286 statewide,[64] the highest annual number under the Napoleonic regime, and certainly the best indication of improved execution of the immunization policy. Among the departments this article examined, Reno performed the best with 13,294; Adige had 9.352; Serio, 6,917; Mincio, 6,876; and Agogna, 6,801.[65]

The Napoleonic authorities created the foundations of a modern centralized state in northern Italy. Indeed, many institutions and policies that govern present-day Italy "were born or assumed a clear physiognomy" during the *ventennio Francese* (The French twenty years).[66] They include military conscription, uniform taxation, legal codes, and a primary and secondary school system. This article provides ample proof that one needs to add to that list vaccination against smallpox, the most significant public health policy of the Napoleonic government. It is a major example of the increasingly effective centralized state during the *epoca francese*. The Napoleonic authorities created the vaccination system, including the laws, administration, and personnel designed to enforce the vaccination policy. Through bureaucratic perseverance, state and departmental officials applied this policy consistently in everyday life. They proclaimed decrees, dispatched numerous letters inducing and promoting vaccination at the local level, exerted efforts to overcome resistance and educate the public, turned clergy into civil servants in order to convince the people to follow the law, gathered statistical information on vaccination performance, and took measures to isolate cases of smallpox and prevent the disease from spreading. Luigi Sacco, a pioneer in the battle against smallpox, represented the exemplary state health official, doing everything in his power to assure the success of the program. However, to succeed, this policy needed the close cooperation of local administration and health personnel. Indeed, on the ground, the hard daily work and commitment of

[62] ASNo. *PdA*, *b*. 1896, 9 March 1811.

[63] ASBo. *PdRS*, *b*. 1810, *Tit:* 25 *Rub:* 1-7, Tables of vaccinations.

[64] Zangheri, "La popolazione," appendice IV, Regno italico popolazione, nati, morti e matrimoni negli anni 1810, 1811, 1812 e vaccinati nel 1812.

[65] Zangheri, "La popolazione,"

[66] Carlo Capra, *L'età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica in Italia 1796-1815* (Turin, Loescher Editore, 1978) 12.

hundreds, if not thousands, of local administrators, physicians, surgeons, and numerous clergymen turned that policy into a reality and into an annual routine that people gradually learned to expect.



Medal by Bertrand Andrieu, c.1804. Société pour l'extinction de la petite vérole en France par la propagation de la vaccine, 14 germinal an XII (4 avril 1804). Diameter: 4.2 cm. Musée Carnavalet, Histoire de Paris.



La Vaccine en Voyage by an anonymous artist. Musée Carnavalet, Histoire de Paris.

Jenner chases death from Parisian streets as vaccinated children play at the feet of a bankrupt inoculator and his closed premises. Paris, c. 1800. Wellcome Library, London.

"What We've Got Here Is Failure to Communicate": Marshal Ney and Napoleon in Poland

by Wayne Hanley, Ph.D.

Michel Ney, "the bravest of the brave," remains perhaps the most fascinating of Napoleon's marshals, not necessarily because of the heroic feats associated with his name—his role in the Russian campaign secured his place in posterity—but because of the twenty-six, he may be the most human. While a gifted corps commander and without peer in a rearguard action, his penchant for leading from the front could cause him to lose sight of the bigger tactical picture and make mistakes that would cost him a battle (as at Dennewitz). While his pride could certainly lead to conflict with his fellow marshals, he tempered that pride with introspection and caution, repeatedly turning down promotions because he did not think he was ready for higher command even though his superiors did. His temper was notorious (perhaps it was the stereotypical redhead in him): As one of his junior officers noted, "he knew not how to administer a calm reprimand. He either said nothing or else exceeded all bounds." Yet his former aide-de-camp the Duc de Montesquiou-Fezensac also noted, "despite this violence of character, his heart was good, his spirit perfectly just, his judgment sound; very precious qualities in a soldier."[1] It was this goodness of heart and spirit which his soldiers and the majority of colleagues saw and which inspired them. Simply put, Marshal Ney, though incredibly talented and among the bravest of Napoleon's soldiers, like all of us, was a flawed individual, and it is that humanity and how he responded to challenges, not just the high points of his career, that makes him so interesting. One of those challenges would occur during the Polish campaign of 1806-07 when Ney "disobeyed" Napoleon's orders, precipitating the Russian offensive that would set off a chain of events, culminating in the Battle of Eylau. The question is: Did Ney actually disobey the Emperor's orders?

Over the last 200 years, historians have taken great delight in denigrating Marshal Michel Ney, attributing to him all sorts of negative behaviours, one of which is that he sometimes wilfully disobeyed orders, often undoing Napoleon's visionary strategies. This vilification of one of France's most effective military commanders by those who have almost certainly not engaged in warfare is often the result of either faulty historical research or the hagiographical

[1] Raymond Joseph de Montesquiou-Fezensac, *Souvenirs Militaires de 1804 à 1814* (Paris: Librairie Militaire, 1863),133. See also F. Loraine Petre, *Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-1807* (Barnsley, UK: Greenhill Books, 2001), 43.

adherence to the idea that Napoleon could do no wrong (after all, had not Napoleon, in his magisterial and well-reasoned, St. Helena-based, assessment of his military career, attributed the disaster at Waterloo to Ney's inability to obey orders?). Critical analysis, however, reveals a very different picture. What many of these historians suffer from is either an over reliance on secondary sources in their research or a residual need to 'stay on message' that Napoleon must not be criticised and so blame others for his strategic or tactical errors or from both. Applying a critical analysis also reveals a failure to take into account the realities of the geographical environment, the weather conditions, and the methodologies of communication. A perfect example of this is the usual malignment of Ney over the Polish Campaign of 1806-1807.

The campaign in Poland, in many ways, was really a continuation of the Campaign of 1806 that had led to the destruction of the Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstädt. Following those battles, Ney's VI Corps played a key role in the pursuit of the remnants of the Prussian forces and the siege of Magdeburg which finally capitulated on 7 November, resulting in the surrender of some 18,000 men and earning the Emperor's expressed gratitude. Leaving a garrison in that town, Ney and VI Corps hurried to Berlin to be reviewed by the Emperor and to enjoy a period of respite.[2] By mid-November the strategic situation had changed. Russian General Levin August von Bennigsen had occupied Warsaw, and Napoleon was determined to pursue the last remnants of the Prussian army (General Anton Wilhelm von Lestocq's corps) and prevent their linking up with the Russians. To that end, he set the *Grande Armée* in motion eastward: III

[2] Napoléon to Maréchal Ney, 10 November 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Plon, 1858-1869), No. 11227, XIII, 633; and Napoléon to Maréchal Ney, 11 November 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11239, XIII, 643; L'Empereur au Maréchal Ney, Berlin, 10 novembre 1806 in P. Foucart, *Campagne de Pologne Novembre-décembre 1806 – Janvier 1807 (Pultusk et Golymin) D'après les Archives de la Guerre*, 2 Tomes (Nancy: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1882), I: 82-83; A.H. Atteridge, *Marshal Ney: The Bravest of the Brave* (Barnsley, UK: Greenhill Books, 2005), 96; Raymond Horricks, *Marshal Ney: The Real and the Romance* (Tunbridge Wells, UK: Midas Books, 1982), 78-79; and David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1966), 502. Interestingly Napoleon's Bulletins of the 10th and 12th of November 1806 give two different sets of numbers as to what was captured: In the 30th Bulletin, the Emperor announced the capture of 16,000 men and nearly 80 pieces of artillery; yet in the 31st Bulletin, he announced the capture of 20 generals, 800 officers, 22,000 prisoners and 800 pieces of artillery. See 30e Bulletin de la Grande Armée, 10 November 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11230, XIII, 634-35; and 31e Bulletin de la Grande Armée, 12 November 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11246, XIII, 648-49. See also David Markham, *Imperial Glory: The Bulletins of Napoleon's* Grande Armée*, 1805-1814* (London: Greenhill Books, 2003), 114-15.

Corps was to reposition toward Posen, VII Corps to Driesen, and V Corps to Bromberg; meanwhile I Corps remained in support at Lubeck, with IV Corps at Schwerin, and VI Corps remaining at Magdeburg (and with Marshal Édouard Mortier's VIII Corps at Hanover and Prince Jerome's IX Corps at Glogau).[3] As the operations progressed, on 20 November Ney directed General Jean Marchand's division to move from Berlin to Frankfort-sur-l'Oder, and on 22 November Ney received orders to move his headquarters to Posen within two days.[4] His ultimate destination became clear when on 29 November, Marshal Alexandre Berthier instructed the commander of VI Corps to take up position across from Thorn (in the area of Bromberg), establish a bridgehead there and cross the Vistula.[5] Meanwhile as Napoleon and the lead elements of the *Grande Armée* took position in and around Warsaw, the Russian forces withdrew toward Pultusk.[6]

On 4 December, Ney's Corps arrived near Bromberg (on the left bank of the Vistula just north of Thorn). He established Pierre-Louis Marcognet's 2nd Division at Bromberg and Marchand's 1st Division just south at Schulitz to observe Lestocq's Prussian Corps in Thorn as he prepared for his next moves.[7] After collecting some boats under the shelter of islands in the middle of the already ice-clogged Vistula, on 7 December, Ney conducted a crossing (by boat), commanded by Colonel Charles Savary who led the 6e Légère, the voltigeurs and grenadiers of the 69e Regiment and a detachment of the 14e Regiment against the Prussian rearguard. In the sharp struggle and with the aid of Polish boatmen, Savary's assault drove the Prussians from Thorn, but during the fighting two parts of the bridge over the river were burned, requiring four days to repair. Lestocq and about 4,000 men retreated northward toward Königsberg and Graudenz. Meanwhile with the crossing over the Vistula established, Ney set about restoring the fortifications at Thorn and prepared for the arrival of Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières second cavalry reserve before resuming his own pursuit of Lestocq's Corps.[8] The speed and efficiency with which Ney conducted these operations were noted by the Emperor, who complimented the

[3] Henri Bonnal, *La Vie Militaire de Maréchal Ney*, 3 vols. (Paris: Librarie Militaire R. Chapelot et Compagnie, 1911), II: 316-17; and Chandler, 513-15. Bonnal's work is particularly valuable as it makes extenstive use of archival resources, including Ney's papers, and often quotes verbatim from these sources. As Ney's Memoires end in 1805, Bonnal continues a primary source narrative of Ney up through 1811. Alas Bonnal died in 1917 before his work could be completed.

[4] Bonnal, II: 318

[5] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Posen, 30 novembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 202; and Bonnal, II: 320.

[6] Chandler, 515.

[7] Bonnal, II: 321.

[8] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Thorn, 7 décembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 227; Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Thorn, 7 décembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 245-46; Bonnal, II: 321-22; Petre, 69-70; and Louis Samuel Béchet de Léocour, *Souvenirs* (Paris: Librarie Historique F. Teissèdre, 1999), 272-73.

marshal in his 10 December letter, and was the primary subject of the *40th Bulletin of the Grande Armée*:

> Marshal Ney has crossed the Vistula and entered Thorn on the 6th. He particularly commends Colonel Savary, who headed the 14th Regiment of Infantry and the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the 96th and the 6th Light Infantry, was the first to cross that river. At Thorn he came into action with the Prussians, who, after a light combat, he compelled to evacuate the town. Some were killed, and 20 taken prisoner.
>
> This remarkable affair offers a remarkable trait. The river, 400 *toises* wide, was carrying ice; the boat occupied by our advanced guard was held back by the ice and could not be moved; from the other bank, Polish boatmen started across in the midst of a shower of bullets to help get the vessel afloat. The Prussian boatmen wanted to oppose this. A fistfight ensued between all of them. The Poles succeeded in throwing the Prussians into the water, and guided our boat to the right bank. The Emperor asks the names of these brave fellows to reward them.[9]

That same 10 December letter also instructed Ney to begin a reconnaissance along the Vistula toward Plock and Willenberg (Wielbark), but to be mindful of the large Russian forces in the theater of operations, and not to engage in any unequal fights (and if necessary to retreat on Thorn and back across the Vistula).[10]

The Emperor's plan at this stage of the campaign, according to David Chandler, was to fall on the flank of the Russian forces in a "full-scale *manoevre sur les derrières* in an attempt to cut [their] communications by an onslaught toward the River Narew."[11] Four days later, Napoleon modified his plans, reorganizing the command structure of the *Grande Armée*, informing Ney that he was placing VI Corps, along with Bernadotte's I Corps, Jean Soult's IV Corps and Bessières second cavalry reserve under the command of Marshal Bessières. While the cavalry intercepted communications between Königsberg and Pultusk and pursued the enemy forces as closely as possible, Ney was to establish a hospital and magazines at Thorn, arrange for provisions for 80,000

[9] 40e Bulletin de la Grande Armée, 9 Décembre 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11423, XIV, 70-71. See also Markham, 122-23.

[10] Napoléon au Maréchal Ney, 10 Décembre 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11430, XIV, 76-77; and L'Empereur au Maréchal Ney, Posen, 10 décembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 278-79.

[11] Chandler, 515.

men, and for his sappers to prepare the bridges against winter ice.[12]

Against the more numerous forces of Bessières, the Prussians under Lestocq continued their retreat (toward the Russians), first to Strasburg (Brodnica) then to Lautenberg, leaving a division under Friedrich von Bülow to try to hold the defile at Gurzno. On 19 December, however, Bessières's advanced guard under the command of General Emmanuel Grouchy seized control of Beizun, cutting off the route between the Prussians and the Russians. Lestocq responded by sending a sizeable detachment by way of Soldau (Działdowo) and Kuczborck in an attempt to reopen his link with his allies, but a now-reinforced Grouchy easily beat back this attempt on the 23rd. Meanwhile, Ney's corps had been advancing eastward in support, and on 25 December, Marchand's division encountered more than 6,000 of Lestocq's Prussians at Soldau.[13] Although outnumbered and after some bitter hand-to-hand fighting, Ney's lieutenant was master of the town by early afternoon, capturing 200 prisoners, two cannon and a flag. The nearness of the Marshal and his second division (at Gurzno) and with Marshal Bernadotte fast approaching Mława caused Lestocq to abandon plans for a counter-attack, and the Prussians gave

Marshal Ney (JDM)

up any immediate hopes of linking up with the Russians.[14] Following the combat at Soldau, on 29 December, Ney proposed a disposition of his corps that would allow him to pursue the Prussians and keep the pressure on Lestocq, hoping to capture him and definitively prevent his linking up with

[12] Napoléon au Maréchal Ney, 14 Décembre 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11465, XIV, 107-08; and l'Empereur au Maréchal Ney, Posen, 14 décembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 297-99.

[13] Béchet de Léocour, 277-78.

[14] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Dlutowo (près Zielun), 27 décembre 1806 in Foucart, I: 500-02; Bonnal, II: 338-40; Béchet de Léocour, 278-79; and Petre, 86-88;.

the Russians.[15] So far, Ney's campaign in Poland had been straight forward with few surprises, but things were about to change.

Following a series of combats and battles in the second and third weeks of December 1806, on 29 December Napoleon decided to bring the campaign season to a close and had Berthier send the army into winter quarters.[16] Indeed, in the case of Ney's corps (which was typical for the rest of the army), the campaign had taken a considerable toll. According to A. H Atteridge, "Ney's corps had marched from Nuremberg four months earlier with a fighting strength of 20,000 men. It was reduced to 10,000 though it had lost very few in battle, only the advanced guard being engaged at Jena, and the corps having had no serious fighting since that day."[17] Orders for the army were drawn up and issued to deploy into bivouacs along the eastern banks of the Vistula with Marshal Bernadotte's I Corps the farthest north, at Osterode (where he could cover both the approaches to Königsberg and support the siege at Danzig). To his south was to be Ney's VI Corps, centered around Mława, but his precise cantonments were to be determined by Bernadotte. Interestingly and importantly, Berthier's initial instructions to Ney also acknowledged Ney's earlier proposal to keep pressure on Lestocq and authorized the marshal "if you judge appropriate, to push some troops along the route from Neidenburg to Hohenstein that the Prussian army appears to follow."[18] To the south of Ney was Soult's IV Corps, using Plock as his major supply depot; then came Marshal Charles-Pierre Augereau with Wyszogrod as his base, Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout was next, and finally Marshal Lannes was deployed near Warsaw. Besides giving his army some much needed rest after months of hard marching and the recent battles, perhaps another reason for the cessation of operations was the conditions in Poland. Interestingly about the same time that Napoleon had decided to send his army into winter quarters, the Russians held a Council of War at Nowograd on 2 January 1807 and decided to move north to support the Prussian positions at Königsberg

[15] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Soldau, 28 décembre 1806, 7 heures du soir in Foucart, I: 553-54; and Bonnal, II: 342-43.

[16] Bonnal, II: 345.

[17] Atteridge, 97.

[18] Bonnal, II: 345-46. See also Petre, 118-19; and Chandler, 525-26. Two days later, on 31 December, Ney laid out his play to pursue the Prussians, pushing Marcognet's brigade to Ortlesburg along the grand route to Königsberg with Colbert's cavalry establishing itself at Guttstadt and Marchand's division occupying Hohenstein while Ney would keep his 2nd division with him at his headquarters in Neidenbert. Ney also noted that "after these dispositions, the Prince de Ponte-Corvo, if it was convenable, could direct his troops on the grand route to Koenigsberg." (Bonnal, II: 347-48). Clearly Ney had informed Berthier and Napoleon of his planned operations. It is also interesting to note that Berthier received instructions to "menace" Königsberg from the imperial HQ. See for example Bonnal, II: 348; and John Philippart, *Memoirs and Campaigns of Charles John, Prince Royal of Sweden*. (London: C.J. Barrington. 1814), 116-17.

(apparently even if it meant another possible engagement with French forces).[19]

Poland was unlike any other in which the *Grande Armée* had previously operated and would profoundly affect the morale and operations of the French army. In Northern Italy, Austria and Germany, networks of hardened roads linked towns and cities, making travel easy; and the productivity of farms and villages made foraging and requisitioning of supplies easy for Napoleon's soldiers. This was definitely not the case in the East. Early in the campaign, as Marshal Lannes led the advance guard from Stettin toward Warsaw, for example, he reported back to Napoleon that Poland was "a veritable desert" and that "the country from Stettin to this place is exactly similar to that which we traversed when we marched from Egypt into Syria except that here the sand makes the road even worse. It is impossible to get one day's bread for an army corps here."[20] And if the land could not properly provision the army, the roads provided even less support. Fauvelet de Bourrienne recalls that

> every letter which I received was but a series of complaints of the miserable roads, wherein the army fought, as it were, with the mud; nor, without extreme difficulty, could the artillery and tumbrils be brought forward. I have since been told that the carriage of Talleyrand, whom Napoleon had summoned to headquarters in hopes of concluding a treaty of peace, became so imbedded that the minister stuck fast for nearly twelve hours.[21]

One should remember that this was also before the winter had really set in, as well—that would compound the situation. When that happened, as one French officer remembers, "Poland in the winter is an immense quagmire, along the surface of which are scattered very miserable villages and a few dilapidated farms that the Polish nobility called their chateaus."[22] Indeed by the beginning of December, the situation had become so demoralizing, with numerous reports flooding the imperial headquarters of "the discontent of the troops, … suffering from severe weather, bad roads, and privations of all kinds," that Napoleon made a special proclamation in honor of the anniversary of the Battle of Austerlitz, hoping to raise morale. [23] In a

[19] James R. Arnold and Ralph R. Reinersten, *Crisis in the Snows: Russia Confronts Napoleon—The Eylau Campaign, 1806-1807* (Lexington, VA: Napoleon Books, 2007), 200-02; and Chandler 529. About a week later, Russian patrols captured orders from Ney to Colbert, revealing the presence of VI Corps near Königsberg, and General Bennigsen, now in overall command of the Russian army, resolved to attack Ney's isolated corps. It was this that event that would set of a chain of events that would eventually culminate in the Battle of Eylau (7-8 February 1807).

[20] qtd. in Arnold and Reinersten, 71.

[21] Fauvelet de Bourrienne, *Memoires of Napoleon Bonaparte*, trans. by John S. Memes, 3 vols. (New York: P.F. Collier, 1892), II: 153.

[22] qtd. in Arnold and Reinersten, 70.

[23] Bourrienne, II: 153-54. Bourrienne gives the timeline for this as the beginning of the new year, but

bitter irony, the winter of 1806/07 proved to be mild. As Ney's biographer A.H. Atteridge notes, a "sharp frost and snow would have been more tolerable, for a hard winter would have made the plains beyond the Vistula passable in all directions and bridged every river with thick ice. The comparatively mild weather, on the contrary, inflicted endless sufferings on man and beast."[24] Understanding the impact of the weather, the condition of the roads and the paucity of resources provided by the countryside are crucial to understanding the next series of events that would befall Marshal Ney.

A week after issuing orders for the *Grande Armée* to move into winter quarters, on 4 January 1807 Marshal Berthier sent Marshal Ney further instructions to clarify the cantonments for VI Corps and the Emperor's intentions. Of particular importance is the passage: "The Emperor, Monsieur Marshal, not wanting to make any offensive movement with his armies [corps] during the winter, wants you to take cantonments such that they support the left of Marshal Soult and the right of the Prince of Ponte Corvo."[25] These instructions are explicit and would negate or halt Ney's previously authorized pursuit of Lestocq. And they are the source of much historical controversy which focus on Ney's "blatant disregard" of these instructions and offer various potential explanations of why the marshal violated orders. Typical of these interpretations can be found in F. Loraine Petre's *Napoleon's Campaign in Poland*

> Napoleon's marshals had faithfully carried out his wishes, with the sole exception of Ney. The keynote to the Emperor's dispositions was the avoidance of all forward movements calculated to rouse the enemy to activity. He desired to leave the Russian bear to hibernate quietly, if he would do so, whilst he himself was busy making every preparation to awake him in the spring. Hibernation was, as has been seen, not the Russian scheme, but Ney did not know that. He had received a general indication of the Emperor's plan on the 4th January, but his cantonments were not, in that order, precisely specified. [26]

According to Petre, Ney disobeyed orders in part because his cantonments were not explicit enough. Even Ney's biographers try to excuse the marshal's defiance of

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the proclamation was written/published at Posen on 2 December 1806, not 1 January 1807. Clearly this had to have occurred early in December (although Bourrienne was in Germany and not with Napoleon, so not a witness to the events!). See also Proclamation, 2 Décembre 1806, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 11352, XIV, 16-17.

[24] Major Général au Maréchal Ney, Varsovie, 4 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 139-40; and Atteridge, 97.

[25] qtd. in Bonnal, II: 349.

[26] Petre, 130.

imperial orders, often blaming it on the problems of supply and the need to expand the area of foraging for his army corps. This seems to be the conclusion reached by both A.H. Atteridge and Raymond Horricks.[27] David Chandler reaches the same interpretation but adds that rivalry between the marshals was already beginning and that they were stealing limited supplies from one another and that "in this respect Ney had been 'more sinned against than sinning' and in consequence had felt compelled to move off and seek for rations and winter fodder."[28] Éric Perrin offers yet another explanation: Ney, emotionally bruised from the justifiable imperial chastisement for his mistake during the battle of Jena sought redemption by being the first French general to enter Königsberg.[29]

What is true is that during the period 1-14 January, Marshal Ney did indeed continue his operations against the Prussians in the direction of Königsberg. At the turn of the year, an advance on this last Prussian stronghold was not out of the ordinary. As late as 1 January, Marshal Bernadotte had orders to at least "menace" the city with his corps (which had been reinforced by Sahuc's dragoon division), and Ney himself had been authorized by Berthier on 29 December to continue his pursuit of Lestocq.[30] Indeed, a senior member of Ney's staff, Louis Samuel Béchet de Léocour believed that the marshal had been given a special mission to pursue the Prussian general.[31] So why was it that Bernadotte ceased operations against the Prussians and went into winter quarters sometime after 4 January and Ney did not? Was it a case of Ney defying orders to pursue his own ambitions or to seek better sources of supply as asserted by so many others, or is there another, perhaps, simpler explanation? In order to disobey orders, one actually has to receive those orders. Ney did not receive the orders in question until 14 January, ten days after they were issued.[32] And in the intervening time, the marshal was merely operating in the spirit of the last communications he had received from the imperial headquarters.

What had happened is anybody's guess, but communications problems were nothing new, and they were a particular plague during the Polish campaign because of the poor state of the roads. Bernadotte, for example, also had communication problems with Imperial headquarters. When Berthier complained about that marshal's lack of regular reports, Bernadotte defended himself to the Emperor on 27 December: "The Major General (Marshal Berthier) writes to

[27] Atteridge, 98; and Horricks, 79.

[28] Chandler, 529.

[29] Éric Perrin, *Le Maréchal Ney* (Paris: Perrin, 1993),102-03.

[30] Bonnal, II: 348; and Philippart, 116-17.

[31] Béchet de Léocour, 283.

[32] Bonnal, II: 349; cf. Arnold and Reinersten, 198. Arnold and Reinersten have Ney receiving the orders at 4:00 am on 13 January.

Marshal Bessiéres [sic] that he has no information from me. Yet I write to him every day."[33] Besides the weather and road conditions, other factors which might cause delay were the fact that staff officers were not given maps but had to find their own ways to their destinations—destinations which changed as headquarters changed locations when corps and divisions advanced or retreated—by asking for directions often of people who did not speak their language. One of Ney's aides-de-camp related his experience to trying to deliver a message to General Marchand some 7 or 8 miles from the marshal's headquarters: It took nearly two days to get there and back because of these challenges (and when he returned to where Ney's headquarters had been, the marshal had moved on because the tactical situation had changed, and the aide-de-camp had to prolong his search before completing his mission).[34] It took Berthier's aide-de-camp ten days to find Ney and deliver the 4 January orders regarding winter quarters. By that time, VI Corps had advanced well beyond its assigned bivouacs.[35]

Marshal Ney's problems only compounded. In the intervening ten days, elements of his corps had advanced to within about 35 miles of Königsberg. During that time he had gathered some intriguing intelligence: Lestocq had moved off to the east (in order to maintain contact with the Russians), leaving Field Marshal Ernst von Rüchel to hold the capital of east Prussia with a force of only about 4,000 men.[36] On 9 January, Ney ordered three battalions of voltigeurs supported by cavalry to scout the approaches to the city; he reasoned that a quick, determined strike might be able to seize the city.[37] Before undertaking such an endeavor, however, he thought it best to update the Emperor as to his progress. On 10 and 12 January, Ney, oblivious to the previous orders from imperial HQ, sent reports of his activities to Berthier, noting his movements toward Königsberg and his selection of cantonments at Iceburg, Passenheim, Guttstadt and at Osterode (in advance of those designated by Berthier).[38] Then on 14 January, Ney dispatched a senior member of his staff, Antoine Jomini, to Warsaw with official reports, including his latest reconnaissance of Königsberg and troop dispositions, noting that he had received no recent news from Bernadotte or Soult, that the Prussian king had departed the capital of east Prussia for Memel, and that the Russians were moving a force of

[33] qtd. in Dunbar Plunket Barton, *Bernadotte and Napoleon, 1763-1810* (London: John Murray, 1921), 174.

[34] Montesquiou-Fezensac, 80-81; cf. Atteridge, 99.

[35] Emplacement provisoire des troupes du 6e Corps d'Armée dont le mouvement s'opérera du 7 au 8 janvier 1807 in Foucart, II: 163-69.

[36] Arnold and Reinersten, 198.

[37] Arnold and Reinersten, 199.

[38] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Wartenburg, 10 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 204; and Bonnal, II: 351.

6,000 toward Königsberg.[39] It was only then that Berthier's 4 January orders finally reached what must have been Marshal Ney's shocked eyes (let alone the 7 January instructions to cease all offensive operations).[40] The next day, Ney sent another aide-de-camp to Warsaw with an intelligence update and a proposal to create an armistice with the Prussians. It took Raymond de Fezensac only three days to cover the torturous 150 miles (while it had taken Berthier's courier ten!).[41] Bernadotte, who had been copied by Ney in his 14 January report, understood immediately that a breakdown of communication had occurred and sent a letter to Berthier on 15 January from Hohenstein, noting that it appeared that Ney had never received the orders dated 7 January! Bernadotte also sent a letter to Ney, informing him of the 7 January orders, instructing him to abandon his advanced positions and to return to the quarters assigned to him (at Mława).[42] Upon hearing from Bernadotte (it would be several days still before he would hear from Berthier), Marshal Ney immediately halted his operations and began redeploying to his assigned winter quarters, but his problems had only just begun.[43]

When Ney's latest dispatches reached the imperial headquarters in Warsaw, Napoleon was furious. The Emperor naturally assumed that his marshal had received the 4 January instructions and had, instead, chosen to ignore them, threatening to agitate the Russians with his activities. He waited several days, however, before summoning Antoine Jomini to deliver the message of his displeasure concerning Ney:

> "What is the meaning," he [Napoleon] had asked, "of these movements that I never ordered, which fatigue the troops and may even endanger them? To obtain supplies? To extend the occupation of the country and enter Königsberg? But it is my business to direct the movements of my army and to provide for its needs. And who authorized Marshal Ney to conclude

[39] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Wartenburg, 14 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 226-30; and Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Wartenburg, 16 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 252-54.

[40] Bonnal, II: 355-58.

[41] Montesquiou-Fezensac, 78-79. cf. Atteridge, 98. And then to absolutely add to Ney's problems, as will be seen, prior to receiving Bernadotte's 15 January letter, Ney sent a dispatch to Berthier on the 15th, informing him that the king of Prussia was now at Memel (awaiting the arrival of Czar Alexander) and proposing an armistice with the Prussians near Königsberg in the vicinity of Prussisch-Eylau (Bonnal, II: 363-64).

[42] Le Maréchal Bernadotte au Major Général, Hohenstein, 15 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 248-52; and Bonnal, II: 359; and Arnold and Reinersten, 204-05. Bonnal wonders if Bernadotte set Ney up by not forwarding the instructions to him earlier (as Bernadotte was Ney's technical superior at that point in the campaign). He calls the letter of 15 January "a monument of perfidity!"

[43] Bonnal, II: 365. See also Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Allenstein, 22 janvier 1807, 6 heures du soir in Foucart, II: 300-04.

> an armistice—a right that belongs to the Emperor alone as commander-in-chief? Generals have been brought before a court of inquiry for an act like this."[44]

Jomini was then dismissed to deliver personally the Emperor's message. This is a classic error: issuing a reprimand without first collecting full information.

In the meantime, 16-22 January, Ney received a succession of dispatches from Marshal Berthier, accusing him of willingly violating the Emperor's orders, condemning his actions, and ordering him to return to his assigned winter quarters immediately. [45] Berthier, who had a personal dislike for Jomini, played a dreadful trick on the marshal's senior staff officer that would both compound the Emperor's chastisement and would put Jomini in the most awkward of positions. When Jomini made his way back to Ney's headquarters, he asked the marshal if he wanted to hear the Emperor's rebuke verbatim or merely a summary; Ney wanted to hear Napoleon's exact words. Jomini complied, then handed over a letter from Berthier. As James R. Arnold and Ralph R. Reinersten explain in their *Crisis in the Snows*:

> Unbeknownst to Jomini, the dispatch he handed Ney reproduced the message Jomini had just verbally delivered. It was hard enough for the marshal to listen to what he thought were unjust criticisms, but at least they had been conveyed in person and therefore retained some confidentiality and preserved Ney's dignity. But having Berthier's clerks in on the secret meant that soon news of Ney's rebuke would spread throughout the army.[46]

Ney was devastated.[47]

On 21 January the Marshal wrote an apology to Berthier and asked the chief of staff to put the letter before the Emperor's

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[44] Montesquiou-Fezensac, 79-80. Cf. Atteridge, 98. Arnold and Reinersten speculate that the reason for Napoleon's delay in meeting with Jomini was perhaps his preoccupation "with his budding relationship with Marie Walewska" and that he was "supremely confident that the Russians would never stir in deepest winter" (Arnold and Reinersten, 200).

[45] Le Major Général au Maréchal Ney, Varsovie, 18 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 267-69; Le Major Général au Maréchal Ney, Varsovie, 19 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 269-70; Bonnal, II: 366-69.

[46] Arnold and Reinersten, 206. Arnold and Reinersten contend that Ney lost his temper and vented toward Jomini in an ugly scene "during which Jomini could do nothing except stand silently and bear Ney's wrath," but they give no explicit source for this episode (Arnold and Reinersten, 206). Indeed other officers did know of Ney's "insubordination." In a letter to his father, the future Marshal Grouchy wondered what the emperor would say of the conduct of a marshal (Ney) who wantonly disobeyed orders. "Me, I would be punished severely, as would my subordinates who are under my orders" [Emmanuel Grouchy, *Mémoires du Maréchal Grouchy par le Marquis de Grouchy*, 5 vols. (Paris: E Dentu, 1873), II: 286].

[47] Bonnal, II: 370.

eyes and to assure Napoleon that he "will never have a more faithful servant, nor a man more devoted to his sacred person than me." Ney also brought up the subject of his conduct at Jena, which apparently Napoleon had included in his oral debriefing of Jomini, noting that, "His Majesty reproaches me for the fault that my army corps did not fight in its entirety at the battle of Jena; if this thought remained with him, I would be inconsolable."[48] What is particularly ironic about Napoleon's holding of that particular grudge is that there is some evidence to suggest that this is yet another example of a break down in communications: The staff officer who was carrying the orders for Ney to delay his attack on the Prussians was wounded, captured, and escaped, only to finally reach the marshal's headquarters when the first elements of Ney's corps were already engaging Prussian cavalry.[49]

And, of course, the final consequence of the miscommunication and Ney's continued operation was that Napoleon would blame the marshal for the impending Russian offensive. In fact, within days on VI Corps returning to its assigned winter quarters, elements of Bennigsen's army began to attack its outposts. From captured prisoners, Ney learned that

> a column of Russian and Prussian infantry, about 4000 men strong, was marching from Sensburg to Willenberg. Another column of 10 regiments of Russian cavalry, 8-900 men each, were marching on Guttstat, Allenstein, Hohenstein and Neidenberg; Russian infantry followed in support of the cavalry but in an unknown force. General Bennigsen is at Rastenburn. The Prussians under the orders of General Lestocq, directed themselves on Leibstadt and Ebling by the left bank of the Alle.[50]

To ensure that his message got through, Ney sent three copies: One to Berthier, one to Bernadotte and one to Soult. This timely alert from Ney enabled Bernadotte to warn his divisions that enemy movement was afoot.[51] Realizing that his position was untenable with the whole Russian army bearing down on him, Ney hastily began to withdraw from the very positions his corps had only just occupied.[52] Fortunately for Ney, Bennigsen's line of advance was perpendicular to the marshal's line of retreat, so Ney was able to extricate himself

[48] Bonnal, II: 371-72

[49] Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 171

[50] Bonnal, II: 375; cf. Le Lieutenant-Colonel Aide de Camp Regnard au Maréchal Ney, Guttstadt, 22 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 305-07.

[51] Le Maréchal Bernadotte au Maréchal Ney, Elbing, 24 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 347-48; Bonnal, II: 375; and Arnold and Reinersten, 205.

[52] Le Maréchal Ney au Major Général, Hohenstein, 23 janvier 1807, in Foucart, II: 330-32;

with only minimal losses.[53] The main target of the Russian advance was, in fact, Bernadotte's I Corps on the extreme left of the French line. On 25 January, thanks to Ney's warning, the Prince de Ponte Corvo was waiting at Mohrungen with General of Division Pierre DuPont's division and Brigadier General Jacques Léonard Laplanche's dragoons and was able to win a brilliant rearguard action, before retreating south toward Leibermühl. With Bennigsen focused on Bernadotte's corps, Napoleon planned a brilliant counterattack which promised to destroy the Russian army—except for one little problem, a failure of communication: A set of orders for the plan failed to reach its intended audience and fell, instead, into the hands of the Russians. The result would be the Battle of Eylau. As historian David Chandler notes in his *Campaigns of Napoleon*:

> Although Ney's ill-advised advance may have slightly contributed to Bennigsen's final decision to move forward, there were other reasons underlying his action. Napoleon was unjustified in making Ney the sole scapegoat for his present inconvenience; in fact it was the Emperor who was at fault, for he had consistently underestimated the Russian general's "enterprise of design."[54]

So, it was not a case as has been so long interpreted of Ney flagrantly disobeying orders and venturing beyond his assigned winter quarters in search of additional provisions or of attempting to gain additional glory by seizing a weakly defended Königsberg because the opportunity seemed to present itself. What happened in January 1807 (as would happen again in June 1815) was a failure to communicate. For whatever reason, Marshal Ney never received the orders sent from the imperial headquarters. The roads were horrible and staff officers sometimes got lost and delayed. Apparently neither the chief of staff nor the Emperor accounted for those possibilities. And in the absence of new orders, Ney continued to operate in the spirit of the latest order he had. In the end, it led to an unwarranted imperial reprimand, but the marshal proved his character as biographer Raymond Horricks notes: "… Ney didn't try to talk his way out of it. He just stood there and took it on the chin. Moreover, not being a man to bear grudges his loyalty remained the same: based on a genuine admiration for Napoleon…."[55] Why has Ney been scapegoated for the errors leading to the battle of Eylau by so many, including his own biographers? Horricks perhaps gives a clue: Admiration for Napoleon … and perhaps a bit of laziness. If Ney was not to blame, then one needs to look at the choices Napoleon made in the

[53] Arnold and Reinersten, 205-06.
[54] Chandler, 529-30.
[55] qtd. in Horricks, 79-80.

lead-up to Eylau and his serious miscalculation of Bennigsen's abilities and willingness to fight in the winter (as Chandler suggests). But perhaps more importantly, too many historians and biographers, Horricks and Atteridge included, used secondary sources heavily influenced by the myth of the Napoleonic legend and not primary sources for virtually their only source materials. Sure, you get the big picture and produce a highly readable narrative, but you miss the important subtle details, like the timing of sending and receiving of orders, which provide the fuller picture of history and a fairer account of someone's life, like Ney's.

Marshal Ney (JDM)

Napoleon's Theorem and His Military Strategy

by Eugene Breydo

This paper is a hypothesis. I do not think it is possible to prove it precisely, so my goal is more modest: to validate it with fairly convincing arguments. We start from the history of this question. In the 18th century, Euclidean geometry was developing rapidly and problems involving triangles were popular. One of them is attributed to Napoleon. Its modern history dates to 1825 when mathematician William Rutherford published it in *Lady's Diary* without the author's name. That year, the deceased emperor's name was banned in France because of the Bourbon's reaction and could not appear in the official press, including scientific publications. Any work published anonymously always raises doubts. And I think we can never prove Napoleon's authorship 100 percent, but the well-known historian of mathematics Christoph Scriba thinks that it is very likely that young Bonaparte discovered (or invented because it looks more like a construction) and proved this theorem.[1]

Based on diplomas from the Brienne and Paris military schools and testimonials from his contemporaries, Napoleon had an aptitude for mathematics and was especially interested in geometry. After completing the Italian campaign and signing the Campo-Formio Treaty (17 October 1797) he returned to Paris and on 10 December, gave a talk about the geometry of circles in the presence of Lagrange and Laplace.[2] The talk also includes our theorem about triangles. This does not prove that Napoleon authored the theorem but it proves that he knew about it.

On 27 December, Napoleon was elected a member of the French Institute in the Department of Physics and Mathematics. If we look at these two events together, it looks like an informal pre-electoral talk for other Institute members that is very common in modern academies. I do not know about the customs in 18th century France.

From another standpoint, Napoleon was the author of the novel *Clisson et Eugénie*, the famous pamphlet *Dinner in Böcker*, a few other literary publications thus, he could have been elected to the literature department as well. The fact that he was elected to the mathematics department means he had to have some achievements in this area. Most likely this was the problem regarding triangles.

[1] Christoph J Scriba, "Wie kommt 'Napoleons Satz' zu seinem namen?" *Historia Mathematica* 8, no. 4 (1981): 458-59

[2] Scriba, 458-59

It is not important for my topic if he authored the theorem, rather that he was aware of it. This is enough. The fact of the matter is that this is not just a theorem that he discovered and proved for the love of geometry. I would like to show that one key part of the emperor's military strategy, the famous central position, grew from this theorem. I would also like to say that such rapid use of science achievements in practice was very typical for the 18th century because of its faith in the power of science.

Now we turn to the theorem itself. Napoleon's theorem states that if equilateral triangles are constructed on the sides of any triangle, either all outward or all inward, the lines connecting the centers of those equilateral triangles themselves form an equilateral triangle. In this case, one example is enough and I have chosen outward triangles. The triangle constructed this way is called Napoleon's triangle (see Figure1).

Proof of this theorem is not the subject of my paper but remember the construction itself: we have outward polygon AYCXBZ and inward triangles ABC and MLN, and MLN located in the center of the polygon. Actually, the polygon is approximated easily by triangle XYZ and we can call it so for simplicity: developing the idea is more important than geometrical accuracy in this case. Based on this construction alone, we make one more. Now let the centers of these triangles be X, Y and Z respectively. Then the lines AX, BY and CZ are concurrent. The point of concurrence N1[3] is the first Napoleon point, or the outer Napoleon point of the triangle ABC.



Figure 1

[3] We get the second point if we are going to build inward triangles. For our purpose, one example is enough but for the whole picture I just mention the second possibility. This is the construction we are talking about:





Figure 2

The distance between Napoleon's point N1 and any of the vertices X,Y,Z is the shortest. If we would like to reach it outside of our figure it will be much more. This is a trivial thought, although it does not look trivial if we imagine that this is not just a paper with geometrical constructions but the map of territory where war is underway or the plan of a real battle. In this case, the length of these lines called internal communications in military language is extremely important for the result of the fight or even the whole war. And the thought that it is possible to operate on internal communications instead of external is absolutely not trivial. If you can imagine that two enemy's armies are at points E and F and your army is on the offensive from point D, to operate inwardly, on internal communications you should be at point N1. Or, in Napoleon's language to win a central position. At this point, geometry and military art are concurrent. However, Napoleon insisted that war is a science. He wrote in *Maxims* about great commanders from the past: "They never stopped making war a real science. And only when we imitate them in this can we compete with them." [4]

Any case, we see that Napoleon's point is the famous central position, one of the key elements of his strategy. We now look at the military plan of the central position built by David Chandler based on real campaigns of the emperor (Figure 3).

The previous picture and this one are very similar. It looks like a big triangle EFD on Figure 2 or XYZ on Figure 1. The real military plan is the realization of the ideal geometrical picture. Napoleon's army of three conditional columns Left wing, Reserve and Right wing is moving from point D to point N1 to win the central position. If Napoleon wins, all the lines will be the shortest and the speed of his movement compensates for the fewer numbers because he can move his forces from one point to another much faster than his enemies since they can only operate on

[4] Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III (Paris: Plon, 1858-1869), No. 75, I, 95.

external communications. This means that as we see on the schematic, the army of 90,000 can destroy 2 armies with 80,000 each if it operates sequentially against one of them and then against the other. We can see the phases of it in Figure 4. Figures 3 and 4 are taken from Chandler's book.[5]



Figure 3

On the first schematic, the attacking army is gaining the central position. This is the first phase. In the second phase, one of Napoleon's corps contains the army from the left while the other forces attack the army from the right. The third schematic shows that one corps (light cavalry) is chasing the defeated army, which was on the right side and at the same time, the other troops reform and attack the army from the left. This is the third, final phase. In his campaigns, we can find a lot of examples of this strategy. We will look at a few of them. This strategy was developed to beat larger armies and accordingly it was used more in the Italian campaign and in final campaigns. But in some battles of his golden period, we also can find elements of the central position.

The situation in November, 1796 was very suitable for this kind of maneuver. To lay siege from Mantua, the Austrian government sent 2 armies: General Davidovitch and General Alvinczy, a veteran of the Seven Years War in the middle 18th century. Napoleon was located right between them. He sent the division of Vaubois to contain Davidovitch while he himself with divisions of Massena, Augereau and others with a swift thrust attacked Alvinczy. Alvinczy held off his attack at Caldiero, Napoleon retreated to his base in Verona, replenished his supplies and made the subsequently famous covering flanking maneuver along the Adige River to Arcole. He was not a hundred percent successful because of the desperate defense of the Arcole bridge and the three-day battle of Arcole began. After two days of fighting, Napoleon was forced to leave Arcole, which was conquered with tremendous effort, and to retreat to the right bank of Adige to be in a position to help Vaubois if he were attacked by the

[5] David Chandler. *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1966), 36

larger forces of Davidovitch. Only on the third day, after getting a report that Davidovitch is not moving, did the French move to the other riverbank again, attacked the Austrians and in very heavy fighting, broke their defense line. Alvinczy was defeated and Bonaparte was even able to send two divisions to help Vaubois. Davidovitch was bypassed by Augereau from the left side, and he retreated because of the risk of encirclement with the loss of 2,000 people from his corps of 18,000. In this case, the use of the central position maneuver did not completely eliminate the Austrian armies, but the Alvinczy forces were demoralized and fled the field of battle, Davidovitch was defeated and as a result, the Austrians could not lay siege from Mantua.

Austerlitz is an example of using the central position strategy in a successful battle. The battle started from an unsuccessful attack by Russians and Austrians, and then Napoleon seized the central position when he conquered the Pratzen Heights (before he himself left it to the Russians as a lure– it was necessary in his plan for the Russians to attack the French and go down into the valley). At the next step, he contains the right flank of the enemy and destroys its



Figure 4

left flank. He acts on internal communications while the Russians and Austrians had to operate on external ones, therefore the smaller numbers of his army could not prevent it from being stronger than his enemies everywhere. Phase three was not necessary because the enemies' army was completely defeated and fled the battlefield.

And the last example is Waterloo's campaign. In the first phase, Napoleon successfully gained the central position when he split the Wellington and Blücher armies near Charleroi. Then Ney's corps were fighting with Wellington near Quatre Bras while Napoleon attacked the Prussians near Ligny. But the d'Erlon corps stayed in the same place the whole day and did not give any help to Napoleon or Ney, Napoleon could not destroy Blücher and just drove him back. During the third phase, he should have defeated Wellington but destiny decided otherwise. And Grouchy's unsuccessful attempt to immobilize Blücher in the battle of Wavre was a part of the same strategy. Actually, it was a double-battle in the same way as Ligny—Quatre-Bras, and it should be called Waterloo–Wavre. We see in these examples that using any strategy can be successful or unsuccessful, since success depends on numerous factors. This cannot compromise the strategy itself: the maneuver near Charleroi was brilliant but mistakes and the unfortunate convergence of circumstances can destroy any plan.

In the 18th century, art played the main role, science was just appearing. The time for its flourishing lay ahead and nobody was thinking about technologies, the key in our time. The Prussian drill is most similar to a crude mechanical ballet, where each step, every move is repeated an unlimited number of times and beaten into the soldier's head with the help of the corporal's stick. Napoleon, with his keen attention to science, was here also a little bit ahead of his century because he was not only a military leader, but he was also an intellectual leader. It is obvious that the mathematical and military thinking of the emperor was a unified entity. Only in one case we get a theorem while in another, military triumphs. I have tried to show how geometrical discovery influenced the development of military strategy. But nobody can judge with certainty how a human being is thinking, where cause is and where effect is, so as I said in the beginning, this is only a hypothesis, but I believe in it.

Volcanoes in the Time of Revolution: The Impact of Natural Events on Political Change: A Critical Theory Approach

by Alasdair White, PhD, FHEA, FINS

There is a rather romantic intellectual conceit discernible in the writings of many historians that significant historical events should be analyzed only in terms of the social, economic, and political environment, and to look beyond human actions to events in the natural world is outside the scope of historical analysis. Whether this is a fair or even particularly accurate interpretation is actually not important, other than it raises questions of causation that are not properly researched and discussed.

In this paper, the author will be looking beyond the social, economic, and political environment that gave rise to two very different historical events which had very different outcomes: the French Revolution of 1789-1799, and the Irish Potato Famine of 1846-1847. He will be applying modern-era psychological and behavioral economic theory to see why these two events had such different socio-political outcomes and, at the same time, to question why historians have not engaged more thoroughly in critical thinking and critical analysis before reaching conclusions about causation that then become modern myths.

This is particularly obvious in the writings about the French Revolution, which is usually taken as starting in 1789 and running until 1799 and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, in which the causes are usually only analyzed back to economic events and the post-feudal political structure at the time. This is a very selective approach, but understandable as many writers had neither access to more critical data nor the desire to challenge deeply held beliefs. Take the 1939 magisterial work: *Quatre-Vingt-Neuf* by Georges Lefebvre. Lefebvre believed that the ultimate cause of the Revolution was 'the rise of the bourgeoisie' according to William Doyle in his 1980 book *Origins of the French Revolution*. This Marxist analysis was closely argued but ultimately seems to have relied on the intellectual conceit that man and mankind's actions were the root causes of, rather than reactions to, outside events.

It is also evident in the writing about the Irish Potato Famine of 1845-1851, which has focused on the impact of the famine in Ireland and has been used to attack the actions of the landlords and politicians, especially in London. The focus has been on blaming the ruling elite (the British) for the death and destitution and the resulting immigration and avoiding talking about the natural causes and the reaction of the people to those causes.

'Change' in context:

A common definition of rebellion is the defiance of authority or control that can lead to resistance (even armed resistance) to an established government or ruler, an example of which is the ideological and political rebellion of the North American colonists against the British colonial power between 1765 and 1784. Rebellion can, therefore, become the organized and forceful subversion of the law of the land in an attempt to replace it with another form of government.

Revolution, on the other hand, is a political upheaval in a government or nation state characterized by orders of magnitude change in the social and political fabric of the country, as can be seen in the French Revolution that took place between 1789 and 1799. Such an upheaval is likely to gain momentum leading to unforeseen change, and, in the case of France, to the conditions favorable to the rise of a strongman dictator, such as Bonaparte, to restore order and to impose a radically different governmental system.

These two definitions are really only separated by the outcome of the process, the degree of change that occurs: rebellion seeks short-term gain for a limited number of individuals, whilst revolution is likely to involve the common masses, the proletariat, the *communi populo*. Whatever their causes, whatever their motivations, and whatever their outcomes, both rebellion and revolution fall towards the extreme end of the change spectrum.

Understanding change, why and how it happens, why it is resisted, and why it often doesn't deliver on its objectives, is the subject of study by psychologists and behavioral economists, but seldom by historians, or political theorists, but it is the contention of the author that to understand both the French Revolution and the Irish Potato Famine the application of modern-era psychological and behavioral economic theory would provide a good deal of extra insight into the events in question.

'Change' in action:

According to Kurt Lewin (1951), for change to occur, the driving forces of change must outweigh the resisting forces and he explains this in his force field analysis. This is illustrated below in its simplest form.



Figure 1 Lewin's Force Field Analysis

If the forces FOR change match the forces AGAINST change, then nothing will happen, but these are seldom evenly distributed and people are reluctant to change simply because they value more highly what they already have than they value any prospective gain, no matter what other factors are in play. This was

investigated by clinical psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, for their 1979 paper *Prospect Theory: an analysis of decision under risk*.[1] Prospect Theory describes how individuals assess their loss and gain perspectives in an asymmetric manner – in other words, the pain of the loss (for example of $1,000) could only be compensated for by a gain of a larger amount (say, $2,000) This insight describes the actual behavior of people as they make decisions. Thus, in Lewin's force field, the forces for change would include the gain and the forces against, the pain of the loss. But with prospect theory applied, if change is to happen, then the loss would have to be half or less of the gain.

But despite classical economics claiming otherwise, people are not rational: they do not have access to all the information they need to make rational decisions and so they calculate the probability of the gain versus the probability of the loss and then factor that in. So, if the probability of gaining the $2,000 is 1:2 and the probability of avoiding the loss by doing nothing is 1:1, then they will choose to do nothing as this is the safe bet.

Now, in terms of rebellion or revolution, the people may feel oppressed or in some other way dissatisfied, but at least they still have static conditions with predictable results, but if they rebel or revolt, then they have a high risk of losing what they have and a low chance of gaining something better. As a result, they will be unwilling to take action. So, to get the people to reverse this situation, it is necessary for them to consider their current situation both intolerable and unsustainable to the extent of recognizing it as existential: that their lives are at risk and for them to consider the loss of what they have (including their lives) to be an acceptable risk, together with the probability of gaining better conditions being high.

In simple terms, revolutions and rebellions are only likely to happen when people believe their lives to be intolerable and unsustainable and to gain something better is worth dying for. And one thing's for certain, ideas, ideology, oration, and high-flown rhetoric, while providing a vision that could be obtained, are not going to make men, women and children put their lives on the line, unless their lives are already forfeit and under threat.

[1] Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics for Prospect Theory, Tversky having died a little earlier.

'Change' in practice:



Figure 2 Real GDP/capita

In practice, the situation in France was of a growing population that was matched by economic development growing at the same rate. This resulted in a flat GDP/capita between 1700 and 1775 using PPP (purchasing power parity) calculations – in fact, GDP/capita grew by just 1.03% in the 75 years.[2] And for most of that time, the economy, very focused on agriculture, was doing okay.

Although inflation over the same period made life difficult for many, the situation for the majority of the French population was one of belt-tightening rather than destitution or starvation. But this was all to change in the 1780s with the impact of volcanoes in faraway places.

Volcanic impact in the 1700s:

Iceland is situated on the mid-Atlantic ridge in the north Atlantic Ocean, just south of the Artic Circle. It is the only place where the North American tectonic plate and the Eurasian tectonic plate are above sea level. It is a truly volcanic landscape in which 100% of the land has been created as a result of volcanoes and lava flows. It is geologically the most active volcanic area in the world and in the 1700s there were 21 significant eruptions, 13 of which occurred before 1750. In 1755 there was a major five-month long eruption of *Katla*, which produced a large volume of ash.

In 1766, *Hekla*, another big volcano, started erupting, an eruption that was to last nearly two years. Again, a huge volume of ash was produced and then, in 1783-1784, a six-month eruption took place around the volcano known as *Laki*.[3] This eruption produced 580 km^2 of lava, together with massive quantities of gasses (mainly water vapor, Sulphur dioxide and fluorine) and enormous volumes of ash. Together these killed 25% of the Icelandic population as a result of crop failures and famine. Why is this of issue to France?

[2] The Fig 2 graphic is by the author based on figures from the French National Archives and other source documents. These are indicative and are not to be taken as definitive. [see Bolt et al, *Rebasing Maddison (2018)*, Maddison, *The West and the Rest in the World Economy (2008)*, White *Measuring the French Revolution's Inflation (1991)*, Blayo *Mouvement naturel de la population française de 1740 à1829 (1975)*]

[3] Erik Klemetti, Local and Global Impacts of the 1783-1784 Laki Eruption in Iceland, 2013

Figure 3 Laki and surrounding landscape (WikiCommons)

Well, Iceland also sits under the northern jet stream, a system of high-speed winds that flow south of the Artic in an easterly direction as shown in fig 4.

This high-speed wind sweeps the Atlantic weather system up towards Iceland and then down across Ireland, England and northern Europe, bringing with it all the volcanic debris, polluting the atmosphere and causing a drop in global temperatures, whilst increasing the rainfall (often acidic). The eruption of *Laki* is estimated by vulcanologists to have killed 6 million people globally, and caused major crop failures, firstly across northern Europe, and then around the entire northern hemisphere[4]. Famine became a reality. *Laki* and the northern jet stream are almost certainly the cause of the 1788 storms, the subsequent crop failures and the devastating winter of 1788-1789. As Doyle wrote: "It did not cause the French

[4] Volcanic eruptions affect climate by ejecting large quantities of water vapor, H_2O, and Carbon Dioxide, CO_2, both of which are greenhouse gasses and can increase the temperatures experienced below the plume. Eruptions can also eject large quantities of Sulphur Dioxide, SO_2, Fluorine, F, and particulate ash. The SO_2 combines with water vapor to produce acid rain, which is also the result of F combining with Hydrogen creating Hydrogen Fluoride , HF, and, after contact with water, hydrofluoric acid, which is highly corrosive: acid rain then leads to the poisoning of crops, crop failure, and a dramatic decline in crop yield. Particulate ash and SO_2 also increase the reflection of the Sun back into space, cooling the Earth's troposphere (lower atmosphere) by around 0,25 degrees Centigrade. This then leads to wetter and colder weather and can also have a significant negative impact on crop yields, often over a one-three year period. US Geological Survey - https://www.usgs.gov/programs/VHP/volcanoes-can-affect-climate



Figure 4 Position of the JetStream (metoffice.co.uk)

Revolution, but it did dictate the sort of revolution it would be."[5]

The French peasantry was subject to famine, the economy started to implode, there was a lack of cereal crops, all food became scarce, the nobility suffered the same and the bourgeoisie used their wealth to stockpile. According to prefectural reports, the people were sullen, angry, starving and dying. And this problem of food security persisted until 1789. Wages of the peasantry and artisans did not keep pace with inflation, which was skyrocketing, and the government went bankrupt in 1788, making France effectively ungovernable. And while the intelligentsia, political classes and the aristocracy argued and did nothing to relieve the peasantry and artisans, the people were pushed to a point where they took the law into their own hands for their own survival, breaking into bakeries, looting barns, refusing to pay rents, dues and taxes. Mobs forced local authorities to fix low prices for bread, and there were disturbances across large swaths of France, eventually reaching Paris itself where the Queen is supposed to have said, on being told of the bread shortage, "then let them eat cake."

On the other side of Lewin's force field, and opposing the change being demanded, were the evidently clueless politicians whose only thoughts were to use outdated and outmoded political and economic tools – tools that may well have worked if these were 'normal' economic disturbances, but France had moved beyond that and was already in a state of open rebellion. The King had no idea of how to cope, the

[5] William, Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution (*Oxford University Press, 1980), 158.

politicians had no vision, and troops were being used to try, generally unsuccessfully, to quell the rebellion. From the perspective of Prospect Theory, the conditions were such that the population had abandoned restraint and risk aversion and were committed to the gamble that change would produce a better way of life. Change had become inevitable and a violent and cataclysmic revolution was being born.

It is clear from the timeline that the malign and significant impact of the *Laki* eruption in Iceland had tipped an unstable food security issue into a full-scale *casus revolutio*. Of course, the *Laki* eruption alone didn't cause the French Revolution: indeed, there were many contributory forces involved, feeding on each other, but it is clear that natural events rather than political and economic events, coupled with high-flown rhetoric, brought France to the edge from which the descent into the abyss of revolution was inevitable. The French Revolution was, to all intents and purposes, caused by natural events and the people's response to them.[6]

Volcanic impact in the 1800s:

In the 1800s, there were approximately 43 volcanic eruptions of greater than 4 on the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI)[7] and perhaps the most well-known of the early eruptions was the April 1815 eruption of *Tambora*.[8] (VEI 7) in Indonesia, which led to the 'Year without a Summer' in 1816 (Wood, 2012) and from which harvests did not return to normal for nearly three years. But for the purpose of this paper, the volcanic eruption of *Hekla* in Iceland in 1845 is the one on which we need to focus

Hekla is a 1,488 m mountain in southern Iceland that has had a fiery reputation ever since the 1104 CE eruption after which it was known throughout Europe as the 'The Gates of Hell'. It erupts at least once in every century and in 1845 it started to erupt in September and continued until April 1846. It had a VEI of 4 and produced very large volumes of volcanic dust and

[6] The dramatic impact of the combination of volcanic activity in Iceland and the northern jet stream become very real in April 2010 when a small volcano, *Eyjafjöll*, situated under the *Eyjafjallajökull* icecap in southern Iceland, erupted, melting the icecap and sending plumes 5-6 km high of ice crystals and fine ash into the atmosphere, which remained suspended. This 'cloud' was then carried by the jet stream south and east towards the Atlantic coast of Europe, effectively closing the entire airspace to aircraft. Fortunately, the amount of SO_2 emitted was low and there was little further impact on the climate. The VEI of this eruption was 3. See Smithsonian Institution for more information at : https://volcano.si.edu/volcano.cfm?vn=372020.

[7] The VEI values for the volcanoes mentioned in this paper are: Laki 1783-84 – 6, Tambora 1815 – 7, Hekla 1845 – 4. The Katla 1755 and Hekla 1766 eruptions have unknown VEI values but for comparison, the 1980 St Helens eruption in the USA was a 5. The higher the VEI index, the higher the volume of atmospheric ash and gases emitted, the higher into the atmosphere the particles and gasses go, the greater the impact on climate.

[8] cf. https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/tamboura-1815-ou-l-histoire-du-volcan-du-bout-du-monde-qui-a-change-ce-qu-on-savait-sur-la-planete-7498310 - this is by Chloé Leprince (2022) and is in French but well worth the read.

Figure 5 An old photograph of Hekla in Iceland. Copyright: Tom Pfeiffer, VolcanoDiscovery.com

associated gases. Later, in 1872, an anonymous writer recorded:

> After a violent storm on the night of the 2nd of September in that year, the surface of the ground in the Orkney Islands was found strown [sic] with volcanic dust. There was thus conveyed to the inhabitants of Great Britain an intimation that Hecla [sic] had been again at work. Accordingly, tidings soon after arrived of a great eruption of the mountain. On the night of 1 September, the dwellers in its neighbourhood [sic] were terrified by a fearful underground groaning, which continued till mid-day on the 2nd. Then, with a tremendous crash, there were formed in the sides of the cone two large openings, whence there gushed torrents of lava, which flowed down two gorges on the flanks of the mountain. The whole summit was enveloped in clouds of vapour [sic] and volcanic dust.

Other studies (cf. *Tephra on Orkney. Orkney Landscapes,* archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20070915034132/http://www.fettes.com/Orkney/tephra.htm) confirm this distribution of *Hekla*'s tephra dust, thereby confirming that the troposphere (sea-level) winds are strong enough to transport dust to Europe without necessarily having to rely on the jet stream which operates in the stratosphere and above.

The 1845 *Hekla* eruption produced an almost immediate impact on the climate of northern Europe, reducing the temperatures and increasing the rainfall experienced from the Atlantic coast to Russia. According to Eric Vanhaute and others in their 2006 paper *The European*

subsistence crisis of 1845-1850: a comparative perspective, this climatic change, which started in September 1845, continued well into the 1850s with its effects still being felt in the 1860s. In 1846 it produced a food supply crisis as a result of a decline in harvest yields of 15-50% (rye), 6-43% (wheat) and 33% (oats), thus creating a famine across the whole of northern Europe. But the impact of the famine was to slow the population growth rather than dramatically increasing the mortality rate, thus the famine was extremely unpleasant but not a significant existential crisis. Vanhaute et al (2006) estimates the excess deaths across Europe for the period may have been measured in the hundreds of thousands but not in the millions.

But in the summer of 1843, a full two years before the *Hekla* eruption, potato blight (or late blight) was detected in potato crops in Pennsylvania and New York. Normally a water-born fungus, that pathogen, *Phytophthora Infestens*, can also be spread in seed potatoes and, most crucially, by the wind, and by 1845 it was to be found from Illinois to Nova Scotia, from Virginia to Ontario.

Many historians tend to think that the fungus crossed the Atlantic in a shipment of seed potatoes delivered to Belgium; this must have occurred in 1843 or 1844 as blight was detected in the developing potato crop in 1845. However, this explanation needs to be carefully reappraised since blight devastated the potato crops starting in 1845 (it becomes evident in the summer and the fungus attacks the stems and tubers) and so must have been present in Europe at least by the winter of 1844. So, an earlier shipment must have been the primary cause, but once in Europe, the fungus was spread by the



Figure 6 Spread of Potato Blight in north America 1843-1845 (National Museum of Ireland)



Figure 7 Spread of Potato Blight in Europe (National Museum of Ireland)

wind. This has not been properly researched but as Hirst and Stedman, in their 1960 paper, report as a result of their experiments:

> There was evidence of two patterns of dispersal for *P. infestans*. Distant spread was probably by air-borne sporangia, but that near to the initial sources probably resulted from sporangia transported in water. The effects of initial sources of infection on the date when the disease became general could not be traced for more than a few hundred yards. Blight often reached crops remote from the experiments at the same time as it infected every plant within them; this often happened during the weather which elicited disease forecasts.[9]

[9] JM Hirst and OJ Stedman, "The Epidemiology of Phytophthora Infestans," *Annals of Applied Biology* Vol 48, Issue 3, (September 1960), 489-517.

For *Phytophthora Infestens* to have spread to so wide an area so quickly the transmission vector can only logically have been the wind, and from the evidence of potato crop failure in 1845 (-87% decline in Belgium, -20% in France, -55% in northern Germany and Prussia, -71% in the Netherlands and -30% in Ireland[10]) the fungus must have been well established in the 1844 European crop. Equally obvious is that the eruption of *Hekla* in Iceland had no effect on the early impact of potato blight.

That changes once *Hekla* erupts in September 1845 and immediately introduces wetter and colder climatic conditions, conditions very suitable to the rapid transmission of *p. infestans*, both locally and widespread, and the result was a dramatic change in the impact of the blight on the crops. Vanhaute (2006) claims that, in 1846, the potato crop declines from pre-blight yields by -43% in Belgium, -19% in France, -50% in northern Germany and Prussia, -56% in the Netherlands, -88% in Ireland, and -80% in Scotland.[11]

From this we can conclude that although the 1845 eruption of *Hekla* in Iceland did not cause or even contribute to the cause of the *p. infestens* potato blight, it did contribute directly to the changed climatic conditions that assisted the spread of the disease, whilst at the same time creating the weather conditions that induced the failure of cereal crops. On this basis, the famines of 1845-1852 are certainly indirectly caused by the impact on the climatic conditions of the eruption of *Hekla* in far-away Iceland.

The received wisdom about the death toll in Ireland, in which it is claimed that 12.5% of the population died in the famine, tends to hide a number of factors seldom discussed in the often emotive histories of the Great Famine: indeed, the 1851 census shows 985,000 people died in Ireland between 1841 and 1851, a huge number, mainly in the west and southwest, but mortality only started to rise sharply after the failure of the second harvest in the late summer of 1846 and although a small number actually starved to death (2.37% or around 22,000), the majority died of common but hunger exacerbated diseases such as typhoid, typhus, dysentery, and in the urban areas, cholera.[12] Most of the deaths occurred in 1847-1848, when a typhus epidemic struck Ireland. And then there is the other human loss: emigration.

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[10] Vanhaute et al (2006) gave their sources 'as with special thanks to Hans-Heinrich Bass, Carl-Johan Gadd and Peter Solar; Tortella, 2000: 60 (Spain 1857); Von Reden (1853/54: 87-95); Hellstenius (1871: 106); Gadd (1983: 248); *Emigrationsutredningen* (1913: 91); *Statistisch en staathuishoudkundig Jaarboekje* (1850: 232); Ó Gráda (1999: 24). See also: Bourke (1993: 53)'.

[11] In Scotland, the percentage of the nutritive element of the diet reliant on potatoes (1846 crop yield of which declined by 80%) and on oats (crop yield declined by 33%) was around 30-40%, which means the famine was extreme and this contributed to the later Scottish Clearances.

[12] J. Mokyr, J & Ó Gráda, C (2002a), 'Famine disease and famine mortality: lessons from the Irish experience, 1845-50,' in T. Dyson, T & C. Ó Gráda, C, *Famine Demography: Perspectives from the Past and Present* (Oxford University Press, 2002),19-43.

The 1851 census shows that 967,908 people emigrated between 1841 and 1851, with most going to the United States of America and to Canada, and a further 200,000 heading to mainland Britain. Essentially, as a result of the famine, the subsequent deaths from disease, and the decade long emigration, the Irish population declined by around 25%, creating a massive socio-economic and political change in the land.

The physical conditions of the people of Ireland were, in many ways, similar to those in France before the French Revolution, so why is the result so very different? Using the argument presented in the first half of this paper, and taking first Lewin's Force Field Analysis, we can see that, perhaps surprisingly, famine and hunger are NOT strong forces for change. Although the effect of famine is intense hunger and even starvation, the numbers dying are low as a percentage of the total population being affected – Ireland being considered just about the most extreme case and there 2.37% died.[13] Famine is thus survivable and over 97% of those affected do survive the lack of food. In turn this makes death from famine a low-risk prospect. What Mokyr and Ò Gráda highlight is that the vast majority of the deaths that occurred in the Irish Famine were in fact from disease, the causes of which were often exacerbated by poor nutrition.[14] At the time, the treatment of such diseases was rudimentary to say the least and often simple 'quackery' at the worst, and as such, the people of Ireland were well aware that the weaker members of society would succumb and die, which, at that time, was regarded as a simple fact of life, people in the 1800s having a very pragmatic attitude towards death. All in all, therefore, it seems that the actual famine was not considered an existential risk and was therefore a weak force for change.

Looking at Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory and factoring in the prospect of famine, a recurring event at the time, the survivability at around 97%, and the 'norm' of the mortality risk from disease, the current stasis (*status quo ante* famine) was actually acceptable to the majority (again, fatalistically, as a 'fact of life'). A *status quo post hoc* in which famine and hunger did not exist and significant numbers of people did not die of disease was simply inconceivable. Therefore, the potential gain was insufficiently conceivable to be considered realistic and thus the population would be unwilling to gamble on the change.

In addition, the depopulation of Ireland, Scotland and Wales had been going on for a number of years and hundreds of thousands had already emigrated. In Scotland, there

[13] J. Mokyr and C. Ó Gráda,"What do people die of during famines: the Great Irish Famine in comparative perspective," *European Review of Economic History* Vol 6 Issue 3 (2002): 339-63

[14] Mokyr and Ó Gráda, "What do people," 339-63

is evidence that the more benevolent landlords actively encouraged the surplus population (those that the land could not support and for which there was no real labor use) to emigrate and even went so far as to charter shipping and arrange for land grants in Canada and America. It is not inconceivable that something similar was taking place in Ireland and this should be researched but is beyond the scope of this paper. The knowledge that transports to the New World across the Atlantic was readily available as a realistic escape from the famine, providing they could get to the point of embarkation, would, in Prospect Theory terms, form part of the status quo which they would not want to lose by rising in rebellion. Indeed, it would be another 20 years before conditions would provide sufficient force for change for the population to rebel against the economic and political status quo.

Conclusion

In conclusion, therefore, we can see that the conditions in Ireland in 1845-1852 only superficially resembled the conditions in revolutionary France in 1788-1799 in that both started following the onset of food security issues that were the result of poor harvests rather than economic factors. We have also seen that the poor harvests were themselves triggered by natural events in the form of volcanic eruptions in Iceland, mainly, and elsewhere. It would be wrong, however, to assume that natural disasters such as volcanoes constitute a significant trigger event for rebellion and/or revolution, although they have provided the foundation that has acted as a tipping point in some cases. Rebellion and revolution are two forms of extreme change, and this paper has shown that famine and food security are a weak force for change: the populace would rather suffer, stoically, perhaps, rather than engage in rebellion that would strip them of their survivable status quo.

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The Formula of Power and Anatomy of Heroic Act of Napoleon Bonaparte: A Review of Ivane Menteshashvili's *Power and Hero. Napoleon Bonaparte*

by Blizniakov Roman Alexandrovich and Malishev Dimitrii Arkadievich[1]

The concept of the hero and power are eternal topics permanently subjected to scientific, particularly philosophic consideration, sociological and political evaluation which will possibly never be exhausted. When one speaks about heroes, the personalities come to mind immediately, who left deep prints in the history of their countries and humankind in general – Alexander the Great, Peter I the Great, and Napoleon. The case of Napoleon, who became the embodiment of the notion of power in first quarter of the 19th Century, is the focus of the book written by Professor Ivane Menteshashvili, historian, well- known beyond the borders of his native Georgia. The book was published in 2014 with a catchy title – '*Power and Hero. Napoleon Bonaparte*,' which attracts attention. It is not surprising. During the last several years, as the 200th anniversary of Russia's 1812 Patriotic war was celebrated, numerous new books and articles have been published. They presented new sources, which enlarged Napoleonic studies immensely. All the more it is pleasure to mention, that current work by Ivane Menteshashvili, not so large, just 80 pages, stands out advantageously among all these Russian and foreign books as well. It is distinguished—and this is the intention of harmonious approach of the mature historian—because the impression is created by means of twofold thing. These are external and internal. Externally the book looks very festive. The glossy book jacket stresses the beauty, adolescence and impetuosity of the main character of the book, Napoleon. He is depicted with the flag in his hands on the bridge at Arcola. This famous painting by Antoine Gros disposes reader to an appropriate perception of the content, which is considered below.

The goal of research is clearly framed. "… in order to reveal the place and role of Napoleon in the events which are the focal point of our interest it is necessary to consider phenomena, which preceded his rising" (Menteshashvili, 4). Such indication is a sort of chronological frame of the research, i.e., until proclaiming Napoleon First Consul and then Emperor, although other examples and turns make possible to enlarge this frame. Notwithstanding its small volume this research is rather multilateral, because it considers various sides and spheres of mutual relations

[1] Translated into English by Ivane Menteshashvili.

dealing with the field – Napoleon – power. We accept only some of them, which in our opinion are the most important. In order to thoroughly conceive the topic, we decided to learn out the main viewpoints of one more author. This is O. Plotnikova, whose dissertation also deals with the topic "Man and power." One aspect draws our attention: "Power as socio-philosophical notion is characterized by its essential basis – the relations between people.

The problem of power is inseparable from the main philosophical problem of the existence of humans. Power as a phenomenon is created precisely as a result of the relations between humans. Unlike other relations, the relations dealing with power consist of elements of domination (Plotnikova, 1993). In our opinion this very phenomenon can be traced in the book by Ivane Menteshashvili. Eg. The author submits such an opinion: "Revolution starts as the demand of rights. Soon this demand outgrows into the struggle for power. This struggle is nothing else rather than violence, manifestation of aggression. All these is expressed in various forms, particularly the violent treatment of power as the value and institution and aggressive foreign policy" (Menteshashvili, 6-7). Napoleon does not neglect this harsh, drastic tool. He will manifest them in crucial minutes of his political career. The scientist gives us brilliant panorama of making of new ideas after 1789 and says: "The spirit of revolution, its values imbued the participants with the idea of holding power" (Menteshashvili, 11). Here it is - the beginning of Napoleon's relations with power, because he, the future Emperor, is nothing else than the child of this revolution. Idea, which is couched by Ivane Menteshashvili existed during Jacobine terror and even later. Attempts on power had not ceased after Thermidorian coup d'etat (Menteshashvili, 13). Napoleon had already imbibed this idea, tightly interconnected with it. Even more, soon power itself will be identified with his name. Here we should like to address again the research of O. Plotnikova. She writes the following thing: "Thus, man lives in society, his fate depends on people, who surround him and, on that position, which he occupies in the hierarchy system and on power itself. This power has an essential impact on communal and individual life. Therefore, we hold that it is expedient to study the power and place of humans in mass society" (Plotnikova, 1993). The fate of Napoleon, who aimed political rising depended on Directory and its state. Making reference to A. Trachevski, the author gives it rather harsh characteristics, naming this body the moral rot (Menteshashvili, 25). The rebukes of Napoleon's soldiers are cited as well.

The rather impressive part is that part, where the author speaks about the way of rewarding the soldiers by Napoleon. Before the battle he put the orders and medals on his chest and after it took them off from his bosom and fastened to the soldiers' (Menteshashvili, 28). This is not a tool to gain cheap popularity, but a sort of PR campaign. By that act Napoleon

demonstrates unity of morale and strength with those ones who are his comrades in arms in that concrete moment and who will support him when he takes to office, and whose bayonets will be the basement of his governance. Napoleon is not just captain and conqueror. By this act he demonstrates that not he is the victor, but "We." And "We" means people, the French! This is the factor of unity of man and the grass roots: "At the same time while considering man of the mass, we payed attention to that controversy in which this man exists: on the one hand - impersonal, featureless man of the mass, who is subjugated to the general phenomena, thinks and acts as everybody; and on the another – the same man and individual namely, has specific personal traits. Thus, the mass of the people – it is not just their sum, but very peculiar unit of individualities, Therefore the question comes forth very naturally: how retain one's personal freedom while subordinating to the general man?" (Plotnikova, 1993).

Napoleon knew the answer. As early as during his first campaigns he does everything so that not to go about on everybody, but to be followed by the masses. Through this he retains his own freedom. But he does this in a very refined way! "CIC always addresses army while entering the office" (Menteshashvili, 29). The will of people - is law! His speeches are full of such phrases, and this forces masses to be attracted by him, to follow him in any direction, but to be always loyal to him. "Later, he developed further the ability to incline people to his side" (Menteshashvili, 38).

To the honor of author, it must be said that he puts forward such controversial issue as legitimacy of Napoleon's authority but makes absolutely logical conclusion, that this legitimacy was fragile. But did not others act before him in the same way? It is impossible not to agree with this provision. Revolution did cease the legitimate authority that existed for centuries. And since that time the power was not handed over, but was taken by means of revolutionary ways, while such takings each new authority stated itself no less legitimate than the preceded one. Napoleon could take this power and he did it. But even this is not the case. Against the background of the degraded authority of corrupted Directory Napoleon deserved power and received it, what the author shows us also (Menteshashvili, 2014:31-33).

Axiological aspect within the issue of interaction of man and power deserves attention at least because it is directly connected with the issues of moral. Has power morality, how to correlate moral with power? (Plotnikova, 1993). Here we may also cite the author of the reviewed book: "How the general-saviour could be converted into general- sovereign?" (Menteshashvili, 2014: c.41). And the answer is in the given provision: "It is the typical situation, when while socio-economic and political instability, absence of dignified ideals the community, being tired and exhausted through the strain

looks for somebody, waits something, longs for minion of fate and genius of victory" (Menteshashvili, 2914: 44). Actually, the society itself looked forward from Napoleon his political transformation and he, as a real politician, made people's expectations true. "This is the irrefutable proof, that public opinion was absolutely indifferent towards authorities, no matter, legislative or executive...the result of such feelings and opinions is the aspiration of society to find the hero-saviour, a sort of panacea from all evils" (Menteshashvili, 2914: 44). At the same time Napoleon himself had felt already his superiority over those ones whose orders he carried out" (Menteshashvili, 2914: c.49). Moral and power, interacting, substituted each other.

The author also deals with the issue of predetermination in history. Historians do not like to say what would happen if "... the development of all events which Napoleon got through en route to supreme power is the demonstration of objective development of history at one if its concrete stages." So, anybody, the other one, not being Bonaparte could become Napoleon. But it was impossible for Napoleon not to come to the historical scene. Although at the same time author exclaims: "Hardly the country accepted other one! It is undoubtable that any other could see better what country wanted ... Napoleon felt this" (Menteshashvili, 59).

It is impossible not to agree with this provision. He reconciled the country, which was torn into pieces and plunged into bloodshed. Under his flag united former Jacobins, the supporters of ancien regime, atheists and Church (not everybody, but the part of them of course). It well may be, that any other dictator would take the office, but hardly he would cause after him such an eternal memory, admiration, palpitation, interest and even adoration of the civic and military genius of one man. "In such cases persons, who take power least of all are considered by the grassroots as usurpers ...they are conceived as some folk chiefs, folk leaders" (Menteshashvili, 63).

It is impossible not to notice the broad range of the sources and historical literature used by the author on this topic. This list consists of classical research (E. Tarle, A. Manfred. J. Jaures, A. Aulard, V. Volgin, A.Trachevski) and the new works as well, where Napoleonic epic is considered (R. Dufres, H. Lachouque). It was possible to enlarge the list of appropriate books of course, but there is no need, because in our opinion the author succeeded to single out from the multitude of books on Napoleon's epic namely those ones which make possible to describe and explain the given thesis "the hero and the power." It must be said that the author thoroughly revealed the topic of his study. The only pity is that the book is too small and contains mainly the analysis of the issue "The Power – Napoleon" regarding the first period of his rule. We wish the author to continue to study this issue in the same direction, highlighting the evolution of interaction of these notions during the late Empire and

Hundred Days. Besides, in our opinion the book would gain more if it were sectioned into chapters. This would give the reader an opportunity for better orientation and find the needed places faster. On the whole, we want to say, that the given book must rightfully take the worthy place among the Russian-speaking research of Napoleonic studies.

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Jonas de Neef, *In The Wake of the Emperor: Memoirs and Letters of French Soldiers in Napoleon's Armies 1805-1814*

(Imprint: Lulu.com), 2021 ISBN: 9781667131795 Hardback, 289 pages

by Paul Chamberlain

Historians of the Napoleonic period will have many publications by Gareth Glover in their library, based upon the letters and diaries of British soldiers. In *The Wake of the Emperor* is a valuable addition to this genre by Jonas de Neef, bringing to our attention the memoirs and letters of Napoleon's soldiers, translated into English. As David Markham writes in his foreword to the book:

> The writings of higher officers…often have a political agenda and may be designed to make the writer appear more important…Junior officers may not be able to present a broad overview of a battle, but they generally have no political agenda and are perhaps more honest…they give much more



> of a 'real life' understanding of what it is actually like to be in a campaign.

The author of this book has presented a wide range of letters and unpublished memoirs from throughout the period to illustrate this very point, providing interesting and sometimes moving details of life on campaign under Napoleon. These letters have not been published before. They tell of events in the field, but the writers often include more personal details by asking after friends and family.

Captain Maffre wrote several letters describing the preparations for the 1805 Campaign, from the march of the Army from its camp at Boulogne to the area of operations. He relates the diversion from the route of march to search for food, and being billeted upon the inhabitants, including complaints about not having been paid for six months. His other correspondence deals with the campaigns in Prussia and Poland, and the battle of Eylau. His letters include news of friends who had been wounded or captured, asking the recipient to pass on such news to their family.

These letters from numerous correspondents take us around Europe and into the Peninsula. Maurice de Maltzen relates his arrival in Bayonne, on the march to Spain:

> No resources [are to be found] in this miserable city, cluttered with soldiers. Everything there is exorbitantly expensive. The troops not only support the shopkeepers but…make them rich.

He describes the aftermath of the siege of Saragossa and the entry of the French into the city. His letters also provide the opinion of junior officers of some of their superiors such as General Junot:

> He came to the trench a few times, bowing his head at all times, showing anxiety wherever he was led to. This surprised me because it is said he is courageous…he is as brutal as a grenadier and very haughty to all that surround him.

De Maltzen even sent his pants measurements to his sister asking her to have some comfortable ones made for him as his uniform pants and underwear cannot be worn together and are unwearable in the summer!

The horrors of the war in the Peninsula are described by Dragoon officer Daubon, who tells of the aftermath of the Battle of Bailen and the fate of many of the French prisoners of war, relating how …*the townspeople gathered to slit the prisoners' throats*. Some of the soldiers whose writings are included leave us with a feeling of admiration. Dr Treille, a surgeon in Dupont's Army, could have left with the bulk of the French force but discovered a farm courtyard in which were five hundred wounded. He decided to remain with them and saw to their treatment for the next three weeks, despite being the only surgeon present and having no medicines.

Jonas de Neef has included as an introduction to some of the letters/memoirs a short biography of the writer, such as for Grognard Jean Michaud, who was conscripted into the fusilier-grenadiers of the Imperial Guard in 1807. His letters tell of joining the army, lack of food, asking his family for money with which to purchase extra provisions, marching to join the Grande Armée in the scorching heat, arriving in Königsburg after the battle of Friedland, suffering from scabies, returning to France, life in garrison, marching into Spain, and serving in the invasion of Russia, where he died.

These letters and memoirs provide a varied look at life in Napoleon's armies, both on campaign and in garrison, and the hazards all soldiers faced, be they the enemy, the weather, lack of food, scabies, or ill-fitting pants! Jonas has provided us with a fascinating and often poignant collection of accounts of these men. *In The Wake of the Emperor* allows historians to get into the minds of the men who fought during the Napoleonic Wars. Recommended reading.

Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan, and Brian Vick, eds., Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). pp. 316. $105 (hardback).

by Wayne Hanley, Ph.D.



While Napoleon's career is one of the most written about topics in history, one of the more recent related trends in historical discussion has been the recent aftermath of the Napoleonic period and the question of peace-making after a generation of almost continual warfare involving France. In 2018, for example, Christine Haynes wrote *Our Friends the Enemies: The Occupation of France After Napoleon* which explored how the allies purposefully used the occupation of France to lay the groundwork, not only for hopefully for a stable Bourbon regime in France but for a lasting European peace as well. Now the editors of *Securing Europe after Napoleon* examine more broadly post-

1815 affairs to see how European leaders attempted to build a new balance of power and restore international stability after the generation of disruptions caused by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Securing Europe after Napoleon is a much-needed update to the classical interpretation of role of the Congress of Vienna offered by Henry Kissinger's classic 1957 *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (which was actually an outgrowth of his 1954 Harvard University doctoral dissertation). This work emphasized the roles of Klemens von Metternich and Viscount Castlereagh in shaping post-Napoleonic European politics. Especially important was the need to limit the spread of nationalism and liberalism as they were seen as the disruptive forces that had caused a generation of warfare. To do this and to create a stable post-war Europe, the two also emphasized the need for a balance of power among the great powers of Europe (which would France—to help counterbalance the potential threat of a too-powerful Russia). And in the years since its publication, Kissinger's interpretation of the Congress of Vienna has dominated. What Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan, and Brian Vick offer, however, is a much more nuanced and sophisticated view of the Congress and its aftermath. More than just "restoring" a pre-Napoleonic world, they show the participants laying the foundations of the modern world. More than creating a system of balance of power, they demonstrate the creation of a system of international cooperation, laying the foundation of systems some of which still exist today.

The editors focus on the development of what they term the "European security culture," an interdisciplinary idea borne from the study of international relations that explores security, securitisation and security culture (3). While these ideas are perhaps more familiar in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, they find their antecedents in the nineteenth and find their origins in the Congress of Vienna and subsequent negotiations. As de Graaf notes in her introduction, "these security arrangements were not ad hoc undertakings or incidental, bilateral campaigns, but instead instances of truly supranational or transnational cooperation, … that profoundly impacted the perception and handling of security issues in the years thereafter" (5). To do this, the editors divide their book into four parts: The first section (chapters 1-3) examines the conceptual framework of the security structures created by the Congress; the second section (chapters 4-8), the majority most intriguing part of the book, explores the institutions and interests of these security arrangements; the third section (chapters 9-12) examines the threats to the security arrangements; and the final section (chapters 13-15) explores selected agents and practices of the security system.

One of the more interesting chapters, "The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine: A First Step towards European

Economic Security?" explores the origins of an institution which still operates today, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR). During the Napoleonic era, the Rhine was fully under the control of the French Empire and, thus, was free to navigate for all within the empire. With the fall of the Empire, what would become of that legacy of free trade and free navigation? It was from this question that the CCNR arose. As Joep Schenk notes:

> "controlling rivers [is] a policy of existential importance. What is more, the nature of this infrastructure is different from non-natural transportation and communication systems. To fully benefit from a river, riparian states have to deal with the given circumstances of the nature, direction and range of waterflow. Fully artificial, more malleable international infrastructure can be agreed beforehand. Conflicting national interests might be negotiated in anticipation of their actual construction. Sharing a river on the other hand, easily leads to disputes" (77).

Hence the creation of the CCNR as a means for the states which shared access to the Rhine to communicate their concerns regarding use of the river and to maintain freedom of navigation and use for all. It provided a safe environment for trade; this trade benefited the member states; and as a result, chances for conflict between those states was minimized, contributing to the development of a broader sense of "European security culture."

In another representative chapter, Erik de Lange explores the European response to a perennial problem that plagued the Mediterranean in the early years of the Nineteenth Century, the Barbary pirates. While a nuance, most of the major power simply chose to pay off the Barbary Regencies rather than deal with the threat with military force. The issue was complicated, in part because the Regencies were nominally under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte, meaning that any action could technically initiate a broader conflict with the Ottoman Empire (however unlikely). For lesser powers trading in the Mediterranean like the Dutch and Denmark or Lübeck and Breman, however, the disruption to trade caused by the pirates was comparatively much more costly, and they wanted action. As de Lange notes, the Great Powers were divided as to what should be done: Some, like Russia, advocated action; others, like Great Britain, were simply willing to tolerate the situation (despite the eagerness of Admiral Sydney Smith to lead a veritable crusade against the Barbary pirates). And so, the situation remained for over a year, until several events changed the circumstances. The first a reframing of the "problem" from one of piracy to one of "white slave trade." The British had been ambivalent toward the piracy problem, but they had been quite enthusiastic about ending the slave trade (see Brian Vick's essay, for example).

The second was the creation of a Dutch-Spanish mutual defense pact against the Barbary Regencies. These two events now spurred the British into action, and in Spring 1816, they sent a naval squadron to the North African coast to try to convince the Dey of Algiers to amend his ways. When diplomacy did not work, on 27 August 1816 a joint Anglo-Dutch force bombarded Algiers into submission, marking the beginning of the end of the Barbary pirates. As de Lange notes, this incident also "stands as an important moment of international agenda setting. Its main significance lies in proving a platform on which Barbary corsairing could be presented as a shared threat, where the Regencies could come to be delineated as a common European enemy" (247). Collective security was no longer about maintaining peace within the borders of Europe.

The editors of *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture* do what they set out to do. I, for one, came to see the Congress of Vienna in a whole new light. The participants in those negotiations were attempting to do much more than simply "restore" their world, to turn back the hands of time (although there certainly were elements of that in the resulting treaties and attitudes). They were also building on their experiences of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras and, importantly looking forward, seeking ways to avoid the problems that had led to the problems of the past. And while the terms of "security," "securitization" and "security culture" are certainly modern, the concepts behind them certainly were not as the authors of the various essays and the editors of this volume have ably demonstrated. In its own was the Congress of Vienna and its subsequent treaties was as groundbreaking as the earlier Treaty of Westphalia, especially when one considers that elements of those treaties are still in existence today and working well and are models for international cooperation.

Call for Articles

International Napoleonic Society

Napoleonic Scholarship: The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published each winter by the INS. We solicit articles that cover every aspect of Napoleonic history from any point of view. We especially encourage articles that deal with military, political, diplomatic, social, economic, musical, artistic aspects of that epoch. Selected papers from INS Congresses will also be published in the journal. We also encourage submission of important translated materials and reviews of new books.

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The International Napoleonic Society hosts academic International Napoleonic Congresses around the world. These congresses attract scholars and students from a wide range of backgrounds, giving them the opportunity to meet and share the results of their research. Here are Congresses we have hosted in the past as well as those planned for the near future:

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July 2024

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Vienna, Austria July 9-15, 2018

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Trier, Germany July 10-14, 2017

Shades of 1916: Ireland in Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe
In cooperation with the Government of Ireland, Trinity College Dublin
and The Napoleon Society of Ireland
Dublin, Ireland 11-16 July 2016

Endings and Beginnings: The World in 1815
Brussels, Belgium
In cooperation with Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit
Brussels, Belgium 6-10 July 2015

Napoleon and Revolutions Around the World
In association with *La Muséo Napoleonico* and the *Office of the Historian of the City of Havana*
Havana, Cuba 7-11 July 2014

Old World, New World: Momentous Events of 1812 – 1814
Toronto, Canada 29 July-2 August 2013

Napoleon's 1812 Russian Campaign in World History: A Retrospective View
In cooperation with the Institute of World History (Russian Academy of Science)
Russian State University for the Humanities, Association Dialogue Franco-Russe
State Borodino War and History Museum and Reserve
Moscow, Russian Federation 9-13 July 2012

Napoleonic Europe at its Peak
In cooperation with the Foundation Top of Holland (City marketing Den Helder),
The City of Den Helder, The Royal Netherlands Navy and Fort Kijkduin
Den Helder, The Netherlands 4-8 July 2011

Napoleon and the Transition to the Modern World
San Anton, Malta, 12-16 July 2010

Napoleon, Europe and the World
In cooperation with the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts
Montréal, Québec, Canada 8-12 June 2009

Napoleon and the Mediterranean
In cooperation with the City of Ajaccio, the General Council of Southern Corsica, and the Territorial Collective of Corsica
Ajaccio, Corsica, France 7-11 July 2008

Napoleon and Poland 1807 - 2007
In cooperation with the Słupsk Pedagogical Academy and the Polish Historical Society
Słupsk, Poland 1-5 July 2007

Imperial Glory: Austerlitz and Europe in 1805
In cooperation with the city of Dinard, France
Dinard, France 9-16 July 2005

Napoleon's Campaigns and Heritage
In cooperation with the Napoleonic Society of Georgia
Tbilisi, Georgia 12-18 June 2000

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Instructions to Authors

1. Articles are published in English and uses American, not British spellings and punctuation.

2. The typical maximum length of the paper, including notes, is usually limited to twenty-five (25) double-spaced manuscript pages.

3. Photographs and illustrations may be included. We cannot accept slides or transparencies nor can we accept anything directly from a third party (such as a Museum). The author is also responsible for securing any required permissions. These must be sent in with the final version of the paper. In addition, we may include relevant images from our collections.

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5. Please translate all quotes into English (although you may want to include the original text in a footnote, especially if the translation is a matter of interpretation).

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Computer Instructions

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Style Sheet

1. With minor exceptions, we follow the 15th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style. See Chapter 17, pp. 485-510 for detailed instructions on acceptable note citations.

2. Omit publisher's name and "p." or "pp." except where needed for clarity.

3. Use Roman numerals to designate volume number, but use Arabic numerals for journal volumes. (See below)

4. Use abbreviated references in the second and subsequent citations of a work. (If they are in sequence "Ibid." can be used, but not preferred).

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6. Use "passim" only after inclusive page numbers indicating a reasonable stretch of text or after a reference to a chapter, part, etc.

7. Use "idem" only when several works by the same author are cited within one note.

8. Avoid use of "f." and "ff." and other unusual abbreviations.

9. Do not use "ob.cit." or "loc.cit." Use an abbreviated reference instead (see #4).

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11. In notes and references do not use "cf." (compare) when you mean, "see." "Cf." is appropriate only when you really mean "compare."

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13. Please note the correct format for the Correspondence of Napoleon and Wellington as well as the archival citations.

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When citing books, the following are elements you may need to include in your bibliographic citation for your first footnote or endnote and in your bibliography, in this order:
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4. Edition;
5. Name of series, including volume or number used;
6. Place of publication, publisher and date of publication;
7. Page numbers of citation (for footnote or endnote).

For periodical (magazine, journal, newspaper, etc.) articles, include some or all of the following elements in your first footnote or endnote and in your bibliography, in this order:
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2. Article title;
3. Periodical title;
4. Volume or Issue number (or both);
5. Publication date;
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For websites:
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1. Author or editor of the website (if known)
2. Title of the website
3. URL
4. Date of access

For an article available in more than one format (print, online, etc.), cite whichever version you used (although the printed version is preferable).

SAMPLES

Books:
[1]Donald D. Horward, *Napoleon and Iberia: The Twin Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 80.

[2]Horward, *Twin Sieges*, 180-85 and 249-317.

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[1]Ramsay W. Phipps, *The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), I, 141.

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[1]Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, vol. 2 of A History of East Central Europe*, gen. eds., Peter F. Sugar and Donald Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 146.

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[1]Donald D. Horward, "Wellington's Peninsular Strategy, Portugal, and the Lines of Torres Vedras." *Portuguese Studies Review* II (1992-93): 46-59.

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Napoleon's Correspondence:
[1]Bonaparte to Executive Directory, 8 June 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (Paris: Plon, 1858-1869), No. 587, I, 461-63.

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Wellington's Dispatches:

[1]Wellington to Liverpool, 28 March 1810, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington* (London: J. Murray 1838), V, 604-06.

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B. Archival Sources

Public Records Office:

[1]Hookham Frere to Lord Hawkesbury, 1 April 1802, Great Britain, Public Record Office, London, MSS (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office [hereafter FO], Portugal, 63/39.

[2]Fitzgerald to Lord Hawkesbury, 25 September 1804, PRO, FO, 63/40.

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[1]Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, British Library, London [hereafter BL], Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

[2]Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 15 June 1797, BL, Thomas Grenville Papers, Add. MSS. 51852.

Archives de la guerre:

[1]Augereau to Dugommier, 28 germinal an II (17 April 1794), France, Archives de la guerre, Service historique de Défense Château de Vincennes, MSS, [hereafter SHD], Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Registre de correspondence du général Augereau, Carton B4 140.

[2]Augereau to Schérer, 26 prairial an III (14 June 1795), SHD, Correspondance: Armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, Carton B4 142.

Archives Nationales:

[1]France, Archives Nationales, AF IV, MSS, Carton 1311, dossier 1807, "Tableau des domaines dont Sa Majesté a disposé par décret du 30 juin 1807," Ordre No 4.

[2]Dom João to Bonaparte, 23 May 1803, Archives Nationales, AF IV, Carton 1689, dossier 2.

Archives Étrangéres:

[1]Lannes to Talleyrand, 14 November 1801, France, Archives Diplomatiques, Ministére des Affaires Étrangères, [hereafter Affaires Étrangères], Correspondance politique: Portugal, MSS, vol. 122.

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[1]Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810, Wellington Papers, University of Southampton, [hereafter WP], No. 11304.

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